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ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND MATTERS OF CONSCIENCE
MARK STRASSER*
INTRODUCTION
I. EXEMPTIONS FOR THOSE OBJECTING TO PERFORMING WORK
CONTRARY TO FAITH
A. The Limitations of Conscience
B. Contexts in which Claimed Exemptions Might Occur
C. Objections to Abortion or Sterilization in Particular
1. The Breadth of Activities Subject to Exclusion
2. Exceptions for Significant Burdens on Businesses
II. CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS AND THE LGBT COMMUNITY
A. Creating an Exemption for Those with Religious
Objections to Same-Sex Marriage
B. The Expansion of Exemptions
C. The Expansion of the Classes against Whom the
Exemption Might Be Employed
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of states offer some sort of legal status to
same-sex couples and their families, whether through recognition of
same-sex marriages, civil unions, domestic partnerships, reciprocal
beneficiary status, or some other sort of familial relationship. How-
ever, some individuals refuse to recognize lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) relationships as a matter of conscience, and var-
ious commentators have urged states to adopt legislation protecting
such refusals.
Conscience exemption legislation is not new—states have already
passed legislation protecting those who refuse to take part in the pro-
vision of abortion or other medical procedures deemed contrary to the
dictates of conscience. Yet, commentators pointing to the healthcare
exemption statutes as a model for relationship exemption legislation
tend to discount some of the problems associated with the existing
statutes and, further, tend to overlook important dissimilarities be-
tween these differing kinds of conscience clauses. While the creation
of an exemption based on sincere belief might seem an ideal compro-
mise whereby same-sex couples and their families can receive legal
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, OH.
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recognition and those with religious qualms will not be forced to vio-
late their convictions, such a compromise loses its luster upon further
consideration. By creating one exemption specifically for same-sex
relationships rather than a more generalized exemption for those
with religious reservations about facilitating or being associated with
relationships contrary to their beliefs, the state would undermine
its commitment to equality by implicitly suggesting that individuals
might rightly object to this kind of union, but no other, on religious
grounds. Such a message reinforces rather than reduces stigma and
second-class citizenship, which is exactly what the state should not
be doing. While all difficulties would not be resolved by creating a gen-
eralized exemption so that individuals would not be forced to recog-
nize any relationships contrary to conscience, the kind of exemption
at issue here is especially problematic. This article discusses recent
attempts to craft a compromise whereby same-sex couples will be
allowed to receive certain civil benefits, but individuals with religious
objections to such relationships will be afforded by law the right to
discriminate against these unions but no others. The article concludes
that while religious beliefs must be taken seriously, this kind of com-
promise undermines both religion and same-sex relationships, and
thus needs to be rethought.
I. EXEMPTIONS FOR THOSE OBJECTING TO PERFORMING WORK
CONTRARY TO FAITH
Various states have passed legislation protecting those who
refuse to participate in certain practices that violate their religions’
dictates. A brief consideration of the case law in this area, however,
reveals some of the difficulties associated with the creation of such
exemptions and illustrates why they do not provide the obvious, virtu-
ally cost-free solution to the problems posed when individuals object
as a matter of conscience to providing certain services.
A. The Limitations of Conscience
Employees have long asserted in a variety of contexts that they
were precluded by conscience from performing certain tasks. For ex-
ample, individuals have refused to participate in war because of their
sincere objections to killing.1 In Welsh, the Court examined the case
of Elliot Welsh II, who refused to report to be drafted because he was
“ ‘conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.’ ” 2 He
1. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 333 (1970) (seeking conscientious
objector status from the Armed Forces).
2. Id. at 335 (quoting 62 Stat. 612).
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was not claiming that his objections were based in religion, because
“his beliefs . . . [were] formed ‘by reading in the fields of history and
sociology.’ ” 3 That said, however, he held these convictions with the
same “strength” as might someone whose objection to war was reli-
giously based.4 The Court interpreted the statutory exemption to in-
clude individuals like Welsh whose heart-felt reservations about war
were not directly based on religious beliefs.5
The conscientious objection at issue in Welsh might be contrasted
with a different type of objection to promoting a war effort, where the
objection is to participating in particular wars rather than partici-
pating in war as a general matter.6 In Gillette, one of the plaintiffs
was a devout Catholic who believed it “his duty as a faithful Catholic
to discriminate between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear par-
ticipation in the latter.” 7 Asked to decide whether the conscientious
objector law included those who objected to particular wars on reli-
gious grounds,8 the Court held that the objection to particular wars
rather than to war as a general matter did not qualify under the rele-
vant statute.9 Yet, this meant that those with sincere religious beliefs
that included an objection to all wars would qualify for an exemp-
tion, whereas someone with equally sincere religious beliefs that in-
cluded an objection to only unjust wars would not qualify for such
an exemption.10
3. Id. at 341 (quoting Welsh’s conscientious objector application).
4. See id. at 343 (holding that plaintiff maintained his beliefs with the force of more
mainstream religious principles).
5. See id. at 343-44 (finding that the statute in question only required an individual
have “deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs [that] would give them no rest or
peace . . .”); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
[T]he test of belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being” is whether a given be-
lief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of
their respective holders we cannot say that one is “in a relation to a Supreme
Being” and the other is not.
Id.
6. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971).
7. Id. at 441.
8. See id. at 439 (“These cases present the question whether conscientious objection
to a particular war, rather than objection to war as such, relieves the objector from respon-
sibilities of military training and service.”).
9. See id. at 447.
[W]e hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating
in all war—“participation in war in any form”—and that persons who object
solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the
exempting section, even though the latter objection may have such roots in
a claimant’s conscience and personality that it is “religious” in character.
Id.
10. Id. at 440 (noting that an objection to the Vietnam War and not all war disqualified
petitioner from exemption).
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Plaintiffs claimed that the refusal to grant an exemption to those
who wished to differentiate among wars violated Establishment
Clause guarantees.11 In rejecting that assertion, the Court noted that
the touchstone for determining whether the Clause was violated was
“neutrality,”12 emphasizing that the Establishment Clause prohibits
the government from putting its “imprimatur on one religion, or on re-
ligion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious orga-
nization.”13 However, the Court did not believe that Congress was
attempting to favor some religions over others when affording an
exemption to those opposing all war rather than only certain wars,14
but merely attempting to affect a compromise that took account of
conflicting interests.15 On the one hand, Congress recognized the
practical difficulties associated with trying to force a sincere consci-
entious objector to fight,16 and wished to take into account a “concern
for the hard choice that conscription would impose on conscientious
objectors to war, as well as respect for the value of conscientious action
and for the principle of supremacy of conscience.”17 On the other hand,
Congress also had a “need for manpower”18 and, further, an important
interest in employing a “fair system for determining”19 who would
be selected for inclusion in the armed services.20 The Court was
persuaded by the government’s claim that the interest in fairness
would be at risk if objections to particular wars were permitted,
11. Id. at 437.
12. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450.
13. Id. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (citation omitted)).
14. See id. at 451-52.
Properly phrased, petitioners’ contention is that the special statutory status
accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular
war, works a de facto discrimination among religions. This happens, say peti-
tioners, because some religious faiths themselves distinguish between per-
sonal participation in “just” and in “unjust” wars, commending the former
and forbidding the latter, and therefore adherents of some religious faiths—
and individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include the dis-
tinction—cannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the
true imperative of conscience.
Id.
15. Id. at 453 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting)).
16. Id. (discussing “the hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into
an effective fighting man”) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
17. Id. (citation omitted).
18. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 455 n.20 (“The Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Selective Service (1967) is aptly entitled In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All
Serve?”).
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because there would be “a real danger of erratic or even discrimina-
tory decisionmaking in administrative practice.” 21
This interpretation of the relevant statute was driven in part by
public policy considerations. The Court foresaw the difficulty that
would otherwise arise when trying to fashion a way to cabin the ex-
emption—a whole host of individuals might claim to have an objection
of conscience to a particular war, and it would be difficult if not im-
possible to determine which claims had merit in a fair or accurate
way.22 The potential for abuse must always be considered whenever
exemptions are proposed or applied.
The Court has made clear that an individual who objects to one
war in particular rather than to war as a general matter will not be
protected by federal constitutional guarantees when refusing to serve
in the military.23 Yet, it should not be thought that the only cases
involving religious objections to war have involved individuals seek-
ing to avoid the draft. On the contrary, there have been other con-
texts in which individuals with religious qualms about aiding a war
effort have argued that they should not be forced to perform certain
jobs.24 In Thomas, the plaintiff claimed that his religion prevented
him from helping make war materials.25 The Court in Thomas noted
that “beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause,” 26 although the Court recognized that determining “what is
a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and
delicate task.” 27 In an effort to provide some guidance about how to
determine whether a belief or practice is religious, the Court pointed
out some criteria that should not be used, noting that “religious be-
liefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” 28
Thomas had been forced to choose between working on the one
hand and maintaining his religious beliefs on the other.29 He chose
the latter, and the question before the Court was whether Indiana
could deny him unemployment benefits—the state claimed that he
had failed to establish that he had left work for good cause.30 The
21. Id. at 455.
22. Id. at 455-56.
23. Id. at 447, 462.
24. E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
25. Id. at 709.
26. Id. at 713.
27. Id. at 714 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 717 (noting his “choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of
work”).
30. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (“Indiana requires applicants for unemployment
compensation to show that they left work for ‘good cause in connection with the work.’ ”)
(citation omitted).
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Court held that the state could not deny him benefits based on his
refusal to work for religious reasons.31 Indeed, the Court offered a
rather robust understanding of the free exercise jurisprudence:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise
is nonetheless substantial.32
Here, the Court followed the position offered in Sherbert v.
Verner,33 where the Court struck down South Carolina’s refusal to
accord unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to work
on Saturday because of her religious beliefs.34 The South Carolina
Employment Security Commission had found that “appellant’s re-
striction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within
the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail,
without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . .’ ” 35
Basically, the South Carolina Employment Commission decided that
for purposes of the statute, a refusal to work on one’s Sabbath did not
qualify as a justification or excuse.36
The Court rejected the South Carolina Commission’s position,
reasoning that Sherbert was forced to “choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand.” 37 The Court emphasized that “such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.” 38
After finding that the state requirement imposed a substantial burden
on Sherbert, the Court sought to determine whether “some compel-
ling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South
Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s
31. See id. at 720 (“Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him on the basis of the
findings of the referee, the Review Board, and the Indiana Court of Appeals that he ter-
minated his employment because of his religious convictions.”).
32. Id. at 717-18.
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. Id. at 399 (“Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was dis-
charged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith.”).
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 404.
38. Id.
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First Amendment right.” 39 No such interest was present.40 The
Court was careful to note that “the recognition of the appellant’s
right to unemployment benefits under the state statute [does not]
serve to abridge any other person’s religious liberties.” 41 Yet, one of
the ways that exemptions for people refusing to perform same-sex
marriages differs from other kinds of exemptions is that marriage
rights for members of the LGBT community may be of religious as
well as civil import and thus the denial of those rights may implicate
matters of faith.42
When explaining that the Constitution does not require indi-
viduals to forsake the precepts of their religion merely because legit-
imate state interests might thereby be promoted,43 the Court was not
implying that those precepts had to be in accord with the tenets of an
established religion. On the contrary, as was demonstrated in Frazee
v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,44 precepts need not be
found in the formal dogma of an established religious denomination
in order to be given constitutional weight.45
At issue in Frazee was the plaintiff’s sincere religious belief that
he should not work on Sunday.46 However, Frazee was not a member
of an established religious group or sect, and his beliefs about work
on Sunday did not spring from the teachings of a particular religious
group or body.47 The Court explained that the lack of connection be-
tween Frazee (or his beliefs) and an organized religion was not fatal,
rejecting “the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular reli-
gious organization.” 48 Because his religious belief was sincere,49 it
was entitled to protection.50
39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
40. Id. at 409; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139
(1987) (“[T]he Appeals Commission’s disqualification of appellant from receipt of benefits
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).
41. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
42. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
43. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
44. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
45. Id. at 834.
46. Id. at 830 (“William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly
Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly
that, as a Christian, he could not work on ‘the Lord’s day.’ ”).
47. See id. at 831 (“Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church,
nor did he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a ‘tenet, belief or teaching of an
established religious body.’ ”) (citing Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 512 N.E.2d, 789, 791
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987)).
48. Id. at 834.
49. Id. (“Frazee’s refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief.”).
50. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834.
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It is simply unclear whether the kinds of protections recognized
in Sherbert, Thomas, and Frazee are still recognized today. In the
meantime, the Court has decided Employment Division of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,51 in which Oregon’s
statute prohibiting the use of controlled substances was challenged
as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.52 While “a State would be
‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts
or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or
only because of the religious belief that they display,” 53 there was no
evidence that Oregon was targeting religious practice.54 The Court
explained that the Free Exercise Clause does not “require exemptions
from a generally applicable criminal law . . . ,” 55 and seemed tempted
to limit the strength of the Clause’s protections in the unemployment
benefit context.56
According to the Court in Smith, the Free Exercise guarantees
afforded by the Constitution are not particularly robust.57 For exam-
ple, “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” 58 However, the Court
offered a possible loophole whereby the otherwise tepid protections
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause might be stronger, namely,
those situations implicating both Free Exercise and other protected
interests.59 It is not at all clear, however, that this hybrid loophole
51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
52. Id. at 874 (“This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use
within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug . . . .”).
53. Id. at 877 (alteration in original).
54. Id. at 882 (“There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an
attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising
of one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds
plainly controls.”).
55. Id. at 884.
56. See id. at 883 (“We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis
of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have
always found the test satisfied . . . .”) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
57. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal.
2008) (“[U]nder the United States Supreme Court’s most recent holdings, a religious
objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemption from a neutral and valid law
of general applicability on the ground that compliance with that law is contrary to the
objector’s religious beliefs.”) (emphasis in original).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
59. See id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
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would be of much help to those seeking an exemption from recogniz-
ing LGBT families, since the hybrid loophole would seem more likely
to be invoked to require the recognition of same-sex marriages than
it would be to justify individual refusals to assist in the celebration
of such marriages.60
As constitutional matters stand currently, Free Exercise protec-
tions are tepid at best.61 While the United States Constitution would
preclude clergy members from being forced to perform a same-sex
ceremony contrary to their faith,62 it would be highly unlikely that
the Court would find similar constitutional protections for a justice of
the peace. The more controversial issue involves the conditions, if any,
under which a civil servant should be afforded a statutory exemption
from performing his civil duty when fulfilling that duty would contra-
vene his religious beliefs.
B. Contexts in which Claimed Exemptions Might Occur
As should be unsurprising, individuals have claimed that they
were precluded by their convictions from performing certain kinds
of work in a variety of settings. For example, Grace Pierce refused to
work on a particular project because she believed that doing so would
violate the Hippocratic oath.63 Basically, she feared that the drug she
was working on posed too great a risk of harm to justify using it in
trials involving human subjects.64 The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed that an individual has a right to refuse to continue working
on a project when doing so would violate her convictions,65 but it
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise, and the Constitution, 26 LAW
& INEQ. 59, 102-06 (2008) (arguing that in some cases same-sex marriage would be an
example of such a hybrid).
61. See Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality”: A
Non-Neutral Critique, 84 OR. L. REV. 935, 949 (2005) (“One of many problems with a
neutrality approach to religious freedom is that it translates into very weak protection
of Free Exercise Clause rights.”); see also John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech
Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 260 (2007) (noting that “the Free Exercise Clause (both
independently and in hybrid contexts) is so weak”).
62. Cf. Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 1 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008)
(“No one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even asked, to perform marriages
that are anathema to them.”) (citation omitted).
63. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 507 (N.J. 1980) (“She felt that by
continuing to work on loperamide she would violate her interpretation of the Hippocratic
oath.”).
64. Id. at 507 (“[Dr. Pierce] concluded that the risk that saccharin might be harmful
should preclude testing the formula on children or elderly persons, especially when an
alternative formulation might soon be available.”).
65. Id. at 514 (“[N]othing in this opinion should be construed to restrict the right of an
employee at will to refuse to work on a project that he or she believes is unethical.”).
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denied that an individual could maintain an action for wrongful dis-
charge unless the practice at issue clearly violated public policy.66
Corrine Warthen refused “to dialyze a terminally ill . . . patient
because of her ‘moral, medical and philosophical objections’ to per-
forming the procedure.” 67 When notified that her continued refusal
to perform the dialysis would result in her being fired, she still refused
and was then discharged.68 Rejecting the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge
claim,69 the court concluded that “by refusing to perform the proce-
dure she may have eased her own conscience, but she neither bene-
fited the society-at-large, the patient, nor the patient’s family.” 70
Frances Free claimed to have been wrongfully discharged71 when
she refused to evict a bedridden patient from the hospital where she
worked.72 However, the court concluded that her objections were not
religiously based,73 holding that her refusal to violate professional
ethical standards did not fall within the protections offered for those
who refuse to engage in medical practices that violate the dictates of
religious conscience.74 Perhaps Free simply committed a strategic
error. Rather than suggest that evicting a bedridden patient violated
her religious beliefs about how the weak and vulnerable should be
treated,75 Free instead suggested that doing so violated her profes-
sional obligations.76 Apparently, she might have been more successful
66. See id. (“[A]n employer may discharge an employee who refuses to work unless the
refusal is based on a clear mandate of public policy.”); see also id. at 512 (“We hold that an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to
a clear mandate of public policy.”).
67. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985).
68. Id. (“[P]laintiff continued to refuse to dialyze the patient, and the head nurse in-
formed her that if she did not agree to perform the treatment, the Hospital would dismiss
her. Plaintiff refused to change her mind, and the Hospital terminated her.”).
69. Id. at 234 (“[W]e conclude as a matter of law that even under the circumstances
of this case the ethical considerations cited by plaintiff do not rise to the level of a public
policy mandate permitting a registered nursing professional to refuse to provide medical
treatment to a terminally ill patient . . . .”).
70. Id.
71. Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“The plaintiff,
Frances Free, brought this action against the defendant, Holy Cross Hospital, for wrongful
termination of her employment as a nurse.”).
72. Id. at 1190 (“Free alleges in her complaint that the hospital discharged her for
insubordination because, as an act of conscience, she refused to provide a medical service
ordered by the hospital; i.e., she refused to evict a bedridden patient from the hospital.”).
73. Id. (“Nowhere in Free’s complaint is it alleged that a refusal to follow the hospital’s
orders would conflict with her moral convictions arising from what are traditionally char-
acterized as religious beliefs.”).
74. Id. at 1189. “Based upon the language of the Act, the public policy mandated is that
hospital personnel will not be discriminated against for refusing to perform medical ser-
vices as they relate to their religious beliefs. This contemplates morally controversial issues
such as euthanasia, sterilization or abortion.” Id. at 1190.
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. Free, 505 N.E.2d at 1190 (“Free’s allegations relate to her ethical duty as a
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had she asserted both theories.77 In any event, many of those assert-
ing ethical objections to performing particular tasks have been quite
explicit that their objections were religiously based, and the courts
have offered very different analyses of the conditions under which
conscientious refusals would be protected.
C. Objections to Abortion or Sterilization in Particular
Several cases have involved individuals who were religiously
opposed to assisting others seeking to accomplish certain reproductive
ends. Marjorie Swanson, a Certified Registered Nurse-Anesthetist,
refused to administer anesthesia to a patient who was to undergo a
tubal ligation.78 Basically, Swanson invoked her rights under Montana
law to refuse to participate in such a procedure.79 The Montana statute
did not qualify this exemption by suggesting that an individual would
not be able to assert such a privilege if doing so would impose a hard-
ship on a particular facility, and the Montana Supreme Court refused
to read such a qualification into the statute.80 Thus, it did not matter
that the hospital might have to schedule procedures in light of the
fact that someone would have to be brought in from fifty or ninety
miles away to assist in the relevant procedure,81 because the statutory
right was “unqualified.” 82
registered nurse not to engage in dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct of
a character likely to harm the public as mandated by the Illinois Nursing Act.”).
77. Cf. id. (“We do not believe that the Act contemplates the protection of ethical
concerns as opposed to sincerely held moral convictions arising from religious beliefs.”).
78. Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 705 (Mont. 1979).
79. See id. at 704 (“All persons shall have the right to refuse to advise concerning,
perform, assist, or participate in sterilization because of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions.”) (quoting REV. CODE MONT. § 69-5223(2) (1947) (current version at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-5-503(2) (1999))).
80. See id. at 710 (“[S]ection 69-5223 admits of no such limitation or qualification, nor
may the statutory rights of Marjorie Swanson be so weighed because to do so would
emasculate her statutory rights.”).
81. See id. at 709.
The District Court bases this conclusion upon its findings that substitute
nurse-anesthetists available to replace Swanson must be procured from
Bonners Ferry, Idaho, a 55 mile distance or Kalispell, Montana, a 90 mile
distance; that such substitutes are employed at other hospitals and available
only when their schedules do not conflict; that continual arrangements for
substitutes are unacceptable to the hospital because of traveling and sched-
uling difficulties; that uncertainty results in the hospital as to when a steril-
ization procedure might be accomplished, that are detrimental to patients;
and that the cost of substitutes is greater, and is an additional burden to the
hospital and to the hospital patients.
Id.
82. See id. at 710 (noting that the “unqualified” status made the district court’s limi-
tations unlawful).
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Several states have enacted legislation affording individuals ex-
emptions based on conscience,83 although many of the exemptions are
not as robust as was provided in the Montana legislation. There are at
least two different respects in which exemption legislation might be
more or less robust: (1) the breadth of activities that would be sub-
ject to the exemption; and (2) the burdens on the employer that would
have to be met to overcome the protection afforded by the exemption.
1. The Breadth of Activities Subject to Exclusion
California has limited the breadth of activities subject to the
exemption.84 For example, when construing a state statute that pro-
hibited “denying admission or discriminating against any applicant
for study because of the applicant’s reluctance to ‘assist or in any
way participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations,’ ” 85
a California appellate court explained that “the proscription applies
only when the applicant must participate in acts related to the actual
performance of abortions or sterilizations.” 86 While an individual
would be protected if she chose not to perform an abortion, similar
protection would not be afforded for those asserting the exemption
with respect to “[i]ndirect or remote connections with abortions or
sterilizations . . . .” 87
At issue in Erzinger was whether students could be forced to
pay mandatory student fees for student health services where some
of those fees would be used to support abortion or pregnancy-related
counseling.88 The California appellate court made clear that “the fact
plaintiffs may object on religious grounds to some of the services the
University provides is not a basis upon which plaintiffs can claim a
constitutional right not to pay a part of the fees,” 89 since it could not
be shown that by requiring the payment of these fees the University
was unreasonably interfering with the practice of the plaintiffs’
religion.90
83. See, e.g., Meredith Edwards Eckstut, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 1153, 1171 (citing forty-two state statutes and one federal law that allow
health care professionals to refuse from participating in certain procedures on moral or
religious grounds).
84. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006) (noting that the statu-
tory right to refuse from participating in abortion procedures is subject to qualifications).
85. Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2000)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 391.
89. Id. at 393.
90. See id. at 392-93 (“[T]o prevail on their First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs must
allege and prove the University coerced their religious beliefs or unreasonably interfered
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The interpretive tack adopted by the California court might be
contrasted with that adopted by a federal district court in Indiana.
That court had to interpret the Indiana Conscience Statute, which
read:
No physician, and no employee or member of the staff of a
hospital or other facility in which an abortion may be performed,
shall be required to perform any abortion or to assist or participate
in the medical procedures resulting in or intended to result in an
abortion, if such person objects to such procedures on ethical,
moral or religious grounds, nor shall any person as a condition of
training, employment, pay, promotion, or privileges, be required
to agree to perform or participate in the performing of abortions,
nor shall any hospital, person, firm, corporation or association
discriminate against or discipline any person on account of his
or her moral beliefs concerning abortion.91
Elaine Tramm was an aide whose job description included “clean-
ing surgical instruments.”92 She objected on religious grounds to clean-
ing any instruments that would be used in abortion procedures.93
Tramm was told that she would be fired unless she performed her
job duties, including cleaning instruments that might be used in such
procedures.94 She refused and was fired.95
In this case, the hospital made no effort to accommodate Tramm’s
beliefs.96 Indeed, co-workers volunteered to substitute for her when
abortion instruments needed to be cleaned, but the hospital rejected
that arrangement.97 What was at issue was not the sincerity of her
belief,98 but whether the Indiana statute was intended to include
people like Tramm within its protections.99
with their practice of religion.”) (citing School Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963)).
91. Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., Civil No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391,
at *1, *28 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (citing IND. CODE § 16-10-3-2).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *1-2.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *12 (noting that “PMH made no effort whatsoever to accommodate Tramm’s
religious beliefs”).
97. Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *12 (“Although Tramm’s co-workers tes-
tified in their depositions that they were willing to clean abortion instruments for Tramm,
PMH rejected this alternative.”).
98. Id. at *15-16 (“Here there would be a direct, substantial burden on the practice of
Tramm’s religion if she is forced to clean abortion instruments. Tramm’s testimony in-
dicates that her anti-abortion stance is a principle tenet of her Catholicism and that any
involvement with abortion procedures would be a substantial violation of her religious
and moral beliefs.”).
99. Id. at *29 (noting the hospital’s argument that only doctors and employees who
“assist” or “participate in” abortion procedures are protected by the conscience statute).
14 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:001
The court in Tramm examined the language of the statute, which
“protects physicians and other hospital employees and staff from being
required to participate directly in abortion procedures that violate
their beliefs . . . [and] protects employees from being forced to par-
ticipate in the performance of an abortion as a condition for employ-
ment, pay, promotion or privileges.”100 The court reasoned that the
statute was designed to protect people who might be forced to perform
abortion procedures, and that the plaintiff’s duties did not fall within
that protected classification.101
The surprising part of the court’s analysis was in how it inter-
preted the third provision: “nor shall any hospital, person, firm, corpo-
ration, or association discriminate or discipline any person on account
of his or her moral beliefs concerning abortion . . . .”102 At the very
least, this section means that regardless of one’s job duties one will
not be terminated because of one’s religious beliefs.103 The question
at hand, however, is in determining how this section should be ap-
plied.104 The court concluded that since the administrators “admitted
to knowing of Tramm’s beliefs and terminating her for refusing to
perform duties that would violate those beliefs, the termination vio-
lated her rights under the Indiana Conscience Clause.”105
Yet, there was no evidence that the hospital would have allowed
Tramm to continue if her refusal to clean instruments had not been
because of her religious beliefs.106 Nor was there any evidence that
she would have been fired because of her religious beliefs had she
been willing to clean the instruments.107 Rather, the hospital was un-
willing to make an exception for her because her refusal was based
on her religious beliefs.108
100. Id. at *31.
101. Id. at *30 (“In this case, the undisputed facts are that an aide’s duties include pre-
paring and cleaning instruments used in surgical procedures and securing specimen con-
tainer lids before they are transported to the laboratory for analysis. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15).
Under the plain meaning of the statute, those duties do not encompass the ‘performance’
of procedures resulting or intended to result in an abortion.”).
102. Id. at *31 (emphasis in original) (quoting IND. CODE § 16-10-3-2).
103. Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *31 (“Under the third provision, all hos-
pital personnel are within the class of persons who may not be terminated because of their
religious beliefs.”).
104. See id. at *29-30 (recognizing that this court had to try and predict how the Indiana
Supreme Court would interpret the conscience statute, because no Indiana court had pre-
viously construed the scope of the Indiana conscience statute).
105. Id. at *32.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *13-14 (“[I]t is clear that PMH refused to make any accommodation for
Tramm and then terminated her because she refused to perform certain tasks which she
felt violated her religious beliefs.”).
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Perhaps the hospital should have acted differently as a matter
of respect. Others volunteered to substitute for Tramm when she
could not clean the instruments as a matter of conscience,109 and it
should not have mattered to the hospital who sterilized the instru-
ments as long as the sterilization was performed. In the hospital’s
defense, however, the co-workers’ willingness to perform this substi-
tution might not have continued indefinitely.110 The hospital might
have reasoned that it should address the issue early, because the
issue would have to be addressed eventually anyway. Perhaps the
hospital should have adopted a wait-and-see attitude or explored
whether it could have done something else to avoid the problem, e.g.,
transfer her to another job,111 although those measures would not
themselves have been without cost. In any event, the difficulty pointed
to here is not that a blameless hospital was punished, but that the
Indiana court offered an interpretation of the law that simply was
not plausible.
As interpreted by the Indiana court, the third provision swallows
up the other two. If no employee can receive punishment for refus-
ing to perform any job because of her religious beliefs concerning
abortion, then it is of course true that no medical professional can re-
ceive punishment for refusing to participate directly in the provision
of an abortion.112 So, too, a refusal to hire or promote someone be-
cause of her beliefs about abortion would presumably be viewed as
discriminatory, making the second provision superfluous. At least one
of the difficulties suggested by the Tramm decision is that conscience
exceptions might be construed in utterly implausible ways that are
much more robust than anyone intended.113
Suppose that Tramm was hired to help raise money for the hos-
pital. At least one question raised by the decision is whether she would
be immunized from trying to steer unrestricted monies away from the
hospital for fear that they might be used in a way that might improve
facilities where abortions or abortion counseling were offered.114 Or,
suppose that Tramm was hired by the hospital to provide information
to the public, for example, where particular offices or clinics within
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (stating that while individuals initially
willing to cover a nurse so she might avoid doing something that she found religiously
objectionable could eventually refuse to do so).
111. See Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *2 (noting that Tramm asked that
she be transferred to another job).
112. See id. at *31 (noting that, based on the third provision, no hospital personnel can
be terminated due to their religious beliefs).
113. See id. at *17 (stating that when there is substantial pressure to modify beliefs,
a burden on religion exists, violating free exercise).
114. See id. at *12, *18 (noting that an employer need offer only reasonable accommo-
dation to one’s belief).
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the hospital might be found. One wonders if she would be permitted
to refuse to direct families or patients to particular parts of the hos-
pital because she feared that she might otherwise be helping them
to attain abortions or to comfort those who had obtained them.
A related issue arose in a California case, Brownfield v. Daniel
Freeman Marina Hospital,115 which involved a hospital’s refusal to
provide “ ‘pregnancy prevention treatment’ ”116 information to a rape
victim after such information was requested.117 The hospital also
failed to inform the individual that a particular treatment was time-
sensitive and would be most effective within seventy-two hours.118
Brownfield was not informed about the importance of acting quickly
and did not see her family doctor until more than three days passed.119
There was no contention that the rape resulted in pregnancy,120 and
the hospital had advised her to see her doctor within two days with-
out specifying why.121
One of the contested issues was whether use of a morning-after
pill should be thought of as “ ‘post-coital contraception’ ” or, instead,
as abortion.122 The rape victim asserted the former and the hospital
the latter view.123 The California court concluded that for purposes
of the statute offering protection for those refusing to perform abor-
tions, the former rather than the latter view was correct.124 The abor-
tion protection statute was thus interpreted to confer no immunity on
the hospital, so that its refusal to provide the relevant information
might make it liable under appropriate circumstances.125
115. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).





121. Brownfield, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
122. Id. at 244.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 245.
Appellant alleged, and respondent by its demurrer admitted, that the
morning-after pill was a “pregnancy prevention” treatment, the proper name
of which was estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis. The conclusion that the treat-
ment constitutes “prevention,” i.e., birth control, rather than “termination,”
i.e., abortion, is consistent with the above-cited law. We therefore conclude
that Health and Safety Code section 25955, subdivision (c), does not immu-
nize respondent from liability for failure or refusal to provide information
about estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis to rape victims.
Id.
125. Id. at 245.
[W]hen a rape victim can allege: that a skilled practitioner of good standing
would have provided her with information concerning and access to estrogen
pregnancy prophylaxis under similar circumstances; that if such information
had been provided to her she would have elected such treatment; and that
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The Tramm court would likely have offered a much different
interpretation of the statute, which stated:
[N]o nonprofit hospital or clinic which is organized or operated
by a religious corporation or other religious organization or its
administrative officers, employees, agents, or members of its
governing board shall be liable, individually or collectively, for
failure or refusal to perform or to permit the performance of an
abortion in such facility or clinic or to provide abortion services.126
The court might well have suggested that supplying any of the
relevant information would be to assist in the provision of abortion
services broadly construed, and neither the hospital nor any of its
employees could be liable for the failure to afford the rape victim the
information that she would need to maximize her chances of avert-
ing pregnancy after being raped.
Consider a related scenario. A patient has a prescription for a
morning-after pill,127 but the pharmacist refuses to fill the prescrip-
tion. In some states, the pharmacist not only would be immune from
liability for refusing to dispense the particular drug, but also for re-
fusing to refer the patient elsewhere.128 Further, there might be no
exception for those who had been raped.129 Thus, while some states
may tailor their exemptions narrowly, other states may offer very
broad exemptions,130 notwithstanding the kinds of harms that might
thereby be caused to those who are refused service or even a referral.
2. Exceptions for Significant Burdens on Businesses
Some statutes with conscience exemptions include a limitation
so that a business will not be forced to incur significant burdens by
damages have proximately resulted from the failure to provide her with in-
formation concerning this treatment option, said rape victim can state a cause
of action for damages for medical malpractice.
Id.
126. Id. at 244.
127. Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision
of Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 326 n.242 (2009) (“Because
the ‘morning after pill’ (also called Plan B or RU-486) is now an OTC medication for women
over eighteen, a prescription is now required only for minors.”).
128. See Catherine Grealis, Note, Religion in the Pharmacy: A Balanced Approach to
Pharmacists’ Right to Refuse to Provide Plan B, 97 GEO. L.J. 1715, 1723 (2009) (noting that
the conscience clauses of Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota do not impose
a duty on pharmacists to give advanced notice of their refusal or a referral).
129. See id. (“[N]one provide an exception for women who are raped.”).
130. See id. (noting that four states have adopted laws protecting pharmacists while
other states have enacted laws to protect patient access to both emergency contraception
and prescription medication).
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employing someone who refuses for religious reasons to perform
particular procedures, Florida is an example. Consider the Florida
conscience statute:
Nothing in this section shall require any hospital or any person
to participate in the termination of a pregnancy, nor shall any hos-
pital or any person be liable for such refusal. No person who is
a member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital nor any
employee of a hospital or physician in which or by whom the termi-
nation of a pregnancy has been authorized or performed, who shall
state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds,
shall be required to participate in the procedure which will result
in the termination of pregnancy. The refusal of any such person
or employee to participate shall not form the basis for any disci-
plinary or other recriminatory action against such person.131
While the statute does not expressly include any consideration
of the possible burdens that might be placed on a business by virtue
of a conscience exemption, a Florida appellate court interpreted the
statute to incorporate such a limitation, “an employer must reason-
ably accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless he estab-
lishes that he would suffer undue hardship.”132
Margaret Kenny alleged that she was demoted because of her
refusal to assist in abortions and other reproduction-related mat-
ters.133 Her employer attempted to accommodate her refusal by ask-
ing other nurses to exchange duties with her.134 However, after a
while, the other nurses refused to substitute for her,135 and Kenny’s
employer did not take the further step of arranging Kenny’s schedule
so she would never be assigned to assist in providing abortions.136 The
court in Kenny reasoned that “[a]lthough appellees would incur some
hardship, the record does not support a finding that undue hardship
would result.”137
131. Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FLA. STAT. § 458.22(5) (1977)).
132. Id. at 1266.
133. Id. at 1267 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (“[T]his action filed by the Plaintiff is founded
on employment discrimination from her employment as a nurse and her duties in termi-
nation of pregnancy procedures and other related birth control and sterilization operations
contrary to her religious beliefs.”).
134. Id. at 1263, 1266.
135. Id. at 1266 (“Some efforts toward accommodation were made by fellow employees
seeking to assist appellant. When other nurses ceased cooperating, however, the employer
made no further effort to accommodate appellant.”).
136. Id. at 1266-67 (“There is no showing that schedules could not have been arranged
to accommodate appellant’s religious beliefs.”).
137. Kenny, 400 So. 2d at 1267 (emphasis in original).
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Yet, there is reason to think the appellate court underestimated
the burden that was thereby imposed. The trial court found that to
accommodate the plaintiff’s desires, the employer would have to hire
someone else138 at a time when doing so would not be fiscally pru-
dent.139 The appellate court neither explained why being forced to hire
another person to accommodate Kenny was not an undue burden as
a matter of law,140 nor what would have constituted an undue burden.
If forcing an employer to hire additional workers does not qualify,
then burdens might be quite significant without crossing the rele-
vant threshold.
The Seventh Circuit has explored the contours of the existing
undue burden jurisprudence in a series of cases. In one, an FBI em-
ployee refused to investigate pacifist groups accused of destroying gov-
ernment property.141 John Ryan was a Catholic who believed that the
United States Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace “show[ed]
the impropriety of conducting investigations into groups that destroy
governmental property to express their opposition to violence.”142 He
informed his superior that this letter might make it impossible for him
to perform particular duties.143 However, he did not ask to be reas-
signed or to have different duties as a general matter,144 and rejected
a fellow employee’s offer to take over the particular investigation that
Ryan could not perform in good conscience.145 While Ryan had been
willing in the past to trade assignments so he would not have to in-
vestigate the alleged criminal acts of non-violent groups,146 he was
unwilling to make a similar compromise this time.147
Ryan’s sincerity was not in question.148 The Seventh Circuit
raised but did not decide whether it would be an undue burden to
require the FBI to offer transfers to those agents who had religious
138. See id. at 1268 (Hendry, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court found that
“the lack of employee cooperation would have resulted in the employer paying additional
wage salaries contrary to sound business and fiscal management”).
139. See id. at 1267 (noting the district court’s finding that “there is justifiable and
compelling financial basis for Defendant’s decision” and that the decision was “made in
good faith based on fiscal necessity”).
140. Id. (“We therefore hold that appellees failed to sustain their burden of establish-
ing undue hardship, and we reverse the trial court’s decision.”).




145. See id. at 459 (“Agent James Swinford volunteered to swap assignments with Ryan.
He declined. An agent had taken off Ryan’s hands an earlier order to investigate a group
of peace activists including nuns and priests; this time Ryan chose confrontation.”).
146. Id.
147. Ryan, 950 F.2d at 459.
148. See id. at 460 (“Ryan’s sincerity is unquestioned.”).
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objections to the performance of particular tasks.149 Because Ryan
had refused the reasonable accommodation of swapping assignments,
the difficult determination of what would constitute an undue burden
could be left for another day.150
The Seventh Circuit had another opportunity to discuss undue
burdens in Wright v. Runyon.151 Gordon Wright, a Seventh Day Adven-
tist, had a position with the United States Postal Service that did not
require him to work on his Sabbath,152 but that position was abol-
ished.153 He could have gotten a different position that did not require
his working between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday,
but he did not seek it.154 He became an “unassigned regular,” which
meant that he could be assigned to any open position, and was eventu-
ally assigned to a position requiring him to work on Friday evening.155
The court in Wright suggested that he was responsible for his own
Hobson’s choice between quitting his job or working on the Sabbath,
because he did not avail himself of the opportunity to take a compa-
rable position that did not require him to work on the Sabbath.156 Be-
cause the position that he could have had would not have involved
149. Id. at 461.
Whether tolerating Ryan’s disobedience and that of other agents with sincere
religious claims would contribute to a breakdown in discipline, and whether
transferring such an agent to an assignment where nonviolent protests are
not a potential issue would hinder the efficient operation of the FBI, are
subjects about which reasonable persons can and do differ.
Id.
150. See id.
Reallocation of work between agents is the most obvious accommodation, one
that Ryan’s fellow agents had arranged for him before. Because Ryan refused
Swinford’s offer to arrange for a swap this time, we need not decide whether
a series of swaps—potentially calling for training a different agent in the tech-
niques of domestic security investigations—would create “undue hardship”
for the FBI.
Id.
151. 2 F.3d 214 (7th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 215.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 216 (“[F]our positions were let for bid in the ordinary process that did not
require work during Wright’s Sabbath. Wright would have received at least two of these
positions, as the senior bidder, had he bid for them.”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 217.
The bidding system enabled Wright to obtain a job the requirements of which
did not interfere with his religious practices. Indeed, it allowed Wright to
select such a position. This strikes us as a paradigm of “reasonable accom-
modation.” Wright, in refusing to bid on two “flat sorter machine operator”
jobs that would not have required work during his Sabbath, chose not to take
full advantage of the bidding system. Wright, not the Postmaster General,
is therefore responsible for the consequences.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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a reduction in pay or transferring from a skilled to an unskilled
position, the Postal Service was held to have offered him a reason-
able alternative.157
Individuals might request their employers to modify work sched-
ules or assignments for a variety of reasons. Angelo Rodriguez worked
for the Chicago Police Department and claimed that he was discrim-
inated against because of his religious beliefs158 when he was assigned
to protect an abortion clinic.159 Rodriguez could have avoided this prob-
lem without losing pay or benefits by being transferred to a district
that did not contain an abortion clinic,160 but he liked being in the dis-
trict where he was currently assigned.161 The Seventh Circuit sug-
gested that the Police Department had met its burden by affording
the opportunity to work elsewhere for similar pay and benefits.162
Judge Posner made clear in his concurrence that he would have
gone further—he suggested that “police officers and firefighters have
no right under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recuse them-
selves from having to protect persons of whose activities they disap-
prove for religious (or any other) reasons.”163 He worried about the
effect on the public confidence were such a right of recusal recog-
nized,164 explaining:
157. Wright, 2 F.3d at 217 (“The USPS here has taken adequate steps to accommodate
Wright’s religious practices.”).
158. Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1998). “As a life-long
Roman Catholic, Officer Rodriguez accepts the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church
that an elective abortion is the wrongful taking of innocent human life and that individuals
have a general moral obligation to avoid participating in, or facilitating, an elective abor-
tion.” Id. at 773.
159. Id. at 772.
On September 20, 1995, Angelo Rodriguez, a patrol officer in the Chicago
Police Department (“CPD”), filed a four-count complaint against the City of
Chicago. In that complaint, Officer Rodriguez alleged that the City discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of his religion by refusing to exempt him from
an assignment to stand guard outside an abortion clinic on November 19,
1994.
Id.
160. Id. at 774 (“Officer Rodriguez could have requested transfer to six alternative dis-
tricts on the north side comparable to the 14th District that did not have facilities where
abortions were performed. Due to his seniority, Rodriguez would have been able to make
the change with no reduction in his level of pay or benefits.”).
161. Id. at 776 (“[T]he fact that Officer Rodriguez may prefer an accommodation that
allows him to remain in the 14th District does not render a transfer ‘unreasonable.’ ”).
162. Id. at 775 (“The district court concluded that the City had satisfied its duty to
accommodate Officer Rodriguez by providing him the opportunity . . . to transfer to a dis-
trict that did not have an abortion clinic with no reduction in his level of pay or benefits.
We agree.”).
163. Id. at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
164. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779 (“The public knows that its protectors have a private
agenda; everyone does. But it would like to think that they leave that agenda at home when
they are on duty . . . .”).
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When the business of the employer is to protect the public safety,
the maintenance of public confidence in the neutrality of the
protectors is central to effective performance, and the erosion of
that confidence by recognition of a right of recusal by public-
safety officers would so undermine the agency’s effective perfor-
mance as to constitute an undue hardship within the meaning of
the statute.165
Judge Posner’s point is well-taken. If individuals must be ex-
empted from performing public safety functions whenever those indi-
viduals have religious objections to anything associated with their
assignment, logistics might become quite burdensome.166 The Eleventh
Circuit worried that forcing a police department to modify training
schedules to accommodate religious beliefs167 would itself impose too
great a burden on the department.168
Judge Posner’s concerns about the loss of public confidence and
the potential health and safety risks that might be created by re-
cusals169 should not be thought limited to contexts in which members
of police and fire departments might be called to duty. Consider a hos-
pital where a nurse refuses to participate in an emergency procedure
that would result in a pregnancy termination.170 The procedure might
165. Id. at 779-80.
166. Cf. Jones v. City of Gary, 57 F.3d 1435, 1442 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If the fire chief is
unable to find a last minute replacement, the post may go unstaffed and public safety may
be at risk.”).
167. Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 634 (11th Cir. 1995) (“At all times relevant
to this lawsuit, Beadle was a practicing member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
One of the tenets of this faith is the prohibition of secular labor on its Sabbath—from
sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.”).
168. Id. at 637
The Department chose to implement a rotating shift schedule, randomly
assign recruits to shifts, and expose its recruits to a variety of training
officers. In order to accommodate Beadle’s religious practices, the Department
would have been forced to assign him to another training squad and to not re-
assign him during the third phase of training.”). “[T]he magistrate court did
not err when it found that requiring the Department to grant shift exceptions
would result in a greater than de minimis cost and that the City had met its
obligation under Title VII.
Id. at 638.
169. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 779 (“The objection to recusal in all of these cases is not the
inconvenience to the police department, the armed forces, or the fire department . . . . The
objection is to the loss of public confidence in governmental protective services if the
public knows that its protectors are at liberty to pick and choose whom to protect.”).
170. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2000).
In 1994, Shelton refused to treat a patient. According to the Hospital, the
patient was pregnant and suffering from a ruptured membrane (which the
Hospital describes as a life-threatening condition). Shelton learned the Hos-
pital planned to induce labor by giving the patient oxytocin. Shelton refused
to assist or participate.
Id.
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have to be delayed until another nurse could be located, which might
increase risks for the patient.171
Several issues must not be conflated. One issue involves what
conditions satisfy the requirement that a reasonable accommodation
be made. For example, offering an employee a different position where
the conflict would not arise would be a reasonable accommodation as
long as the salary and benefits were similar and the position involved
a similar skill set.172
A different issue involves the conditions under which an em-
ployer must offer such an alternative. That would depend upon the
language of the relevant statute,173 and whether it would be consid-
ered an undue burden for an employer to have to hire an additional
person so that the objected-to procedures could still be performed.174
As to whether an employer would be required to modify schedules to
accommodate beliefs, this might depend upon how easily such a modi-
fication could be made and at what costs to morale or the program as
a whole.175
An entirely different issue is whether an exemption should be
created. This might depend upon a number of factors including how
widespread the exemption would be, and what kinds of obvious and
non-obvious costs would be incurred by affording this exemption.
Some commentators advocate that an exemption be created so that
individuals objecting to LGBT relationships would not have to serve
171. See id. at 223.
In November 1995, Shelton refused to treat another emergency patient. This
patient—who was “standing in a pool of blood”—was diagnosed with placenta
previa. The attending Labor and Delivery section physician determined the
situation was life-threatening and ordered an emergency cesarean-section
delivery. When Shelton arrived for her shift, she was told to “scrub in” on the
procedure. Because the procedure would terminate the pregnancy, Shelton
refused to assist or participate. Eventually, another nurse took her place. The
Hospital claims Shelton’s refusal to assist delayed the emergency procedure
for thirty minutes.
Id.; additionally, “[t]he Hospital believed Shelton’s refusals to assist risked patients’
safety.” Id.
172. Id. at 226 (“Shelton has not established she would face a religious conflict in the
Newborn ICU. The Hospital’s offer of a lateral transfer to that unit thus constituted a
reasonable accommodation.”).
173. See Grealis, supra note 128, at 1725-26 (discussing the Washington and California
statutory exemptions for pharmacists).
174. Cf. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 224 (“Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires em-
ployers to make reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious beliefs and
practices, unless doing so would result in ‘undue hardship’ to the employer.”).
175. See, e.g., Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The Supreme
Court has described ‘undue hardship’ as any act requiring an employer to bear more than
a ‘de minimis cost’ in accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs. . . . The Court has
also recognized that the phrase ‘de minimis cost’ entails not only monetary concerns, but
also the employer’s burden in conducting its business.”).
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or associate with members of the LGBT community.176 However, it
seems clear that many of those proponents have not given adequate
consideration to all the costs that would have to be borne by recog-
nizing such an exemption.177
II. CONSCIENCE EXEMPTIONS AND THE LGBT COMMUNITY
When trying to figure out whether to create an exemption so that
those objecting to LGBT families would not have to support such
families, a number of factors might be taken into account.178 For ex-
ample, the importance of the implicated interests and the rationale
for making the particular exemption at issue.179 A less obvious con-
sideration might involve the implications, if any, of providing an ex-
emption with respect to this group but no others. Contrary to what
commentators might believe, creation of an exemption for conscience
with respect to the treatment of members of the LGBT community
will not be virtually cost-free.180 On the contrary, creating such an ex-
emption so that individuals in the workplace would be free to refuse
to perform their normal duties for those in “religiously objectionable”
relationships would create a whole host of difficulties that would
inure to the detriment not only of those immediately affected but to
society as a whole.181
176. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS, 77, 101-02 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello & Robin
Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) (noting some religious objectors to same-sex marriage will
not favor the author’s proposal that while there should be an exemption to facilitating such
relationships, such a refusal is would be unavailable where significant burdens to the
same-sex couple would occur).
177. Id. at 94 (“Legislatures that enact conscience clauses are, by definition, valuing
more heavily the moral and religious convictions of the objectors; and legislatures that re-
fuse to enact conscience clauses are valuing more heavily the dignitary interests of same-
sex couples—not to be embarrassed, not to be inconvenienced, not to have their choice
questioned.”).
178. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-
Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 494-95 (2008) (discussing some factors to be taken
into account when deciding whether to create an exemption in the context of adoption).
179. See id. (asking “What impact would a legislative exemption have on same-sex
couples seeking to adopt?” or “What percentage of adoption agencies are likely to object
to serving them?” or “Will other adoption agencies fill their needs?”).
180. Cf. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life after
Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101, 109 (2009) (“In rare instances, it is possible that permitting a reli-
giously based refusal may create a hardship for the person seeking an abortion—or in this
context, for the couple seeking a marriage license”).
181. See id. at 100-01 (“[I]t is much easier to imagine hardships resulting from the
denial of benefits that other married couples enjoy, such as hospital visitation. Even where
hardships do not result, being turned away can inflict damage which should not be lightly
dismissed—the harm to one’s dignity.”); see also id. at 101 (“Indeed, marriage is the touch-
stone for receiving a host of government-provided or government-mandated benefits that
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A. Creating an Exemption for Those with Religious Objections to
Same-Sex Marriage
Some commentators suggest that states should enact statutes
affording exemptions so that those with religious objections to LGBT
relationships would not have to promote those relationships, just as
states already afford exemptions to those who have religious objections
to performing abortions.182 While these commentators are correct that
the experience with abortion exemptions should be examined, they
are incorrect that our experience with such legislation suggests that
we have an easy compromise within reach.183
Suppose that a state enacted a statute to protect those who did
not want to officiate at a same-sex marriage. First, it should be noted,
such a provision would not be necessary to protect clergy refusing
to celebrate marriages contrary to their faith, because they could not
be forced to celebrate such marriages even without such a statutory
exemption.184 However, such a provision might be necessary for pub-
lic officials, for example, town clerks or justices of the peace, seeking
to avoid helping same-sex couples who wished to marry.185 Under
such a statute, two individuals of the same sex presenting themselves
before a justice of the peace might be told that although the state
permitted same-sex marriages, the couple would have to find some-
one who did not have religious objections to the union to perform the
ceremony.
married couples simply take for granted: receipt of family medical leave from certain large
employers; benefits for spouses of civil service employees . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., id. at 80 (“This chapter argues further that legislatures should deflect this
litigation with legislative accommodations as they ultimately did with fractious healthcare
services. Indeed, legislative accommodations in medicine offer a number of approaches for
resolving the clash between those who want a service and those who have moral objections
to performing it.”).
183. Id. at 101 (“Perhaps the best we can hope for is to create statutorily a live-and-let-
live solution, one that provides the ability to refuse based on religious or moral objections,
but limits that refusal to instances where a significant hardship to the requesting parties
will not occur.”).
184. See id. at 97 (“As to churches and members of the clergy, the state cannot easily
affect the choices to perform, or to refrain from performing, same-sex unions because of
constitutional doctrines limiting their control of religious functions . . . .”).
185. Cf. Wilson, supra note 180, at 103.
Closer to home, the chief legal counsel for Massachusetts’ governor, on the
heels of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, told the state’s justices
of the peace that they must “follow the law, whether you agree with it or not.”
Anyone who turned away same-sex couples could be held personally liable
under the state’s antidiscrimination statute, which provides for penalties up
to $50,000.
Id. (citing Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2004, at A15).
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It might seem that affording such an exemption would not im-
pose any burden on the LGBT community. There are many individuals
who can perform same-sex unions, so permitting particular individuals
to refuse as a matter of conscience to help such couples need not
create an insurmountable stumbling block for those couples wishing
to marry.186 Further, the state might require that a conscientious ob-
jector refer a couple to someone willing to perform the ceremony or,
perhaps, might require that a sign be posted outside an office directing
the couple to the appropriate place.187 Professor Wilson comments:
Clerks’ offices likewise can take steps to avert collisions over
same-sex marriage with good information and good practices.
These offices should ask existing and prospective employees
whether they would anticipate a moral or religious objection and
keep appropriate lists. Same-sex couples who present could then
be directed to a willing clerk with little inconvenience.188
Yet, numerous difficulties are suggested by the practice mod-
eled by Professor Wilson. Imagine the signs that might be posted—
“Different-sex couples here” and “All couples here” or, perhaps, “All
couples, including same-sex couples, here.” In such a scenario, the
same office might be able to handle all couples who met the local mar-
riage requirements, although there is something disquieting about
the image of several couples standing in one line while no one stands
in the other.
Exemption proponents might suggest that such an image should
not be disquieting. After all, when one goes to the airport to get tick-
ets, there might be two lines, one for preferred customers and the
other for non-preferred customers. While the state offering a fre-
quent flyer analogue with regard to marriage would have its own
problems,189 there are separate problems with the state saying that
it prefers certain legal marriages over others. Suppose, for example,
that a couple were to come to a town clerk’s office and see two signs:
186. See Wilson, supra note 176, at 98 (“It does not necessarily follow that permitting
conscientious refusals will bar access to marriage. This is so because so many different
parties in any given state can marry a couple.”).
187. See id. (“Information-forcing rules—that is, rules that require refusing parties to
direct couples to others who will perform the service—allow protection for matters of
conscience without sacrificing access or humiliating same-sex couples. . . . For example,
Illinois requires pharmacies that do not carry emergency contraceptives to post a sign
directing patients to other pharmacies that do.”).
188. Id.
189. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, The Fall of Marital Family Stability and the Rise of Juvenile
Delinquency, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 83, 94-97 (2007) (arguing that society bears heavy costs
when there is an increasing divorce rate).
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“Single-race couples here,” and “All couples, including mixed-race
couples, here.” The difficulties associated with such signs would not
suddenly disappear were there an accompanying explanation that
one of the clerks had religious objections to facilitating mixed-race
marriages.190
The above scenario assumes that the same-sex couple might have
to wait in a different line, but would ultimately be served by the same
office. Yet, that need not be true—a particular office might be staffed
by individuals only willing to help different-sex couples who wished
to marry. If so, a sign might be posted indicating that same-sex cou-
ples would have to go to a different office, city, or county to marry.
Professor Wilson believes that there would be relatively few cases
where same-sex couples would have to go too far out of their way.191
She offers an example to communicate her sense of what would be
too great a burden to impose on same-sex couples wishing to marry:
Imagine, for example, that a same-sex couple resides in the state
of Montana, a million miles from anywhere else, and that there
is only one town clerk that can help the couple complete their
application for a marriage license. By refusing to assist the same-
sex couple, that clerk is effectively barring them from the institu-
tion of marriage, to which state law has said they are entitled.
In this instance, because a real and palpable hardship would
occur, I would argue that the religious liberty of the objector
must yield . . . .192
Professor Wilson should be commended for recognizing that there
are conditions under which the religious liberty of the objector must
yield.193 However, her example does not inspire much confidence that
there would be many instances in which same-sex couples’ needs
would be accommodated. One must wonder, for example, how many
hundreds of miles one could be forced to travel before the burden
would be viewed as too great.
Some commentators imply that being forced to go to another
town or county or, perhaps, waiting additional days because one
190. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing some of the couples
whose marriages might be viewed as religiously objectionable).
191. Wilson, supra note 180, at 110 (“[O]utside this rare case of a hardship, where there
are other clerks who would gladly serve the couple, and no one would otherwise lose by
honoring the religious convictions of the objector, then I believe those convictions should
be honored. . . . In part I am less willing to trample on religious beliefs [in the wedding
planning context] because I believe that hardships are likely to be fewer—there are simply
more vendors in the marketplace.”).
192. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
193. Id. (“In this instance, because a real and palpable hardship would occur, I would
argue that the religious liberty of the objector must yield . . . .”).
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does not wish to make a match approved by the town clerk194 is simply
one of the prices that same-sex couples have to pay to live in a country
that respects religious freedom.195 Yet, there are at least two reasons
to think that this is a misleading characterization of the debate. First,
respect for religious freedom militates in favor of the recognition
of same-sex marriage, because same-sex couples, like different-sex
couples, may marry for religious reasons among others.196 Ironically,
some of the commentators trumpeting the importance of religious
liberty when arguing for a conscience exemption197 argue against
rather than for same-sex marriage,198 notwithstanding the religious
liberty interests implicated in the latter.199 Whether or not the recog-
nition of same-sex marriage is constitutionally required,200 one might
expect that those proclaiming the importance of religious liberty would
be less selective with respect to the times that they would proclaim
its importance.
Those championing religious liberty often do not seem to appre-
ciate that the arguments offered to justify providing an exemption
with respect to assisting individuals in same-sex relationships would
also support providing a more generalized exemption.201 Religious
liberty might also justify a broad exemption allowing individuals not
to be associated with other relationships of which they disapproved,
for example, interracial, interreligious or intergenerational unions.202
194. See Wilson, supra note 176, at 99 (“The possibility of slight delay while locating a
willing clerk can be addressed with a modified timing rule. States could simply have a
different timing rule for same-sex couples than they do for other couples . . . .”).
195. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?,
48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 845-46 (2007) (“A bit more respect, flexibility, and humility on all sides
in the clash between religious groups and advocates for rights for gays, lesbians, and trans-
gendered people could open possibilities for resolutions that accommodate civil rights
norms and religious principles.”).
196. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiff Robin
Joy Shahar is a woman who has ‘married’ another woman in a ceremony performed by
a rabbi within the Reconstructionist Movement of Judaism.”).
197. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting The Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 181 (1993).
198. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman,
83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (2007).
199. Strasser, supra note 60, at 103 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that same-sex
unions do not play an important role in the spiritual lives of individuals seeking to marry
a same-sex partner.”) (citing Jamal Greene, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE
L.J. 1989, 1995 (2005)).
200. See id. at 64-65 (discussing whether same-sex marriage implicates free exercise
concerns).
201. See Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities
of Boston was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 297, 311-12 (discussing how recognition of same-sex marriage will
have other ramifications in the religious liberty context).
202. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (discussing couples whose marriages
might be viewed as religiously objectionable).
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B. The Expansion of Exemptions
Those who recommend using healthcare exemptions as a model
for other kinds of exemptions tend not to emphasize that legislation
affording exemptions for those who wish to be excused as a matter of
conscience from performing abortions have not been limited to those
seeking exemption from performing that particular procedure.203
Rather, there has been a tendency to expand those exemptions to
sterilization or, perhaps, to any medical procedure.204
That there has been this expansion should not be surprising.
The rationale supporting an exemption for abortion—individuals
should not be forced to violate their religious convictions in order to
keep a job205—might seem equally compelling whether one is dis-
cussing abortion, sterilization, or other medical procedures.206 But
this suggests that exemptions for those not wishing to promote same-
sex marriage might well expand into other areas.
203. See Grealis, supra note 128, at 1719 (discussing the recent expansion class of
healthcare providers who can also refuse to give out birth control or counsel on other
forms of family planning).
204. Id.
State legislatures have been even more willing than the federal government
to expand conscience clause protection beyond abortion services. Today, thir-
teen states permit some healthcare providers to refuse contraceptive services,
and seventeen states allow healthcare providers to refuse sterilization ser-
vices. In addition, given the recent advancements in medical technology men-
tioned above, some states now provide conscience clause protection for medical
procedures and practices such as family and referral services, assisted repro-
duction, fetal experimentation, human cloning, and euthanasia.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Georgia Chudoba, Comment, Conscience in America: The
Slippery Slope of Mixing Morality with Medicine, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 85, 86 (2007).
Conscience clauses in this country are becoming dangerously broad and over-
inclusive. What was once a protection for physicians who objected to per-
forming abortions is now a tool for religious activists to obstruct a patient’s
right to contraceptives, sterilization, and any other medical procedure that
they feel is “morally” wrong.
Id.
205. Cf. Wilson, supra note 178, at 477 (“For individuals the cost of vindicating one’s
conscience frequently comes at the expense of one’s livelihood.”).
206. Cf. Wardle, supra note 197, at 181.
There is no rational justification for protecting rights of conscience in the
context of just one of these morally controversial medical procedures (for
example, abortion) but not others. Such restrictive protection is fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic principles underlying the extension of any such
protection—respect for constraints of individual conscience, care for the con-
science rights of minorities, and commitment to the value (and belief in the
feasibility) of accommodation. Limiting protection for rights of conscience
to just one or two specific procedures that are politically significant (for ex-
ample, those that bother a majority or influential minority of voters) could
manifest cultural or religious oppression.
Id.
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To see how such an expansion might occur, it would be useful
to consider a broad healthcare exemption. Illinois law prohibits
discrimination against any individual “on account of the applicant’s
refusal to receive, obtain, accept, perform, counsel, suggest, recom-
mend, refer, assist or participate in any way in any forms of health
care services contrary to his or her conscience.” 207 Illinois law further
limits the liability of those who refuse to perform particular health
services as a matter of conscience.208
Suppose that the words “forms of health care” were deleted from
the statute. After all, individuals who did not want to promote same-
sex marriages might also object to providing other services that would
promote same-sex relationships or assist members of the LGBT com-
munity in pursuing a religiously objectionable lifestyle.209 For example,
a Washington district court noted that “[i]t is certainly plausible that
some pharmacist in the State of Washington could . . . deny distribu-
tion of needed HIV-medicine because of personal disdain for a homo-
sexual lifestyle.” 210 Or, consider someone who did not want to offer
relationship counseling because she did not approve of same-sex rela-
tionships and thus did not want to play a role in helping such relation-
ships flourish.211 By the same token, someone else might refuse to let
an apartment or sell a home to someone in a same-sex relationship.212
207. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/7 (West 1993).
208. See id. § 4.
No physician or health care personnel shall be civilly or criminally liable to
any person, estate, public or private entity or public official by reason of his
or her refusal to perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or par-
ticipate in any way in any particular form of health care service which is
contrary to the conscience of such physician or health care personnel.
Id.
209. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001)
Bruff testified that when she initially applied to be an EAP counselor she
assumed she would have to counsel homosexuals, but she also assumed she
could refer such individuals when they sought counseling on their relation-
ships. Nothing in the record reflects that she raised this issue with her inter-
viewer, or explored how any such conflicts with her religious beliefs could, in
fact, be accommodated. Instead, she apparently assumed she would only have
to perform those aspects of the position she found acceptable.
Id.
210. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2007), vacated,
586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
211. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (noting that those who object to same-
sex marriages may object to providing any service that relates to the LGBT lifestyle).
212. Cf. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994)
(per curiam) (“Swanner, d/b/a Whitehall Properties, appealed the superior court’s decision
which affirmed the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission’s (AERC) order that Swanner’s
policy against renting to unmarried couples constituted unlawful discrimination based on
marital status.”).
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It is clear that Professor Wilson does not envision the conscience
exemption as being restricted to town clerks or justices of the peace—
she believes that bakers, photographers, and wedding planners should
be protected insofar as they do not wish to provide services for same-
sex couples.213 She also believes that just as there should be exemp-
tions for those who object to same-sex marriage, there should be an
exemption for those who object to adoption by same-sex couples.214
Yet, it seems underappreciated how easily such an exemption could
cover most areas of one’s social existence. Presumably, individuals
who morally disapproved of LGBT families might refuse to serve such
families in stores, banks, and restaurants. Indeed, it is not clear how
this exemption would be cabined.
Creating such an open-ended exemption permitting individuals
to be excused from providing services to LGBT families in particular
would be a public policy disaster and might implicate constitutional
protections as well. Affording this exemption to those objecting to
LGBT families but no others would seem to have “the peculiar prop-
erty of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group . . .” 215 which might make it seem “inexplicable by any-
thing but animus toward the class it affects . . . .” 216 But Colorado’s
imposition of a broad disability solely on members of the LGBT com-
munity was struck down by the Court in Romer,217 which suggests
that the kind of exemption envisioned here might also be constitu-
tionally suspect.
One of the important respects in which healthcare exemptions
should be differentiated from the kind of exemptions at issue here is
that the former involves a kind of procedure which would not be per-
formed as a general matter,218 whereas the latter involves members
of a particular group who are subject to something which other simi-
larly situated individuals are not.219 The justice of the peace could
213. Cf. Wilson, supra note 180, at 110 (“I have a harder time requiring every baker,
photographer, and wedding advisor to serve every person who presents . . . .”).
214. Wilson, supra note 178, at 492 (“The parallels between the clashes over abortion
and same-sex adoption are so striking that policymakers would be remiss not to draw on
the abortion experience in deciding how to approach same-sex adoption.”).
215. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 635 (“Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legis-
lative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”).
218. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ABORTIONS BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 1990-2005 (2010), available at http://www
.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0100.pdf (showing that only 19.4 women out
of every 1,000 had an abortion in 2005).
219. Cf. MARK STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE RULE OF
LAW 108 (2002) (“Some commentators deny that the issue is who should be allowed to
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refuse to perform this marriage about which she had a religious ob-
jection but not another marriage about which she might also have
objections. Consider, for example, the Mississippi conscience exemp-
tion, which states, “[a] health care provider has the right not to par-
ticipate, and no health care provider shall be required to participate
in a health care service that violates his or her conscience.” 220 How-
ever, the Mississippi subsection makes quite clear that a health care
provider is not thereby permitted to refuse “to participate in a health
care service regarding a patient because of the patient’s race, color,
national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion, creed or sexual orientation.”221
Mississippi seems to recognize one of the potential difficulties of ex-
emptions, namely, that they can be used to target specific groups.222
C. The Expansion of the Classes against Whom the Exemption
Might Be Employed
States might well have some difficulty in justifying selectively
respecting the religious liberty of their justices of the peace and
town clerks by affording them an exemption with respect to same-
sex relationships, but not other “religiously offensive” relationships.223
Further, were the state to expand the exemption, it seems likely that
public officials would take advantage of that expansion and refuse to
help other religiously objectionable couples who wished to formalize
their relationships.224 It was not so long ago that individuals would
assert religious objections to interracial marriage,225 and it would be
unsurprising were such claims to be asserted again if such protec-
tions were incorporated into law.226 Other types of unions might also
marry, claiming that lesbians and gays, like everyone else, can marry; they simply cannot
marry someone of their sex.”).
220. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5 (1) (West 2009).
221. Id.
222. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s rejection of discrimin-
ation against interracial couples).
223. See Minow, supra note 195, at 828 (discussing the possibility of granting exemp-
tions based on conscience and not spiritual beliefs).
224. Id. (“[E]ach additional exemption curtails the application of the overarching
norm—and civil rights as a result can be too easily and thoroughly undermined.”).
225. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983) (discussing
that a school would not allow students to matriculate if they were dating or married to
someone of another race).
226. Cf. Newscast: Louisiana justice of the peace refuses to apologize for not marrying
interracial couple, SUNDAY TODAY, Oct. 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20611994.
[T]he Louisiana justice of the peace who refused to marry an interracial couple
says he will not apologize and says he did nothing wrong. Beth Humphrey
and Terence McKay says the justice of the peace, Keith Bardwell, told them
he does not marry interracial couples because he’s worried about their
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be subject to similar treatment if, for example, they were thought to
be non-procreative.227 Or, individuals might have objections to facili-
tating those who wished to enter into religious intermarriages.228 In
short, were there an open-ended exemption so that individuals could
refuse to perform marriages contrary to conscience, many kinds of
couples might have their hopes of marriage initially thwarted.
That there might be a whole host of marriages subject to this
exemption would not alone establish that such an exemption should
not be created. Nonetheless, it might give one pause for both practical
and theoretical reasons. Presumably, very few if any of the commen-
tators would wish to return to the day in which burdens could be
placed on an individual seeking to marry someone of another race.
Some commentators suggest that it may not be helpful to com-
pare a refusal to perform a same-sex marriage with a refusal to per-
form an interracial marriage. Professor Koppelman notes that, “[n]ot
all antigay views, however, deny the personhood and equal citizenship
of gay people.” 229 Yet, his point is at best unhelpful for two reasons.
First, the exemption from performing same-sex marriage may well
be part of a broader exemption so that individuals would be free to
refuse any service to members of the LGBT community.230 Were that
so, the exemption might well deny personhood and equal citizenship,
especially if this exemption were targeted so that only those in the
LGBT community would be adversely affected.231 Second, it is impor-
tant to consider the right that is being burdened—at issue is the right
to marry. The Court in Zablocki noted that “the decision to marry has
been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships,” 232
explaining that “it would make little sense to recognize a right of
children’s future. Well, the couple finally did get married. Bardwell says he
has no plans to step down.
Id.
227. Cf. Rutledge, supra note 201, at 301 (2008) (“God’s design for human sexuality . . .
is first and foremost for procreation.”).
228. See Gustav Niebuhr, Marriage Issue Splits Jews, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/31/us/marriage-issue-splits-jews-poll-finds.html
(discussing the varying opinions on Jews and non-Jews being able to marry).
229. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections
for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 145 (2006)
(citing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 53-68 (2002)).
230. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing how an employee assumed she only was required to perform services she found
morally acceptable).
231. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the specific effect Amend-
ment 2 would have on the gay community in particular).
232. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
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privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with re-
spect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation
of the family in our society.” 233 But given the centrality of marriage,
permitting that right to be burdened might well speak to dignity and
equality even if other sorts of limitations would not.
States have a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
on a variety of bases, including race,234 religion,235 gender,236 and orien-
tation.237 This interest must be taken into account when deciding
whether the religious liberty of the objecting public official should win
the day. Indeed, if we look to the healthcare exemption caselaw, we see
that exemptions must sometimes give way when historically discrim-
inated-against groups would be disadvantaged by the exemption.238
Some commentators make clear that they believe an exemption
permitting individuals not to support same-sex marriage is appro-
priate, at least in part, because of the (alleged) wrongness of same-sex
marriage.239 But this is exactly the wrong approach—the state should
not be in the position of deciding whether to grant an exemption based
on the theological correctness of the objector’s position. That would
be precisely the kind of judgment that the Establishment Clause
would prevent the state from making.240
233. Id.
234. See Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868,
886 (Wis. 2009) (discussing the “state’s compelling interest in prohibiting racial dis-
crimination”).
235. See Mill River Club, Inc. v. N.Y. Div. of Human Rights, 873 N.Y.S.2d 167, 173
(App. Div. 2009) (discussing the “compelling state interest in preventing discrimination
on the basis of religion”) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
236. See Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 121 P.3d 671, 685
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing “the state’s compelling interest in eliminating gender dis-
crimination”).
237. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,
5 (D.C. 1987) (discussing “the District of Columbia’s compelling interest in the eradication
of sexual orientation discrimination”).
238. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 93-94
(Cal. 2004) (“Nor are any less restrictive (or more narrowly tailored) means readily avail-
able for achieving the state’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination. Any broader
exemption increases the number of women affected by discrimination in the provision of
health care benefits.”); see also N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 189
P.3d 959, 968 (Cal. 2008) (“The Act furthers California’s compelling interest in ensuring
full and equal access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation, and there are
no less restrictive means for the state to achieve that goal.”).
239. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, Conscience, Totalitarianism, and the Positivist
Mind, 77 MISS. L.J. 571, 618 (2007) (discussing those objecting to same-sex unions “in
good conscience, based not on ‘feeling’ but on sound and reasoned views of rightness and
wrongness”).
240. Kaitlin DeCrescio, Casenote, An Education in Evolution: Silencing Scientific
Inquiry in Selman v. Cobb County School District, 25 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 285,
301-02 (2006) (“Under the Establishment Clause, the government is prohibited from taking
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The difficulty pointed to here will not be solved by expanding
exemptions so that individuals will be immune from civil rights laws
as long as they have religious or non-religious qualms about inter-
acting with the people in question.241 Such an expansion would im-
pose too great of a cost on society as a general matter—anyone who
had any sort of qualms about dealing with anyone else could thereby
be excused and society could become increasingly balkanized.242
Respect and tolerance for the religious and non-religious alike is more
likely to be undermined than promoted if these kinds of exemptions
for religious and non-religious conscience are enacted.243
CONCLUSION
Commentators suggest that legislatures should afford an exemp-
tion to those who for religious reasons do not wish to serve members
of the LGBT community, likening such exemptions to those already
provided in the context of healthcare. Yet, the existing jurisprudence
on healthcare exemptions suggests that such an exemption, once
offered, might be difficult to cabin both with respect to the kinds of
services subject to the exemption and to the groups of “objectionable”
people who need not be served. All too often, commentators fail to
note the important difference between the compared exemptions—
healthcare exemptions permit those with religious qualms about
performing particular services to refrain from providing them, but
‘sides’ regarding questions of religion.”) (citing Selman v. Cobb Cnty Sch. Dist., 390 F.
Supp. 2d 1286, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2005)); cf. Dieter Grimm, Conflicts Between General Laws
and Religious Norms, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2369, 2373 (2009) (“The more multireligious
a society, the more important it is that the state remain neutral in religious matters. A
state that would take sides in religious matters would lose its capability to guarantee
liberty for all religious faiths.”).
241. See James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 241 (2007) (“[A]lthough such laws make reference to ‘conscience,’
most define that term in a virtually boundless fashion to include ‘religious, moral or ethical
principles.’ ”); cf. Minow, supra note 195, at 827-28 (“A third option . . . is to grant exemp-
tions not only to religious groups, but to other groups that make comparable accommo-
dation requests based on conscience rather than spiritual tenets.”) (citation omitted).
242. See Minow, supra note 195, at 828 (discussing how an expansion would further
undercut the laws of civil rights).
243. Dean Minow does not seem to appreciate this possibility. Cf. id. at 845-46 (“A bit
more respect, flexibility, and humility on all sides in the clash between religious groups
and advocates for rights for gays, lesbians, and transgendered people could open possibil-
ities for resolutions that accommodate civil rights norms and religious principles.”).
Certainly, we would not expect commentators to advocate flexibility about, say, racial
discrimination or exclusion. Cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights
and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 120 (2006) (“Just as we do not tolerate private racial
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such be-
liefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about
sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect LGBT people.”).
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they do not permit individuals to discriminate against a particular
class of persons by providing certain services for some groups of
individuals but not others.
Religious views should be taken seriously but the suggestion
that those with sincere qualms should be permitted to refuse to serve
members of the LGBT community must be rethought. Such a policy
if enacted into law will either create or reinforce second-class citizen-
ship for members of the LGBT community or, if generalized, increase
the balkanization and intolerance that is already undergoing a re-
surgence in this country. Creation of the proposed exemption will
lead to less tolerance and respect for everyone, a result that furthers
the interests of neither the religious nor the non-religious. While
sincere religious views should not be dismissed, they also should not
be allowed to bring about such harm to minorities in particular or to
society as a whole.
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
One morning a district court judge sentenced three defendants
in separate cases. In the first case, the defendant’s offense had no
victims. In the second case, the defendant’s offense resulted in a hand-
ful of victims, whose harm constituted small financial loss. In the
third case, the defendant’s crime directly facilitated a multi-billion
dollar worldwide criminal enterprise with thousands of victims, all
of whom are children.
In only one of these cases did the judge sentence the defendant
below the Sentencing Guidelines range: the case resulting in the
greatest harm.
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The defendant’s crime in that case facilitated criminal activity
that caused children, including babies, to be violently sexually abused.
This crime was possession of child pornography.
The hypothetical does not present a unique scenario. Even though
district courts now have the discretion to sentence defendants below
the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, their sentences still
fall within the recommended range in the vast majority of cases; in
fact, in 2009, district court judges sentenced defendants below the
recommended Guidelines range in only 16.9% of all cases.1 If a defen-
dant was charged with possessing child pornography, however, nearly
half of all federal judges in 2009 gave below-Guidelines sentences.2
Some of these defendants even received probation, a sentence well
below the Guidelines imprisonment range.3
In one example, the defendant, an elementary school teacher for
more than thirty years, possessed hundreds of images of child por-
nography, including images of “ ‘an adult male performing oral sex
on a prepubescent female’ ” and children being raped.4 The defendant
argued that he should not be sentenced within the recommended
Guidelines range of thirty-seven to forty-six months because he was
simply a “ ‘curious, casual user’ ” and his viewing of the images con-
stituted a “ ‘solitary, private activity.’ ” 5 The defense attorney capi-
talized on this argument, asserting that the defendant’s crime was
something that the defendant did alone and never involved “another
human being.” 6 The prosecutor responded that possession of child
pornography is a serious crime, but the judge interrupted her, stating
that it was really only “a psychological crime.” 7 The judge sentenced
the defendant to four months’ imprisonment.8
Another case involved a defendant who downloaded hundreds
of child pornographic images, “some depicting children as young as
2 or 3 being vaginally penetrated by adult males.” 9 He masturbated
while he watched them.10 Although the Guidelines range for this




4. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 251, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting the pre-
sentence report); Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L.
REV. 847, 848 (2008).
5. Goff, 501 F.3d at 252, 258 (quoting the defendant’s brief).
6. Id. at 253, 258 (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 251.
9. United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);
see also Rogers, supra note 4, at 849 (discussing the defendant’s actions and sentence
received in United States v. Goldberg).
10. Goldberg, 491 F.3d at 669.
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defendant was sixty-three to seventy-eight months of prison, the
district court sentenced him to one day in jail.11 In justifying this
sentence, the district court found “that the defendant was not a real
deviant because he had committed the crime out of ‘boredom and
stupidity,’ ” and that sending him to jail “would ruin his life.”12 The
judge further relied on her conclusion that no “ ‘actual children are
at risk’ ” from the defendant.13
Federal judges’ views that possession of child pornography is
not that serious were brought to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission recently, with some federal judges asking the Sentencing
Commission to lower the Guidelines offense level and enhancements
for this offense because they are too harsh.14
Unfortunately, these judges’ views are all too common. In the
last six months of 2009, publications ranging from those that address
the law, to those that address politics and the economy, to those that
address women’s fashion have all published articles critical of the
criminal justice system’s treatment of those charged with and con-
victed of child sex offenses.
For example, the June 2009 edition of the A.B.A. Journal fea-
tured an article entitled A Reluctant Rebellion in which the author
described critics’ views that possession of child pornography laws
carry penalties that “far exceed the seriousness of the crime.”15
Two months later, the August 8, 2009, cover story of the Econo-
mist was entitled America’s Unjust Sex Laws, with the author of
that article questioning our country’s sex offender registration re-
quirements.16
A few months after that, in the December 2009 edition of Vanity
Fair, an article entitled A Crime of Shadows scrutinized law enforce-
ment techniques employed in investigating and apprehending in-
dividuals who use the computer to prey on children, and seemed to
question the general culpability of these defendants as well.17
Unlike many sentencing judges and some of society at large, our
federal legislature and executive branch have committed themselves
to fighting possession of child pornography.18 Still, there remains
11. Id.
12. Id. at 671.
13. Id.
14. Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession of Child Porn May Be Too High, Judges
Say, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/newswire/cache/1202433693658
.html.
15. Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 54, 56.
16. Illiberal Politics: America’s Unjust Sex Laws, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 9.
17. See Mark Bowden, A Crime of Shadows, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2009, at 244 (analyz-
ing both sides of an actual case and the techniques used to catch child predators).
18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROJECT SAFE
CHILDHOOD INITIATIVE (2006), [hereinafter FACT SHEET] available at http://www.justice
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one statute that does not treat this offense as seriously as it treats
the other federal sex crimes against children: the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.19
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was promulgated by Congress to help
protect society against crimes committed by defendants on pretrial
release.20 In doing so, Congress declared that defendants charged with
certain sex crimes against minors be subjected to mandatory pretrial
release conditions, and, if the government moved to detain them pre-
trial, that they would be subject to a rebuttable presumption of deten-
tion.21 Unlike other federal sex crimes against children, possession of
child pornography is not included in the mandatory-release-condition
category of cases or in the rebuttable presumption category.22
Amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to treat possession of
child pornography offenses the same way it treats other sex crimes
against children is important because we simply cannot continue to
ignore the true nature of this offense. A belief that the defendants
who commit this offense are not dangerous rests on a misunderstand-
ing of the offense itself.23 This offense results in grave harm to real
children—more harm than most other offenses.24 These harms in-
clude the physical and emotional abuse endured by the real child vic-
tims who are portrayed in the pornographic images; the continued
abuse these victims suffer each time that the image is viewed; the
continued market that is fueled by demand for more and more porno-
graphic images; the injurious effects on the defendants themselves
when they view and share the images; and the use of child pornog-
raphy to abuse additional children.25 By not recognizing the true
nature of the crime, we are complicit in allowing the horrific abuse
being endured by children worldwide to continue unabated.
Analyzing the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is timely for two reasons.
First, this statute is based on an incapacitation theory of justice, a
theory on which more and more statutes are being based.26 Under an
incapacitation theory, statutes are promulgated to benefit society
.gov/opa/pr/2006/February/06_opa_081.html (discussing actions taken in the fight against
the sexual exploitation of children on the internet).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
20. Kenneth Fredrich Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 686
(1985).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), (e).
22. Id.
23. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 860-62 (discussing the perceived harmlessness of child
pornography possession).
24. Id. at 853.
25. See infra Parts III.B.1-4 (discussing harm caused by viewing child pornography).
26. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1217, 1232-33 (2002) (discussing how the incapacitation theory has become dominant
in criminal law and how the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is based on that theory).
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at large by protecting it from dangerous defendants.27 One of the
Bail Reform Act’s main purposes is to protect society from crimes
committed by defendants on pretrial release.28 It is important that
an incapacitation-based statute be properly crafted so as to fully
achieve its purpose. As incapacitation-based statutes are becoming
increasingly popular, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a useful
example of how best to analyze these statutes.
This article argues that the proper way for a legislature to craft
an incapacitation-based statute is to: (1) identify the statute’s benefits
and its costs and burdens; (2) look at the harm caused by a particular
offense and the defendant’s culpability in committing the offense so
as to determine whether a defendant poses a danger to society and
thus determine whether society needs to be protected from the offense;
and (3) if the defendant does pose a danger to society, determine how
to best protect society by balancing and weighing the harm caused
by the offense against the statute’s costs and burdens. In addition,
the legislature should ensure that, if all offenses result in the same
harm, and if the statute’s costs and burdens are the same for each
of these offenses, the statute should treat these offenses similarly.
When the grave harm resulting from possession of child por-
nography is weighed against the costs and burdens of detaining a
defendant pretrial or releasing him subject to mandatory release con-
ditions, and when it is recognized that the other, included sex crimes
against children result in the same harm as possession of child por-
nography, it becomes clear that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 must be
amended for it to fully achieve its underlying purpose. At present, the
statute does not treat possession of child pornography in proportion
to the danger posed by a defendant who commits this offense. The
statute also does not properly weigh the harm that results from this
offense against pretrial treatment’s costs and burdens, nor does it
treat possession of child pornography offenses consistently with other
offenses resulting in the same harm. Simply put, by amending the
statute to treat possession of child pornography with the seriousness
that it deserves, Congress would help it to achieve its underlying
incapacitation-based purpose.
Analyzing the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is also timely because
federal judges are increasingly forced to make pretrial decisions in
possession of child pornography cases as the number of these prosecu-
tions has increased.29 This is true because the Department of Justice
27. Id. at 1232.
28. See id. at 1233 (noting the Bail Reform Act of 1984 permitted detention without
bail and that this was done to protect the community).
29. See Efrati, supra note 1 (noting that in 2009 the Justice Department handled its
highest number of child pornography cases since beginning to track the statistic).
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has targeted child pornography offenses as a national concern and
has designated prosecuting this offense a national priority.30
With the Department of Justice’s new priority, sex crime offenses
are now “ ‘among the fastest growing crimes handled by the federal
justice system,’ ” 31 with pornography offenses becoming the majority
of these cases.32 In 1994, 74% of all sexual exploitation cases referred
for federal prosecution involved sexual abuse.33 That percentage fell
to 16% by 2006, but child pornography cases referred for federal pros-
ecution increased from 22% to 69% during this same time period.34
In 2008, United States Attorney’s Offices around the country prose-
cuted 2211 computer-based child exploitation cases, the vast majority
of which were for possession of child pornography.35 This number is
more than double the number prosecuted five years earlier.36 Thus,
this issue is of pressing concern.
Part I of this article will address the history of bail in our country
and explain how that history led us to the current bail statute, the
Bail Reform Act of 1984. In doing so, the article will discuss the legis-
lative incapacitation-based intent behind the statute. Part II will
explain how incapacitation-based statutes should be crafted so as to
fully achieve their goals. Part III will apply this analysis to the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and argue that it should be amended to treat pos-
session of child pornography offenses the same way that the Act treats
other federal sex crimes against children. Lastly, Part IV addresses
an anticipated argument against the proposed amendments.
I. BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ITS HISTORY AND
CURRENT PRACTICE
A. History of Bail in the United States
Bail has always been part of our criminal justice system, but
the Constitution provides only that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.” 37
30. FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
31. James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio & Roger Pimentel, New Defendants, New
Responsibilities: Preventing Suicide among Alleged Sex Offenders in the Federal Pretrial
System, 73 FED. PROBATION, 40, 42 (Sept. 2009) (quoting M. MOTIVANS, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF CHILD EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS 1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007)
(2006)).
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2008, at A14.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:037
The mechanics of bail are instead governed by our Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and by our bail statute.38 They require that,
after a defendant is arrested, he or she be taken to a judge “without
unnecessary delay.” 39 At the first court appearance, the judge must
inform the defendant of the complaint against him, his right to be
represented by counsel, his right to a preliminary hearing, and his
right to remain silent.40 Also, the judge must determine whether the
defendant should be detained pretrial or released, and, if released,
what, if any, amount of bond applies and what, if any, conditions of
release should be imposed.41
Historically, courts have detained defendants only if they posed
a risk of flight or were charged with a capital crime.42 The rationale
for detaining those charged with capital crimes was that they were
more likely to flee.43 Whether a defendant posed a danger to society
was irrelevant to bail determinations.44
Although the traditional purpose of bail was simply to ensure the
appearance of a defendant at trial, pretrial release was often unavail-
able to defendants who could not afford it.45 This apparent inequity
“led to a national bail reform movement in the early 1960s.” 46
During that time, Congress began investigating bail practices
around the country and discovered a wide disparity in bail procedures:
“[s]ome district courts routinely released . . . defendants on their
own recognizance while other[s] . . . never granted such releases,”
and others seemed to detain a high percentage of indigent defendants
who could not afford bail.47 These inconsistencies prompted passage
of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.48
The underlying goal of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was to enact
a system in which all defendants, no matter their net worth, would
be released pretrial on their own recognizance.49 Under this Act, a
court was required to release any defendant not charged with an
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(A).
40. Id. at 5(d)(1).
41. Id. at 5(d)(1)(C), (d)(3).
42. JoAnn M. Arkfeld, Comment, The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984: Effect of the
Dangerousness Determination on Pretrial Detention, 19 PAC. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1988)
(citation omitted).
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1437 (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214
(1966) (repealed 1984)).
45. Id. at 1438 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 4-5 (1976)).
46. Id. (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 4-5 (1976)).
47. Id. at 1439-40 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 161-62 (1976)).
48. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1440 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA
162-63 (1976)).
49. Id.
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offense punishable by death on the defendant’s own recognizance or on
an unsecured bond, unless the judge believed that the defendant posed
a flight risk.50 Only if the judge believed that a defendant posed a risk
of flight, could the judge detain a defendant or impose restrictions on
his pretrial release.51 Notably, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not
allow judges to detain a defendant pretrial if the judge believed that
the defendant posed a danger to the community or another person.52
B. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
1. Legislative History
Congress and the public became increasingly concerned with the
courts’ inability to consider a defendant’s dangerousness when mak-
ing pretrial decisions.53 In 1984, Congress addressed this concern and
passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984.54
This Act changed bail in our country in a radical way: with this
statute, judges were given the authority to detain a defendant, not
only because he posed a risk of flight, but also because he posed a risk
of danger to the community or to another person if released pretrial.55
Congress recognized the radical nature of their actions, stating,
“[t]he adoption of these changes marks a significant departure from
the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole pur-
pose of bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the defendant
at judicial proceedings.” 56 Congress engaged in this “significant depar-
ture” because of its concern, shared by the public, of the “alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release.” 57
In addition to trying to protect the public, in passing the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 Congress also gave district courts the ability to
conduct bail hearings fairly, thereby benefitting defendants.58
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966)
(repealed 1984)).
52. See id. at 1441 (citing R.A. Powers, Detention Under the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 413, 414 (1985)) (noting that the only reason judges could detain
defendants is if they posed a flight risk).
53. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188-89.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
55. Id. § 3142(e).
56. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3.
57. Id. In passing the statute, the Senate referenced a study of release practices in
eight jurisdictions, finding that approximately one out of every six defendants was re-
arrested while on pretrial release. Id. at 6. Of these, one-third were arrested more than
once, “and some were rearrested as many as four times.” Id. (citing LAZAR INSTITUTE,
PRETRIAL RELEASE: AN EVALUATION OF DEFENDANT OUTCOMES AND PROGRAM IMPACT 48
(1981)).
58. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1446 (citation omitted).
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Before the Act, a court concerned that a defendant was dangerous,
could either “release the defendant prior to trial despite these fears,”
or it could detain the defendant by imposing a high money bond.59
Congress wrote, “it is intolerable that the law denies judges the tools
to make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of
such defendants.”60 Congress hoped the Act “would allow the courts to
address the issue of pretrial criminality honestly and effectively.” 61
It also hoped that the defendant would benefit from a more open
system because he would be fully informed of the issue before the
court, and because the government would be required to come forward
with information to support a finding of dangerousness, to which the
defendant could directly respond.62 Congress believed that the new
bail procedures would “promote candor, fairness, and effectiveness
for society,” crime victims, and defendants.63
Congress recognized that the Act constituted a departure from our
country’s prior bail proceedings, but reiterated the principle, “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the pre-
sumption of innocence.” 64 In the end, Congress attempted to balance
a defendant’s presumption of innocence with the government’s duty
and mandate to protect the public while a defendant awaits trial.65
2. The Mechanics For Determining Pretrial Bail and
Detention
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides that, after a defendant is
arrested and brought to his first court appearance,66 the judge has
four options. She can: (1) release the defendant on his own recogni-
zance or upon the defendant signing an unsecured bond; (2) release
the defendant on conditions; (3) temporarily detain the defendant
pending “revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclu-
sion”; or (4) detain the defendant.67
59. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (2006).
65. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 8-9 (discussing a defendant’s constitutional rights and
the possibility of pretrial detention).
66. The defendants charged with committing possession of child pornography offenses
are: 99% middle-aged male, 89% white, 96.3% United States citizens, 42% with some
level of college education, and 79.9% have no prior felony convictions. Byrne, Lurigio &
Pimentel, supra note 31, at 41-42. Because these defendants are 99% male, this article
refers to them by using the masculine pronoun “he,” but it should be noted that women do
account for a small percentage of defendants charged with possessing child pornography.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a).
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Just as with the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the Act of 1984 makes
pretrial release the preferred option.68 To that end, the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 still requires a judge to release a defendant pretrial on
his own personal recognizance or on an unsecured bond unless the
judge determines that such release would not reasonably ensure the
defendant’s presence at trial or unless the judge determines that
doing so would “endanger the safety of any other person or the com-
munity.” 69 The Act also specifically prohibits a judge from imposing
bail that would, in effect, result in the pretrial detention of a defen-
dant who could not afford it.70
a. Pretrial Release with Conditions
Only if the judge determines that pretrial release on the defen-
dant’s own recognizance or on an unsecured bond would not reasonably
assure the defendant’s appearance or the safety of another person
or community may the judge order that a defendant’s pretrial release
be subject to certain conditions.71
If the judge determines that pretrial release conditions should
be ordered, the court must choose the “least restrictive further con-
dition, or combination of conditions . . . [to] reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community . . . .” 72 The judge may impose, but is not
limited to, the following conditions requiring that the defendant:
(1) remain in the custody of a particular person; (2) “maintain employ-
ment”; (3) “commence an educational program”; (4) “abide by speci-
fied restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel”;
(5) “avoid all contact with an alleged victim . . . and with a potential
witness”; (6) “report . . . to a designated law enforcement agency”;
(7) “comply with a specified curfew”; (8) “refrain from possessing a
firearm”; (9) “refrain from excessive use of alcohol” or illegal drugs;
(10) undergo medical, psychiatric, and/or substance abuse treatment;
(11) provide security for the bond; and/or (12) “execute a bail bond
with solvent sureties.” 73
68. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(a), 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966)
(repealed 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b); see also Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1441-42 (discussing what
a judge must find in order to deny pretrial release).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c); see also Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1442 (noting that a judge
cannot impose a financial condition that, as a result of the financial situation of the de-
fendant, results in pretrial detention).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
72. Id. § 3142(c)(B).
73. Id.
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Other release conditions not specifically listed in the statute,
but which are nonetheless available to a judge, include remote com-
puter monitoring, field inspections, and full forensic searches of a
defendant’s computer.74
If a defendant is charged with committing certain sex crimes
against minors, and if the judge determines that the defendant may
be released pretrial, the judge must impose the following conditions:
(1) electronic monitoring; (2) specific restrictions on the defendant’s
associations, residence, and travel; (3) no contact with the alleged
victim and any potential witness at trial; (4) mandatory reporting
“on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial
services agency, or other agency”; (5) a curfew; and (6) a prohibition
against “possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon.” 75 Possession of child pornography is one of the only federal
sex crimes against minors that is not included in the list of offenses
requiring mandatory release conditions.76
b. Pretrial Detention
With respect to detention, a judge is not authorized to detain
all defendants pretrial; instead, the judge is restrained by several
statutory requirements and prohibitions.
First, only if a defendant has been charged with certain offenses
that are specifically enumerated in the statute, or if the defendant
poses a flight risk, may the court impose pretrial detention.77 Second,
the government must move for detention.78
If the defendant qualifies for detention and if the government has
moved to detain him, a detention hearing should be held at the de-
fendant’s first court appearance or within five days thereafter.79 At
the detention hearing, the defendant has a right to be represented by
counsel, “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses,”
74. Jon Muller, Implementing Pretrial Services Risk Assessment with a Sex Offense
Defendant Population, 73 FED. PROBATION, 45, 46 (2009).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B).
76. See id. (listing the offenses requiring a conditioned pretrial release). Besides pos-
session of child pornography, the sexual abuse of a minor or ward under 18 U.S.C. § 2243
is also not included in § 3142(c). This statute criminalizes the sexual act with a minor
who is in prison, who is between twelve and sixteen years old, and who is at least four
years younger than the defendant. Id. § 2243. The exclusion of this offense is beyond the
scope of this article.
77. Id. § 3142(f).
78. Id. The government or the court may also move for detention in a case that involves
a serious risk that the defendant will flee or a serious risk that the defendant “will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice.” Id. § 3142(f)(2).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
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and to proffer information.80 Before ordering pretrial detention, the
judge must find that no pretrial release condition or combination
of conditions would reasonably assure the defendant’s presence or
another’s safety by clear and convincing evidence.81
At this hearing, the judge must consider the following factors:
(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense”;82 (2) “the weight
of the evidence against the [defendant]”;83 (3) “the history and char-
acteristics of the [defendant]”;84 and (4) “the nature and seriousness”
of the danger to the community or any person should the defendant
be released.85
As stated above, unless the defendant is a flight risk, detention
is not available in every case, but instead is limited to those cases in
which a defendant has been charged with an offense that Congress
specifically delineated as allowing the possibility of pretrial detention;
if a defendant is charged with an offense not listed, a judge may not
order that defendant detained.86 This decision to limit the availability
of detention was made after Congress determined that, “there is a
small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as
to whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the
prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or other persons.” 87 Congress only granted judges the
power to deny pretrial release to this very limited group of offenders.88
If the defendant is not a flight risk, the government may seek
detention only if the case involves: (1) “a crime of violence”;89 (2) the
sexual trafficking of children under 18 U.S.C. § 1591;90 (3) acts of
terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which the maximum
80. Id.
81. Id. § 3142(e)-(f).
82. Id. § 3142(g)(1). This factor includes “whether the offense is a crime of violence, a
Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm,
explosive, or destructive device.” Id.
83. Id. § 3142(g)(2).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). This factor includes:
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employ-
ment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history,
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether,
at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on
parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion
of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law . . . .
Id.
85. Id. § 3142(g)(4).
86. Id. § 3142(f).
87. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
88. Id. at 7.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A).
90. Id.
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term of imprisonment is ten years or more;91 (4) “an offense for which
the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death”;92 (5) a con-
trolled substance offense for which the maximum term of imprison-
ment is ten years or more;93 (6) any felony if the defendant has been
previously convicted of two or more of the following offenses: a crime
of violence, an act involving terrorism which has a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more, an offense for which the maxi-
mum sentence is life imprisonment or death, or a controlled sub-
stance offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten
years or more;94 or (7) “any felony that is not otherwise a crime of vio-
lence that involves a minor victim,” use or possession of a dangerous
weapon, or failure to register as a sex offender.95
Under provision (7) above, the government may seek detention
in all cases involving felony sex crimes against a minor, including
cases charging a defendant with possession of child pornography.96
c. The Rebuttable Presumption of Detention
Just as a defendant walks into court at trial bearing a presump-
tion of innocence, the defendant typically walks into court at the bond
hearing with the related presumption that he should be released
pending trial.97 In the Bail Reform Act of 1984, however, Congress
included what is known as the “rebuttable presumption” for certain
serious offenses.98
Under this doctrine, if a defendant has been charged with a spe-
cific type of offense and if the government has moved for detention,
a defendant will walk into court at the bond hearing facing a pre-
sumption that he should be detained pending trial.99 In this case, the
defendant bears the burden of production; that is, the defendant must
establish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release
sufficient to assure that he will not engage in dangerous criminal
activity pending trial.100
91. Id.
92. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(B).
93. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(C).
94. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(D).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E).
96. Id. Under the sentencing classifications in the United States Code, a felony is any
offense punishable by more than one year. Id. § 3559(a)(1)-(5). The sentencing range for
possession of child pornography exceeds one year, and therefore, the offense is classified
as a felony. Id. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1).
97. Id. § 3142(b).
98. Id. § 3142(e).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
100. Id.
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It is presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the person: (1) committed a controlled sub-
stance offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten
years or more; (2) used, carried, or possessed a firearm in, during,
and in relation to or in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);101 (3) conspired
to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a for-
eign country under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a);102 (4) engaged in acts of ter-
rorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b;103 or (5) engaged in certain offenses
involving a minor.104
Possession of child pornography is one of the only federal sex
crimes against minors that is not listed as one of the offenses that
triggers the rebuttable presumption.105
3. The Bail Reform Act of 1984’s Different Treatment of
Possession of Child Pornography Offenses
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 treats possession of child pornog-
raphy differently from other sex crimes against children in two ways:
(1) it is not included in the list of sex crimes against children that man-
dates imposition of release conditions if the defendant is released
pretrial;106 and (2) it is not included in the list of sex crimes against
children that triggers a rebuttable presumption of detention.107
With the rebuttable presumption, the Bail Reform Act of 1984
states that the following offenses involving a minor trigger the rebut-
table presumption: kidnapping; sex trafficking; aggravated sexual
abuse; sexual abuse; abusive sexual contact; offenses against minors
resulting in death; sexual exploitation; selling or buying children;
transporting child pornography; receiving child pornography; selling
101. Id. § 924(c).
102. Id. § 956(a).
103. Id. § 2332b.
104. These sex offenses are: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(a)(1), 2245,
2251, 2251A, 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(3),
2252A(a)(4), 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, and 2425. Id. § 3142(e).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Just as with the mandatory release conditions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c), another federal sex crime against a minor that is not included in § 3142(e) is
the sexual abuse of a minor or ward under § 2243. Id. Again, the exclusion of this offense
is beyond the scope of this article.
106. The mandatory conditioned release provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), does not mention
§ 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5). Id. § 3142(c).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) does not mention § 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5) as creating a
rebuttable presumption of detention. Id. § 3142(e).
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child pornography; reproducing child pornography or advertising/
soliciting child pornography; producing child pornography; transport-
ing someone for sexual activity; coercing or enticing a minor to engage
in illegal sexual activity; transporting minors; or using interstate facil-
ities to transit information about a minor.108 A glaring omission, pos-
session of child pornography is not included.109
Similarly, defendants subject to mandatory release conditions are
defendants charged with these exact same crimes involving a minor,
in addition to defendants charged with failing to register as a sex of-
fender.110 Here again, possession of child pornography is omitted.111
4. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 Constitutes an Incapacitation-
Based Statute
As explained above, in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
Congress acted on the “deep public concern” about crimes committed
by people on pretrial release and promulgated a statute concerned
with protecting the public.112
To that end, Congress crafted a statute that, although trying to
balance the rights of the accused with its obligation to protect the
citizenry, treated certain offenses differently than others.113 That is,
Congress hand-picked certain offenses that it believed defendants
charged with, and ultimately proven to have committed, posed a risk
of danger to the community.114 Congress did this in three ways: (1) by
limiting the availability of detention to only certain crimes;115 (2) by
further providing a rebuttable presumption of detention to an even
narrower category of offenses;116 and (3) by mandating certain release
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. These offenses include violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping); § 1591 (sex
trafficking); § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse); § 2242 (sexual abuse); § 2244(a)(1) (abusive
sexual contact); § 2245 (offenses resulting in death); § 2251 (sexual exploitation of
children); § 2251A (selling or buying of children); § 2252(a)(1) (transporting child por-
nography); § 2252(a)(2) (receiving child pornography); § 2252(a)(3) (selling child pornog-
raphy); § 2252A(a)(1) (transporting child pornography); § 2252A(a)(2) (receiving child
pornography); § 2252A(a)(3) (reproducing child pornography or advertising/soliciting child
pornography); § 2252A(a)(4) (selling child pornography); § 2260 (production of child
pornography); § 2421 (transporting someone for sexual activity); § 2422 (coercion and
enticement); § 2423 (transportation of minors); § 2425 (use of interstate facilities to
transmit information about a minor); § 2250 (failure to register under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
111. Id.
112. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).
116. Id. § 3142(e).
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conditions if a defendant is released pretrial but has been charged
with committing certain crimes.117
By attempting to protect the public against crimes committed
by defendants on pretrial release, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 adopts
an incapacitation theory, one of the four penological theories existing
today.118 These four theories are: retribution, rehabilitation, incapaci-
tation, and deterrence.119
A criminal justice system seeking retribution tailors the pun-
ishment of a crime to the moral blameworthiness of the criminal act
itself.120 A retributive system considers only the defendant’s past
actions when fashioning a sentence.121 In determining the degree of
blameworthiness for a particular offense, society looks to “the nature
and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime,” and
to “the offender’s degree of culpability,” such as his intent, motive,
and role.122
The remaining three purposes—rehabilitation, incapacitation,
and deterrence—constitute utilitarian models of justice.123 Under these
utilitarian theories, the goal of the criminal justice system looks for-
ward, not backwards, and its purpose is to treat criminal offenders
in ways that benefit society in the future; thus, societal benefit is of
primary concern when dealing with a defendant.124
Under a deterrence theory, the criminal justice system will treat
offenders in ways that will deter that offender and society in general
from committing similar criminal acts in the future.125 Under a re-
habilitation theory, the criminal justice system will attempt to reha-
bilitate the offender, thereby benefiting society at large.126 Finally,
incapacitation theory attempts to protect the public by imprisoning
dangerous individuals so that they cannot continue to inflict harm.127
The past several decades have seen an emergence of incapacita-
tion theory as society has begun to believe that a small number of
117. Id. § 3142(c).
118. See Note, supra note 26, at 1233 (discussing the incapacitation theory behind the
Bail Reform Act); Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315
(2000) (noting the four theories of criminal punishment).
119. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1315.
120. Id.
121. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590 (2005).
122. Id.
123. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
124. Frase, supra note 121, at 592.
125. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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repeat offenders account for a disproportionate share of criminal
offenses committed.128
The penological theory underlying the Bail Reform Act of 1984
is clear: one of the statute’s main goals is to protect the public from
crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release.129 Thus, the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has a utilitarian goal and constitutes an
incapacitation-based statute. To that end, the statute is consistent
with the dominating penological theory of the day.
II. PROPER ANALYSIS OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES
At first blush it would seem easy to craft and implement an
incapacitation-based statute, but upon closer review it becomes
apparent that legislatures do not always engage in proper analysis,
with the result being a statute that does not fully achieve its goal or
does more harm than good. Many believe that incapacitation-based
statutes need not concern themselves with tailoring the criminal
justice system’s treatment of a defendant to the charged offense, and
in so believing, ignore the offense’s resulting harm.
Even though “[t]he principle that a punishment should be pro-
portionate to the crime is deeply rooted” in our jurisprudence,130 some
retribution theorists assert that proportionality principles are not
relevant to incapacitation-based statutes.131 This initially seems to
make sense because, under retribution theory, the key question in
determining the proper treatment of a defendant is to assign a level
of moral blameworthiness to the offense and then tailor the treat-
ment to that assignment.132 In assessing the moral blameworthiness,
128. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 287, 309 (2001). One well-known example of a recent incapacitation-based
statute is the “three strikes” law. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (con-
sidering CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999)).
129. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
130. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
131. For example, Justice Scalia has opined that, “[p]roportionality—the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring). He further wrote, “it be-
comes difficult even to speak intelligently of ‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and reha-
bilitation are given significant weight.” Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
989 (1991)). Scalia continues, “not to mention giving weight to the purpose of California’s
three strikes law: incapacitation.” Id. See also Frase, supra note 121, at 589 n.98 (quoting
Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 192 (1995) (noting that “proportionality [of a forfei-
ture] can only be measured in relationship to the owner’s culpability.”); Allyn G. Heald,
Comment, United States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningful Proportionality Principle,
58 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 455 n.2 (1992) (describing how “the proportionality principle is
inherently a retributive concept”)).
132. Frase, supra note 121, at 590.
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society looks to the harm caused by the act and to the culpability of
the defendant in committing the act.133 In the end, the criminal jus-
tice system’s treatment of a defendant must be proportional to both.
In contrast, under a utilitarian theory, the criminal justice sys-
tem should benefit society as a whole, and under the incapacitation
theory, a subset of utilitarian theory, the criminal justice system’s
treatment of an offender should be tailored to protecting the public.134
According to some theorists, then, no proportionality between the
crime committed and the subsequent treatment of the defendant is
needed because the goal of that theory is not to connect the treatment
with the offense, but simply to protect the public from future harm.135
So if a dangerous defendant commits a minor offense, he should re-
ceive a severe prison sentence simply because he is dangerous, and
conversely if a benign defendant commits a serious offense, he should
not receive a severe prison sentence because he is not dangerous.136
At least one commentator, however, has argued that proportion-
ality principles do apply to incapacitation models of justice, and has
introduced two non-retributive proportionality concepts.137 Specifi-
cally, Richard Frase has proposed two types of proportionality that
should be achieved under an incapacitation-based system: (1) means
proportionality; and (2) ends proportionality.138
Under Frase’s means proportionality principle, the criminal jus-
tice system’s treatment of a defendant is disproportionate if less costly
or burdensome treatments will achieve the same societal benefit.139
Under the ends proportionality principle, the criminal justice
system’s treatment of a defendant may be disproportionate to the
societal benefit if the costs and burdens of the defendant’s treatment
outweigh these benefits.140
Here, one of the main goals or benefits of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 is to protect society against crimes committed by defendants
on pretrial release.141 According to Frase’s theory, to avoid issuing
disproportionate punishment, society needs to employ the least costly
133. Id.
134. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
135. See Frase, supra note 121, at 573 (noting Justice Scalia’s view that courts can
consider theories of justice, such as incapacitation, that have nothing to do with pro-
portionality).
136. See Cotton, supra note 118, at 1318 (discussing sentencing principles in a utili-
tarian theory under which dangerous crimes would receive longer sentences and “less
socially harmful crimes” would receive shorter sentences).
137. Frase, supra note 121, at 576.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 592-93.
140. Id.
141. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
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or burdensome pretrial treatment that will protect society and the
costs and burdens of the treatment should not be greater than the
protection offered.142
It seems to reason that the harm resulting from a charged
offense is relevant to the analysis because it speaks directly to the
question of how dangerous a defendant may be and how much pro-
tection against him is needed, which in turn speaks directly to the
question of how to compare the protection needed against the costs
and burdens.
The Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of harm, even
if the proportionality analysis is based on an incapacitation-based
“three strikes” statute.143 Specifically, the Supreme Court has con-
sistently considered the proportionality of the penalty in deciding
whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment is violated.144 In determining whether the treat-
ment is grossly disproportionate to the offense, the Court has looked
to “the gravity of the offense” and “the harshness of the penalty.”145
In determining the gravity of the offense, courts may further look to
“harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpa-
bility of the offender.”146 Because the Court has “recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes ‘parallel limitations’ on bail,” this line
of cases seem to support the proposition that bail decisions should
be in proportion to the harm a defendant threatens if released.147
Thus, applying the Supreme Court’s analysis for excessive punish-
ment, determining whether the treatment of a defendant pending
trial is proportionate to the offense for which he is charged requires
the lawmaker to look to the “gravity of the offense,” which, in turn,
requires the legislature to look to the “harm caused.”148
142. Frase, supra note 121, at 592-93.
143. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (discussing the seriousness of the
defendant’s offenses); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (stating that courts
should look at the nature of the offense to determine proportionality).
144. See Frase, supra note 121, at 576-88 (discussing major cases that have considered
the proportionality of punishment requirements under the Eighth Amendment) (citing
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Solem, 463
U.S. 277; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing, 538 U.S. 11; Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).
145. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
146. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
147. Id. at 289 (quoting Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
148. Frase also notes that “utilitarian theory might consider not only the harm asso-
ciated with a particular act similar to the defendant’s, but also the aggregate harm caused
by all such actions and the difficulty of detecting and deterring such actions.” Frase, supra
note 121, at 594-95 (citing Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:
An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 851-52 (1972)).
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Using both Frase’s proportionality concept with the Supreme
Court’s recognition of harm, crafting and implementing an incapac-
itation-based statute like the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires the
legislature to do several things.
First, Congress should identity the goal of the statute and the
statute’s costs and burdens.
After these two elements have been identified, Congress should
then examine the statute’s goal, and if that goal is to protect society,
it should look at the harm caused by a particular offense and the de-
fendant’s culpability in determining whether a defendant poses a dan-
ger to society. If the defendant does pose a danger to society, Congress
should next determine how to best protect society against this danger
by balancing and weighing the offense’s resulting harm against the
costs and burdens of protection. Whenever Congress weighs the harm
against the costs and burdens, it is required to make public policy de-
cisions.149 In addition, Congress should ensure that when all offenses
result in the same harm, and when the statute’s costs and burdens
are the same for each of these offenses, the statute should treat these
offenses similarly so as to fully achieve the law’s purpose.
In applying this analysis to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, it be-
comes clear that the statute is deficient and should be amended in
at least two ways: (1) the statute’s rebuttable presumption category,
found at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), should be amended to add possession
149. Some will argue that this test is not useful because a less serious offense still jus-
tifies a severe sentence if the defendant who commits the offense is dangerous. Although
this argument makes sense in the abstract, in reality we simply cannot know if a de-
fendant who commits a minor offense does indeed present a danger. In fact, the best
single predictor of future criminal activity—i.e., the best predictor that a defendant is
dangerous—is prior criminality. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment:
Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 423
(2006). “Indeed, no risk factor has been more thoroughly studied and none have gener-
ated more reliable results.” Id. (citing Alfred Blumstein, Preface to 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND “CAREER CRIMINALS,” at vii (Alfred Blumstein et al., eds.) (1986)). “ ‘[A] history of
violence has been consistently shown to be the best single predictor of future violent
behavior.’ ” Id. (quoting Dale E. McNiel, Empirically Based Clinical Evaluation and
Management of the Potentially Violent Patient, in EMERGENCIES IN MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTICE: EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT 95, 96 (Phillip M. Kleespies ed., 1998)). Under
this test, many “three strikes and you’re out” statutes would likely fail if they do not take
into account the harm that results from a defendant’s current and/or prior offenses. It is
doubtful that “three strikes and you’re out” statutes that do not account for the harm
resulting from a defendant’s offenses would pass the proposed test here, because the
statutes’ costs and burdens would arguably outweigh its benefits. In addition, a related
question to ask is how the Bail Reform Act should treat a defendant who has prior con-
victions involving sex crimes against minors, but whose present charge does not qualify
for a rebuttable presumption or mandatory release conditions. Specifically, should the
defendant’s prior criminal activity, which shows that he is dangerous, speak to whether
the defendant should be subject to pretrial detention, or, if released, subject to mandatory
release conditions? The answer is likely “yes,” but this analysis requires more time than
can be devoted to it here.
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of child pornography offenses; and (2) the statute’s mandatory release
conditions, found at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B), should be amended to
include possession of child pornography offenses.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984’s current exclusion of possession of
child pornography in those sections addressing sexual offenses against
minors fails to achieve the goals of an incapacitation system: (1) by
not treating possession of child pornography commensurate with, and
proportionate to, the danger that a defendant charged with this offense
may pose and with the harm that results from the offense; and (2) by
not treating possession of child pornography consistently with other
crimes resulting in the same harm. Until the Bail Reform Act of 1984
is amended, it will not fully achieve its purpose of protecting society
against child sexual exploitation offenses committed by defendants
on pretrial release.
III. APPLYING PROPER ANALYSIS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
A. Defining the Statute’s Benefits and Its Costs and Burdens
One of the Bail Reform Act’s main goals and benefits is the pro-
tection of society from crimes committed by defendants while on pre-
trial release.150
The statute’s costs and burdens consist of: (1) the burdens to
both the wrongly-charged and the correctly-charged defendant when
he is detained pretrial or subject to pretrial release conditions; and
(2) the potential negative effect that the criminal justice system’s
pretrial treatment of a defendant has on society’s perception of the
criminal justice system.
B. Determining Whether a Defendant Who Is Charged with
Possessing Child Pornography Poses a Danger to Society
After determining that one of the main goals of the Bail Reform
Act is to protect society, Congress should next analyze whether posses-
sion of child pornography results in harm from which society needs
protection and whether defendants charged with committing this
offense may be dangerous.
Only after we truly recognize the harm caused by possession of
child pornography, does it become clear that defendants who are
ultimately proven to have engaged in this offense are dangerous
and that society needs to be protected from them.151
150. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1437.
151. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 863 (“If we focus on the harm inflicted to a child when
an image of him being sexually abused is possessed and viewed, we can help dispel mis-
perceptions that possession is a victimless crime.”).
2010] THE PURPOSE OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES 59
Generally speaking, under an incapacitation-based system, a
defendant who commits a crime resulting in more serious harm will
be treated more severely than a defendant who commits a crime re-
sulting in less serious harm.152 This is so because society needs more
protection from serious harms than from less serious ones.
However, if a defendant commits an offense that results in great
harm, the system need not treat him as seriously as the resulting
harm if that defendant, for whatever reason, does not pose a danger
to society.153 It is here that defendants charged with possessing child
pornography try to make their case.154 They argue that their offense—
if proven—is not serious, and that they themselves are not dangerous,
because: (1) they have simply viewed pictures in the privacy of their
own home and have never actually harmed a real child;155 (2) they
have no criminal history and are otherwise law-abiding, upstanding
citizens;156 and (3) they will never engage in this conduct again.157
Based on recent statistics showing district court judges sentenc-
ing defendants far below the Sentencing Guidelines range, many
people want to believe this argument.158 The problem, however, is
that the offense is serious because it does result in great harm, and
thus the individuals who commit these offenses are dangerous.
1. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, They Have Viewed “Crime Scene Photographs” of
Real Children Suffering Real Harm159
a. Real Children, Real Harm
Legally, what is child pornography? When we hear the term, we
often think of an eighteen-year-old girl dressed to look younger in
a Catholic school girl uniform, or we fear that we will be prosecuted
152. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1318.
153. Id.
154. Alexandra Gelber, Assistant Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Response to “A Reluctant Rebellion” 5 (July 1, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf (citing Hansen,
supra note 15, at 56).
155. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
156. See Hansen, supra note 15, at 54, 57 (describing defendant Jon Hanson).
157. See Muller, supra note 74, at 46 (discussing defendants who scored low on the Risk
Prediction Index (RPI) for repeated offenses based in part on employment, education, and
prior criminal history factors).
158. Efrati, supra note 1.
159. Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, State-
ment at United States Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary
of the Passage of the Sentencing Act of 1984 2 (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20091020/Allen_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Sentencing Commission Hearing].
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for the picture we took of our newborn baby taking his first bath.
Neither image constitutes child pornography.160
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) makes it illegal in part for any per-
son to: (1) knowingly possess; (2) one or more matters containing a
visual depiction; (3) that has been transported in interstate commerce,
including by computer, or that has been produced using materials
that have been; (4) if the visual depiction is of, and was produced
using, a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.161
A minor is defined as someone less than eighteen years old.162
The minor must be a real child, and cannot be a digitally created
image.163 “ ‘[S]exually explicit conduct’ means actual or simulated—
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or oppo-
site sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic
abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person . . . .”164 Factually, this means that child pornography con-
sists of pictures of real children suffering real sexual abuse.
“In the 1970’s and 80’s, the typical sexually abusive images of
children involved photos of nude children in sexual poses.”165 Unfor-
tunately, the children in these images are becoming younger and
younger, and the images more graphic and violent.166
According to data from the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children, 83% of defendants charged with child pornogra-
phy possess pornographic images of prepubescent children.167 Of
these, 19% possess images of children younger than three years old
and 39% possess images of children younger than six years old.168
A study of all national arrests for possession of child pornography
in 2000 found that 80% of defendants possessed images graphically
depicting sexual penetration.169 Twenty-one percent possessed “images
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006) (giving the definition of “child pornography”).
161. Id. § 2252(a)(4).
162. Id. § 2256(1).
163. See id. § 2256(9) (defining an “identifiable minor” as a real person).
164. Id. § 2256(2)(A).
165. Gelber, supra note 154, at 1.
166. Id.
167. Combating Child Pornography by Eliminating Pornographers’ Access to the
Financial Payment System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children) [hereinafter Bank Hearing] available at http://
www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCoutnry=en
_US&PageId=2792; Rogers, supra note 4, at 852.
168. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
169. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-
RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ONLINE JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION STUDY
vii (2005), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
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depicting sexual violence to children such as bondage, rape, and tor-
ture.”170 Additionally, “39% had at least 1 video with moving images
of child pornography.”171
The abuse that young children endure in the pornographic
images affects them both physically and emotionally. Due to their
small size, children often suffer severe physical injuries when they
are victims of the sexual abuse that is portrayed in pornographic
images. One looks no further than case law to see this harm. In State
v. Kennedy, the eight-year-old victim suffered profuse vaginal bleed-
ing, “[h]er entire perineum was torn and her rectum protruded into
her vagina.”172 In State v. Mundt, the seven-year-old victim’s “vaginal
walls were ‘very abraded’ and had lacerations extending ‘practically
the full length of the vaginal canal’ and ‘all the way through the side
walls of the vagina’ on either side.”173 In State v. Smith, “[i]t took
more than an hour of surgery to repair some of the physical injuries”
suffered by the six-year-old victim.174 In State v. Goodwin, the seven-
year-old victim suffered “a severe laceration in the vaginal area ex-
tending all the way to the cervix,” requiring major surgery and mak-
ing it questionable whether the victim would ever be able to engage
in normal sexual intercourse or have children of her own.175
In addition to physical harm, victims may experience psychologi-
cal problems, including “sudden school failure, unprovoked crying,
dissociation, depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances, nightmares,
feelings of guilt and inferiority, and self-destructive behavior, includ-
ing an increased incidence of suicide.”176
In addition, one study has “estimated that as many as 40% of




172. 957 So. 2d 757, 760-61 (La. 2007), quoted in Brief for U.S. Representatives Lamar
Smith et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16, United States v. Farley, No.
08-15882-BB (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
173. 873 N.E.2d 828, 832, 844 (Ohio 2007) (quoting testimony of the urologist who
assisted in the victim’s autopsy), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 16.
174. 909 P.2d 236, 238-39 (Utah 1995), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
172, at 16.
175. 679 P.2d 231, 232, 234 (Mont. 1984), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
172, at 16.
176. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677 (2008) modified on denial of reh’g, 129
S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Melissa Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence:
The Constitutionality of Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 209 (2003); J. Richard
Broughton, “On Horror’s Head Horrors Accumulate”: A Reflective Comment on Capital
Child Rape Legislation, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 38 (2000); Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware!
The Death Penalty and Louisiana’s Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 79, 88 (1997)).
177. Id. at 2677 (citing A. Lurigio, M. Jones, & B. Smith, Child Sexual Abuse: Its
62 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:037
b. The Harm Continues Beyond the Sexual Abuse Itself
Unique to this offense, the harm that a victim suffers continues
far beyond the sexual abuse itself. Unlike traditional crimes in which
the harm results from the crime committed and may continue with
the victim’s recollection of that crime thereafter, the victim of child
pornography offenses is abused in the making of the images them-
selves, but is also re-victimized each time the image is viewed.178
The victims feel just as strongly about the individuals who are
looking at—and enjoying—the abuse they have endured as they feel
toward the person who made the pornographic image itself. One vic-
tim has said, “ ‘[i]t terrifies me that people enjoy viewing things like
this . . . . [E]ven though I don’t know them, they are hurting me still.
They have exploited me in the most horrible way.’ ”179 Another victim
has stated:
Usually, when a kid is hurt and the abuser goes to prison, the
abuse is over. But because [the defendant] put my pictures on
the Internet the abuse is still going on. Anyone can see them.
People are still downloading them . . . I’m more upset about the
pictures on the Internet than I am about what [the defendant] did
to me physically.180
These feelings are not surprising given that “a significant part
of the healing process for children traumatized by sexual abuse is
the ability to control the disclosure of the abuse.”181 Victims, who pre-
viously felt powerless, “may feel empowered by choosing when, how,
and to whom to disclose their abusive experiences.”182 “[C]hildren
whose pornographic images are circulated online” lose control over
the disclosure.183
“The repeated distribution and possession of child pornography . . .
re-victimizes children and exposes them to further shame and humil-
iation and the attendant physical and mental ramifications.”184 The
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 69,
70 (1995).
178. Rogers, supra note 4, at 853.
179. Gelber, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting a child pornography victim).
180. Id. (quoting a victim of child pornography) (alterations in original).
181. Sentencing Commission Hearing, supra note 159, at 13 (citing ETHEL QUAYLE ET




184. Id. (citing NAT’L SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, IMAGES
OF ABUSE: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (2006), http://www.nspcc
.org.uk/Inform/publications/downloads/imagesofabuse_wdf48065.pdf).
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harm that victims endure during the abuse continues every day of
their lives. This harm should not be ignored.
In addition to the harm associated with each viewing, the victims
often suffer physical and emotional harm long after the actual abuse
is over.
An amici curiae brief filed in the Northern District of Georgia by
certain Republican Representatives on the Judiciary Committee lays
out in detail the social science evidence demonstrating that “[s]exually
[a]bused [c]hildren [s]uffer [s]evere [p]sychological, [s]ocial, and [c]og-
nitive [p]roblems that [l]ast [l]ong into [a]dulthood.”185
Resulting psychological problems include “ ‘multiple personality
disorder, refractory psychosis, borderline personality disorder, soma-
toform disorder, and panic disorder.’ ”186 Victims of child sexual abuse
often experience depression as an adult.187 In addition, one survey has
found that there is “a twofold increased risk for suicide attempts.”188
A strong link also exists between childhood victims and post trau-
matic stress disorder later in life.189
As Justice Alito noted in United States v. Kennedy, the social
problems resulting from child sexual abuse “often become society’s
problems as well,” in the form of later “substance abuse, dangerous
sexual behaviors or dysfunction, inability to relate to others on an
interpersonal level, and psychiatric illness.”190
For example, “[v]ictims of child rape are nearly 5 times more
likely than nonvictims to be arrested for sex crimes and nearly 30
times more likely to be arrested for prostitution.”191 In addition,
“ ‘women who report child sexual abuse are at greater risk during
adolescence of sexually transmitted diseases, teenage pregnancy, mul-
tiple sexual partnerships, and sexual revictimisation.’ ”192 Further,
185. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 6.
186. Id. at 7 (quoting Yutaka Ito et al., Preliminary Evidence for Aberrant Cortical
Development in Abused Children: A Quantitative EEG Study, 10 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY
& CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 298, 298 (1998) and citing Elliot C. Nelson et al., Association
Between Self-reported Childhood Sexual Abuse and Adverse Psychological Outcomes,
59 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 139, 139 (2002)).
187. Id. at 8 (quoting Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse
on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL.
164, 175 (1993)).
188. Id. at 9 (quoting Sharon R. Dube et al., Long-Term Consequences of Childhood
Sexual Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 430, 433 (2005)).
189. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Joan Archart-Treichel, Dissociation Often Precedes PTSD in
Sexually Abused Children, 40 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 34, 34 (2005) and citing Cathy Spatz
Widom, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Abused and Neglected Children Grown Up, 156
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1223, 1223 (1999)).
190. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677 (2008) modified on denial of reh’g 129
S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 13 (quoting Paul E. Mullen & Jillian
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“children who have been sexually abused are disproportionately vic-
tims of rape and sexual assault as adults.”193
Women who were sexually abused as a child have higher rates
of alcohol abuse than women who were not abused, and those who
were abused “ ‘were roughly three times more likely than unabused
girls to report drug dependence as adults.’ ”194 Even accounting for
women who grew up in lower socioeconomic status homes, women
who were sexually abused as children were more likely to find them-
selves in the lowest socioeconomic status categories than women who
were not abused.195
In addition to the resulting psychological, social, and health
problems, studies also show that many child abuse victims suffer
neurological damage from the abuse, which causes lifelong cognitive
problems.196
2. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, the Crime Provides a Demand That Fuels
Worldwide Supply
In addition to the abuse endured during the making of the por-
nographic image and the harm a victim suffers with each new view-
ing, the offense of possessing child pornography presents a third
harm, unique to it. Each time an individual possesses child pornog-
raphy, he provides a demand that fuels supply—and with supply,
more and more children are abused.197
A 2006 report by McKinsey Worldwide projected that “commercial
child pornography is a multi-billion-dollar industry worldwide.”198
With the potential to make large amounts of money, many are pro-
ducing child pornography for the market.199 They create child por-
nography because it is profitable to do so.200
Fleming, Long-term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 9 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION
7 (1998)).
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id. at 12 (quoting K. S. Kendler et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse and Adult
Psychiatric and Substance Use Disorders in Women: An Epidemiological and Co-twin
Control Analysis, 57 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 953, 959 (2000)).
195. Id. (citing Paul E. Mullen & Jillian Fleming, Long-term Effects of Child Sexual
Abuse, 9 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION 5 (1998)).
196. Id. at 10 (citing Carryl P. Navalta et al., Effects of Childhood Sexual Abuse on
Neuropsychological and Cognitive Function in College Women, 18 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY
& CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 45, 45 (2006)).
197. Gelber, supra note 154, at 4 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
198. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
199. See Gelber, supra note 154, at 4 (describing a website operator who created child
pornography for his customers).
200. Id.
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One example illustrating the demand involves a commercial on-
line child pornography enterprise. In that prosecution, investigators
identified 70,000 customers who were using a credit card to pay $29.95
a month to access graphic child pornography images.201
The demand exists worldwide. An example of the market’s world-
wide span can be found in the prosecution of the Regpay Company,
“a major Internet processor of subscriptions for third-party commer-
cial child pornography websites.” 202 The Regpay site “was managed
in Belarus, the credit card payments were processed by a company in
Florida, the money was deposited in a bank in Latvia, and the major-
ity of the almost 300,000 credit card transactions on the sites were
from Americans.” 203
Even when money is not involved, many are producing child por-
nography in response to a demand for new material. Law enforce-
ment has discovered pedophile website communities where, to be
accepted into the online community, an individual needs to submit
a new photograph or videotape of child pornography; in other words,
an applicant seeking membership must produce new child pornog-
raphy that no one has ever seen before.204
Unfortunately, it is clear a market exists that “constantly de-
mands that more children be abused in order to create new images,”
and that supply is meeting that demand.205 Ignoring the seriousness
of this offense allows this horrific market to continue to grow un-
abated, making cruel predators rich at the expense of our children
and creating more and more child abuse victims.
3. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, the Possessor Himself Has Suffered a Deleterious
Effect from Viewing the Images
Viewing child pornography harms not only the child abused, but
the defendant himself. Michael Bourke and Dr. Andres Hernandez,
Director of the Federal Sex Offender Treatment Program, note that
viewing child pornography has an injurious effect on the viewer by
normalizing adult/child sexuality, by dehumanizing children, and
201. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See 4 Arrested During Child Porn Raids, WSBTV.COM, Nov. 30, 2009, http://www
.wsbtv.com/news/21726107/detail.html (noting that one website requires members to post
their own content as part of their membership).
205. Gelber, supra note 154, at 4.
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by desensitizing the viewer “to the harmful consequences of child vic-
timization.” 206 They report that they have never seen a defendant who
has not experienced these effects after viewing child pornography.207
The desensitization that occurs from viewing the images also con-
tinues in internet communities where possessors provide each other
with a sense of community and give each other validation that their
interest in children is normal.208 They also encourage each other to
act out on their interests.209 This message “erodes the societal mores
which could otherwise inhibit them from satisfying that impulse.” 210
These effects should not be ignored.
4. Possessors of Child Pornography Oftentimes Use the
Images Against Other Children
A fourth harm also results from this offense. Not only are the
child victims of sexual abuse harmed by their pornographic images,
but defendants often use these images to abuse even more children.
Michael J. Heimbach of the FBI testified to Congress on May 1, 2002
that defendants will show child pornography to children to demon-
strate sexual acts to them, to lower their sexual inhibitions, and to
desensitize them to sex.211 In addition, defendants may also use the
images to blackmail a victim child into not disclosing the images or
into engaging in additional sexual acts with the adult.212
5. Child Pornography Possessors’ Lack of Criminal History Is
Not Proof That They Are Not Dangerous
A common argument that a defendant charged with possessing
child pornography asserts during his initial appearance is that he has
no criminal history.213 The argument goes, then, that his actions in
this case constitute an isolated incident and that he poses no danger
206. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A Report
of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 188 (2009).
207. Id.
208. Gelber, supra note 154, at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 9-10 (2002) (statement
of Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative
Division, FBI).
212. Id. at 10.
213. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6.
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to society.214 Judges rely heavily on this argument when deciding
whether to detain a defendant or how to treat him while he is on
pretrial release.215
The problem with this argument is that the defendant’s asser-
tion does not correctly lead to the conclusion; that is, just because a
defendant has no reported prior criminal history does not mean that
his charged conduct, if proven, is an isolated act and that he does not
pose a danger to society. What it does mean is that the defendant
may simply have never been caught.
The fact that the defendant previously may have not been caught
is not surprising given how difficult it is to catch someone commit-
ting this offense in their own home on their own computer, and, if the
defendant did engage in a hands-on offense, the vast majority of child
victims keep their abuse silent.216
In addition to all the crimes we never learn about, the one crime,
if proven, for which the defendant has been charged illustrates that
he in fact does have a criminal history. Given that the above-described
harms occur with each separate possession and viewing, a defendant
who has hundreds, if not thousands of images has committed the
offense a commensurate number of times. Ernie Allen has testified
that “the reviews conducted by NCMEC at law enforcement’s request
demonstrate that many offenders set about building libraries of child
pornography images with each single image representing the sexual
exploitation of one or more children.” 217 In other words, the defen-
dant’s actions in the charged case show that he has recidivated hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of times. These crimes are not counted as
prior criminal history, however, because they are tried in one case
for judicial efficiency.218
As one commentator has noted, “the lack of a criminal history
[often] hides years of systemic criminal behavior. The defendants
simply had never been caught,” and “[t]hat their fall from grace may
have been more dramatic than other criminals does not mitigate the
seriousness of the crime.” 219
214. Id.
215. See discussion supra Part I.B (considering the dangerousness of the defendant as
a factor in pretrial release under the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
216. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6.
217. Sentencing Commission Hearing, supra note 159, at 4.
218. Similarly, the criminal justice system typically does not treat a defendant’s com-
mission of new offenses while on pretrial release towards his recidivism rate. Studies
examining sex offender recidivism rates measure recidivism by looking at re-arrest or new
convictions. Muller, supra note 74, at 46. Often defendants who commit new offenses while
on pretrial release would not be classified as recidivists, however. Because the new activ-
ities they engaged in on pretrial release were not charged as separate offenses, this new
activity was simply used as another factor to account for at sentencing. Id. at 45.
219. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6-7.
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6. Disturbing New Evidence Links Defendants Who Possess
Child Pornography to Those Who Commit Hands-On
Offenses
As explained above, possession of child pornography is a serious
offense in and of itself, regardless of whether the possessor has ever
molested an actual child. Disturbing new evidence, though, continues
to emerge illustrating that possessors have, more likely than not,
molested a real child.
In a recent study, researchers set out to determine whether con-
victed possessors of child pornography posed little risk for engaging in
hands-on offenses or if they were contact sex offenders whose criminal
sexual behavior had never been detected.220
They studied 155 defendants who were convicted in federal court
of possessing child pornography.221 They divided the offenders into
two groups:
men whose known sexual offense history at the time of judicial
sentencing involved the possession, receipt, or distribution of child
abuse images, but did not include any “hands-on” sexual abuse; and
men convicted of similar offenses who had documented histories
of hands-on sexual offending against at least one child victim.222
The subjects completed questionnaires regarding their sexual
histories when they began treatment and every six months there-
after.223 In addition, each participant voluntarily underwent a poly-
graph examination.224 Researchers compared the number of known
hands-on victims reported in the sentencing documents with the num-
ber ultimately disclosed after at least six months of treatment.225
“At the time of sentencing, 115 (74%) subjects had no documented
hands-on victims. Forty (26%) had known histories of abusing a
child via a hands-on sexual act.” 226 There were 75 known victims at
the time of sentencing averaging 1.88 victims per offenders.227
“By the end of treatment . . . 131 subjects (85%) admitted they
had at least one hands-on sexual offense, a 59% increase in the num-
ber of subjects with known hands-on offenses.” 228 Also by the end of
220. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 183.
221. Id. at 185-86.
222. Id. at 183.
223. Id. at 186.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 187.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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treatment, the number of reported victims was 1777, averaging 13.56
victims per offender.229 Dramatically, the acknowledged number of
sexual contact offenses increased by 2369%.230
“[O]f the 24 subjects . . . who denied they committed a hands-on
offense at the end of treatment, nine were polygraphed, and only two
‘passed.’ ” 231 That means that “less than 2% of subjects who entered
treatment without known hands-on offenses were verified to be ‘just
pictures’ cases.” 232 “[B]oth of these offenders remarked that while they
had not molested a child prior to their arrest for the instant offense,”
they would have been at risk for doing so had they had the access
and opportunity.233
Based on these findings, the researchers questioned “whether
it is pragmatically, not to mention theoretically, useful to discrim-
inate between ‘child pornographers’ and ‘child abusers’ or even
‘pedophiles.’ ” 234
7. All Three Branches of the Federal Government Have
Recognized These Harms
All three branches of federal government have recognized that
children depicted in pornographic images can suffer severe physical
and emotional harm, that the harm continues with each separate view-
ing, that demand fuels supply, that child pornography possessors are
encouraged to act out on their desires by viewing the pornographic
images, and that possessors use the contraband to harm even more
children.
In passing the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Con-
gress found that “[t]he use of children as subjects of pornographic
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health
of the child,” 235 and that “[c]hild pornography stimulates the sexual
229. Id.
230. Id. at 188.
231. Id.
232. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 188.
233. Id.
234. Id. Similarly, a 1980 study by the Chicago Police Department found that in almost
100% of their annual child pornography arrests, officers found visual media depicting the
defendant engaging in sex with real children. Stephen T. Fairchild, Note, Protecting the
Least of These: A New Approach to Child Pornography Pandering Provisions, 57 DUKE
L.J. 163, 168 (2007) (quoting Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and
the Constitution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 60-61
(2002) (statement of Ernest E. Allen, President and Chief Exec. Officer of the Nat’l Ctr.
for Missing & Exploited Children, and Daniel S. Armagh, Dir. of the Legal Res. Div., Nat’l
Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children)).
235. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758
(1982)).
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appetites and encourages the activities of child molesters and pedo-
philes, who use it to feed their sexual fantasies.” 236 Congress further
found that, “[c]hild molesters and pedophiles use child pornography
to convince potential victims that the depicted sexual activity is a
normal practice; that other children regularly participate in sexual
activities with adults or peers.” 237
In recently passing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act on July 27, 2006, Congress noted that, “[e]very instance of view-
ing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the
privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.” 238
Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that, “[b]ecause the
child’s actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt
him in future years, long after the original misdeed took place”;239 and
that “the distribution network for child pornography must be closed
if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation
of children is to be effectively controlled.” 240
Through the Department of Justice, the executive branch on
February 15, 2006, announced the initiation of Project Safe Child-
hood.241 With this initiative, the Justice Department allocated more
than $14 million to the Internet Crimes Against Children Program,
which is comprised nationally of 46 regional task forces, to better coor-
dinate partnerships between state, local, and federal law enforcement
in prosecuting child exploitation offenses.242 The Justice Department
stated one of its goals is to have “[i]ncreased federal involvement in
child pornography and enticement cases,” and that “[g]iven the bene-
ficial investigative tools and stiffer punishment available under fed-
eral law, U.S. Attorneys and the federal investigative agencies will
be expected to increase the number of sexual exploitation investi-
gations and prosecutions.” 243
Thus, it is accepted by all three branches of the federal govern-
ment that defendants’ arguments as to why they are not dangerous,
and relatedly, why there is little to no harm from their offense, hold no
merit. These defendants are dangerous and the harm resulting from
their offense is grave, and therefore, it is apparent that society needs
236. Id. at 12.
237. Id. at 13-14.
238. Adam Walsh Child Protection Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D),
120 Stat. 587, 624 (2006).
239. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982) (citing David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
535, 545 (1981)).
240. Id.
241. FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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to be protected from this offense. Accordingly, the criminal justice
system’s incapacitation-based treatment of that defendant must be
tailored to the harm.
The next question, then, is how much protection is needed. In
other words, what constitutes proportional pretrial treatment of a
defendant whose alleged actions result in the harm previously de-
scribed? In addressing this question, Congress should weigh the of-
fense’s resulting harm against the statute’s costs and burdens. In
doing so, Congress must necessarily make public policy decisions
as to what weight to assign both elements. If the benefit of amend-
ing the statute outweighs the costs and burdens of doing so, the Bail
Reform Act should be amended so as to fully achieve its incapacitation-
based goals.
C. Weighing the Offense’s Resulting Harm Against the Statute’s
Costs and Burdens
As already explained, the harms resulting from possession of
child pornography—harms to the individual victim portrayed in the
abuse, to future victims, to society at large, and even to defendants
themselves—are great; indeed, very few criminal offenses carry
greater harm.
After recognizing this harm and society’s need for protection,
the benefit of protection should be weighed against the statute’s costs
and burdens. The costs and burdens consist mainly of the burdens to
defendants, both wrongly and correctly charged, and to the criminal
justice system’s credibility if society does not approve of the system’s
pretrial treatment.
In weighing these two elements, policy decisions ultimately dic-
tate the end result. For example, a minor shoplifter with a high risk
of flight may flee unless bail is high, but the burdens of high bail or
pretrial detention may outweigh this risk.244 Conversely, a harm that
is not likely to occur, but which is very serious, may outweigh the
burdens of conditional bail or detention.245
Each category of costs and burdens is discussed below, with each
discussion weighing the particular cost and burden with society’s need
for protection.
244. Frase, supra note 121, at 604.
245. Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Predictions of Dangerousness and Washington’s
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 298 (1992) (“[A] harm which
is not likely to occur but which is very serious may add up to dangerousness,” whereas
“a trivial harm even though it is likely to occur, might not add up to dangerousness.”)
(quoting SEYMOUR HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 85 U.S. Dep’t. of
Health & Human Serv. Pub. No. 86-1471 (1974)).
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1. Weighing Possession of Child Pornography’s Resulting
Harms Against the Bail Reform Act’s Costs and Burdens
to a Defendant
a. Costs and Burdens to Defendants Wrongly Charged
Defendants who are wrongly charged with possessing child por-
nography obviously face a great cost while awaiting trial, whether they
are released or detained. Unfortunately, however, this is true for all
defendants wrongly charged with an offense, whatever that offense
may be. Our system is not perfect; it is a tragedy that sometimes
innocent people are charged with crimes they did not commit. Hope-
fully our system discovers this mistake and the innocent walk free.
The Supreme Court, although recognizing that simply because
a defendant has been charged with an offense does not mean that
the defendant committed the offense, still found, in United States v.
Salerno,246 that a defendant’s substantive due process rights are not
violated by pretrial detention because this detention does not consti-
tute impermissible punishment; in fact, the Court stated, pretrial
detention is not punishment at all, but instead serves only to further
the government’s legitimate regulatory interest in preventing danger
to society.247
In determining whether the Act’s restriction on liberty consti-
tuted punishment or legitimate, nonpunitive regulation, the Court
first looked to Congressional intent.248 It concluded that Congress
“perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing soci-
etal problem,” and that there was “no doubt that preventing danger
to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.” 249
The Court further found that the government’s regulatory inter-
est in protecting society can, at times, outweigh a defendant’s liberty
interest and, here, the authorized pretrial detention was not exces-
sive in relation to the regulatory goal.250 This is true because the Act
carefully limits detention to the most serious of crimes, affords defen-
dants a prompt detention hearing, and the Speedy Trial Act limits
the maximum length of pretrial detention.251
In addition, “the Government must convince a neutral decision-
maker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release
246. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
247. Id. at 747 (citation omitted).
248. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 748, 750-51.
251. Id. at 747.
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can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.” 252
The Court concluded that, “[u]nder these narrow circumstances, soci-
ety’s interest in crime prevention is at its greatest,” 253 and the gov-
ernment’s “concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens”
authorized the Bail Reform Act of 1984.254
Furthermore, the Bail Reform Act requires the district court to
consider “the weight of the evidence” against the defendant when de-
termining how to treat a defendant pretrial.255 Thus, if the evidence
against a defendant is weak, the court is required to factor that con-
sideration into its pretrial decisionmaking.
In the end, the costs and burdens to a defendant wrongly charged
with possessing child pornography are the same as the costs and bur-
dens to defendants wrongly charged with any offense. The statute is
designed to account for these costs and burdens, and therefore, they
do not alter the analysis presented here.
b. Costs and Burdens to Defendants Correctly Charged
The correctly charged defendant is also burdened by pretrial
treatment to the extent that the treatment is not commensurate to
the risk he poses of committing the offense while on pretrial release.
Also, if a defendant poses no risk, but is incarcerated anyway, his
burden is great. Similarly, if he poses no risk but is subject to man-
datory release conditions, he suffers a burden.
In attempting to predict a correctly charged defendant’s propen-
sity for future criminal activity, two approaches are used: clinical
prediction and actuarial prediction.256 Clinical predictions are made
by psychologists, psychiatrists, parole boards, and judges, all of whom
analyze the defendant personally.257 Actuarial, or statistical, prediction
relies on explicit rules that list risk factors, weigh each factor, and then
mathematically combine these numbers to yield an objective measure
of violence risk.258 Actuarial prediction has been proven to be a more
accurate, and thus preferred, method of prediction.259 Nevertheless,
252. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 755.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
256. Monahan, supra note 149, at 405.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 405-06 (citing Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting
Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgement, 88 YALE L.J. 1408,
1420-22 (1979)).
259. Id. at 408 (citing William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of
Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POL’Y & L. 293 (1996)).
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“[i]t has been widely accepted for some time that predictions of an
individual’s likelihood of committing future serious violent crime are
only one-third accurate.” 260
Even in the face of generally accepted views that we cannot al-
ways accurately predict the likelihood that a defendant will commit
future crimes, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, a federal
government agency tasked with managing and regulating federal
detention programs, with support from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, recently sponsored a study to identify rele-
vant predictors of pretrial outcomes so as to better identify which
federal defendants “are most suited for pretrial release,” and to de-
velop a risk classification scheme to rate the risk a defendant poses
if released pending trial.261
The study found that nine factors are statistically significant
in predicting pretrial risk:
(1) whether there were other charges pending against the defen-
dant at the time of arrest, (2) the number of prior misdemeanor
arrests, (3) the number of prior felony arrests, (4) the number of
prior failures to appear, (5) whether the defendant was em-
ployed at the time of arrest, (6) the defendant’s residency status,
(7) whether the defendant suffered from substance abuse prob-
lems, (8) the nature of the primary charge, and (9) whether the
primary charge was a misdemeanor or felony.262
Weights were then assigned to these nine factors.263 On a scale
from one to five, defendants classified as risk level one posed the least
risk for pretrial failure, while defendants classified as risk level five
posed the greatest risk.264
Eighty-seven percent of defendants in the lowest risk category
were released pending trial.265 They had a 97.7 percent success rate,
and were thus concluded to be “the best candidates for release.” 266
The study also found that pretrial release conditions generally did
not increase these defendants’ success level, and in some cases in-
creased the risk of pretrial failure.267
260. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 293-94 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 47 U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services Pub. No.
81-921 (1981)).
261. Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, PreTrial Risk Assessment in the Federal
Court, 73 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (2009).
262. Id. at 5.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 19.
266. Id.
267. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 19.
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“Sixty-two percent of all defendants classified in level 2 were
released pending trial,” and those released had an average pretrial
success rate of ninety-four percent.268 The study concluded that
“[d]efendants classified as level 2 are good candidates for release,
yet, similar to risk level 1, [pretrial release conditions] . . . generally
do[ ] not increase success and in some cases increases the risk of
pretrial failure.” 269
Less than half of all defendants classified as risk level three were
released pending trial and those who were “had an average success
rate of 90.8 percent.” 270 Defendants who were subjected to release
conditions were more likely to be successful pending trial.271
Forty percent of defendants classified as risk level four were re-
leased pending trial and, of these, 88.2% completed pretrial release
successfully.272 Ninety-two percent of those released were subjected
to release conditions.273
Finally, “[a]pproximately 30 percent of the highest risk defen-
dants, risk level 5, were released pending trial,” with nearly all of
these defendants being subjected to pretrial release conditions.274
These “defendants had an average success rate of 84.5 percent.” 275
The study concluded that the majority of defendants charged
with federal crimes present a low risk of pretrial failure, meaning
that they are purportedly at low risk of committing an offense while
on pretrial release or of failing to appear in court on the presently
charged crime.276 Generally, sex crime defendants fall into a lower risk
category for which the study recommends pretrial release with no re-
lease conditions attached.277 The study admonishes that “[l]ower-risk
defendants are the most likely to succeed if released pending trial.
Release conditions that include alternatives to detention—with the
exception of mental health treatment, when appropriate—generally
decrease the likelihood of success for lower-risk defendants and should
be required sparingly.” 278
Several problems exist with this study. First, the defendants’






273. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 19.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Byrne, Lurigio & Pimentel, supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted).
277. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 22.
278. Id. at 6.
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as low risk defendants.279 As explained above, however, the defen-
dant who views child pornography will often go undetected because
it is difficult to discover what someone is doing in their home and on
their computer.
In addition, the study fails to recognize the unique nature of
the possession of child pornography offense. Those who supervise de-
fendants charged with possessing child pornography caution against
the study’s conclusions for this subcategory of defendants.280 Address-
ing the study’s findings, a probation officer who deals with sex of-
fenders on pretrial release published an article alongside the study
urging restraint in applying the study’s findings to what he termed
the “special population” of federally charged sex offenders.281
In urging restraint, this probation officer provided specific
examples from his work of defendants continuing to reoffend while
on pretrial release. In one of his cases, a defendant faced with pos-
session of child pornography charges was found to possess more than
600 child pornographic images.282 “This defendant initially scored
a 1 on the [risk assessment test], was professionally employed, and
educated.” 283 The probation officer discovered chat logs on the de-
fendant’s computer that confirmed he had attempted to make online
contact with children while on pretrial release.284
Another example involved a defendant charged in the federal
District of New Jersey.285 The defendant was aware that his computer
activity was being monitored while on release, yet he chatted with an
individual who identified himself as a fifty-five-year-old convicted sex
offender.286 The two “exchanged stories of fantasy rape of children
and subsequently exchanged images of child pornography.” 287 The
probation officer went to the defendant’s home and discovered numer-
ous images of child pornography.288 The defendant scored a zero on
a risk assessment test, “was educated, employed, and had no prior
criminal history.” 289
Given both of these defendants’ assessed risk levels, the study
would have recommended that judges release them pretrial with no
279. See id. at 12-13 (discussing the increased likelihood of pretrial failure if defendants
had prior arrests and the use of this factor in assigning defendants a risk category).
280. Muller, supra note 74, at 45.
281. Id.
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release conditions attached. We would not have known of the defen-
dants’ continued criminal activity, however, but for the release condi-
tions that were imposed.290 In the end, at best, the correctly-charged
defendant’s risk level is unknown.
Next, in weighing the harm against the unknown risk, public
policy decisions must be made. As recognized above, most commen-
tators accept that predictions of future criminal activity are approxi-
mately one-third accurate.291 Bochnewich argues, however, that those
who say these numbers mandate abandoning preventive detention
from our criminal justice system are incorrect.
First, she says critics are incorrect because assuming that a two-
thirds false positive is inadequate unfairly incorporates our legal stan-
dards of proof into what is, essentially, policy making.292 Deciding
what level of risk a defendant must present in determining how to
treat a defendant pretrial is a question of public policy, and this public
policy determination is unfettered by legal constraints and standards
established by probable cause, reasonable doubt, reasonable proba-
bility, and the like.293
Next, she asserts critics of pretrial detention are incorrect because
“some of the ‘false positives’ are actually true positives, whose real
violent acts were undetected by authorities, unreported by the vic-
tims, or not prosecuted for a variety of reasons.” 294 Bochnewich cites
a study similar to the above-described Butner study, of defendants
prosecuted and convicted in Washington of child molestation.295 The
study found that although records uncovered a median of one victim
per defendant, the defendants reported in an anonymous survey that
they had a median of seven victims each.296 In terms of real numbers,
this translated to an increase from 136 known victims to 959 total vic-
tims.297 She concludes, therefore, that “there is compelling evidence
290. Id.
291. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 293-94 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 47 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services Pub. No.
81-921 (1981)).
292. Id. at 295 (quoting Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness:
Ethical Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393,
424 & n.67 (1986)) (“We reject on logical grounds any tie between standard of proof and the
level of prediction necessary to justify preventive detention.”); see also John Monahan
& David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978) (discussing using standards of proof in predictions of
dangerousness).
293. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 295-96 (citing Monahan & Wexler, supra note
292, at 37-39).
294. Id. at 296.
295. Id. at 296-97 (citing Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes
Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991)).
296. Id. at 297.
297. Id.
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that the widely accepted two-thirds ‘false positive’ incidence seriously
understates the rate of re-offense by convicted sex offenders.” 298
Even if we are to accept the two-thirds “false positive” analysis,
Congress should still decide that a defendant who poses a risk of com-
mitting additional child pornography offenses or engaging in a hands-
on sexual offense of a child while on pretrial release should be subject
to release conditions if released or a rebuttable presumption if the
government moves for detention because even if the risk is small,
a realized risk results in harm that is great. The question is, quite
simply: is it worth any risk to treat possession of child pornography
differently from other sex crimes against children? Given possession
of child pornography’s resulting harm, the answer should be a re-
sounding “no.”
2. Weighing Possession of Child Pornography’s Resulting
Harms Against the Bail Reform Act’s Costs and Burdens to
the Criminal Justice System Itself
Another cost or burden associated with a defendant’s pretrial
treatment is the system’s effect on public perception. Critics assert
that an incapacitation-based system is not fair because it treats people
based on what they might do and not on what they have done, and
treats people differently even though they have committed the same
offense, thereby leading to a loss in the public’s acceptance of, and
abidance by, the criminal justice system. Thus, this criticism speaks
directly to the costs and burdens associated with the criminal justice
system’s treatment of a defendant pretrial.
In support of retribution, and against incapacitation theory, Kant
wrote, “[p]unishment by a court . . . can never be inflicted merely as
a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for
civil society. . . . For a man can never be treated merely as a means
to the purposes of another . . . .” 299 These same sentiments underlie
298. Id. at 298.
299. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1797), quoted in Andrew Strauss, Note, Losing Sight of the
Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist Tress: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion
in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2002). Similarly,
Robinson and Darley argue that an incapacitation-based system is fundamentally flawed
because offenders are treated differently from what the community regards as just punish-
ment for the offense committed. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 467-68 (1997). To support this argument, they state that this sys-
tem will assign different sentences to two individuals who commit the exact same crime,
that the offender is being punished for an action that he has not yet done, and that the
penalty is based on factors that are irrelevant to the community’s perception of an appro-
priate sentence, such as race, gender, and age. Id. at 468.
2010] THE PURPOSE OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES 79
the criticisms of preventive pretrial detention to protect society from
crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release.
Critics also argue that under an incapacitation-based system that
treats individual defendants based on predictions of future behavior,
defendants who commit the same offense will be treated differently.
Long writes:
I think the ultimate fault with selective incapacitation is its in-
compatibility with some basic values of a free, democratic society.
Selective incapacitation constitutes an illegitimate exercise of state
power because, its employment, and specifically its appeal to pre-
dictions of individual dangerousness, results in something other
than equal, just, and uniform treatment of criminal offenders in
particular, and of citizens in general.300
As a result of these two assertions, Robinson and Darley con-
clude that, “an incapacitation-based sentencing system undercuts the
moral credibility of the criminal law . . . .” 301 According to Robinson
and Darley, our criminal justice system maintains credibility, and, as
a result, is able to help build, shape, and maintain society’s norms and
principles, only when it criminalizes and punishes offenses which de-
serve moral condemnation.302 If our system does not reflect the com-
munity’s perception of “moral blameworthiness,” then our system is
no longer credible.303 Long has further asserted that “[c]itizens could
not unanimously recognize the legitimacy of state actions, policies, and
legal rules that treated some of them as mere means for the benefit
of others.” 304
Weighing the grave harm resulting from possession of child por-
nography offenses against this argued cost, however, does not defeat
an argument to amend the statute. This is true because the purported
“costs and burdens” are, in reality, not costs and burdens at all.
First, critics’ fear of dissimilar treatment for defendants who
commit similar offenses does not apply to the Bail Reform Act of
1984. The rebuttable presumption and mandatory release conditions
apply to all defendants charged with the enumerated offenses.305 So
all defendants, no matter their personal characteristics or history, are
subjected to a rebuttable presumption of detention and mandatory
300. Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation: More at Stake than Control-
ling Violent Crime, 62 UMKC L. REV. 107, 111 (1993) (citation omitted).
301. Robinson & Darley, supra note 299, at 468.
302. Id. at 477.
303. Id.
304. Long, supra note 300, at 142.
305. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e) (2006).
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release conditions if they have been charged with the enumerated
statutory offenses.
Second, the critics’ assertions fail because they completely dis-
regard the public’s true expectations and requirements of its criminal
justice system. The public wants and demands that the criminal jus-
tice system protect them and their family. These expectations are
heightened when the threat posed is to our children. If the criminal
justice system fails to meet this public demand, it is then that the
system loses its moral credibility and legitimacy.
Although Robinson and Darley’s proposition that “the criminal
law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control” and that
this credibility “is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is
perceived as ‘doing justice,’ ” is true,306 their theory is deficient to the
extent that it ignores the public’s expectations of protection.
Indeed, these expectations are at the heart of the very reason
we have our government. Classical political philosophers cite to the
“State of Nature” as the reason individuals submit to governmental
authority, and John Locke’s arguments for the social contract were
extremely influential on the founding of this country.307 John Locke ex-
plained that the state of nature is the state of complete liberty to con-
duct one’s life as one wants, without any interference from others.308
Because the state of nature can dissolve into a state of war, however,
it is advantageous for individuals to contract together and form a civil
government.309 Government is formed only when individuals come
together and agree to relinquish their individual power to punish
those who transgress the “Law of Nature,” and to give that power to
a government.310 The government’s justification to exist is to protect
people’s property and well-being, and “when such protection is no
longer present . . . [citizens] have a right, if not an outright obligation,
to resist” the government.311
Thus the costs and burdens of amending the Bail Reform Act of
1984 to include possession of child pornography are nonexistent when
it comes to the effect an amendment would have on the criminal
justice system’s moral legitimacy. Indeed, it is only if the Act is not
amended that the criminal justice system’s moral legitimacy could
suffer. The offense’s resulting harm mandates that the statute be
306. Robinson & Darley, supra note 299, at 457.
307. Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF





2010] THE PURPOSE OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES 81
amended to treat possession of child pornography similarly to the
other sex crimes against minors.
D. Analyzing Whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984 Treats
Possession of Child Pornography Consistently with Other
Crimes Resulting in the Same Harm
In addition to treating an offense in proportion to its harm, as
weighed against its costs and burdens, in order for an incarceration-
based statute to fully achieve its goals, it should treat similar offenses
consistently. By carving out possession of child pornography offenses
from other federal child exploitation offenses, the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 fails to treat similar harms similarly, and thus fails to fully
achieve its utilitarian, incapacitation-based goal. Two examples are
provided below.
First, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 classifies receipt of child
pornography as a rebuttable presumption offense and a mandatory-
release-condition offense.312 To violate the receipt statute, the defen-
dant must: (1) knowingly receive; (2) any visual depiction; (3) that
has been transported in interstate commerce, including by computer,
or that has been produced using materials that have been; (4) if the
visual depiction was produced using a minor engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct.313 The only difference between possessing child pornog-
raphy and receiving it are the elements “possession” versus “receipt”;
otherwise, the offenses are identical.314
The harm resulting from a defendant who commits the offense of
receiving child pornography and the resulting harm from a defendant
who possesses child pornography is the same. The only difference in
these two cases is a matter of proof. In one case, the prosecutor can
prove how, where, and when the defendant received the child pornog-
raphy, but in the other case, the government lacks this evidence. In
both scenarios, however, a child has been abused and that abuse is
portrayed in the images; the victim is revictimized by both defen-
dants; both defendants supply the demand that fuels the market; both
defendants suffer injurious effects themselves; and both defendants
can use the images to abuse more children.315 By treating offenses that
result in the exact same harm differently, the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fails to fully meet its underlying incapacitation-based purpose.
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e) (2006).
313. Id. § 2252(a)(2).
314. Compare id. § 2252(a)(2) (receipt of child pornography statute) with id. § 2252(a)(4)
(possession of child pornography statute).
315. See the discussion of harm caused by viewing images of child pornography supra
Part III.B and accompanying text.
82 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:037
Another important point to note is that, by not including posses-
sion but by including receipt, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 rewards
the savvy defendant. Technology is becoming much more advanced
and defendants are able to wipe their hard drives clean, thereby elim-
inating evidence of when, where, and how they received the child por-
nography and thus inhibiting a prosecutor from being able to charge
and prove receipt. In contrast, the less savvy defendant will not elim-
inate the traces of when, where, and how he came to possess the child
pornography, and he will thus be charged with receipt, face a rebut-
table presumption at the bail hearing, and face mandatory release
conditions if he is released pretrial.
Similarly, if a defendant receives child pornography through the
mail, and if law enforcement finds the mailing envelope, prosecutors
can charge the defendant with receipt because the prosecutor can
prove where, when, and how the defendant came to possess the con-
traband. Here again, the savvy defendant may discard traces of his
receipt, but the less savvy defendant may not. Where receipt of child
pornography and possession of child pornography result in exactly
the same harm, the law should not reward the defendant who know-
ingly attempts to hide his crime. By doing so, we reward the defen-
dant who is arguably more dangerous.
Another example shows that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 treats
an offense resulting in arguably less harm—or, at the very least, the
same harm—more severely. Soliciting child pornography is included
in the rebuttable-presumption category of cases and in the mandatory-
release-condition category of cases.316 This offense makes it illegal in
part for any person who “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes,
or solicits . . . any material or purported material in a manner that
reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe,
that the material or purported material is, or contains” child pornog-
raphy.317 An individual violates this statute, then, if he advertises to
another person that he has child pornography to view or sell, even if
he does not. If a defendant is charged with such conduct, although
serious and rightly criminalized, the resulting harm from this action
is arguably less than the resulting crime of possessing actual child
pornography.
This is true because, with advertisement no child pornography
actually exists. Although the supply-and-demand harm is perpetu-
ated and a defendant may suffer certain injurious effects, such as
the belief that his desires are normal and socially acceptable, a real
316. Note the presence of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3) in the provisions of § 1342(c) and (e).
18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e).
317. Id. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
2010] THE PURPOSE OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES 83
child has not been abused to create the image and is not revictim-
ized with additional viewings. Consequently, the Act treats an offense
with arguably less harm more seriously than an offense with argu-
ably greater harm. Thus, in this example too, the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fails to fully achieve its purpose of adequately protecting the
public in a consistent, and thus most effective, manner.
Amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to include possession of
child pornography offenses alongside the other child sexual exploi-
tation offenses would result in consistent treatment of the same
harm and thus help fulfill one of the statute’s main purposes.
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS
The best argument that critics have against amending the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 is that the mandatory-release provision itself is
unconstitutional. This argument has some support from the courts.
For example, to date at least six courts have found that this
portion of the Bail Reform Act violates the Constitution’s procedural
due process clause.318 At least one court has found that mandatory
conditions of release do not violate procedural due process.319
At least four courts have found that this portion of the Act
violates the excessive bail clause under the Eighth Amendment.320
At least two courts have found that the mandatory conditions do not
violate the Eighth Amendment.321
318. See United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (D. Neb. 2009) (holding
Bail Reform Act of 1984 provisions allowing for the imposition of electronic monitoring and
curfew violate the Due Process Clause); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590,
607 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding the imposition of a curfew with electronic monitoring under
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 violates the Due Process Clause); United States v. Kennedy,
593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding conditions of pretrial release man-
dated by Bail Reform Act of 1984 violate the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d
591, 599, 601-02 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding the provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
mandating curfew with electronic monitoring for pretrial release facially denies procedural
due process and, as applied, violates the defendant’s Eight Amendment right “to be free
from excessive bail”); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901, *3
(D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007) (holding the imposition of electronic monitoring requirement as
a condition of release under the Bail Reform Act is unconstitutional because it denies
procedural due process and violates the Eighth Amendment and the separation of
powers doctrine); United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736, *11
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (holding the conditions of release under the Bail Reform Act of
1984 deny procedural due process and violate the Eighth Amendment and the separation
of powers doctrine).
319. United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
320. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02; Vujnovich,
No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901 at *3; Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736
at *11.
321. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
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Finally, at least three courts have found that the mandatory re-
lease conditions violate the separation of powers doctrine.322 At least
two cases hold that they do not violate this doctrine.323
These numbers may be skewed because they account only for
published district court orders. Most district courts, however, do not
publish their orders, so it is possible that many judges have found
that the mandatory release conditions do not violate the Constitution,
but have not published these findings.
The constitutionality of this statutory provision is beyond the
scope of this article, but even if the mandatory release conditions
were ultimately found to be unconstitutional, the argument asserted
here that possession of child pornography offenses should be treated
in the exact same manner as other child sex offenses does not change.
Assuming the Supreme Court was to find the mandatory release pro-
vision unconstitutional, Congress should treat possession of child
pornography the same way that it treats the other federal sex crimes
against minors.
If, for example, Congress were to amend the statute to make the
release conditions a rebuttable presumption, possession of child por-
nography should be included in the rebuttable presumption category
alongside the other child sex crimes. In this way, the statute would
continue to fully achieve its purpose.
CONCLUSION
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 currently treats possession of child
pornography offenses differently from other federal sex crimes against
children in two ways: (1) it does not include possession of child por-
nography offenses in the mandatory-release-condition category of
cases; and (2) it does not include possession of child pornography
offenses in the rebuttable-presumption category of cases.324 This
omission inhibits the statute from fully achieving its incapacitation-
based purpose.
Simply put, the statute fails to fully achieve its underlying in-
capacitation-based purpose because, though Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the executive branch have recognized that possession of
child pornography results in grave and exceptional harms, the Act
does not treat possession of child pornography offenses proportionally
322. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901
at *3; Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736 at *11.
323. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
324. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of how possession
of child pornography is treated differently from similar offenses.
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to those resulting harms. The Act does not give proper weight to the
harms caused by the offense relative to pretrial treatment’s costs and
burdens, and also does not treat the offense consistently with other
offenses resulting in the same harms. If these harms are properly
weighted, it becomes clear that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 should
treat possession of child pornography the same way that it treats
the other federal sex offenses against minors.
The analysis applied here to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is
useful because, as federal judges are presented with an increasing
number of defendants charged with possession of child pornography
offenses, and as many of these same judges fail to recognize the harms
resulting from this offense, amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984
would treat the offense with the seriousness that it deserves. The
analysis is also useful because, as legislatures around the country
promulgate more and more incapacitation-based statutes, the test, if
applied, helps ensure that new statutes are crafted to benefit society.
Protecting society is, after all, one of the main purposes of our criminal
justice system. This is especially true when it comes to protecting the
most vulnerable—our children.
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
An employee, whose husband regularly beat her and her five
children, informed her supervisor of her experience and requested
time off.1 She used a little over a week of paid leave to move her chil-
dren to safe housing, consult with police, assist in her husband’s
criminal prosecution, and work with the county to obtain other
support, including transitional housing, counseling and health ser-
vices, and legal assistance.2 A month after she returned to work, her
employer demoted her and two months later, terminated her em-
ployment purportedly for falsifying payroll records.3 Assuming that
the employer actually terminated the employee for taking time off
to address the impact of her husband’s violence, many courts across
this nation would not provide this at-will employee with any remedy
against her employer.4 An October 2008 decision from the Washington
Supreme Court, however, may spark a change in how courts address
these cases.5
In Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, the Washington Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that employment terminations such as
1. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 130 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
2. Id. at 130-31.
3. Id. at 131.
4. See infra Parts IV.B-C (discussing states with limited to no recognition of the public-
policy exception to at-will employment).
5. Domestic violence is a pattern of physical violence, coercion, threats, intimidation
isolation, and emotional, sexual, or economic abuse used to control an intimate partner,
child, or other family or household member. JULIE GOLDSCHEID & ROBIN RUNGE,
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 2 (2009). Con-
sistent with the definitions used by the U.S. Department of Justice, domestic violence
is a term that includes both intimate partner violence and violence between other family
members. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, (Dec. 9, 2007), http://bjs
.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf. Intimate partner violence occurs between “current
or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends, including same-sex relationships.” Id. Because
much of the research on the impact of violence on employment and the workplace is specific
to intimate partner violence, the cited statistics focus on this relationship. But certainly,
as the Danny case illustrates, child abuse and other forms of domestic violence also impact
employment. These forms of domestic violence should therefore be included in any work-
place protections. Danny, 193 P.3d at 130, 135.
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this one implicate the state’s “clear mandate of public policy of pro-
tecting domestic violence survivors and their families and holding
abusers accountable.” 6 It ultimately applied the state’s policy to
allow “employees to do what they must to prevent domestic violence,
without fear of losing their economic independence.” 7 This decision,
the first of its kind from a state supreme court,8 has great potential
to influence other state courts to recognize a similar common-law
claim and to curb the wrongful discharge of many employees.
This article builds on earlier research advocating for a public-
policy exception in this context,9 particularly in light of the recent
Washington Supreme Court decision in Danny and the expansion of
state employment laws that reflect the growing recognition of the
public benefit of providing some economic stability to those experi-
encing domestic violence.10 The Danny decision provides a blueprint
for other states to follow. It does not answer all the thorny questions
regarding what employees must prove to establish a wrongful dis-
charge claim and what defenses employers may have,11 but it clarifies
that the state’s long-term commitment to addressing this societal
issue creates a public policy that applies in the employment arena
as well.12 States should look to the Washington decision and recognize
a public policy in this context.
To evaluate the need for and likelihood of other state courts’ re-
ceptivity to a Danny-like policy, this article simultaneously considers
three variables: 1) the states’ approaches to the public-policy excep-
tion, generally; 2) their statutory recognition of the relationship
6. Danny, 193 P.3d at 141.
7. Id.
8. Before Danny, few courts recognized a similar public policy and other reported
decisions on this issue rejected public-policy claims. See infra Part III.A (discussing cases
leading up to Danny, none out of state supreme courts).
9. See Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public
Policy” Exception to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 121, 124 (2003) (arguing that those who are subject to intimate partner abuse
and are fired as a result of its effects should be able to invoke the public-policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule).
10. Several states have enacted workplace legislation. See Deborah A. Widiss,
Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State Legislation and the Need
for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 698-718 (2008) (discussing laws
created to address the workplace effects of domestic violence); see also infra Part III.B
(discussing state statutes that protect domestic violence victims in the workplace).
11. See infra Part III.A.5 (describing Danny’s holding as limited to the public-policy
element of the wrongful discharge claim). Similarly, this article focuses solely on the rec-
ognition of the public policy and does not address employer defenses or other questions
this cause of action will raise. Because of the great variability in state approaches to this
exception to at-will employment, such an analysis would require another fifty-state survey
and thus, goes beyond the scope of this article.
12. Danny, 193 P.3d at 138.
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between domestic violence and employment, specifically; and 3) the
extent to which these statutes either support or preclude a common-
law remedy for employees based on the particular statutory remedies
provided and the extent of the courts’ legislative deference. This analy-
sis suggests that at least four states and the District of Columbia
would be quite receptive to a broad public policy supporting the eco-
nomic stability of employees experiencing domestic violence.13 Six
other states likely would recognize a public policy at least in the con-
text of an employee who has sought judicial protection from the abuse,
and at least thirteen more in the context of employees who testified or
otherwise assisted with the prosecution of their batterers.14 In over
half of these states, recognition of the public-policy exception is not
only likely, but necessary to implement statutory policies intended to
assist these employees who otherwise fail to specify a cause of action.15
This analysis serves several purposes: to inform employers and
employees of their respective rights and responsibilities; to encourage
state courts to use their power to expand the common-law protections
to reach terminations related to domestic violence; and to further in-
form the current state and national debate on the need for statutory
reform to provide greater, and more consistent, financial stability to
these employees.16 The public-policy exception may currently be the
13. Employees in three additional states (Hawaii, Illinois and Oregon) have strong
statutory claims, but such statutes would preclude most common-law wrongful discharge
claims. See infra Part IV.A.3.c (discussing those states that would be receptive to a Danny-
like policy).
14. Id. (analyzing the likelihood of the states recognizing a form of the public-policy
exception for domestic violence victims).
15. Id. (explaining why the public-policy exception is critical to implementing the
various states’ existing statutes).
16. Scholars and corporate leaders have advocated for laws and policies to address this
societal issue for some time. E.g., Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII,
Domestic Violence, and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 168 (2003) (“Title
VII provides a viable means by which domestic violence victims can challenge unlawful
discrimination in the workplace and establishes disparate impact as the best alternative
for disputing discriminatory practices.”); Jane A. Randel & Kimberly K. Wells, Corporate
Approaches to Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Through Workplace Initiatives, 3
CLINICS OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 821, 829-32 (2003) (discussing how employers assist
and educate employees on ways to reduce domestic violence through workplace programs).
Scholars continue to advocate for a more comprehensive and effective employment-law
approach. Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence & Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 113-14 (2008) (advocating for an
interpretation of Title VII that would require employers to engage in a good-faith
negotiation with employees experiencing domestic violence to determine whether any
modest workplace accommodation could be made to “promote safety in the workplace and
maintain valued employees’ economic and physical security.”); Marcy L. Karin, Changing
Federal Statutory Proposals to Address Domestic Violence at Work: Creating a Societal
Response by Making Business Part of the Solution, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 377, 397-418, 428
(2009) (calling for additions to federal statutory proposals that would address employers’
concerns by “transform[ing] the current individual-focused response into a legislative
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only route for many employees seeking relief from their employer’s
conduct. Because the claim is so limited and unpredictable in most
states, however, a statutory claim would be preferable. In the mean-
time, it may be in the judiciary’s hands to strengthen the national
consensus that employees experiencing violence in their homes should
not also be mistreated in the workplace. With Danny as their guide,
state courts should begin to develop this public policy exception.
I. WHAT’S EMPLOYMENT LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?
There is growing recognition that domestic violence impacts
society well beyond the walls of its victims’ homes, often impacting
workplaces.17 The violence may follow the victim-employee to work,
as many batterers seek to sabotage employment in an attempt to ex-
pand their realm of control and make the victims more dependent.18
For those employees who attempt to leave abusive relationships, their
former partners may seek them out at work because of the predict-
ability of that location.19 A current victim’s productivity may thus
suffer because of workplace harassment or stalking, or because of
the stress and distraction the abuse at home causes.20 Victims may
vehicle that recognizes and respects the roles and responsibilities of a variety of
stakeholders”); Widiss, supra note 10, at 718 (advocating for reframing the “patchwork
of protections” state laws offer to further the “public strategy of combating domestic
violence, rather than as protections or benefits for individual victims or individual
employers”) .
17. In a 2007 survey of over 500 employees working at Fortune 1,500 companies, 26%
of the women and 8% of the men self-identified as victims of domestic violence. NAT’L CTR.
ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, CORPORATE LEADERS & AMERICA’S WORKFORCE ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 16 (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.ncdsv
.org/images/Corporate%20Leaders%20and%20America’s%20Workforce%20on%20DV
%20Summary_9-25-07.pdf. In another study of 2,373 employees across three midsized orga-
nizations (an insurance provider, a university, and a transportation company), 10.3% of
the employees had experienced domestic violence in the last twelve months, and between
double and triple that amount had experienced such violence in their lifetime. Carol Reeves
& Anne O’Leary-Kelly, The Effects and Costs of Intimate Partner Violence for Work
Organizations, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 327, 327, 330, 335-36 (2007). A recent,
small-scale study of supervisors in city government and small business settings revealed
that over half had encountered domestic violence issues among their employees in the past
five years and fifteen percent reported encountering such issues “many times” in the
past year. N. Glass et al., Developing a Computer-based Training Intervention for Work
Supervisors to Respond to Intimate Partner Violence 11 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (reporting results from fifty-three participants in computer-based training
pilot program).
18. Anne O’Leary-Kelly et al., Coming into the Light: Intimate Partner Violence and
Its Effects at Work, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 57, 59 (2008). For example, batterers may
interfere with their partners’ ability to get to work or use threats that cause them to leave
work. GOLDSCHEID & RUNGE, supra note 5, at 3.
19. O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 18, at 59.
20. T.K. Logan et al., Partner Stalking and Implications for Women’s Employment,
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also miss work in an attempt to address its effects, recovering from or
seeking medical assistance for injuries, participating in counseling,
finding new housing, developing safety plans with a victim advocate,
or obtaining legal advice and attending court proceedings.21 Many
individuals report experiencing trouble at work22 or losing their jobs
because of domestic violence.23 For businesses, the costs, at least in
terms of the victims’ productivity losses and health care expenses, has
been estimated at $5.8 billion annually.24
The workplace impact is not limited to the victims’ experiences.
Co-workers also suffer consequences, including increased stress and
distraction because of their perception of the abuse and an increased
workload due to the victims’ decreased productivity.25 Perpetrators
may harass or threaten co-workers directly.26 In extreme cases, though
relatively uncommon, perpetrators may even assault co-workers.27
Like the victims, the perpetrators themselves are often less produc-
tive employees.28
22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 268, 285 (2007).
21. Karin, supra note 16, at 378, 393.
22. Id. at 378 (citing WOMEN’S BUREAU, DEP’T OF LABOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
WORKPLACE ISSUE 1 (1996); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termin-
ation the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
275, 287 (2006) (internal citation omitted)).
23. Karin, supra note 16, at 383 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS
7-9, 18-19 (1998)).
24. Widiss, supra note 10, at 679 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION &
CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf).
25. CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET AL., INVENTORY OF WORKPLACE INTERVENTIONS DESIGNED
TO PREVENT INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE § 1.1.3 (May 4, 2006), http://www.caepv.org
/membercenter/files/Inventory%20of%20Workplace%20Interventions%20Designed%20to
%20Prevent%20IPV%20%28May%202006%29.pdf.
26. CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT & JENNIFER STAPLETON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:
IT’S A WORKPLACE ISSUE! RESEARCH REPORT 19-20 (2005), http://www.peaceatwork.org
/resources/DVImpactonWorkplace-SpokaneStudy-2005.pdf (study out of Spokane, Wash-
ington finding that co-workers or supervisors were involved in 20% of the reported work-
place incidents).
27. Id. at 23-24.
28. Although less work has been done to measure the impact that perpetrators have
on their own workplaces, several recent studies support decreased productivity. Emily F.
Rothman & Phaedra S. Corso, Propensity for Intimate Partner Abuse and Workplace
Productivity: Why Employers Should Care, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1054, 1063
(2008) (finding in a small sample of employees that “male employees with a greater pro-
pensity for partner-abusive behavior were less productive than male employees with a
lesser propensity for partner abuse”). Two small-scale studies of men in batterer interven-
tion programs found that they often missed work or had difficulty concentrating at work
because of the violence. Id. at 1055 (citing findings from two 2004 studies in Maine and
Massachusetts). Many perpetrators also admit to using company telephones and vehicles
to stalk or harass their partners. Emily F. Rothman & Melissa J. Perry, Intimate Partner
Abuse Perpetrated by Employees, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 238, 244 (2004).
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Collectively, employers could substantially impact the lives of
those who experience domestic violence and, as a consequence, reduce
the frequency and severity of the harm in our society. Not only does
employment provide some level of financial independence that may
facilitate separation from the abuse,29 but it also provides a sense of
control and psychological reassurance to victims “that they are capable
of providing for themselves and their children.” 30 Employment pro-
vides other non-economic benefits to domestic violence victims, includ-
ing physical safety and social connectedness.31 The workplace also
can serve as an effective vehicle for disseminating information about
available resources, including employee assistance programs and local
and national domestic abuse and batterer intervention programs.32
Employers can train employees to recognize early warning signs of
domestic abuse and to intervene if the employee wants protection or
other assistance to reduce, or even prevent, future violence.33
Many companies recognize the benefits of proactively address-
ing the impact of domestic violence in the workplace.34 Notwith-
standing the great need for such strategies, and the many resources
available to employers who choose to implement them, many em-
ployers still have not implemented domestic-violence-specific policies
or programs.35 Instead of supporting their employees, many employers
29. Widiss, supra note 10, at 680; see also Emily F. Rothman et al., How Employment
Helps Female Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: A Qualitative Study, 12 J.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 136, 142 (2007) (discussing why employment is helpful
to those struggling with the effects of partner violence and abuse).
30. Rothman et al., supra note 29, at 138.
31. Id. at 138-40.
32. See LINDQUIST, supra note 25, § 1.2 (noting the programs employers can implement
in order to educate employees and reduce domestic violence).
33. See id. § 3.2 (discussing IPV prevention programs at twenty-six companies directed
at employees).
34. See GOLDSCHEID & RUNGE, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing how employers are
addressing domestic violence); LINDQUIST, supra note 25, § 1.2 (noting employers’ reasons
for developing IPV prevention programs). For example, the Corporate Alliance to End
Partner Violence, founded in 1995 by business leaders who view the workplace as an
effective vehicle for combating domestic violence, has dozens of corporate members who
“exchange information, collaborate on projects, and use their influence to instigate change.”
Our Purpose, CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE, http://www.caepv.org
/about/ purpose.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). Employers who encourage employees to
report their experiences can work individually with the employees to meet their specific
needs. While some employees may need time off to address the violence, like the employee
in the Danny case, others may benefit from important, but low-cost, accommodations,
such as telephone and voicemail monitoring, a new telephone number, a new work station,
security escorts, and shift adjustments. Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 120; see also LEGAL
MOMENTUM, SAFETY PLANNING IN THE WORKPLACE: PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR JOB
1-2 (2001), http://www.legalmomentum .org/assets/pdfs/safety-planning.pdf (discussing how
victims of domestic violence can protect themselves and their jobs).
35. A recent survey of corporate executives further reveals this disconnect: “Although
nearly 2 in 3 corporate executives (63%) say that domestic violence is a major problem in
our society and 55% cite its harmful impact on productivity in their companies . . . ,” only
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either fail to recognize what is impacting their employees’ work or
choose not to see it because they consider domestic violence a “private”
matter.36 It may be easier to just terminate the employment based
on the employee’s conduct—for example, frequent absences or late
arrivals—and ignore the underlying cause. Employers also may fear
the alternative—that if they maintain the employee, they might
expose others to harm.37 While employee productivity and workplace
safety may be legitimate employer concerns in certain situations, they
are not the rule, and they should not be used reflexively to terminate
employment without considering the specific circumstances.38 Laws
and policies should instead encourage employers to work with their
employees to preserve their financial stability to the extent possible.
II. THE PUBLIC-POLICY EXCEPTION TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
Although many states have begun to address this issue through
specific workplace legislation,39 many employers who terminate em-
ployees for reasons related to domestic violence currently face lim-
ited liability because of the doctrine of at-will employment.40 Not
13% say that their companies should address domestic violence. CORPORATE LEADERS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Workplace Statistics, (2010), http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/facts_stats
.php?factsec=3 (citing CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 34)
(additional survey results on file with author). According to a 2005 Survey of Workplace
Violence Prevention, 29.1% of businesses have policies addressing workplace violence gen-
erally, and less than half of those address domestic violence specifically. Only 4% of busi-
nesses conduct training on how to respond to issues of domestic violence. Press Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Survey of Workplace Violence, 15, 17
(Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://stats.bla.gov/iif/oschwc/osnr0026.pdf. This is consistent
with recent research from the employees’ perspective; although many victims of domestic
abuse report seeking assistance from their supervisors, they also report receiving limited
assistance. Glass et al., supra note 17, at 5-6. On the other hand, perpetrators report ex-
periencing support for enrollment in batterer treatment programs and receiving time off
from work for court dates. Id. at 6.
36. Randel & Wells, supra note 16, at 834.
37. See John E. Matejkovic, Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s Dilemma
in Dealing with Domestic Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 309, 313 (2004) (discussing tort-
based claims employers may face); Porter, supra note 22, at 279 (discussing a hypo-
thetical where a hospital was afraid of violence spilling over into the workplace if it still
employed a domestic violence victim).
38. With respect to workplace safety, the risks are often overstated: “[T]he constant
refrain that domestic violence may lead to workplace violence, especially when combined
with the widely-held tendency to blame victims for violence, distorts the overall picture
and may contribute to the frequency with which victims are fired.” Widiss, supra note 10,
at 686. Even in extreme cases of workplace violence, courts frequently do not find the harm
foreseeable and, thus, do not hold the employer liable. Matejkovic, supra note 37, at 315-24
(summarizing several case examples).
39. Widiss, supra note 10, at 698-716 (summarizing current legislation); infra Part III.B.
40. Park, supra note 9, at 124-25. All states but Montana recognize at-will employment.
Id. at 129. While some employer conduct may be prohibited by other statutes, many
employees remain without a remedy when abuse leads to negative employment
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withstanding the myriad statutory,41 and common-law exceptions to
the at-will presumption,42 most agree that the general rule contin-
ues to reign: employers and employees may terminate the employ-
ment relationship at any time for any reason.43 The most frequently
used exception to at-will employment, a wrongful discharge claim
that alleges the termination violated public policy,44 seeks to bal-
ance “the employer’s interest in operating a business efficiently and
profitably, the employee’s interest in earning a livelihood, and soci-
ety’s interest in seeing its public policies carried out.” 45
A. Public-Policy Element
States that recognize this exception require the employee to
demonstrate a substantial and clearly-defined public policy that the
consequences. Jessie Bode Brown, The Costs of Domestic Violence in the Employment
Arena: A Call for Legal Reform and Community-Based Education Initiatives, 16 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 38-43 (2008) (examining proposed and current laws that protect domestic
violence victims at work); Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 84-104 (explaining that current
application of Title VII fails to address the problem); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and
Economic Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 391-
409 (2007) (summarizing and critiquing laws currently available to domestic violence
victims); Widiss, supra note 10, at 684-85 (“[V]ictims of domestic violence who disclose
their situation[s] to their employers may be fired with relative impunity.”).
41. Such statutory limitations include state and federal employment discrimination
laws, labor protections, and laws protecting employees who report their employers’ criminal
behavior. See Kenneth R. Swift, The Public Policy Exception to Employment At-Will: Time
to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 551, 552-65 (2010) (discussing both state
and federal statutory exceptions to at-will employment).
42. In addition to the public-policy exception, many states recognize an implied contract
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as exceptions to at-will employment.
See Mark E. Brossman, Laurie C. Malkin & Rosemarie M. Coppola, Beyond the Implied
Contract: The Public Policy Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer’s Discretion in the At-Will Setting, 651
PLI/LIT. 7, 65-78 (2001) (examining the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
context of at-will employment).
43. Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right
of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 73 (2000) (“The employer’s divine right to dis-
miss at any time, for any reason, and without notice has survived with vigor.”). Professor
Summers concluded that the common-law exceptions “have been so grudgingly applied
by most courts, that they are little more than paper shields against arbitrary employer
actions.” Id. at 77. Others conclude that the general rule continues to “[s]wallow the[ e]x-
ceptions.” Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007).
44. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1
full.pdf.
45. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981). In the mid-
twentieth century, employment began to shift toward recognizing the “interdependence
of individuals, and particularly the dependence of employees on employers and the con-
comitant power of employers to abuse that power . . . .” Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-
at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 653, 657 (2000) (citation
omitted). It is out of this recognition that the public-policy exception grew. Id. at 659-61.
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termination at least implicated, if not directly violated.46 States artic-
ulate the other elements of the claim in various ways. For example,
some states require the plaintiff to establish a substantial public policy
and that the “discharge was motivated by an unlawful factor contra-
vening that policy.” 47 In this case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to establish that “the same result would have occurred
even in the absence of the unlawful motive.” 48 A few jurisdictions,
Washington for example, spell out four elements that a plaintiff
must establish:
(1) ‘The existence of a clear public policy (the clarity element);’
(2) ‘that discouraging the conduct in which [she] engaged would
jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element);’ (3) ‘that the
public-policy-linked conduct caused the dismissal (the causation
element);’ and (4) [that  the employer] . . . must not be able to
offer an overriding justification for the dismissal (the absence of
justification element).’ 49
Others require a showing that a “clear and substantial public policy”
exists, “the employee’s conduct brought the policy into play,” and
“the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are
causally connected.” 50
Characterized as the “Achilles heel” of a retaliatory discharge
claim,51 the determination of what constitutes a public policy also
varies considerably among states.52 The Illinois Supreme Court ex-
plained that matters that may be recognized as retaliatory discharge
are those that “strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties,
and responsibilities.” 53 The Vermont Supreme Court defines public
policy as “the community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals,
public health, public safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that gen-
46. Muhl, supra note 44, at 4.
47. Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 828-29 (W.Va. 1996).
48. Id. at 829.
49. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 131 (Wash. 2008) (en banc)
(quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996)). The test is
attributed to the well-known work of Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Swift, supra note
41, at 567. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where
Does Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1989) (describing the four-
part test).
50. Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998).
51. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
52. Often, whether the plaintiff has articulated a cognizable public policy is a question
of law for the courts. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Iowa
2000) (citation omitted). At least one jurisdiction classifies this element as one of fact for
the jury. Cilley v. N.H. Ball Bearings, 514 A.2d 818, 821 (N.H. 1981) (citation omitted).
53. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
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eral and well-settled public opinion relating to man’s plain, palpable
duty to his fellow men.” 54
All states clarify that the policy implicated by the termination
must primarily benefit the public, as opposed to serving the individ-
ual’s personal interest.55 States also recognize that the policy must
be “sufficiently concrete” 56 and “so widely regarded as to be evident
to employers and employees alike.” 57 What constitutes a public policy
continues to evolve, but many states recognize public-policy violations
when employees are terminated for refusing to violate laws, perform-
ing public obligations, exercising legal rights or privileges, or report-
ing employers’ criminal activity to public authority.58 Some of the most
common wrongful-discharge claims include terminations for serving
on a jury,59 responding to a subpoena,60 filing a workers’ compensation
claim,61 and refusing to commit an illegal act.62
B. Sources of Public Policy
States also turn to different sources for statements of public
policy. Some states broadly define the sources to include not only
the state’s constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, but also
“ ‘the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear con-
sciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just and
right . . . .’ ” 63 Others limit the sources to specific authority, usually
54. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)).
55. LoPresti v. Rutland Reg’l Health Servs., Inc., 865 A.2d 1102, 1112 (Vt. 2004)
(citation omitted); see also Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1170 (Cal. 1997)
(policy must “ ‘inure[ ] to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the inter-
ests of the individual” (citation omitted)).
56. LoPresti, 865 A.2d at 1112 (quoting Rocky Mtn. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani,
916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996)).
57. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W.Va. 2001). Before a court may
declare the existence of a public policy, it must be “ ‘so thoroughly established as a state
of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any
substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Kan. 1988) (quoting Noel v.
Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934 (Kan. 1954)).
58. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, 972 P.2d 395, 408 (Utah 1998) (citations
omitted); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho 1990) (citations omitted)
(discussing circumstances entitling employees to a public-policy exception).
59. E.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1978).
60. E.g., Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992);
Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc. 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985).
61. E.g., Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Firestone
Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Ky.
1983).
62. E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985)
(refusal to commit indecent exposure); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d
25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (refusal to commit perjury).
63. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
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statutes and constitutions, but recognize that certain terminations
might violate the spirit rather than the letter of the laws,64 or that
allowing certain discharges would undermine the policy.65 The most
restrictive view is that public policy may only be legislatively created
and that the employer must have terminated the employee for
refusing to violate a law66 or for a reason explicitly prohibited by a
statute.67 In some states, the need for legislative statements of the
policy leads to an almost absurd circularity: although the doctrine
was judicially-created, states often require a legislative source for
the underlying public policy;68 yet, if the legislature specifically ad-
dresses the issue and provides at least some relief, the statutory
remedy precludes the common-law claim.69 Thus, any evaluation of
the public-policy exception must at least consider, and may conclude
with, relevant legislation.
III. PUBLIC POLICY OF ASSISTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
In 2003, Sandra S. Park called for states to recognize a public-
policy exception to at-will employment for domestic violence victims,
arguing that it would “build[ ] on the work done by battered women’s
advocates challenging the notion that domestic violence is a ‘private’
concern and address[ ] the obstacles faced by employees who experi-
ence domestic violence.” 70 To do otherwise, she posited, effectively
“contributes to re-victimization perpetrated by society as a whole.” 71
Chic. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)).
64. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (instructing courts
to determine whether the “employer’s conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a con-
stitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme”).
65. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000).
66. E.g., Mott v. Montgomery Cnty., 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted)
(recognizing exception only when discharge violates “the terms of a statute, an employment
contract, or result[s] from an employee’s refusal to commit an illegal act”).
67. E.g., Lawson v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 532 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (S.C. 2000) (citations
omitted) (explaining that the public-policy exception applies when termination itself
violates criminal law or employers require employees to do so).
68. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 399-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curiam).
69. E.g., Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 212 P.3d 982, 991 (Idaho 2009); Kruchowski v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 202 P.3d 144, 150 (Okla. 2008); Imes, 594 S.E.2d at 399; Ross v.
Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Haw. 1994). Other states permit a common-law
claim unless a “ ‘statutory remedy fully comprehends and envelops the remedies provided
by common law.’ ” Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 (Mo. 2010) (en
banc) (quoting Dierkes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mo., 991 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Mo. 1999)
(en banc)); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992) (“[W]here a
common law right exists, and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory
remedy is cumulative unless expressly stated otherwise.”).
70. Park, supra note 9, at 124.
71. Id. at 141.
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This article builds on Park’s work in light of the judicial and legisla-
tive developments that make the public-policy claim even stronger
in some jurisdictions.
A. Judicial Recognition
1. Apessos v. Memorial Press Group
When Park wrote her article, the most recent development was
the 2002 unreported decision from the Massachusetts Superior Court,
Apessos v. Memorial Press Group, which recognized a state policy of
protecting victims from physical and emotional violence and protecting
their livelihoods.72 The court described these interests as “primal” and
“connected,” explaining: “The preservation of a livelihood should serve
to reduce domestic dependence and its concomitant vulnerability to
abuse. A victim should not have to seek physical safety at the cost of
her employment.” 73 In denying the employer’s motion to dismiss, the
court concluded that an employer cannot discharge an employee for
missing one day of work to seek judicial protection, assist police, and
change her locks.74 The court found the policy in the state constitution,
which provides access to the courts and recourse for her injuries; the
state’s Abuse Prevention Act, which provides judicial relief for domes-
tic violence victims; and case law, which protects cooperation with law
enforcement.75 The court seemed most persuaded by the statutory
mandate that a victim of domestic violence who obtains a temporary
protection order, as Ms. Apessos did, appear in court the next business
day to file her complaint.76
2. Vance v. Dispatch Management Service
Not mentioned in Park’s article, but relevant to this issue, is the
2000 decision from the Northern District of Illinois, Vance v. Dispatch
Management Services, which held that terminating an employee for
obtaining a protective order against an ex-domestic partner and cur-
rent co-worker violates Illinois’s public policy.77 The court explained
that “policies affecting the health and safety of citizens will support
72. Apessos v. Memorial Press Group, No. 01-1474-A, 2002 WL 31324115, at *3 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2002).
73. Id.
74. Id. at *1, *3.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id.
77. Vance v. Dispatch Mgmt. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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a retaliatory discharge claim,” and that seeking court protection for
violence by a current or former domestic partner “would appear to
involve the protection of each citizen’s health and welfare.” 78 The
court further concluded that this situation is analogous to the line
of cases establishing a violation of public policy for discharging an
employee for reporting illegal or improper conduct.79
3. Green v. Bryant
Park also considered one other published decision on the issue,
a now fifteen-year-old case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which rejected a public-policy exception for a domestic violence vic-
tim.80 Green v. Bryant involved an employee who reported to her em-
ployer that she had been violently assaulted by her husband and
sought medical treatment for her injuries.81 Her employer not only
fired her, but also retroactively terminated her health insurance so
that her treatment costs were not covered.82 The employee alleged
that the employer admitted that the discharge was based “solely upon
her being the victim of a violent crime.” 83
The employee claimed that her termination violated two policy
interests: “protecting an employee’s right to privacy and protecting
victims of crime or spousal abuse.” 84 The court rejected the privacy
claim because she volunteered the information about the abuse to her
78. Id.
79. Id. at 911-12 (citing Howard v. Zack Co., 637 N.E. 2d 1183, 1190 (1994)). In
addition to Apessos and Vance, two other unpublished decisions since Park’s article provide
at least limited support for a public-policy claim. See Greer v. Beck’s Pub & Grille, No.
6:03-cv-02070-LRR, *32 (N.D. Iowa, Jan. 4, 2006) (declining to dismiss a public-policy-
based claim alleging termination for obtaining a protective order); Pooley v. Union Cnty.,
No. 01-343-JE, at *38 (D. Or., Mar. 17, 2003) (“[P]articipating in the criminal prosecution
of one who commits domestic violence and seeking and modifying restraining orders
appears to qualify as an ‘employment related right of important public interest.’ ”
(citation omitted)).  Both decisions are available through PACER and on file with the
author.
80. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
81. Id. at 800.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court presumed, without any reference to the employer’s arguments, that
the employer may have had concerns about “physical or emotional danger to other em-
ployees or patients” if the employee’s ex-husband came into the workplace. Id. at 800 n.2.
Not only does it seem improper for the court to presume the employer’s motivations, it
should be irrelevant to the public policy element. If a policy interest were established, then
the employer could have argued that it had some other justification for the termination.
The employer should not be able to assume that the ex-husband presented harm to the
workplace and reflexively terminate the victim’s employment. See Goldscheid, supra note
16, at 98 (arguing that firing victims for their spouses’ actions “harkens back to coverture,
when a husband and wife were treated as one legal person”).
84. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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employers.85 With respect to the policy to protect domestic violence
victims, the court held that although Pennsylvania’s Protection from
Abuse Act “provides certain procedures and protections, they do not
thereby create a protected employment class.” 86 In other words, the
court determined that because Pennsylvania’s law did not create any
employment rights or privileges, it could not serve as the basis for a
public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine. The court acknowledged,
however, that “[i]t might be a different case, and a closer question
as to the public policy exception, if plaintiff alleged that she was dis-
charged because she had applied for victim compensation or had
sought a protective order.” 87
4. Imes v. City of Asheville
Just after Park’s article, the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
in Imes v. City of Asheville, rejected a wrongful discharge claim by a
male employee who alleged his employer admitted to firing him be-
cause he was a victim of domestic violence.88 The employee, who had
worked for the company for over twenty-five years, was fired one
month after being hospitalized for gunshot injuries inflicted by his
wife.89 Narrowly defining the public policy that it may recognize, the
court determined that the employee’s claim failed because the em-
ployer’s conduct did not violate “any explicit statutory or constitu-
tional provision,” and the employer did not encourage the employee “to
violate any law that might result in potential harm to the public.” 90
With respect to North Carolina’s domestic abuse laws, the court
characterized them as providing “various protections for victims of
domestic violence,” but not establishing them as a “protected class of
persons or extend[ing] employment security status to such persons.”91
It contrasted the statutory language with that in the employment
discrimination statute, which explicitly announces the “ ‘public
policy . . . to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain and hold employment . . . .’ ” 92 The court
agreed with the employee and the dissent that “domestic violence is




88. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d per curiam,
606 S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 399.
91. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 et seq. (2003)).
92. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2003)).
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problems” that North Carolina’s laws seek to address, and not one
for which the legislature had provided employment protection.93
The dissent in Imes cautioned against rigidly defining public
policy and reminded the court that, “ ‘[t]rue to common law tradition,
we allow this still evolving area of the law to mature slowly, decid-
ing each case on the facts before us.’ ” 94 It looked to North Carolina’s
Domestic Violence Act, which authorized courts to prohibit abusers
from entering the workplace, and its unemployment compensation
laws, which provides benefits to those forced to leave or discharged
from work, as evidence of the state’s “strong public policy aimed not
only at supporting victims of domestic violence, but also at preventing
the effects of domestic violence from entering the workplace.” 95
5. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services
Four years later, the Washington Supreme Court took the ap-
proach encouraged by the Imes dissent, reviewed the state’s relevant
laws and policies, and reached a dramatically different conclusion.96
In Danny, after removing the matter to federal district court, the em-
ployer moved to dismiss the wrongful discharge claim.97 To resolve the
motion, the federal court certified to the Washington Supreme Court
the question of whether the state had “a clear mandate of public policy
prohibiting an employer from discharging an at-will employee be-
cause she experienced domestic violence and took leave from work
to take actions to protect herself, her family, and to hold her abuser
accountable.” 98 Seeking to remove any questions of fact and to focus
on the public policy issue, the Washington Supreme Court instead con-
sidered whether the state had “established a clear mandate of public
policy of protecting domestic violence survivors and their families
and holding their abusers accountable.” 99 Thus, the court’s conclu-
sion that the state did, in fact, have such a policy did not reach the
factual questions of whether this particular discharge violated a
public policy or whether the employer was required to provide time
off to this employee.100
93. Id.
94. Imes, 594 S.E.2d at 401 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (quoting Amos v.
Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 169 n.1 (1992)).
95. Id. at 402 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-3(a), 96-14(1)(f) (2003)). In fact, effective
later that same year, the North Carolina legislature enacted a law that prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees who take “reasonable time off” to seek court pro-
tection from domestic violence. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50B-5.5, 95-270(a) (West 2010).
96. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 155 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 130.
99. Id.
100. After the Washington Supreme Court’s decision on this certified question, the
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In analyzing the public-policy question, the court explained
that the employee must demonstrate that the asserted policy is both
“ ‘truly public’ ” and “sufficiently clear.”101 Relying on the legislature’s
“repeated[ ] and unequivocal[ ]” declarations that “domestic violence
is an immense problem that impacts entire communities,” the court
had little difficulty characterizing the policy to prevent domestic vio-
lence as public.102 For the clarity of the policy, the court again relied
primarily on the state’s legislative enactments in the last thirty years,
which it characterized as “clear, concrete actions to encourage domes-
tic violence victims to end abuse, leave their abusers, protect their
children, and cooperate with law enforcement and prosecution efforts
to hold the abuser accountable.”103 It reinforced this conclusion with
references to administrative, constitutional, and judicial expressions
of the same policy.104 It also looked to judicial law as a source of addi-
tional relevant policies, including “protecting human life from immi-
nent harm.”105
The court clarified that the policy need not be one specific to
employment, but rather that “an employer may be liable for wrong-
ful discharge if the employer fires an employee for taking actions nec-
essary to protect that policy, regardless of whether the public policy
itself addresses the employment context.”106 It explained that the
contrary view, urged by the employer and the concurrence/dissent,
would essentially conflate the first two elements of the wrongful
discharge claim and require the court to evaluate the employer’s
conduct while determining whether a public policy exists.107
parties ultimately resolved the federal matter through mediation, and the court formally
dismissed the action on March 6, 2009. Danny v. First Transit, No. C05-1047RSL, Order
of Dismissal (March 6, 2009) (available through PACER and on file with the author).
101. Danny, 193 P.3d at 131 (citing Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Wash.
2001)).
102. Id. at 135. The court clarified that to be public, the policy must “ ‘concern[ ] what
is right and just’ ” and “ ‘affect[ ] the citizens of the State collectively.’ ” Id. at 131 (quoting
Dicomes v. Sate, 782 P.2d 1002 (Wash. 1989) (citation omitted)).
103. Id. at 134. At the time of the court’s decision, Washington had enacted legislation
that required employers to grant leave to domestic violence victims. The concurrence/
dissent argued that the majority opinion improperly gave retroactive effect to the legis-
lation, which did not exist when the employee was discharged. Id. at 142 (Madsen, J.,
concurring/dissenting). The majority referenced the new legislation as additional support
that the state’s policy “supports liability for employers who thwart their employees’ efforts
to protect themselves from domestic violence,” though it did not rely on this law for its char-
acterization of the state’s policy. Id. at 138.
104. Danny, 193 P.3d at 135-36.
105. Id. at 137 (citing Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (1996)).
106. Id. at 138 (citing Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 383 (1996)).
107. Id. at 137. The concurrence/dissent characterized the “threshold issue of law” as
“whether a ‘clear mandate of public policy’ forbids an employer from discharging an
employee for a particular reason.” Id. at 143 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting) (citing
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)). A separate dissent
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Even the concurrence/dissent agreed that “public policy clearly
prohibits employers from discharging an employee for obtaining a pro-
tection order, filing a complaint against an abuser, cooperating with
the investigation and prosecution of the alleged abuser, finding alter-
native living arrangements, or accessing support services for domestic
violence victims.”108 Its primary disagreement with the majority opin-
ion was its view that it essentially prohibited an employer from dis-
charging an employee for absenteeism related to these actions.109
The majority responded to this critique by explaining that this
issue was irrelevant to the public policy analysis, but rather relates
to the second element—whether the employer’s conduct jeopardized
the public policy—and required a fact-intensive inquiry that the dis-
trict court must resolve.110 The majority explained that for the plain-
tiff to satisfy the jeopardy element, she must show that her conduct
“ ‘directly relates to the public policy, or was necessary for the effec-
tive enforcement of the public policy.’ ”111 In this case, the employee
would have to establish that the time off from work “was the only
available adequate means to prevent domestic violence against her-
self or her children or to hold her abuser accountable” by introduc-
ing evidence of the particular circumstances—including her work
schedule, the abuser’s schedule, and the availability of necessary
services—that justified her missing work.112 The majority stated that
the concurrence/dissent would go to the opposite extreme and decide
as a matter of law that time off from work would never be necessary.113
This view, according to the majority, would discourage employees to
take even a “morning off work to get a protection order, to give a state-
ment to police, or to move her children out of imminent harm’s way,”
and would, in effect, “directly endanger our community’s efforts to end
domestic violence.” 114
concluded that while the legislature has enacted a “web of protections in the domestic
violence arena . . . none evinces a clear articulation of public policy that changes the legal
relationship between employer and employees.” Id. at 152 (Johnson, J., dissenting). It
also argued that it is precisely because the state has enacted so many statutory protections
for victims without addressing the employment context further supports that there is no
such “clear mandate of public policy.” Danny, 193 P.3d at 155.
108. Id. at 146 (Madsen, J., concurring/dissenting).
109. Id. Echoing the view of earlier of cases on this issue, the court stated, “[t]he public
policy tort exception to the at-will doctrine is not a vehicle by which this court may con-
script employers to shoulder the burden of a societal problem.” Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 138-39.
111. Id. at 139 (quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 384 (1996)).
112. Danny, 193 P.3d at 139.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 141. The concurrence/dissent countered that the lead opinion fails to balance
the employers’ interests with the societal interest involved, and does not explain why
employers should bear the burden of accommodating the employees’ needs. Id. at 148-49.
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B. Statutory Support
In these cases, and in fact in all cases that entertain the public-
policy question, courts may consider any relevant statutory support
for the alleged policy. As part of her analysis of the public-policy
exception, Park summarized the many state laws that either directly
or indirectly express a policy in favor of protecting those who experi-
ence domestic violence from employment consequences.115 Since her
article, the number and type of workplace legislation available to
domestic violence victims has only increased.116 Currently, at least
fourteen states specifically protect employees experiencing domestic
violence by requiring that at least some employers provide job-
protected leave to employees seeking judicial relief from the
violence.117 Nine of these states expand the leave to cover time off to
access other services, such as medical care, counseling, safety plan-
ning, or relocation assistance.118 The District of Columbia provides
paid leave for similar kinds of absences.119 In addition to job-protected
leave, both Illinois and, since January 2010, Oregon law prohibit
employment discrimination based on an employee’s experience of
domestic violence and require employers to provide reasonable accom-
modations for these employees, which may include a modified
schedule, a changed telephone or seating assignment, implementation
It also does not explain why this exception applies to victims of domestic violence as op-
posed to all crime victims or any employee who wishes to exercise some legislative right.
Id. at 149. These determinations, it believes, are matters for the legislature as the policy-
making branch of government, and not for the courts. Id.
115. Park, supra note 9, at 125-26, 146-56.
116. For example, Park identified five domestic-violence-specific leave statutes, id. at
146-47; eighteen states that provided unemployment insurance to victims of domestic
violence, id. at 125; and only one city law that prohibited discrimination against victims
of abuse, id. at 126. For a current and regularly updated summary of domestic violence-
related workplace legislation, see Employment and Housing Rights for Victims of
Domestic Violence, LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.legalmomentum.org/legal-knowledge
/publications/employment-and-housing-rights.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (providing
links to various state law guides).
117. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230, 230.1(a) (Deering 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-
402.7(1)(a) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b(a) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.313(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN § 378-72(a) (LexisNexis 2010);
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/20(1) (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23(1) (West 
2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1132(a) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1) ( 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518B.01(23), 609.748(10) (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4A-3
(LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-5.5(a) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 659A.272 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.030 (LexisNexis 2010).
118. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230 & 230.1 (Deering 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.79(1)(a)(II)-(III) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.313(2)(b)(2)-(4) (LexisNexis 2010);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-72(a)(1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2010); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 180/20(1)(A)-(D) (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1132(a)(1)-(3) (2009); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1)(B)-(C) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.272 (West 2010);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.030 (LexisNexis 2010).
119. D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(4) (LexisNexis 2010).
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of safety precautions, or assistance in documenting any abuse that
occurs at the workplace.120 Thirty-four states’ statutes seek to pro-
tect crime victims and witnesses more generally, and particularly
those subpoenaed to attend a judicial proceeding, by providing at
least some job-protected leave.121 Several states also permit employ-
ers to seek workplace restraining orders on behalf of their employ-
ees who have experienced domestic violence.122 At least 31 states
provide unemployment benefits to employees who voluntarily leave
their jobs due to reasons related to documented domestic violence,123
120. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(a), (b)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.290(1)(a),(2) (West 2010).
121. ALA. CODE § 15-23-81 (2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a) (West 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West
2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
85b(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57
(LexisNexis 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621-
10.5(a) (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 915.23(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(8) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. PROC. § 11-102(b) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205(a) (West
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 14B (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
780.762(1), 780.790(1) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.036(1)-(3) (West 2009);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(14) (West 2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205(3) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(1) (West 2009);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:62(I)-(II) (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14(1)
(McKinney 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-09.1-17(1) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2930.18, 2945.451 (West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13(a)-(b) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-4-122(a)-(b) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132(1) (West 2010);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-209(a)-(b) (West 2010).
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(A) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(a),
(c) (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-
7(b) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-6 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.270
(West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-264(b) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-52-2(a)
(West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-14-108 (West 2010). For a critique of how these laws
impact employee-victims’ autonomy and may even cause them harm, see Widiss, supra
note 10, at 715 (describing how protective orders taken out by the victim’s employer could
result in more danger to both the employee and other colleagues).
123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-771(D) (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513
(b)(3)(A) (West 2010); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1030(a)(5), 1032(d), 1256 (Deering
2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II)(B), 108(4)(r)(I) (West 2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(1)
(West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-7.6 (a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 405/601(B)(6) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4-15-1(1)(c)(8), 22-4-15-
1(1)(e), 5-26.5-2-2 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(12)(A) (2009); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23:1774(B) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1193(1)(A)(4) (2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, §§ 1(g)(½), 14(d)(3), 25(e), 30(c) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
268.095(1)(9) (West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
51-2111(1)(a) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.01(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West
2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-7 A(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(b)(i)
(McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 96-14(b)(1f) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 2-210(4)(d) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.176(12) (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
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and some even provide benefits to persons discharged for conduct
related to the violence.124
Some of the clearest and most comprehensive statements of the
public policy interests at stake in these kinds of cases come from the
statements of purpose in this emerging legislation. The first of its
kind, Illinois’s Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, seeks:
[T]o promote the State’s interest in reducing domestic violence,
dating violence, sexual assault and stalking by enabling victims of
domestic or sexual violence to maintain the financial independence
necessary to leave abusive situations, achieve safety, and minimize
the physical and emotional injuries from domestic or sexual vio-
lence, and to reduce the devastating economic consequences of
domestic or sexual violence to employers and employees . . . .125
Washington’s statute, effective April 2008, similarly recognizes:
It is in the public interest to reduce domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking by enabling victims to maintain the financial
independence necessary to leave abusive situations, achieve safety,
and minimize physical and emotional injuries, and to reduce the
devastating economic consequences of domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking to employers and employees. Victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking should be able to
recover from and cope with the effects of such violence and partici-
pate in criminal and civil justice processes without fear of adverse
economic consequences.126
These statutes clarify that domestic violence is not just an individual
employee’s problem, but one that impacts the public and that em-
ployers can help address.
LAWS ANN. § 28-44-17.1(a) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-125(A) (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6) (2010); TEXAS LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.046(a)(2) (West 2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, ch. 16A § 1251 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
50.20.050(1)(b)(4), 50.20.240(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(7)(r)(2)(a)
(West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311(a)(i)(c) (West 2010). For a discussion of the
development of and rationale behind these laws, see Rebecca Smith, Richard N. McHugh
& Robin R. Runge, Unemployment Insurance and Domestic Violence: Learning from our
Experiences, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 503, 503, 508-10, 515, 518-19 (2002) (noting how
victims of domestic violence have used unemployment benefits to secure income during
periods of unemployment caused by abuse).
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1043(23)(B)(3) (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 268.095(1)(9), (6)(b)(10) (West 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (West 2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-51-2111(1)(a) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West 2010).
125. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15(1) (West 2010). Originally enacted in 2003, this
law was recently modified to, among other things, expand its reach to more employers.
S.B. 1770, § 5 (2009) (changing employer definition from those with fifty employees to those
with fifteen).
126. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.76.010(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
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IV. POTENTIAL FOR STATE RECOGNITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PUBLIC POLICY
Although several scholars have accurately concluded that the
public policy exception currently is an undeveloped, unpredictable,
and inadequate remedy for employees terminated because of domestic
violence,127 the recent “explosion” of workplace legislation and the
Danny decision breathe new life into this claim. While a comprehen-
sive analysis of the public-policy exception is nearly impossible be-
cause of the great variability in state approaches,128 general coverage
of the doctrine leaves too many questions unanswered. Thus, this
article attempts to strike a balance between the two extremes by con-
ducting a nationwide analysis, but limiting the scope to focus on only
one source of public policy, state legislation, and specifically, only state
abuse prevention acts and state employment laws related to crime
victims or to employees experiencing domestic violence.129 It further
narrows the scope to only the state abuse prevention acts and employ-
ment laws related to crime victims in general, or to employees who
have experienced domestic violence, specifically.130 In nearly every
state, there are other sources of policy that should be explored. In-
deed, even without considering Washington’s new workplace protec-
tions, the Washington Supreme Court recognized that the states’
myriad laws addressing this societal issue convey a strong public
policy that should impact employment decisions.131 But workplace
127. For example, Professor Tarr reviewed Park’s work and concluded that the exception
is “not reliable enough or inclusive enough to ensure the economic security of domestic vio-
lence victims” and that, even if it were effective, it does not require employers to accom-
modate employees or address discrimination short of termination. Tarr, supra note 40,
at 402. Similarly, Professor Widiss references Park’s work and several unpublished deci-
sions on the public-policy exception and concludes that “many courts would hold that is
perfectly legal for an employer to fire at will a victim of domestic violence based on the
abuse against her.” Widiss, supra note 10, at 684-85.
128. PAUL H. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 5.1, n.2 (West 2009)
(“The extremely wide variety of factual variations that courts have addressed, and the lack
of consistency in their analytical methods, make impossible any systematic and exhaustive
classification of the decisions on a nationwide basis.”).
129. All states that recognize the exception, recognize state legislation as a valid source
of public policy. The more restrictive view requires state statute or constitution as source
of public policy. Id. § 5.4. Some state legislatures have explicitly restricted the public-policy
exceptions to those they create. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(3)(b) (LexisNexis
2010).
130. In particular, this article’s analysis is limited to those state laws summarized above.
See supra Part III.B (summarizing the relevant legislation, including unemployment
insurance, leave laws, and workplace restraining orders).
131. In addition to Washington’s abuse prevention act and its very recently enacted
employment-specific protections for victims of domestic violence, the court looked to state
laws relating to police response, confidentiality, funding for legal services, new crimes and
penalties for perpetrators’ interference, and child abuse prevention; the executive order
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legislation seems to hold the greatest promise for supporting this
common-law claim.
State legislation is just one of the three variables in this national
analysis. The main organizing variable considered is the states’ recep-
tivity to the common-law exception, which I have used to group the
states into three categories: those that generally recognize the claim,
but with varying definitions of “public policy”; those with limited recog-
nition of the claim; and those that have not recognized the exception.
The final variable is the extent to which any workplace legislation
either buttresses or precludes the courts from recognizing a common-
law remedy. In some states, the common-law remedy is necessary
to implement certain legislation and in others, where the statutory
remedy is clear, the courts may defer to the legislature and refuse
to adopt any different or additional common-law remedy.132
The foregoing analysis thus considers these three variables in
various ways to address each state’s likelihood of recognizing a public
policy in support of promoting financial stability for victims of domes-
tic violence. Just like the Danny decision, this analysis does not go
beyond the public-policy element, however. Assuming employees can
successfully establish this element, they will still face the state-
specific burdens of establishing the other elements of the claim, and
employers may have lawful justification for their decisions.133
A. General Acceptance
The majority of states recognize a public-policy exception with
sufficient flexibility to apply in this context.134 Nonetheless, all of
these states view the exception as extremely limited,135 and require
the policy to be exceedingly clear and sufficiently public.136 More-
that state agencies assist employees experiencing domestic violence, including providing
unpaid leave; the state constitution’s support for crime-victim cooperation; and the judicial
opinions that express an interest in preventing domestic violence, encouraging citizen coop-
eration with police, and protecting human life. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193
P.3d 128, 132-38 (Wash. 2008) (en banc). In addition to these laws, Park identified as pos-
sible bases for a wrongful discharge claim: “statutes and policies supporting the right to
physical safety; policies guaranteeing individuals’ right to go to court; and federal and state
anti-discrimination statutes.” Park, supra note 9, at 145-46 (omitting numerals).
132. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (providing an example of state statutes
limiting common-law remedy).
133. See supra Part III.A.5 (summarizing Danny) and Part II.A (listing the other
elements in certain states’ claims).
134. See infra Part IV.D (summarizing the more than thirty states that recognize the
exception in some way).
135. E.g., Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 562-63 (Pa. 2009) (citing Clay v. Advanced
Computer Applications, 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989)).
136. E.g., Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405-06 (Utah 1998).
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over, in some of the states, a legislatively-created remedy may limit
a common-law claim.137 Thus, further analysis of each state is re-
quired to determine their relative receptivity to the exception in the
context of employees experiencing domestic violence.
1. Previous Judicial Recognition
Within this larger group of states that generally recognize the
exception are the four states whose laws have been interpreted to
support a public-policy exception for terminations related to domestic
violence before the Danny decision: Massachusetts, Iowa, Illinois, and
Oregon.138 Because these decisions, either unreported or from a fed-
eral court, are not binding precedent in these states,139 the state courts’
future receptivity to such claims warrants some attention. Based on
their common-law exceptions and relevant statutes, Massachusetts
and Iowa courts most likely would recognize future claims, at least
those involving employees who sought judicial relief from their
abuse or who cooperated in the criminal prosecution of the abusers.140
Illinois and Oregon’s subsequently enacted workplace legislation, on
the other hand, probably precludes most future common-law claims.141
Both Massachusetts and Iowa recognize a common-law claim
broad enough to include terminations related to domestic violence.
Specifically, Iowa’s exception is not limited to terminations explicitly
prohibited by a statute, but rather any termination that undermines
a statute’s underlying policy.142 Massachusetts recognizes the excep-
tion when an employee is “terminated for asserting a legally guaran-
teed right . . . doing what the law requires . . . refusing to do what the
law forbids . . .” and cooperating with law enforcement.143
These two states’ statutes also generally support a policy in favor
of assisting victims of domestic violence. The abuse prevention acts
in Iowa and Massachusetts specifically authorize courts to restrain
137. E.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, 745 A.2d 178, 181 (Conn. 2000) (determining that
the statute precluded wrongful discharge claim).
138. See supra Parts III.A.1-2 (summarizing the judicial decisions supporting this
public policy).
139. 20 AM.JUR.2D COURTS § 148 (2010); 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 234 (2010).
140. See supra Parts III.A.1-2 (explaining the Iowa and Massachusetts decisions, both
of which involved employees who sought judicial relief and assisted with the criminal prose-
cution of their abusive partners).
141. See infra Part IV.A.3.c (analyzing states with domestic-violence-specific workplace
legislation).
142. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000) (stating that
the exception is not limited to express statutory prohibitions, but rather, extends to  any
termination that would undermine policy).
143. Wright v. Shriners Hosp., 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (Mass. 1992).
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offenders from the victim’s place of work,144 and Massachusetts pro-
vides unemployment benefits to employees forced to leave their work
due to domestic violence.145 Iowa and Massachusetts also provide some
protection for employees who participate in judicial proceedings.146
Thus, both states seem ripe for further development of the exception
to at-will employment for terminations that undermine their states’
fairly clear policies encouraging a stable income for crime victims and
those who experience domestic violence. The previous decisions and
the statutes, however, may limit the claim to employees who seek
judicial relief or assist with a criminal prosecution.
2. Broad Public Policy Definitions
In two additional states, New Hampshire and Vermont, the
public-policy definitions and the relevant statutory language combine
to provide strong support for this common-law claim. Both states
define “pubic policy” broadly. Vermont recognizes policies that come
not only from the constitution, a statute, or a judicial decision, but also
from “the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear con-
sciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just and
right.”147 New Hampshire’s policies similarly need not be explicit in
any statute, nor “strong and clear.”148 Employees must establish that
they were discharged for “performing an act that public policy would
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5(1)(b)(3) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§§ 1, 3(c) (West 2010). After violation of an order, the court may require the defendant
to wear a GPS and include plaintiff’s place of employment in a geographic exclusion
zone. Id. § 7.
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, §§ 1, 14, 25, 30 (West 2010).
146. IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23 (West 2009) (protecting an employee who testifies in
a criminal or Domestic Abuse Act proceeding); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 14B
(LexisNexis 2010) (protecting crime victim attending a criminal proceeding). Iowa’s statute
may actually preclude some common-law claims, however, because it provides a remedy
for aggrieved employees. IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23 (West 2009) (allowing actual damages,
court costs, and attorney fees and injunctive relief, including reinstatement). Iowa courts
may thus view the statute, not the wrongful termination claim, as controlling. See Vaughn
v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Iowa 1990) (denying claim based on religious
discrimination as preempted by Iowa Civil Rights Act).
147. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588-89 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916)). In Payne, the
Vermont Supreme Court recognized a wrongful termination claim alleging age dis-
crimination before such allegations were statutorily recognized. The court described age
discrimination as “so contrary to our society’s concern for providing equity and justice
that there is a clear and compelling public policy against it.” Id. at 589.
148. Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (N.H. 1981). New
Hampshire also defers to the jury to determine what constitutes a “public policy” sufficient
for this claim. Id.; Cilley v. N.H. Ball Bearings, 514 A.2d 818, 821 (N.H. 1981) (citation
omitted).
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encourage, or refusing to do something that public policy would con-
demn” and that the employer was motivated by “bad faith, malice,
or retaliation.” 149
While neither state requires statutory support, both have similar
statutes that evince some support for a policy of protecting employees
experiencing domestic violence. New Hampshire’s abuse prevention
act explicitly allows courts to restrain defendants from entering the
plaintiff’s place of work.150 Both states’ unemployment compensation
laws provide benefits to employees who left their employment for rea-
sons related to intimate violence, with Vermont’s specifically requiring
employees to establish that they “pursued reasonable alternatives.”151
To allow employers to simply terminate an employee’s employment
once violence became known to the employer would undermine this
statutory scheme, the underlying purpose of which is to provide finan-
cial assistance to these employees.152 In addition, both states provide
some employment protection for crime victims, generally. New Hamp-
shire prohibits employers with twenty-five or more employees from
terminating their employment for missing work to attend “legal or
investigative proceedings associated with the prosecution of the
crime.”153 Vermont prohibits employers from discharging or disciplin-
ing a crime victim for honoring a subpoena to testify.154 The public-
policy exception would assist in implementing these statutes, as
neither provides a specific remedy for the affected employees.155
3. Domestic Violence-Specific Workplace Legislation
The analysis of at least eight states and the District of Columbia’s
receptivity to this claim turns on their relatively new workplace leg-
islation, which either bolsters or precludes the common-law claim
depending on the extent of the legislative remedy provided and the
extent of the legislative remedy and of the court’s deference to that
remedy.
149. Porter v. Manchester, 849 A.2d 103, 114 (N.H. 2004) (quoting Cloutier, 436 A.2d
at 1143).
150. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:4(I)(a)(6) & 173-B:5(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
ch. 16A § 1253 (West 2010).
152. See Smith et al., supra note 123, at 503 (explaining the purpose of providing
financial assistance to employees who are victims of domestic violence).
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:62 (LexisNexis 2010).
154. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009).
155. New Hampshire’s law penalizes employers who violate employees’ leave rights,
but does not provide employees with any specific cause of action. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275:65 (LexisNexis 2010).
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a. Broad Workplace Legislation Strengthens Common-
Law Claim
In at least three jurisdictions—California, Kansas, and the
District of Columbia—the workplace legislation provides strong
support for common-law recognition of a relatively broad claim.
These three jurisdictions vary significantly in their acceptance of
the public-policy exception, with California having one of the most
established and liberal exceptions,156 and Kansas and D.C.’s excep-
tions being more limited.157 These three jurisdictions’ strong and
explicit workplace protections for employees experiencing domestic
violence make them quite similar in their potential receptivity to
additional common-law protection.
All three jurisdictions’ statutes not only provide job-protected
leave to employees who turn to the civil or criminal justice system,158
but also to those who turn to other resources in response to the vio-
lence, including medical or mental-health care, safety planning, and
other assistance from domestic violence programs.159 Specifically,
D.C.’s Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008160 provides all em-
ployees paid sick leave for these specific reasons and those others
that “enhance the physical, psychological, or economic health or safe-
ty” of themselves, a family member, or a co-worker if they or their
family members have experienced intimate violence.161 In Kansas,
all employers have been required since 2006 to provide up to eight
156. California was the first state to recognize the public-policy exception, and it has
since applied it in several contexts. See TOBIAS, supra note 128, app. 5A (stating that
California courts have since “issued dozens of opinions concerning the scope and
application” of the exception).
157. Kansas courts have not yet applied the common-law exception beyond the context
of retaliation for whistle-blowing or filing a workers’ compensation claim. Palmer v. Brown,
752 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan. 1988). The D.C. courts so far have applied the exception only to
discharges for refusing to violate the law. Vreven v. Am. Ass’n of Retired Persons, 604
F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.
1997) (Terry, J., concurring)). D.C. courts recognize a claim by employees who act “in
furtherance of a public policy ‘solidly based on a statute or regulation . . . .’ ” Id. Kansas
courts do not insist on specific legislation, see Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee Dept. of Labor
Servs., 630 P.2d 186, 192 (Kan. 1981) (noting the legislature’s failure to create a cause of
action does not defeat the public policy), but they do require the policy to be “ ‘so thor-
oughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that is
existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer, 752 P.2d at 687 (Kan. 1988)
(quoting Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 941 (Kan. 1954)).
158. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(b), (c) (Deering 2009); D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4)(E)
(LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132(a)(1), (a)(4) (2010).
159. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1 (Deering 2009); D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4) (LexisNexis
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132(a) (West 2009).
160. D.C. CODE §§ 32-131.01-131.1.16 (LexisNexis 2010).
161. D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2010). The amount of the required leave,
which accrues by the hours worked, depends on the size of the employer. Id. § 32-131.02(a).
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days of job-protected leave.162 California’s 2003 law provides up to
three days leave to those employees working for employers with
twenty-five or more employees.163
Not only do these statutes provide strong support for a public
policy to protect employees experiencing domestic violence, the com-
mon-law remedy they support may play a critical role in their imple-
mentation. Neither the D.C. nor the Kansas legislation specifies the
cause of action or relief available to employees harmed by employer
violations.164 A wrongful discharge claim thus provides the basis for
relief to these employees. While California’s law creates an admin-
istrative complaint process and remedy for employees harmed by their
employers’ conduct, these employees could still pursue a wrongful
discharge claim through the courts unless the court were to determine
that the statute created a right that did not exist at common law or
that the legislative intent was to supplant the common law.165
b. More Limited Workplace Legislation Supports Claim
Two additional states, New Mexico and Arizona, have leave legis-
lation that should provide a strong basis for common-law protection
of at least those employees who seek judicial protection from domestic
violence. Effective July 2009, New Mexico’s leave legislation, aptly en-
titled the Promoting Financial Independence for Victims of Domestic
Abuse Act, specifically requires employers to provide up to fourteen
days of intermittent leave to employees to seek an order for protection
or to meet with law enforcement or otherwise assist in a criminal
prosecution.166 It also prohibits any retaliation against employees who
exercise their leave rights.167 Like California’s statute, New Mexico’s
162. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1131-33 (West 2009).
163. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1 (Deering 2009).
164. The D.C. law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who
request leave and assesses fines against the employers. D.C. CODE §§ 32-131.08-131.12
(LexisNexis 2010). It also directs the Department of Employment Services to administer
the law, and authorizes the Mayor to issue rules to implement the statute, §§ 32-131.10-
131.13 (LexisNexis 2010), but the statute itself does not specify an employee cause of
action. Similarly, the Kansas legislature clarified in 2008 that the Department of Labor
shall enforce these statutes, but did not itself specify the remedy or procedure. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1133 (West 2009). Kansas courts require a detailed analysis of the adequacy
of any statutory relief before precluding a common-law claim. See Flenker v. Willamette
Indus., 967 P.2d 295, 298 (Kan. 1998) (following the interpretation in Polson v. Davis, 895
F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990)).
165. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 381, 388 (Cal. 1990) (allowing a claim alleging dis-
crimination because of public interest in a “workplace free from the pernicious influence
of sexism”).
166. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-4A-1, -2 (LexisNexis 2010).
167. Id. §§ 50-4A-2(B), -3.
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law provides for administrative enforcement, but also clarifies that its
remedies supplement rather than replace any common law relief.168
New Mexico courts have recognized a wrongful discharge claim when
an employee is fired for performing “an act that public policy [has
authorized or] would encourage.”169 The exception seeks to encourage
job security, generally.170 New Mexico’s courts should use this claim
to enforce the clear policy stated in the new legislation.
Arizona’s leave legislation is more limited, and while its common-
law doctrine will not increase the statutory scope, it is again neces-
sary to enforce the leave rights. The Arizona law mandates employers
with fifty or more employees to provide job-protected leave to crime
victims and employees who seek judicial protection for themselves
or their family members and prohibits the discharge of or refusal to
hire employees who exercise these leave rights.171 The statute does
not, however, provide any particular remedy to harmed employees.
While Arizona legislation has limited the public policy exception to
those expressed in state statutes, it has also explicitly recognized that
it applies to terminations for exercising these particular leave rights.172
In other words, the Arizona legislature has essentially instructed the
courts to apply the public-policy exception to terminating employees
for exercising their rights. Employees working for smaller employers,
however, would not have a wrongful discharge claim because, as the
statute clarifies, “[a]ll definitions and restrictions contained in the
statute also apply to any civil action based on a violation of the public
policy arising out of the statute.”173
c. Workplace Legislation Precludes Common-Law Claims
Four other states—Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, and Connecticut—
have enacted workplace protection for domestic violence victims, but
because of those states’ common-law exceptions and the particular
168. Id. §§ 50-4A-7, -8.
169. Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Manville
Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).
170. Id. at 618.
171. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439 (LexisNexis 2010).
172. Id. §§ 23-1501(3)(b), (3)(c)(x). Prior to this legislation, Arizona courts had
recognized a broader common-law exception for “firing for bad cause” or for one that is
“against public policy articulated in constitutional, statutory, or decisional law.” Murcott
v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (1985)).
173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1501(3)(b), 13.4439(A) (2010); see also Taylor v.
Graham Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 33 P.3d 518, 524-25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (noting
there is no public-policy claim for alleged discrimination by an employer with fewer than
fifteen employees).
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statutes, the legislatively-created protection will likely preclude most,
if not all, common-law causes of action by employees experiencing
intimate violence. In particular, the comprehensive laws in Hawaii,
Illinois, and Oregon provide broad leave rights in terms of the number
of employees covered, the amount of leave provided, and the reasons
for which leave is permitted.174 In addition, Illinois and, effective
January 2010, Oregon law prohibit discrimination against employees
experiencing domestic violence and require employers to reasonably
accommodate their workplace needs.175 All three of these states’ laws
also provide specific relief to employees.176 And while at least Hawaii’s
and Illinois’s common-law exceptions are relatively liberal,177 their
courts defer in interpreting these legislative remedies.178
Oregon law on this point is slightly more complicated. Oregon
recognizes a public-policy exception for terminations for either fulfilling
a societal obligation or pursuing private statutory rights “related to
174. All Hawaiian employers must provide job-protected leave for employees needing
medical treatment, victim services, counseling, time to relocate, or legal assistance. HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-72 (LexisNexis 2010). Employers with fifty or more employees must
provide up to thirty days, while smaller employers must provide up to five. Id. Illinois’s
law, as recently amended, requires employers that have between fifteen and forty-nine
employees to provide up to eight weeks of leave and those with over fifty employees to
provide up to twelve weeks. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/20(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
The leave may be used to seek medical attention or recover from injuries, obtain assistance
from a victim services organization, attend counseling, participate in safety planning, or
seek legal assistance. Id. §§ 180/20(a)(1)(A)-(E). Since 2007, Oregon law has required em-
ployers with six or more employees to provide “reasonable leave” to seek medical or legal
assistance, victim services, or safe housing. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 659A.270, 659A.272
(West 2010).
175. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(a) (LexisNexis 2010). Imitating the language
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009), Illinois’s law affirma-
tively requires employers to accommodate qualified employees who have experienced
domestic violence unless such accommodations would “impose an undue hardship on
the . . . employer.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/30(b). Employers are to consider
accommodations such as:
[A]djustment to a job structure, workplace facility, or work requirement,
including a transfer, reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed
telephone number or seating assignment, installation of a lock, or implemen-
tation of a safety procedure, or assistance in documenting domestic or sexual
violence that occurs at the workplace or in work-related settings. . . .
Id. § 180/30(b)(3). Similarly, Oregon law recently added antidiscrimination and reasonable-
accommodation provisions to its employment laws addressing victims of domestic violence.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.290 (West 2010).
176. Both Hawaii and Oregon law provide a civil action to enforce the rights. HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-72(j) (LexisNexis 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.885 amended by
2010 Or. Laws 1st Sp. Sess. Ch. 102 (S.B. 1045). Illinois’s statute creates an administrative
enforcement procedure. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/35 (LexisNexis 2010).
177. TOBIAS, supra note 128, app. 5A (characterizing Hawaii’s exception as “markedly
liberal” and listing many bases and factual scenarios for application of Illinois’s exception).
178. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii), 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Haw. 1994) (finding a
discrimination claim preempted by statutes that provide a remedy); Dykstra v. Crestwood
Bank, 454 N.E.2d 51, 53-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that administrative remedies
under the Illinois Human Rights Act preclude common law remedies).
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[a plaintiff’s] role as an employe [sic] and . . . of important public
interest,”179 but only when no other statutory remedy is available.180
Employees terminated for seeking judicial relief from abuse or par-
ticipating in criminal proceedings would likely still have a common-
law claim because, as Oregon recognized, it is an “employment related
right of important public interest,” and no other remedy exists.181
Employees who allege that their employment was terminated because
they pursued their statutory rights under Oregon’s workplace legis-
lation (by, for example, seeking a workplace accommodation or a rea-
sonable leave) likely will not have a wrongful discharge claim in
addition to any statutory claim.182 Employees alleging discrimination
on the basis of their experience with domestic violence would likely
only have the statutory claim.183
Connecticut’s workplace legislation does not provide leave, but
it prohibits discharges for obtaining court protection from domestic
violence or for participating in or attending any criminal proceed-
ing.184 The statute also provides a civil action for damages for ag-
grieved employees.185 Thus, as Connecticut’s case law demonstrates,
a wrongful-discharge claim would not succeed in this particular con-
text because it only applies when no other relief is available.186 Based
on the statute’s underlying policy and Connecticut’s unemployment
compensation law, which provides relief to employees who “make rea-
sonable efforts to preserve the employment,”187 Connecticut’s public-
policy exception may be broad enough to protect against terminations
simply based on victim status or for seeking other kinds of non-judicial
assistance, such as counseling or medical care.
4. Victim/Witness Employment Protection
Another category of states that generally recognize the public-
policy exception are those that legislatively protect the employment
179. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Or. 1984) (en banc), super-
seded by statute, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2010)).
180. Id. at 1296 (“Because no other remedy existed for the wrongfully discharged em-
ployee, we allowed the employee to recover compensatory damages in tort.”).
181. Pooley v. Union Cnty., No. 01-343-JE, at *38 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 2003).
182. United States ex rel. Chartraw v. Cascade Healthcare Cmty., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17542, at *12 (D. Or. Mar. 5, 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s wrongful discharge claim based on
retaliation cannot go forward because the statutory remedies under Title VII address the
concerns raised by the Oregon Supreme Court in Holien.”).
183. Cf. Cross v. Eastlund, 796 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no cause of
action for discharge motivated by pregnancy discrimination).
184. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b(a) (West 2010).
185. Id. § 54-85b(c).
186. Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 182 (Conn. 2000).
187. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2010).
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of crime victims or witnesses. Many states’ statutes provide such pro-
tection to victims or witnesses who participate in a criminal proceed-
ing or otherwise assist in the prosecution.188 Other states’ laws protect
employees subpoenaed or otherwise required to participate in any
judicial proceeding.189
a. Support for a Common-Law Claim
For nine of these states, which also recognize the common-law
claim and have limited other employment-specific statutes, the crime-
victim or witness-protection programs provide the strongest evidence
of legislative support for a state policy against discharging victims of
domestic violence. These states are: Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia.
All nine of these states recognize the common-law exception
without significant limitation.190 Arkansas and Utah have explicitly
188. ALA. CODE § 15-23-81 (2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017 (West 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4439 (LexisNexis 2010) (for employers with fifty or more employees);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West
2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85b (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West
2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.57 (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1 (West
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23(1) (West 2009) (covering civil and criminal proceedings);
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. ANN. ch. 268, § 14B
(LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.036 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 595.209(1)(14) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205(3) (West 2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275:62 (LexisNexis 2010) (twenty-five or more employees); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 215.14 (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4957 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13 (West 2009) (fifty or more
employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-4-122
(West 2010) (state employees only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-40-209 (West 2010).
189. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 621-10.5(a)
(LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-09.1-17(1) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132(1) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-465.1 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009) (“proceeding pertaining to
a crime”).
190. Arkansas recognizes the common-law exception to the at-will doctrine to protect
employees terminated for exercising statutory rights or performing statutory duties, or
whose discharge violates “some other well established public policy.” Webb v. HCA Health
Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Ark. 1989). Delaware recognized the public-
policy tort more recently, characterizing it as “an important weapon to advance Delaware’s
avowed policy to assure civilized conduct in the workplace.” Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d
1029, 1039 (Del. 2001), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 19 712(b) (2005). See
also Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(finding that an employee who refused to violate another’s constitutional right to privacy
was wrongfully discharged); Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (applying the common-law exception to terminations that violate an employee’s
statutory rights or for an employee’s refusal to violate the law); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision
Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 96 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the common-law exception
2010] PROTECTING ECONOMIC STABILITY 119
recognized its applicability to terminations of employees who report
or gather evidence regarding crimes.191 Maryland has also recog-
nized a wrongful discharge claim by an employee who was fired for
suing a co-worker for assault and battery, stating that employees have
an “interest in preserving bodily integrity and personality . . . .”192
Delaware first recognized its public-policy exception in the context
of alleged sexual harassment in the workplace, explaining that while
the behavior is a personal assault, it is also “a systemic social problem”
and that “[p]reventing it is of immense social value, and [that] com-
bating it promotes the public policy of this State.”193
What makes these nine states most similar with respect to their
likelihood of recognizing a wrongful discharge claim in the domestic
violence context is their statutory protection for employees who are
crime victims or witnesses who testify at a legal proceeding. Arkansas
and Michigan limit their employment protection to crime victims
attending criminal proceedings.194 Several states’ statutes are writ-
ten more broadly to protect any employee who participates in a crim-
inal proceeding, whether as the victim or a witness, either to protect
the victim’s interest or in response to a subpoena.195 Three states
further broaden the scope of the protection to include employees
applies to terminations that violate policies “reflected by” law); Collins v. Rizkana, 652
N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ohio 1995) (recognizing a “clear public policy to justify an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine”); Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 148 P.3d 945, 948-49 (Utah
2006) (recognizing a common-law exception for exercising workers’ compensation rights);
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808-09 (Va. 1996) (empha-
sizing that a statute need not provide a private right to sue for an at-will employee to
pursue a wrongful-discharge claim when the employer violates the statute). Nevada
recognizes a claim “when an employer dismisses an employee in retaliation for the em-
ployee’s doing of acts which are consistent with or supportive of sound public policy and
the common good.” D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 216 (Nev. 1991). The doctrine may
be limited somewhat by a 1995 case that cited Wisconsin law for the proposition that
employees cannot assert simply that they were discharged for actions consistent with
public policy; rather, the employees must show that their employers directed them to vio-
late public policy. Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 634 (Nev. 1995). It is unclear whether
this also reflects Nevada law or just Wisconsin law.
191. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Ark. 1988); Ryan v. Dan’s
Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 408 (Utah 1998).
192. Watson v. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 767 (Md. 1991).
193. Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029, 1039 (Del. 2001).
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010) (protecting the employee when atten-
dance is “reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the victim”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010) (criminalizing terminating the employment of crime
victims who testify in response to a subpoena or a prosecutor’s request).
195. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2930.18 (crime
victim), 2945.451 (pursuant to subpoena) (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(14)
(West 2010) (honoring a subpoena to testify at, attend, or participate in the preparation
of a criminal proceeding).
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required to attend any judicial proceeding,196 and Nevada law pro-
tects the employment of any witness who testifies in court.197 While
all of these statutes may imply a correlative right to miss work to
attend such proceedings, several make the employees’ right to take
time off explicit.198
All of these statutes reflect a public policy that is generally sup-
portive of crime victims’ and witnesses’ rights. To effectively enforce
these provisions, the states must recognize a wrongful-discharge claim
because all but the Nevada and Utah statutes fail to provide any civil
statutory relief for the employee.199 Even those states, like Michigan,
that generally view statutory relief as exclusive,200 may recognize
common-law claims because whereas statutes criminalize the em-
ployer’s behavior, they do not provide any statutory relief to the em-
ployee. Although Utah’s statute provides a civil action with available
damages, reinstatement, and attorneys’ fees, it also specifies that
such relief is “in addition to any other remedy . . . .” 201 The statutory
claim is thus cumulative, not exclusive. Nevada’s statute similarly
196. Maryland law prohibits employers from discharging a crime victim for taking time
off to attend a criminal proceeding, MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102(b) (West 2010),
and from discharging any employee for taking time off in response to a subpoena to attend
any proceeding. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205(a)(1) (West 2010). Both Utah
and Virginia prohibit employers from discharging employees who attend any judicial pro-
ceeding in response to a subpoena. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132 (West 2010); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010).
197. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(1) (West 2010).
198. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-205 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209
(1)(14) (West 2010) (prohibiting employers from requiring employees to use vacation time,
personal time, or sick leave to attend proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010)
(specifying that an employee need not “use sick leave or vacation time” for necessary time
off). Ohio law clarifies that employers need not pay employees for any time off to attend pro-
ceedings, which is some support for employers being required to allow employees to take
at least unpaid leave. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010).
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1105 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9409 (West
2010); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-102 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-205 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.762, 780.790 (West 2010) (crimi-
nalizing employer behavior); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2930.18 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1 (West 2010) (criminalizing
employer violation).
200. See Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. 1993) (“Admit-
tedly, a strictly literal interpretation of the statute without an analysis of legislative intent
arguably could lead to an interpretation that would bar discharge of an employee for re-
porting a crime by anyone under any circumstances.”), overruled in part by Brown v. Mayor
of Detroit, 734 N.W.2d 514, 595 n.2 (Mich. 2007). Similarly, under Missouri law, statutory
relief does not preclude a common-law claim unless it “ ‘fully comprehends and envelops the
remedies provided by common law.’ ” Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95
(Mo. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Dierkes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mo., 991 S.W.2d 662,
668 (Mo. 1999)).
201. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-132 (West 2010).
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provides civil remedies,202 but Nevada courts may still recognize a
tort claim that provides additional relief to the employee.203
Crimes between intimates or family members are not always
handled in a criminal proceeding, or for that matter in any judicial
proceeding. So to expand the protection to all employees experienc-
ing domestic violence, the courts in these states would have to recog-
nize their statutes as expressing a policy of protecting crime victims
from employment consequences or at least protecting them from
analogous participation in a civil protective order proceeding. To bol-
ster such a claim, most of these states have at least one other statute
that supports a policy of protecting the economic stability of victims
of domestic violence.204 Nearly all of the states’ abuse-prevention acts
explicitly permit courts to restrain offenders from the petitioner’s
place of employment.205 Maryland’s law further specifies that the court
may order that the petitioner be provided use of a shared vehicle if
necessary for continued employment.206 Arkansas, Delaware, and
Missouri laws provide unemployment compensation to those who have
left their employment due to intimate violence.207 Arkansas’s law
also encourages employees to make “reasonable efforts to preserve”
their employment before leaving,208 which provides additional support
for a state policy disfavoring employers simply terminating employ-
ment due to the abuse. Further, Arkansas and Nevada law permit
employers to seek restraining orders on behalf of their employees
who are experiencing violence.209
b. Crime-Victim Protections Preclude Common-Law Claims
The statutory employment-protection of crime victims or wit-
nesses in three other states—Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—
will most likely preclude any common-law discharge claim on these
202. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.070(2) (West 2009).
203. See D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Nev. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff
is entitled to pursue a tort claim where statutory relief is limited to, for example, reinstate-
ment and back wages).
204. For example, Virginia’s only other relevant laws of the type discussed here are its
general abuse prevention statutes. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1, 279.1 (West 2010).
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(a)(2) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 4-
505(a)(2)(v), 4-506(d)(5) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(1)(g) (West 2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030(1)(c) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(g)
(West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(2)(c) (West 2010).
206. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-506(d)(10) (West 2010).
207. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b)(3)(A) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314
(West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 288.501(2)(c) (West 2010) (providing compensation either
for quitting due to the violence or if discharged for conduct related to experiencing inti-
mate violence).
208. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b) (West 2010).
209. Id. § 11-5-115(a)(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.250 (West 2009).
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bases. Specifically, Alaska’s statute prohibits employers from penaliz-
ing crime victims for attending a court proceeding in response to a
subpoena or a prosecutor’s request.210 Wisconsin law prohibits em-
ployers from discharging employees who are “subpoenaed to testify
in an action or proceeding pertaining to a crime.” 211 Pennsylvania
law also prohibits employers from terminating employees who attend
court as crime victims or witnesses.212 All of these statutes explicitly
acknowledge that employees may miss work to attend these proceed-
ings. Whereas the Alaska and Pennsylvania statutes specify that
employers need not compensate employees for the time spent away
from work,213 the Wisconsin statute expressly prohibits employers
from reducing pay for time lost in responding to the subpoena.214 All
of the statutes also provide employees with a civil remedy for em-
ployer violations.215 Based on their deference to legislative remedies,
the courts in these states likely would be reluctant to apply the
common-law exception in this specific context.216
With respect to other domestic-violence related terminations,
although all of these states recognize an exception broad enough to
support a wrongful-discharge claim, they have only limited statutory
support for this specific policy. When defining public policy, Alaska
and Wisconsin courts do not limit it to those activities that “violate
the letter” of a law,217 but rather seek to protect against employer
actions that are contrary to the policy reflected in the statutes.218
Pennsylvania seems to recognize the cause of action, generally,219
but at least the Pennsylvania federal district court has rejected its
210. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a) (West 2010).
211. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009).
212. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (West 2010).
213. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(a)(3) (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a)
(West 2010).
214. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009).
215. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.61.017(c) (West 2010) (actual and punitive damages); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(c) (West 2010) (lost wages and benefits, and attorneys’ fees);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.87 (West 2009) (reinstatement and back pay).
216. Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 813 n.13 (Alaska 2005)
(expressing reluctance to recognize a wrongful-discharge cause of action when an individual
can pursue a remedy under the Alaska Human Rights Act); Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d
555, 569-70 (Pa. 2009) (rejecting an employee’s wrongful-discharge claim for sexual discrim-
ination by an employer who employed fewer employees than the statutory requirement);
Repetti v. Sysco Corp., 730 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]here the legislature
has created a statutory remedy for a wrongful discharge, that remedy is exclusive.”) (citing
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842 n.17 (Wis. 1983) (finding that the
legislative remedy is exclusive)).
217. Reust, 127 P.3d at 813.
218. Wandry v. Bull’s Eye Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1986).
219. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1978) (holding that
there exists a cause of action where an employee is discharged for performing jury duty).
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application to terminations for being a victim of intimate violence.220
The other statutory support for such claims in these states includes
Alaska’s and Pennsylvania’s laws specifically permitting courts to
restrain offenders from a petitioner’s place of employment221 and
Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation law, which provides
benefits to employees who leave their work because of intimate
violence.222
5. Limited Workplace Legislation
In at least seven states—Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia—while there is nothing
that prevents the courts from adopting a domestic violence public-
policy exception, it is unlikely that they will: these states do not have
any employment-specific statutes related to domestic violence.
All of these states do recognize a public-policy exception to vary-
ing degrees. Relatively speaking, Idaho,223 Nebraska,224 New Jersey,225
Oklahoma,226 and West Virginia’s recognition of the doctrine is some-
what broad,227 whereas Kentucky and Tennessee limit their exceptions
220. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The court did acknowledge
that the exception might apply if an employee were terminated for seeking an order for
protection. Id. at 801. The growing recognition of societal impact of domestic violence in
the last fifteen years may affect the decision’s ongoing viability.
221. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100(c)(4) (West 2010); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6108(a)(6) (West 2010).
222. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(7)(s)(2)(a) (West 2009).
223. Idaho recognizes the exception generally and has specifically acknowledged policies
that favor refusing to commit perjury and complying with jury duty. Crea v. FMC Corp.,
16 P.3d 272, 275 (Idaho 2000) (emphasizing that public policy favors the disclosure and
investigation of criminal activity); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho
1990) (noting that the exception “protect[s] employees who refuse to commit unlawful acts,
who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal rights or
privileges”).
224. Nebraska’s supreme court recently clarified that its public-policy exception includes
not only specific statutory prohibitions, but also those terminations that effectively circum-
vent the employee’s substantive rights. Wendeln v. Beatrice Manor, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 226,
238-39 (Neb. 2006).
225. In New Jersey, employees can “be secure in knowing that their jobs are safe if they
exercise their rights in accordance with a clear mandate of public policy.” Pierce v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
226. Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 202 P.3d 144, 149-51 (Okla. 2008) (summariz-
ing various instances in which a claim has been pursued successfully, including when an
employee alleges age discrimination not remedied by state or federal law).
227. West Virginia courts use the same four elements that the Sixth Circuit considers.
Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 723 (W. Va. 2001). The West Virginia Supreme
Court has specifically applied the exception to an employee discharged for giving truthful
testimony, explaining that “the unobstructed search for truth in legal proceedings[ ] is a
high purpose deserving profound respect . . . .” Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480
S.E.2d 817, 826 (W. Va. 1996).
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to those contained in a “ ‘well-established legislative enactment’ ” 228
or “evidenced by an unambiguous statutory provision.” 229
Beyond their general intimate abuse prevention acts,230 however,
these states have limited legislative statements of relevant public
policy. Idaho, New Jersey, and West Virginia’s abuse prevention laws
specifically authorize courts to include the petitioner’s place of employ-
ment in their protective orders.231 New Jersey and West Virginia’s
laws also begin with strong statements of purpose that acknowledge
domestic violence as a significant societal issue that warrants an effec-
tive response.232 Kentucky’s, New Jersey’s, and Oklahoma’s laws pro-
vide some assistance to crime victims who need to miss work to attend
criminal proceedings, but they do not specifically prohibit employers
from terminating the employees’ employment.233 New Jersey’s and
Oklahoma’s unemployment compensation laws provide that employees
cannot be denied benefits if forced to leave work to escape the abuse.234
Nebraska’s law requires employees to make “all reasonable efforts
to preserve the employment” before leaving work to escape abuse.235
This may provide some limited policy support for not terminating
these employees for simply being a victim, or for taking some time
228. Ne. Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440, 446-47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Ky. 1985)).
229. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that statu-
tory remedies are not the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge of an employee per-
forming jury duty).
230. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-6301-6317 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.715-785
(West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-901-931 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17-26.1
(West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.6 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-601-
625 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-27-101-1105 (2010).
231. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1)(i) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:25-29(b)(6)
(West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-503(7) (West 2010).
232. New Jersey’s abuse prevention act recognizes violence between intimates as “a
serious crime against society” and seeks to assure victims that it will provide them with
“maximum protection from abuse . . . .” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2010). West
Virginia’s law states that intimate “violence is a major health and law-enforcement prob-
lem . . . with enormous costs . . . in both dollars and human lives,” and that the law is in-
tended to provide victims with a “speedy remedy to discourage violence . . . .” W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-27-101(a)(3),(b)(2) (West 2010).
233. Crime victims in Kentucky may request assistance from law enforcement and state
attorneys in “informing employers that the need for victim or witness cooperation in the
prosecution of the case may necessitate absence of that victim or witness from work.” KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(8) (West 2009). New Jersey law requires prosecutors to notify
employers if a crime victim or witness needs to miss work to assist with a prosecution,
but does not mandate that employers do anything specific with that information. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-44(b)(13) (West 2010). Crime victims in Oklahoma have a right to “employer
intercession services” that seek “to minimize the loss of pay and other benefits . . . resulting
from court appearances.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 215.33(8) (West 2010).
234. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(j) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2-210(4)(d)
(West 2010).
235. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-628.01(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
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off to seek judicial or other protection from the violence. Tennessee’s
only workplace-specific law is one that permits employers to seek
workplace restraining orders on behalf of their employees.236
B. Limited Recognition of the Public-Policy Exception
Litigants in several other states would face greater obstacles in
asserting a wrongful discharge claim because the states’ recognition
of the public-policy exception is so limited. While those states’ courts
recognize the public-policy exception, they limit it to such a degree
that most discharges related to domestic violence would probably not
qualify. Specifically, six states have recognized the exception only
when an employee is terminated for refusing to violate a law or for re-
porting a violation of law (Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas),237 for
filing a workers’ compensation claim (Wyoming),238 or both (Indiana
and South Dakota).239 North and South Carolina law is similarly con-
strained, as their courts seem to recognize the exception only when
employers violate an express statutory provision or require their em-
ployees to violate the law.240 Colorado’s exception applies only when
employers require employees to violate a law or prohibit employees
from “exercising an important job-related right or privilege . . . .” 241
North Dakota has recognized the exception in only two contexts: re-
taliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim,242 and testifying
pursuant to a subpoena.243 Both of which have now been codified,244
and thus will likely control going forward.245
236. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-14-102 (West 2010).
237. Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 455-56 (Minn. 2006); McArn v.
Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993); Mott v. Montgomery Cnty., 882
S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (limiting the exception to an employee’s refusal to
violate criminal statutes only).
238. Griess v. Consol. Freightways, Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 1989).
239. Montgomery v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ind. 2006);
Tiede v. CorTrust Bank, N.A., 748 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (S.D. 2008).
240. Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, 551 S.E.2d 179, 184 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Lawson
v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 532 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (S.C. 2000) (applying the exception when ter-
mination itself violates criminal law, or when employers require employees to do so). The
North Carolina Court of Appeals cites Considine in rejecting a domestic-violence-exception
claim brought by an employee fired after his wife shot him. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594
S.E.2d 397, 398-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606 S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curium).
241. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
242. Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987).
243. Ressler v. Humane Soc’y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992).
244. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-09.1-17 (West 2009) (prohibiting discharge of employees
who serve as witnesses or jurors in any proceeding); Id. § 34-01-20.
245. Vandall v. Trinity Hosps., 676 N.W.2d 88, 92 (N.D. 2004) (“[S]tatutory enactments
take precedence over and govern conflicting common law doctrines.”).
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The abuse prevention acts in six of these ten states permit the
court to restrain parties from going close to the victims’ workplace.246
Six of these states’ unemployment compensation laws provide benefits
to those who separate from employment to protect themselves from
family violence.247 Three of the states permit employers to seek work-
place restraining orders on behalf of their employees.248 These kinds
of laws, while certainly some evidence of a public policy to assist vic-
tims in maintaining some economic stability, are probably not, even
when combined, adequate to invoke the limited exception these states
recognize for most wrongful discharge claims.249
Employees in Minnesota and North Carolina will likely have
viable claims, however, if their employers discharge them for seek-
ing judicial protection from domestic violence. Since 2004, thus not
in effect for the Imes plaintiff,250 North Carolina has prohibited em-
ployers from discriminating against employees who take “reasonable
time off” to seek court protection,251 and Minnesota has had a nearly
identical law since 2005.252 Because of this explicit statutory language,
246. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(b)(4) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, subd.
6(9) (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15(1)(a)(ii) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50B-3(a)(9)(b) (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(A)(2) (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 85.022(b)(3) (West 2009).
247. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II), -108(4)(r)(I) (West 2010); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-4-15-1(1)(c)(8), 22-4-15-1(1)(e), 22-4-15-2(e) & 5-26.5-2-2(1)(A)(i) (West 2010);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 1(9), 2(10) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 96-14(1)(f)
(West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6) (2010); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 207.046(a)(2) (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-311 (West 2010). Minnesota
provides benefits to persons who quit because of domestic abuse and to those who were
“discharged as a result of conduct that was the result of the applicant or [an] immediate
family member being a victim of domestic abuse.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 1(9), 2(10)
(West 2009).
248. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-6
(West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-264(b) (West 2010).
249. South Dakota law has the somewhat unique requirement that employees make
every effort to maintain their employment. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-13.1(6)(c) (2010).
Employers should not be permitted to sabotage these efforts by simply terminating em-
ployees’ employment, but South Dakota’s exception does not appear broad enough to
remedy this behavior as it does not technically violate any law. See Tiede v. CorTrust,
748 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (S.D. 2008) (noting that while South Dakota has recognized a
public-policy exception, the court has also stated that a contract action for wrongful dis-
charge may be a more appropriate remedy).
250. Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) aff’d, 606
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (per curium). See supra Part III.A.4 (summarizing this North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision).
251. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50B-5.5(a), 95-270(a) (West 2010) (including provisions
prohibiting employment discrimination for taking reasonable time off to pursue relief).
252. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 23(a) (civil order for protection); § 609.748, subd.
10(a) (criminal restraining order) (West 2009). Minnesota law also requires employers
to provide all crime victims similar leave to attend or prepare for criminal proceedings.
Id. § 611A.036 subd. 1. It specifically provides a remedy, but characterizes it as
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the common-law exceptions in both Minnesota and North Carolina
may very well serve to implement these statutory policies by provid-
ing consequences for employer violations.253
Whether Colorado courts would apply the public-policy exception
to terminations for seeking judicial relief is more complicated. Since
2002, Colorado law has required employers with more than fifty em-
ployees to provide up to three days off to not only seek judicial pro-
tection, but also to seek other assistance, including medical care or
counseling and safety planning.254 This statute would probably con-
trol any claim that an employer terminated someone for seeking this
type of time off, however, because the statute itself provides relief and
Colorado recognizes statutory preclusion of common-law claims.255
Other Colorado laws provide fairly strong evidence of a public
policy of promoting victims’ employment stability that could support
wrongful discharge claims in other scenarios. Colorado’s abuse pre-
vention act recognizes the “paramount importance” of protective orders
because they “promote safety, reduce violence, and prevent serious
harm and death.” 256 The statute also defines domestic violence to in-
clude not only physical abuse or threats of harm, but also other types
of control, including financial, that “make a victim more likely to re-
turn to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic
needs . . . .” 257 Colorado law also authorizes employers to seek work-
place restraining orders258 and provides unemployment compensation
to employees who leave work to protect themselves or a family mem-
ber.259 Perhaps these statutes provide at least enough support of a
public-policy violation for employees terminated for experiencing
domestic violence or seeking court relief, but not taking any time off.
When the violence leads to criminal charges, Colorado employees
as well as those in Indiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina would
likely have a wrongful termination claim if their employers dis-
charged them for missing work to participate in criminal proceed-
ings. Mississippi law requires crime victims to attend and assist in
supplementing “any remedies otherwise provided by law . . . .” Id. § 611A.036 6.
253. The North Carolina law explicitly states that it does not limit the ability of em-
ployees to “pursue any other civil or criminal remedy provided by law.” N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 95-271 (West 2010). Employers who violate Minnesota’s laws may face misdemeanor
charges and will be required to reinstate the employee and pay back wages. MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518B.01, subd. 23(b), 609.748, subd. 10(b) (West 2009). But nothing in the statute
prohibits additional, common-law relief.
254. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.7(1)(a), (b) (West 2010).
255. See Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761, 766 (Colo. App. 1988).
256. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(1)(a) (West 2010).
257. Id. § 13-14-102(1)(b)(I).
258. Id. § 13-14-102(4)(b).
259. Id. §§ 8-73-107(1)(g)(II), -108(4)(r)(I).
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the preparation of any criminal proceedings and prohibits employers
from terminating their employment or even threatening to do so for
such activity.260 Colorado, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming laws
similarly prohibit employers from taking an adverse employment
action against employees who miss work to respond to a subpoena as
a victim or witness.261 Because none of these statutes explicitly pro-
vides relief to employees, courts in Colorado, Indiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina could use their limited exception to fulfill this
clearly stated public policy. Wyoming courts, which have yet to recog-
nize an exception beyond the workers’ compensation arena, would
have to expand its doctrine to do so.
C. No Recognition of the Exception
The final category of states includes those that either have not
applied the public-policy exception or have explicitly rejected it. These
seven states obviously have the least likelihood of recognizing an
exception in the domestic violence context. Neither Georgia nor
Maine have applied the exception, but their supreme courts have
acknowledged the possibility that a future discharge may warrant
its application.262 These two states thus have some, albeit limited, re-
ceptivity to a claim. In Maine, although the courts would not likely
recognize a common-law claim, there would be a good-faith basis in
law for asserting one, at least in certain circumstances.263 Georgia
260. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-45 (West 2009).
261. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-11.1
(West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-209(a) (West
2010).
262. See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239-40 (Ga. 2000) (acknowl-
edging that a public-policy exception, while disfavored, may be judicially created); Larrabee
v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 100 (Me. 1984) (stating “we do not rule out
the possible recognition of such a cause of action . . . ”).
263. Maine’s statutory recognition of the need to assist employees experiencing domestic
violence is relatively strong. Its abuse definition includes removing someone from the
workplace, and court orders may include enjoining the defendant from the victim’s work-
place. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 4002(1)(D)(1), 4006(5)(D)(2), 4007(1)(C)(2) (2009).
Maine also mandates that all employers provide job-protected leave to employees who have
experienced intimate violence and are seeking legal, medical, or other necessary assistance.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850(1) (2009). The leave statute does not provide a private
right of action, but empowers the Department of Labor to assess civil penalties on em-
ployers who violate the law. Id. § 850(3). Maine’s unemployment compensation laws also
provide benefits to employees who voluntarily separate from their employment for rea-
sons related to the violence and for those who are terminated for “misconduct” if their
actions were necessary to protect themselves or their family members from violence. Id.
§§ 1193(1)(A)(4), 1043(23)(B)(3). In addition to providing some assistance to employees
experiencing domestic violence, these statutes provide a strong statement of Maine’s public
policy of providing some financial stability to victims and discouraging employers from
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employees, on the other hand, would have an extremely weak com-
mon-law claim both because of the court’s legislative deference264 and
the state’s limited statutory statements reflecting support for such
a policy.265 Five other states do not recognize the public-policy
exception to at-will employment: Alabama,266 Florida,267 Louisiana,268
New York,269 and Rhode Island.270 Employees experiencing domestic
violence in these states are not without any statutory rights,271 but
the courts have so far deferred to the legislature for any expansion.272
D. Summary
Courts in at least four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Califor-
nia, and Kansas) and the District of Columbia would be fairly recep-
tive to a broad, Danny-like policy in favor of supporting employment
stability for victims of domestic violence.273 In these jurisdictions, em-
ployees who could prove that they were terminated because of their
status as domestic violence victims or for taking reasonable time off
unnecessarily interfering with these rights.
264. Reilly, 528 S.E.2d at 240 (“[J]udicially created exceptions are not favored.”).
265. Georgia law prohibits employers from taking any adverse action against employees
who participate in judicial proceedings and provides employees a cause of action against
employers who violate it. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-3(a),(b) (West 2010). Georgia employers
may also seek a workplace restraining order on behalf of their employees. Id. § 34-1-7(b).
266. Wright v. Dothan Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 658 So. 2d 428, 431 (Ala. 1995).
267. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof’l Adm’rs, 427 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983).
268. Tolliver v. Concordia Waterworks Dist. No. 1, 735 So.2d 680, 682 (La. Ct. App.
1999).
269. Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
270. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993).
271. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.313(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring limited work-
place leave for domestic violence victims working for large employers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23 (2010) (unemployment benefits) R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-13(a) (West 2009)
(mandating leave for crime victims); id. § 28-52-2 (allowing workplace restraining orders).
Employees in New York City have great protection under the city administrative code,
which prohibits workplace discrimination against domestic violence victims and requires
employers to reasonably accommodate their workplace needs. N.Y.C. CODE § 8-107.1(2)
(2009).
272. As the New York court explained,
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to
elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would be
directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate
and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability.
Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90; see also Wright v. Dothan Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 
658 So.2d 428, 431 (declining to create a public-policy exception); Pacheco, 623 A.2d at 465
(“It is not the role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not
chosen to protect.”).
273. See supra Part IV.A (predicting the likelihood of states adopting a public-policy
exception).
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to seek judicial or other assistance related to the violence would have
a strong likelihood of success in establishing a public policy.274 Em-
ployees in three more states (Hawaii, Illinois, and Oregon) have sim-
ilar protection from employment decisions based on their experience
of domestic violence, but it is statutorily provided, rather than based
on common law.275
The largest number of states would be most receptive to a claim
by an employee terminated for seeking official, court-related relief
from the violence. Six states (Iowa, Massachusetts,276 New Mexico,
Arizona,277 Minnesota, and North Carolina278) would be receptive to
a common-law claim at least by an employee who turned to either the
civil or criminal systems for assistance. Connecticut and Colorado
protect these same employees statutorily.279 Thirteen other states
(Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia)
would likely recognize a public-policy exception for employees termi-
nated for testifying or otherwise assisting with the criminal prosecu-
tion of their batterers.280 Three states (Alaska, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin) provide this relief statutorily.281
V. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
A. Common-Law Remedy Alone Is Insufficient
As others have argued, and further supported by this analysis,
use of the common-law exception to at-will employment is a limited
and imperfect solution to the problems that employers and employees
274. This article’s analysis is limited to the public-policy element. However, employees
may face other obstacles in pursuing a wrongful discharge claim. For example, the em-
ployer in Danny could have prevailed at trial if it established that the employee was, in
fact, terminated for falsifying payroll records, that her time off to address the domestic
violence was not necessary to protect her or her children, or that it had some other over-
riding justification for the termination. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d
128, 139 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
275. See supra Part IV.A.3.c (explaining these three states’ protections).
276. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the two states’ potential receptivity to a common-
law claim).
277. See supra Part IV.A.3.b. (noting Arizona’s recognition would only apply to em-
ployers with fifty or more employees, however, as statutorily defined).
278. See supra Part IV.B (explaining these states’ limited recognition of the exception).
279. See supra Parts IV.A.3.c, IV.B (describing statutory protections).
280. See supra Parts IV.A.4.a,  IV.B (discussing these states’ potential receptivity to
a public-policy exception).
281. See supra Part IV.B (describing these states’ statutory relief).
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face when domestic violence impacts the workplace.282 Because of
varying state approaches to the doctrine and legislative statements
of public policy, employees in more than half of the states are not like-
ly to receive any common-law relief for terminations related to their
experiences of domestic violence. In those states in which the courts
may be receptive to a wrongful discharge claim, employees cannot yet
rely on any concrete protections, and litigation would likely be expen-
sive and unpredictable. Even in Washington, where the exception
to at-will employment has been recognized, the application is unde-
veloped and may remain so because Washington employees can now
turn to clearer, legislative protections.
Development of the common-law doctrine could also lead to bad,
or at least imperfect, policy. It is most likely that courts would be will-
ing to recognize a policy interest when employees are terminated for
seeking judicial relief from violence because of the statutory support
for this policy in many states and because the policy exception would
be more consistent with other exceptions that states already recog-
nize. While civil protective orders are effective mechanisms in many
domestic violence situations, seeking such relief may actually trigger
more severe violence or risk of harm to some individuals and their
children and should not be the only basis upon which employees can
protect their jobs.283 Relying solely on crime-victim statutes for pro-
tection of employment is problematic for similar reasons and because
not all domestic violence fits within the incident-based definitions
under which our criminal justice system is organized.284 Moreover,
some victims who could seek refuge from law enforcement and crim-
inal prosecution choose not to for many reasons, including previous
bad experiences with law enforcement and fear of increased violence
if arrest and prosecution ultimately fails.285
For these reasons and more, it may be preferable for all states
to adopt comprehensive workplace protections or for Congress to
address this issue.286 Progress is ongoing, as several states have now
282. For example, Professor Tarr reviewed Park’s work and concluded that the “remedy
is not reliable enough or inclusive enough to ensure the economic security of domestic
violence victims,” and that, even if it were effective, it does not require employers to accom-
modate employees or address discrimination short of termination. Tarr, supra note 40,
at 402.
283. See id., at 388-89 (explaining the problem of courts and legislatures essentially
requiring an order for protection as a baseline for other remedies or assistance).
284. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call
to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 971-74 (2004).
285. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning
the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7,
16 (2004).
286. See Goldscheid, supra note 16, at 118-19 (proposing application of Title VII to
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enacted such legislation and many continue to advocate for federal
legislation, but the work is slow-going and imperfect as well. To date,
the overwhelming majority of states do not provide adequate statu-
tory protections for employees experiencing domestic violence,287 and
federal legislation, though introduced each session since 2001, has
yet to pass.288 Legislative change presents its own challenges, and
is further complicated by competing interests. As Professor Cottone
explained in the context of discussing modifications to the at-will
employment doctrine more generally, it is difficult to organize the
range of workers who need the protection (from low paid, hourly work-
ers to managers and executives), and even effective organization will
likely face strong and well-funded opposition.289 In his view, any
resulting legislation would be full of compromise which would
“probably drain any potency of the proposed statute.” 290
B. Common-Law Remedy Is Essential to Effective Reform
Common-law recognition of a public-policy exception for termi-
nations related to domestic violence thus provides an appropriate and
necessary complement to the ongoing legislative reform. It is entirely
fitting for courts to further develop this common-law doctrine. As the
Eighth Circuit has explained:
[T]he Legislature is not the only source of [public] policy. In
common-law jurisdictions the courts too have been sources of law,
always subject to legislative correction, and with progressively
less freedom as legislation occupies a given field. It is the courts,
to give one example, that originated the whole doctrine that certain
kinds of businesses—common carriers and innkeepers—must serve
the public without discrimination or preference. In this sense,
then, courts make law, and they have done so for centuries.291
workplace domestic violence issues); Karin, supra note 16, at 379 (urging federal law); 
Widiss, supra note 10, at 718 (advocating for state legislative reform).
287. See supra Part I.B (discussing the inadequacy of existing protections).
288. Proposed in 2001, the Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act would have re-
quired employers to reasonably accommodate employees experiencing domestic violence.
Brown, supra note 40, at 16; Karin, supra note 16, at 397-99 (discussing the Survivors’
Empowerment and Economic Security Act, and the Security and Financial Empowerment
Act, introduced in 2007).
289. Edwin Robert Cottone, Employee Protection from Unjust Discharge: A Proposal
for Judicial Reversal of the Terminable-At-Will Doctrine, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1260,
1279 (2002).
290. Id.
291. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984); see also, Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1838 (1980) (“Courts themselves created the at will
rule; it is therefore entirely appropriate that they now take the lead in modifying it.”).
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Courts have both the power and the expertise to provide a common-
law remedy when confronted with the appropriate case.292 The
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Danny makes it even more
likely that other states might recognize the public-policy exception
in this context, as courts often look to other jurisdictions for support
in developing this doctrine.293
In over half of the states identified as receptive to a wrongful
discharge claim in this context, recognition of the doctrine is not only
appropriate, but also necessary to implement the clear statutory poli-
cies that otherwise fail to provide employees with a cause of action.294
The courts’ recognition, even if limited to those employees who seek
judicial relief or assist in criminal prosecutions, will also begin to pro-
vide clarity to this cause of action and may lead to further develop-
ment of the exception in the domestic violence context. For example,
if courts are willing to recognize that employees who seek orders for
protection should have some employment protection, the logical ex-
tension of such a policy would be to prevent employers from status-
based terminations. In other words, employers should not be able to
circumvent the policy of encouraging employees to seek protective
orders by firing them as soon as the employer learns or suspects that
an employee is experiencing domestic violence. Similarly, in states
like Connecticut, where employees have statutory protection from
terminations for seeking judicial relief,295 the courts could recognize
a wrongful discharge claim in the context of an employee seeking
relief for seeking reasonable time off to seek non-judicial assistance,
such as safe housing or medical attention.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial recognition of this
cause of action may actually support and inspire additional domestic
violence workplace legislation. Many of the now-established public-
policy exceptions have evolved into statutory protections. For example,
after the Oregon Supreme Court recognized an exception to at-will
292. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing
“the capacity of the common law to develop and adapt to current needs” (citing Jersey
Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980))); Nees v. Hocks, 536
P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975) (“This court has not felt unduly restricted by the boundaries of
pre-existing common-law remedies. We have not hesitated to create or recognize new torts
when confronted with conduct causing injuries which we feel should be compensable.”).
293. See, e.g.,; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 509-10; Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657
(Ohio 1995); Nees, 536 P.2d at 515 (discussing the emerging trend of the exception in
other jurisdictions).
294. As noted in the above discussion, many state laws prohibit employer behavior,
but do not specify the employee’s remedy. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132 (West 2009)
(mandating employers to allow leave, but not specifying consequences for failure to do
so); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (West 2009) (prohibiting terminations for honoring
subpoenas).
295. See supra Part I.A.3.c (noting Connecticut’s statutory protections).
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employment for an employee terminated for serving on a jury,296 its
legislature codified the rule, and many jurisdictions later followed.297
The whistle-blower exception, which protects employees who disclose
their employers’ illegal activities, similarly began as a common-law
doctrine,298 and now many state and federal statutes have codified
the protection.299 So while more comprehensive and predictable legis-
lation may be the ultimate goal to address the impact that domestic
violence has on victims’ financial stability, the courts could play an
important role in the evolution of such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Over the last thirty years, state and federal laws have evolved
to address domestic violence on several fronts. State laws, particu-
larly those that recognize the impact that domestic violence has in
the workplace, reflect a growing consensus that domestic violence
warrants a multi-faceted public response. Reviewing its own domestic
violence laws, the Washington Supreme Court declared that its state
has “a clear mandate of public policy of protecting domestic violence
survivors and their families and holding [their] abusers account-
able.” 300 In light of this precedent and the many state laws that
reflect a similar policy, particularly the emerging workplace legisla-
tion, many other states may be poised to recognize a public-policy
exception to at-will employment for terminations related to domestic
violence. Development of this common-law claim could play a criti-
cal role in influencing individual employers’ responses to their employ-
ees, as well as in developing more comprehensive and predictable
workplace legislation.
296. Nees, 536 P.2d at 516.
297.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(a) (West 2003); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2003); 
Swift, supra note 41, at 559 nn. 42 & 43 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 10.090(1) (2003); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001-003 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008)).
298. Id. at 561-64 (citing Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987)).
299. Id. at 564-65 & nn. 68-75.
300. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 141 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
OCTOMOM AND MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCIES: WHY
FEDERAL LEGISLATION SHOULD REQUIRE INSURERS TO
COVER IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
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ABSTRACT
On January 26, 2009, Nadya Suleman, dubbed Octomom by
the media, delivered octuplets after using in vitro fertilization. The
same day, Congressman Anthony Weiner of New York introduced
the Family Building Act of 2009 in the United States House of
Representatives—a federal mandate requiring insurers to provide
coverage for in vitro fertilization.1 The octuplets are no longer head-
line news, but issues associated with in vitro fertilization are still
newsworthy. In this paper I propose that Congress should take a
serious look at the Family Building Act of 2009. After addressing
some additional issues, Congress should pass legislation mandating
that insurers provide coverage for in vitro fertilization. Such legisla-
tion will have the effect of reducing the number of multi-fetal preg-
nancies and preterm births, as well as the costs and risks associated
with such pregnancies and births. 
Although in vitro fertilization is used to treat infertility, it has
replaced one problem (the inability to procreate) with a more serious
problem (multi-fetal pregnancies). This problem exists largely because
the fertility industry is not regulated. While the American Society of
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)and the Society for Reproductive
Technology (SART) have issued permissive industry guidelines,
there is no serious consequence to the physician or clinic that ignores
those guidelines. As in vitro fertilization is expensive and largely
funded with out-of-pocket monies, patients and their physicians are
inclined to transfer more than one embryo for implantation during
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1. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). The Act requires coverage for assisted
reproductive technologies. In vitro fertilization is the most common assisted reproductive
technology.
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each cycle of in vitro fertilization. They do so in order to increase the
chances of a “successful” pregnancy and maximize a patient’s use of
funds. As a result, women who undergo in vitro fertilization often
have more than one baby at a time.
Moreover, the only federal law that regulates the industry—the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act—also encourages
multiple embryo transfers by requiring physicians and clinics to re-
port their pregnancy success rates each year. A successful pregnancy
is one that results in a live birth—regardless of how many children.
This encourages physicians to transfer multiple embryos to increase
their chances of a successful pregnancy so that they can attract addi-
tional consumers. Because the human uterus is designed to carry only
one baby at a time, multi-fetal pregnancies are risky and usually re-
sult in preterm babies. The children often have long-term health and
other needs. This is a public health concern.
The Family Building Act would help regulate the largely unregu-
lated fertility industry. If passed, women and their physicians would
be inclined to transfer fewer embryos for implantation during a cycle
of in vitro fertilization because an unsuccessful pregnancy would not
mean the loss of out-of-pocket dollars. A patient would be more will-
ing to try again if insurance covered the procedure. Furthermore,
physician reimbursement rates could be tied to the industry guide-
lines. A federal mandate requiring insurers to cover in vitro fertil-
ization would strengthen the industry guidelines without a need for
an additional regulatory industry. An insurance mandate will reduce
the incidence of multi-fetal pregnancies, the largest problem associ-
ated with in vitro fertilization, and ultimately increase the incidence
of healthy single-baby pregnancies.
INTRODUCTION
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AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION; WHY IS THERE A DARK SIDE TO
THIS MIRACLE PROCEDURE?
A. “Be [F]ruitful, and [M]ultiply,” but What if I Can’t?
B. The Evolution of In Vitro Fertilization
C. What is Wrong with Multi-Fetal Pregnancies?
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2010] OCTOMOM AND MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCIES 137
III. THE SUPREME COURT HAS DECLINED TO IMPOSE A
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In January of 2009, Nadya Suleman delivered eight babies at
the Kaiser Permanente Medical Center in Bellflower, California.2
The media excitedly awaited details as to who delivered the latest
octuplets.3 Soon, the excitement turned to anger and judgment as
the following information came to light:
2. Ashley Surdin, Octuplet Mother Also Gives Birth to Ethical Debate, WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 2009, at C1.
3. Id. at C8.
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• The mother was identified as a thirty-three-year-old
single mother who already had six children under the
age of seven.4
• The mother received some public assistance for at least
two of her older children.5
• The mother was unemployed with no visible means of
income.6
• The mother lived with her parents, who were also in
financial trouble.7
• The mother used in vitro fertilization in each of her
pregnancies.8
• The mother’s physician transferred six cryopreserved
embryos for implantation, and they resulted in eight
babies.9
The media dubbed Ms. Suleman “Octomom,” and several pundits
offered solutions to the Octomom problem. Such solutions included
the following:
• Remove the babies from Ms. Suleman. She cannot nur-
ture them and care for them because she has no hus-
band and no money.10
• Bring charges against the physician for transferring six
embryos for implantation.11
4. Id. at C1.
5. Octuplets’ Mom On Welfare, Spokesman Confirms, FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 10, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,490269,00.html [hereinafter Octuplets’ Mom on
Welfare].
6. Jessica Garrison et al., Octuplets’ Birth Spawns Outrage from Public, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2009, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/07/local/me-octuplets7.
7. Id.
8. Octuplets’ Mom On Welfare, supra note 5.
9. Garrison et al., supra note 6.
10. See Castina, Nadya Suleman Child Protective Services Complaint (Child Abuse
Claim), POPCRUNCH.COM (Feb. 7, 2009), http://www.popcrunch.com/nadya-suleman-child
-protective-services-complaint-child-abuse-claim (stating that Dr. Carole Lieberman, “a
Los Angeles-area psychiatrist[,] has filed a complaint with . . . Child Protective Services
accusing controversial Nadya Suleman of child abuse and urging CPS to step in and re-
move the serial mommy’s newborn octuplets due to Suleman’s ‘inability to properly care
for her 14 children’ ”).
11. Pamela Madsen, Michael Kamrava, MD is Given the Boot From the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, THE FERTILITY ADVOC. (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www
.thefertilityadvocate.com/?p=1798.
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• Create a regulatory agency to put limits on the number
of embryos that a physician may transfer, and regulate
cryopreserved embryos.12
• Mandate insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization.13
Octomom and her babies are no longer headline news. The
issues raised as a result of the saga, however, are still newsworthy.
Before the single unemployed Octomom gave birth to her eight
babies, the media celebrated other multi-fetal pregnancies and re-
warded the parents and children of these “miracle births” with en-
dorsements and television shows.14 Octomom’s saga, however, has
helped the general population understand the serious side effects
of multi-fetal pregnancies.15 The largest risk factor of multi-fetal
pregnancies is pre-term delivery and the long-term health needs and
developmental delays associated with such preterm babies. The
March of Dimes has recognized not only that preterm labor and
delivery is a serious public health issue that must be addressed, but
also that the rate of such births has increased thirty-six percent over
the last twenty-five years.16
The impact of such multi-fetal pregnancies does not just affect
the mother and her children; it affects all of society. In the case of
extreme multi-fetal pregnancies like Octomom’s pregnancy, hospitals
are generally not able to recoup the costs associated with the preg-
nancy and delivery of the resulting babies.17 Even in the case of
12. Bruce Patsner, The Octuplets: A Medical Mistake Needing More Regulation?, ON
THE EDGES OF SCI. AND L. (Feb. 17, 2009, 11:52 AM), http://blogs.kentlaw.edu/islat/
2009/02/the-octuplets-a-medical-mistake-needing-more-regulation.html.
13. John Zhang, Pass Legislation to Increase Insurance for In Vitro Fertilization, THE
HILL (June 22, 2009, 1:35 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/47123-pass-legislation -
to-increase-insurance-for-in-vitro-fertilization.
14. See, e.g., Jennifer Leahy, Famous Octuplets Reach Milestone, HOUS. CHRON.,
Dec. 21, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/moms/6175553
.html (discussing the tenth birthday of the surviving seven Chukwu octuplets); Stephanie
Woodard, The Septuplets Turn 10!, LADIES’ HOME J., Dec. 2007, http://www.lhj.com/style/
covers/the-septuplets-turn-10/ (discussing the tenth birthday of the McCaughey septuplets).
15. The reasons why Octomom was vilified are subjects for another paper. Unlike
famous moms of multiples, Octomom was a single, non-Christian, woman of color.
16. MARCH OF DIMES, WHITE PAPER ON PRETERM BIRTH: THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
TOLL 3 (2009), available at http://www.nann.org/pdf/09marchofdimes_whitepaper.pdf.
17. Robert Stillman, How to Promote Single Embryo Transfers, N.Y. TIMES ROOM
FOR DEBATE BLOG (Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/
200910/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births/. As a “reproductive endocrinologist and medical
director of Shady Grove Fertility Center in Rockville, Md.” and a past board member of the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Stillman stated that:
Between 1996 and 2007, following professional guidelines and improved clin-
ical outcomes, we saw an 87 percent decrease in triplet and quadruplet preg-
nancies as the average number of embryos transferred steadily dropped and
while the number of I.V.F. cycles and live births increased.
Id.
140 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:135
twins and triplets, multi-fetal pregnancies tend to result in prema-
ture births. Such pregnancies and deliveries are costly and risky—
requiring additional medical professionals and neonatal intensive
care units that are not required of healthy single pregnancies. In
addition, as a result of being born underweight and underdeveloped,
many of the babies have long-term physical or mental disabilities.18
Treatment for such disabilities is often covered through insurance
or social programs such as Medicaid. Thus, all of society bears the
costs for multi-fetal pregnancies through either increased insurance
premiums or taxpayer funded programs.
Though preterm birth is known to be one of the largest neonatal
health issues in the United States, the focus on curing the issue has
primarily been directed at prenatal care for lower income women.19
For example, the recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act provides grants for states and other entities “to develop
and implement evidence-based maternal, infant and early childhood
visitation models.” 20 These visitation programs target at-risk “com-
munities with concentrations of premature birth, low-birth weight
infants, and infant mortality, including infant death due to neglect,
or other indicators of at-risk prenatal, maternal, newborn, or child
health.” 21 In actuality, more than one-third of preterm births are a
result of fertility treatments.22 Thus, it is not simply an issue for at-
risk communities. Because multiple embryo transfers result in mul-
tiple babies, the rate of multi-fetal pregnancies is significantly higher
for women who undergo fertility treatment than those who conceive
naturally.23 While the incidence of multi-fetal pregnancies “is one
pair per 90 live births” with natural conception, such rate for women
who successfully undergo fertility treatments is about one in three.24
Thanks to the Octomom saga, it is now widely known that the
three billion dollar fertility industry is largely unregulated.25 Though
18. See Mark I. Evans, The Problem Is the Cost, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG
(Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble
-with-twin-births/ (discussing the increased risk of complications with multiples).
19. Mike Stobbe, Premature Births Worsen US Infant Death Rate, MSNBC.COM, NOV. 3,
2009, http://www.msnbc.com/id/33604403/ns/health-kids_and_parenting/.
20. Health Care Reform, NAT’L FED. OF FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.ffcmh.org/what-we-do/policy/health-care-reform/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2010);
see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2951, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (detailing provisions for such grants).
21. Id. § 2951(b)(1)(A)(i).
22. Stobbe, supra note 19.
23. See Sarah Bernard & Hugo Lindgren, Twins—The High Cost of Multiple Births,
NYMAG.COM June 4, 2006, http://nymag.com/news/features/17205/index1.html#ixzz0
XQRdbRV7. In vitro fertilization disproportionately results in more pregnancies of twins,
triplets, or more than does natural conception.
24. Id.
25. See Cate Vojdik, Octuplets: The Cost of Making Babies, AC360 BLOG (Feb. 2,
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Octomom and her physician have suffered criticism for the large
number of embryos transferred for implantation during a cycle of in
vitro fertilization and failure to follow industry guidelines, statistics
suggest that most fertility clinics do not follow such industry guide-
lines.26 Furthermore, there are no real penalties for physicians who
do not follow such guidelines.27
On the same day that Octomom delivered her babies, Congress-
man Anthony Weiner introduced the Family Building Act of 2009 in
the House of Representatives.28 Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced
similar legislation in the Senate later that year.29 The companion bills
require insurers to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization and other
assisted reproductive technologies. I suggest that Congress should
take a serious look at the legislation. This bill should not languish in
committee without the benefit of hearings and a markup.30
A federal mandate requiring insurers to cover in vitro fertiliza-
tion will reduce multi-fetal pregnancies and lower the rate of preterm
births.31 Society will benefit from healthy single-birth pregnancies,
and there will probably not be increased costs for insurers. Here is
why: in vitro fertilization is a costly out-of-pocket procedure. With a
success rate of approximately twenty-seven percent, women and their
physicians may maximize their chances for a successful pregnancy
by transferring multiple embryos for implantation.32 Sadly, such
multiple embryos often result in multi-fetal pregnancies. The fed-
eral mandate requiring insurers to provide coverage for the proce-
dure would remove the primary incentive for patients to request or
physicians to offer to transfer multiple embryos for implantation—
money, or lack of money.
2009, 3:42 PM EST), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2009/02/02/octuplets-the-cost-of -making-
babies/ (according to Deborah Spar, a former Harvard business professor, in her book
The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Polities Drive the Commerce of Conception).
26. See Stephanie Nano, Few Fertility Clinics Follow Embryo Guidelines, S.F. CHRON.,
(Feb. 21, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-02-21/news/17189772_1_two-embryos-
fertility-clinics-success-rates (noting “[f]ewer than 20 percent of U.S. clinics follow
professional guidelines on how many embryos should be implanted”).
27. Patsner, supra note 12.
28. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
29. S. 1258, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
30. A markup allows amendments to the introduced bill to be introduced at a committee
meeting. Kevin M. McDonald, Don’t Tread on Me: Faster Than a Tire Blowout, Congress
Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation That Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1181 n.77 (2001).
31. A federal mandate requiring insurers to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization
may not have prevented Octomom’s strange saga. See Darshak Sanghavi, Pregnant Pause:
Who Should Pay for In Vitro Fertilization?, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.slate.com/
id/2211151/ (stating that Ms. Suleman collected $168,000 in disability payments in 1999,
which may have helped cover the procedure).
32. Zhang, supra note 13.
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A standard maternity benefits package includes coverage for labor
and delivery, regardless of the number of children. Those costs are sig-
nificantly higher for multi-fetal pregnancies than they are for single-
birth pregnancies. Additionally, insurers already cover the hidden
costs associated with in vitro fertilization when they cover the medi-
cally necessary treatments for twins, triplets, quadruplets or more.
As an insurance mandate will translate to fewer preterm babies, the
long-term health costs of preterm babies will diminish. Therefore,
the insurance mandate will not cost the insurance industry any more
money than it already spends for labor and delivery, as well as for the
long-term health needs of babies born in a multi-fetal pregnancy and
their mothers. Coverage for in vitro fertilization would be a shift in
costs and possibly lower long-term outlays for health insurance.
Part I of this paper identifies the problems associated with multi-
fetal pregnancies. There are long-term societal costs associated with
multi-fetal pregnancies and the resulting preterm births.33 Part II
looks at the current fertility industry guidelines and federal law.
The Association for Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Repro-
ductive Technology have industry guidelines that are to be used when
clinics do not have internal data. The guidelines are permissive and a
majority of clinics do not follow the guidelines. Currently, the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act is the only federal law that
regulates the fertility industry. The law was passed to assist con-
sumers as they identified successful clinics but encourages clinics
and physicians to transfer multiple embryos in order to be seen as
successful.
Part III addresses why federal legislation is necessary. Although
the medical community has defined infertility as a disease34 and the
Supreme Court has said that reproduction is a major life activity,35
the Supreme Court has stopped short of requiring insurers to pro-
vide coverage for in vitro fertilization under the Americans with
Disabilities Act36 or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.37 Furthermore,
state regulation is inadequate. Only a few states have addressed the
issue and there is no uniformity. In addition, ERISA has a loophole
that exempts self-funded insurance plans from state mandates on
33. Id.
34. Frequently Asked Questions about Infertility, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://
www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]
(last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
35. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 328
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
37. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
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insurance providers. In Part IV, I recommend that Congress should
hold committee hearings and markups to strengthen the Family
Building Act and eventually pass federal legislation. It is my belief
that such legislation is needed and support for the legislation may be
garnered in the same way that support was garnered for the Drive
Through Maternity Benefits legislation that passed in the mid 1990s.
In the last Part, I conclude by acknowledging that a federal insurance
mandate will not answer all policy issues associated with in vitro
fertilization. In vitro fertilization is, however, the simplest and most
effective way to curb multi-fetal pregnancies and promote healthy
single-baby pregnancies.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM—THE HISTORY OF INFERTILITY
AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION; WHY IS THERE A DARK SIDE TO THIS
MIRACLE PROCEDURE?
In vitro fertilization has helped many individuals realize their
dream of parenthood. But, there are often costs associated with such
parenthood. Also, while parents may think that a multi-fetal preg-
nancy, one that results in two, three or more children, is a success-
ful pregnancy, many serious health issues are associated with such
pregnancies. Such issues include “low birth weight, cerebral palsy,
blindness, hearing impairment, and cognitive delays.” 38 These “com-
plications associated with [in vitro fertilization] are often distanced
from the more glowing accounts about reproductive conception.” 39
A. “Be [F]ruitful, and [M]ultiply,” 40 but What if I Can’t?
In the Garden of Eden, God commanded Adam and Eve and all of
the animals to “[b]e fruitful, and multiply.”41 Unfortunately, all human
beings do not have the natural ability to do so. Such individuals are
deemed to be infertile. Infertility is the inability to multiply after con-
tinued unprotected intercourse.42 It occurs when pregnancy and live
birth cannot be achieved because either the male or female repro-
ductive system is not working properly.43 Various entities define the
requisite period of time in different ways. For example, “[t]he World
Health Organization defines this period of time as two years, while
38. Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The
Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 3 (2005).
39. Id. at 26-27.
40. Genesis 1:28.
41. Id.
42. THE STAFF OF RESOLVE WITH DIANE ARONSON, RESOLVING INFERTILITY 5 (Diane
N. Clapp & Margaret R. Hollister eds., 1999).
43. Id. at 63.
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the standard medical definition is twelve months, or at least three
consecutive miscarriages or stillbirths.” 44 The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (SART) define this period as twelve months for women
thirty-five and younger, and six months for women over the age of
thirty-five.45
Even though most people often think of infertility as a “woman
problem,” the condition affects men and women at almost equal
rates.46 Female infertility is often caused by blocked fallopian tubes
resulting from endometriosis or other such conditions. Other causes
include ovulation disorders or disorders of the uterus or cervix.47 Low
sperm production, no sperm production, and blocked passage of sperm
are some of the causes of male infertility.48 Additionally, fertility de-
clines with age in both men and women.49 Although infertility has
been attributed to environmental toxins and poor nutrition,50 con-
ception to birth is a complicated process, and sometimes the causes
of infertility are unexplainable.
Generally speaking, the treatment for infertility is as follows:
When infertility has been diagnosed, eighty-five to ninety percent of
cases are treated using an infertility drug.51 Individuals can also turn
to surgery, such as laparoscopy, which may be used to treat female
structural problems.52 Intrauterine or artificial insemination, a non-
surgical procedure, is also an option, especially if there is a male
infertility issue.53 If these methods are ineffective, which is true for
44. Crystal Liu, Note, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What is a Justified
Limitation on Reproductive Freedom? The Categorical Exclusion of Single Women and
Same-Sex Couples from Infertility Services and its Role in Defining What Constitutes
Justified and Unjustified Limitations on Reproductive Freedom, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
291, 294 (2009) (citing EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY
AND AUTONOMY 162 (2001)).
45. Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Definitions of Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1603, 1603
(2008) [hereinafter Definitions of Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss], available at
http: / /asrm.org /uploadedFi les /ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications
/Practice_Guidelines/ Committee_Opinions/Definitions_of_infertility_and_recurrent.pdf.
46. ARONSON, supra note 42, at 7 (“Infertility is a female problem in 40 percent of
cases, a male problem in 40 percent of cases, and a combined problem of the couple or
unexplained in 20 percent of cases.”).
47. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 34.
48. Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclusions
as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 299 (2005).
49. ARONSON, supra note 42, at 14.
50. Lisa M. Kerr, Note, Can Money Buy Happiness? An Examination of the Coverage
of Infertility Services under HMO Contracts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 605 (1999).
51. Pendo, supra note 48, at 299 (noting that “clomiphene and gonadtropins [are used]
to regulate ovulation and to return female or male hormones to normal levels”).
52. Id. (citing Bonny Gilbert, Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for
Infertility Treatment, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 42, 43 (1996)).
53. Bonny Gilbert, Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility
2010] OCTOMOM AND MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCIES 145
a small percentage of individuals, advanced reproductive technologies
(ARTs) are necessary. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
defines ART “as all treatments or procedures that involve the handling
of human eggs and sperm for the purpose of helping a woman become
pregnant.” 54 In vitro fertilization is the most common ART.55 Approxi-
mately one in eighty babies is a result of in vitro fertilization.56
B. The Evolution of In Vitro Fertilization
In vitro fertilization is a surgical procedure that helps women
with blocked or non-existent fallopian tubes achieve and sustain a
pregnancy.57 In the most basic form, in vitro fertilization is a procedure
in which a woman’s eggs are fertilized with a man’s sperm58 and then
transferred “into the woman’s uterus for possible implantation.” 59
The procedure involves the need to stimulate a woman’s ovaries to pro-
duce eggs,60 and the egg retrieval process requires intravenous seda-
tion.61 Once retrieved, the eggs are graded and incubated before sperm
is added.62 The number of embryos transferred usually “depends on
[the] embryo quality and the woman’s age.” 63 Women can elect to
cryopreserve (freeze) the embryos that are not transferred.64 One
reason for cryopreservation is to have embryos already available if
the cycle is not successful.65
The “first test tube baby,” Louise Brown, was born in the United
Kingdom on July 25, 1978.66 Although much of the world celebrated
the new technology, there were critics who considered the procedure
to be an unethical and immoral medical experiment.67 Some even
Treatment, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 42, 43 (1996).
54. ARONSON, supra note 42, at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See id. (providing examples such as “gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote
intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), embryo cryopreservation, egg or embryo donation, and gesta-
tional carriers”).
56. Sanghavi, supra note 31.
57. ARONSON, supra note 42, at 176.
58. Id. (noting that doctors today use a plastic dish rather than a glass dish; however,
in vitro literally means “in glass”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 177 (asserting that there is a need “to increase the number of mature eggs
that can be retrieved”).
61. Id. at 179.
62. Id. at 180.
63. ARONSON, supra note 42, at 181.
64. Id. at 182.
65. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY
164 (2001).
66. Judith Woods, IVF: The Birth That Started a Revolution, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,
July 21, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/women_shealth/3355633/ IVF-The-
birth-that-started-a-revolution.html.
67. Liu, supra note 44, at 315.
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likened the procedure to the atomic bomb.68 Even so, the procedure
allowed Louise’s infertile mother to experience pregnancy and child-
birth. Australia and the United States soon followed with their very
own test tube babies. Two in vitro pregnancies were documented live
in Australia in 1980.69 In December of 1981, Elizabeth Jordan Carr
was born in Virginia as a result of the new medical technology.70
More than thirty years have passed since the first live birth using
in vitro fertilization. The current state of in vitro fertilization has pro-
duced issues that are far more complex than those associated with
the birth of Louise Brown and Elizabeth Carr.71 Although many indi-
viduals can testify that in vitro fertilization has helped them realize
their dream of becoming parents, the unregulated fertility industry
has an unhealthy dark side. In vitro fertilization is an expensive pro-
cedure that most individuals fund with out-of-pocket dollars. Only a
few states have mandated insurance coverage for the procedure, and
all of those mandates have limitations.72 As a result of the expense,
physicians and patients are motivated to maximize a patient’s invest-
ment dollars and transfer multiple embryos for implantation. Such
transfers result in a higher incidence of twins, triplets, and even
higher order births.73 The unhealthy dark side of in vitro fertilization
occurs when a woman carries more than one child at a time. Such
pregnancies result in significant medical risks to the children and
mothers. Deaths, disabilities, and other long-term problems are often
overlooked as we celebrate the happy occasion of new babies.74
C. What is Wrong with Multi-Fetal Pregnancies?
Octomom’s babies were born nine weeks early and weighed be-
tween one and a half pounds and a little more than three pounds.75
68. Id. (“During the early 1970s when scientists were pursuing the possibility of IVF,
a British magazine wrote a cover story analogizing IVF to the atomic bomb.”).
69. IVF, BIOTECHNOLOGY ONLINE, http://www.biotechnologyonline.gov.au/human/ivf
.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
70. David Rapp, America’s First Test-Tube Baby Turns 25, AMERICANHERITAGE .COM,
Dec. 28, 2006, http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/web/20061228-in-vitro-fertilization
-reproductive-technology-ivf-elizabeth-carr-howard-jones-georgeanna-jones.html.
71. Issues such as cloning are beyond the scope of this paper.
72. See State Mandated Insurance for Fertility Treatment, FERTILITY LIFELINES,
http://www.fertilitylifelines.com/payingfortreatment/state-mandatedinsurancelist.jsp (last
visited Nov. 22, 2010) (“Currently only 15 states have laws requiring insurance coverage
for infertility treatment.” These states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia.).
73. Mark I. Evans, The Truth About Multiple Births, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 14.
74. Id.
75. Vojdik, supra note 25.
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Four dozen medical professionals helped ensure their safe arrival.76
A world record indeed, but it was not one to be celebrated. Each of
the babies required intensive care.77
In vitro fertilization is considered a treatment for infertility.
The procedure has, however, replaced one problem (inability to have
children) with a more severe problem (multi-fetal pregnancies). The
largest problem of multi-fetal pregnancies is that they result in the
preterm births of multiple babies. Although super multi-fetal preg-
nancies like Octomom’s are rare occurrences, twins, triplets, and qua-
druplets are not rare occurrences.78 The March of Dimes has stated
that fertility treatments have contributed to the significant increase
of preterm babies.79
Preterm labor and delivery is costly and dangerous to both a
mother and her children. Approximately 51% of twins and 91% of
triplets are born preterm, compared to 9.4% in single-birth pregnan-
cies.80 Approximately 14% of twins and 41% of triplets are born very
preterm, compared to 1.7% in single-birth pregnancies.81 The average
gestational age for twins is 34 to 36 weeks, for triplets is 32 to 34
weeks, and for quadruplets is 28 to 30 weeks.82 Physicians often do
not do the greatest job of explaining the risks associated with deliv-
ering more than one baby, including twins.83
Babies who are born prematurely have low birth weights, which
means that they have a greater risk of complications and even death.84
A mother may require more medical care during her pregnancy and
her children may require additional medical care during the pregnancy
76. Sanghavi, supra note 31.
77. See Vojdik, supra note 25 (noting that the babies were “underweight and under-
developed”).
78. Pamela Prindle Fierro, Twin and Multiple Birth Rate Statistics, ABOUT.COM,
http://multiples.about.com/od/funfacts/a/twinbirthrate.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
According to data collected in 2006, rates of quadruplets, quintuplets and other higher-
order births are on the decline, whereas the rate of live births in twin deliveries has more
than doubled since 1980.
79. Stephanie Saul, The Gift of Life, and Its Price, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1
(stating that “an increasing number of the newborns are twins, and they carry special
risks often overlooked”).
80. Greg R. Alexander et al., What Are the Fetal Growth Patterns of Singletons, Twins,
and Triplets in the United States?, 41 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 115, 117 (1998).
81. Id.
82. Christopher J. De Jonge & Don P. Wolf, Embryo Number for Transfer Should Be
Regulated, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 784, 785 (1997).
83. See Christina Vienna, Comment to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. TIMES ROOM
FOR DEBATE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 6:27 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births/ (commenting
that “[n]o one sat down and told us the risk of prematurity, and all the other worries that
came along with that”).
84. De Jonge & Wolf, supra note 82, at 785.
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and at birth.85 Such babies may have long-term health needs and
developmental delays, which can also affect parents.86
According to a 2006 report of the Institute of Medicine, preterm
births cost the United States an average of approximately $51,000 per
infant or $26 billion.87 Most of the expense is associated with medical
care.88 In 2007, the average cost of an uncomplicated childbirth was
approximately $8,802.89 “In one study, the average hospital charge
for mother and infant was $9,845 for singletons, $37,947 for twins
($18,974 per baby), and $109,765 for triplets ($36,588 per baby).” 90
In addition to the costs for delivery, preterm babies born as a
result of a multi-fetal pregnancy generally require more medical
attention throughout their first year of life and are less healthy than
babies born as a result of a single birth. There is a greater risk of
death associated with low birth weight babies.91 Additionally, such
babies have a substantial need for care and often suffer long-term
damage, in spite of advances in medical care.92 The low birth weight
often means that the babies will have disabilities that require long-
term—and costly—medical treatment:93
The average cost of medical care for a premature or low birth-
weight baby for its first year of life is about $49,000, according
to a new report from the March of Dimes Foundation. By contrast,
a newborn without complications costs $4,551 for care in its first
year of life, the report said. Newborns with other kinds of com-
85. Saul, supra note 79, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Vojdik, supra note 25.
88. Id.
89. Margaret Denett, The Average Cost of Child Birth, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com
/facts_5391105_average-cost-child-birth.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
According to a study by Thomson Healthcare for The March of Dimes, sub-
mitted in June 2007, the average vaginal childbirth cost $7,737 in 2004. . . .
The June 2007 study conducted for the March of Dimes says one-third of all
U.S. babies are born via Cesarean section, at an average cost of $10,958,
which is $3,000 more than vaginal births.
Id.
90. Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Call For
New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 274 (2003). “These higher costs are due to a
number of factors, including an increase in cesarean sections, more ICU (intensive care
unit) admissions for the infants, and longer hospitalizations for the infants and mothers.”
Id. (citing T.L. Callahan et al., The Economic Impact of Multiple-Gestation Pregnancies
and the Contribution of Assisted-Reproduction Techniques to Their Incidence, 331 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 244, 244-49 (1994)).
91. Barbara Luke & Louis G. Keith, The Contribution of Singletons, Twins and
Triplets to Low Birth Weight, Infant Mortality and Handicap in the United States, 37 J.
REPROD. MED., 661, 666 (1992).
92. Elizabeth Landau, Study: Average Preemie Costs $49,000 in First Year, CNN.COM
Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/03/17/premature.babies/index.html.
93. Id.
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plications, such as congenital defects, have medical expenses of
$10,273 on average in the first year.94
One example of a long-term treatment cost for preterm babies
is the Synagis vaccine.95 Most preterm babies are at risk for RSV, a
severe respiratory virus. As a result of such diagnosis, the babies
require the Synagis vaccine. Each dose of the vaccine costs approxi-
mately $2,000, so the full treatment cost is approximately $8,000 to
$10,000.96 There are also greater frequencies of cardiovascular,
urogenital, and musculoskeletal defects in children born with the
assistance of in vitro fertilization than those born through natural
conception.97 There are significant long-term costs associated with
treating these defects.
Multi-fetal pregnancies encumber the parent as well as the child.
In addition to risks to the children, multi-fetal pregnancies also ad-
versely affect the mother. For example, mothers often suffer with
pregnancy risks such as gestational diabetes and preeclampsia.98
Additionally, parents of multiples often have medical and psycholog-
ical issues. Many are unprepared for the emotional challenges of
raising multiple children. A substantial amount of time is needed to
manage a household and care for multiple children. “[F]atigue and
stress arising from child care is almost universal for mothers of mul-
tiples. Research also shows a higher incidence of depression, alcohol
and drug abuse, and divorce among mothers with multiples.” 99
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS—FEDERAL LAWS AND
FERTILITY INDUSTRY GUIDELINES
The United States has a higher incidence of preterm births
than other developed counties.100 Data from countries that provide
insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization shows that such countries
94. Id.
95. Synagis is a medication designed to protect high-risk babies and preemies from
RSV (respiratory syncytial virus). See Synagis (Palivizumab), http://www.synagis.com
(last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
96. This information was obtained in Author’s conversation with a pediatrician.
97. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology):
Should the Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 78 (2004).
98. Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 620 (2003). “ART procedures [also] raise a
variety of other safety concerns for the mother, ranging from acute and chronic side effects
associated with the use of fertility drugs . . . to complications involved in the harvesting
procedure, and higher rates of ectopic pregnancies.” Id. at 620-21.
99. Strong, supra note 90, at 274 (citations omitted).
100. Janet Tucker & William McGuire, ABC of Preterm Birth: Epidemiology of
Preterm Birth, 329 BMJ 675 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC517653/.
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have lower rates of embryo implantation and lower rates of multi-
fetal pregnancies than the United States, where there is not manda-
tory insurance coverage.101 Because the United States relies on the
guidelines promulgated by ASRM and SART, an insurance mandate
would help strengthen those guidelines by giving physicians an in-
centive to follow them. Current data suggests that most fertility clinics
do not follow the industry guidelines.102 There is no incentive for them
to do so. In fact, the only federal law that regulates the fertility in-
dustry enables physicians to disregard the guidelines. That law, the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,103 requires
clinics to report their success rates to the Centers for Disease Control.
Multi-fetal pregnancies count as successful pregnancies. Patients
use this information to assist them as they choose a clinic. As clinics
want to have a high success rate, physicians will often implant mul-
tiple embryos to increase the chances for success. After all, a success-
ful clinic will presumably attract new patients, and those satisfied
patients will refer others. Unfortunately, successful often means two,
three, or more babies.
A. Lack of Insurance Coverage for In Vitro Fertilization Increases
the Rate of Multi-Fetal Pregnancies
When first introduced, in vitro fertilization allowed childless
couples to become parents. Yet no one ever imagined that a huge
and dangerous downside to the procedure lurked—“multiplying” too
much. Within the time-span of three decades, we have gone from the
celebration of Louise and Elizabeth to the shock of Octomom.
The chance of a multi-fetal pregnancy is higher with in vitro
fertilization than with natural conception, and there is no incentive
for a physician to transfer fewer embryos per in vitro fertilization
cycle.104 Money is a motivating factor when it comes to the number of
embryos transferred for implantation during a cycle of in vitro fer-
tilization. Because many families often take out loans or second
mortgages to fund in vitro fertilization, patients request or physi-
cians offer to transfer two, three, or more embryos in order to maxi-
mize chances of a successful pregnancy.105 Multiple embryo transfers
101. In Vitro Fertilization: Doctors Perform More IVF Treatments, But Multiple Births
Decline, WOMEN’S HEALTH WKLY., Aug. 9, 2001, at 14-15.
102. Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www
.msnbc.com/id/29305552/.
103. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
106 Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to -7 (2000)).
104. The reasons will be discussed in this paper.
105. See Stephanie Saul, Grievous Choice on Risky Path to Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2009, at A1, A14 (stating that multi-fetal pregnancies may also result from the
use of a less effective fertility treatment, such as intrauterine insemination, when in vitro
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are the result of patients attempting to maximize their invest-
ments.106 The cost of one cycle of in vitro fertilization is approximately
$12,400.107 A successful pregnancy occurs only forty to fifty percent
of the time when a single embryo is transferred for implantation.108
“[E]ach attempt at [in vitro fertilization] is a financial gamble.”109
Success rates increase as the number of embryos increase. Physicians
want to please their patients by producing a successful pregnancy.
The happy patients then refer other clients to the physician and the
cycle continues.110 Sadly, a multi-fetal pregnancy is not necessarily
a successful pregnancy.
There are no federal laws that limit the number of embryos that
may be transferred for implantation during a cycle of in vitro fertil-
ization.111 The only federal law that regulates in vitro fertilization,
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, may actually
encourage physicians to transfer multiple embryos for implanta-
tion.112 Furthermore, the American Society of Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) and Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART)
guidelines are not rigid mandates that impose penalties on physicians
who transfer more than one embryo.113
fertilization is not covered by insurance).
106. See Smeyler, Comment to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR
DEBATE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 3:35 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/room
fordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births/.
We were counseled on the likelihood of multiples, issues related to that, and
provided a choice of 1-3 embryos being used. Given the cost and the reality
that we would likely only ever have one shot at child birth (our history include
[sic] 5 years of trying, which is not uncommon), we chose (key word here) to
use more than one embryo and had twins as a result.
Id.
107. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 34. This amount includes lab screenings
for both parents, ultrasound and lab work, egg recovery, and embryo transfer. See Cost
of In Vitro Fertilization,LOVE TOKNOW, http://pregnancy.lovetoknow.com/wiki/Cost_of
_In_Vitro_Fertilization (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
108. Sanghavi, supra note 31.
109. Goodwin, supra note 38, at 26 (citation omitted).
110. See, e.g., Saul, supra note 105, at A14 (stating that Jon and Kate Gosselin used
intrauterine insemination (IUI)). Additionally, some patients choose less effective methods
for fertility treatments because they are less costly than in vitro fertilization. Those preg-
nancies too often result in higher order multi-fetal pregnancies.
111. See Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of
Unconsented Sperm Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 451, 466 (2000) (noting that an attempt at such a law might lead to an outcry that
the government is trying to encroach on “a woman’s right to procreate”).
112. Karey Harwood, Harwood Follows up on Ethical Issues at Stake in the Octuplets
Case, UNC PRESS BLOG (Feb. 25, 2009, 6:18 PM), http://uncpressblog.com/2009/02/25/
harwood-follows-up/.
113. Jesse Reynolds, Preventing the Next Fertility Clinic Scandal, BIOETHICS FORUM
(Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=3240&
biogid=140.
152 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:135
After Octomom’s saga, some suggested that a regulatory agency
was necessary. While pontificating about the need for a regulatory
entity makes for great intellectual discussions, Americans often
shun such government intervention, and legislation would undoubt-
edly be extremely difficult to pass. Federally mandated insurance
coverage can, however, have a positive effect on reducing multi-fetal
pregnancies.
A federal mandate for insurers to cover in vitro fertilization
would provide the needed financial incentive for a physician to trans-
fer fewer embryos because, if the physician did transfer multiple
embryos, he or she would not otherwise be reimbursed by the insur-
ance carrier. Additionally, such a mandate would reduce the incentive
for a patient to request multiple embryos. Insurance coverage removes
the “financial gamble.”114 In states and countries with mandated
coverage for in vitro fertilization, there are lower embryo transfer
rates and fewer multi-fetal pregnancies.115 Unfortunately, few states
have mandates, and the fertility industry is often described as the
“Wild Wild West.”116 Federally mandated insurance coverage for
in vitro fertilization can help curtail the behaviors of patients and
physicians in this unregulated market.
B. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act
There is only one federal law that regulates in vitro fertilization,
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.117 The
purpose of the Act was to help a consumer make informed choices
as she selects an appropriate fertility clinic.118 Unfortunately, the
Act is fundamentally flawed. According to the language of the Act,
the success of a fertility clinic is determined by the number of live
births the clinic “produces” each year; the Act requires fertility clinics
to report their success rates annually.119 The Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) compiles the data and publishes the success rates. It
also publishes the names of clinics that do not disclose their preg-
nancy success rates in accordance with the regulations.120
114. Goodwin, supra note 38, at 26.
115. Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661, 664-66 (2002).
116. See Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 228-29 (2001) (citations
omitted) (noting that “[t]he near-absence of federal and state law combined with ineffective
and unheeded industry guidelines leads to a lawless free-for-all”).
117. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
106 Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to -7 (2000)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change:
The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 568, 593 (2005).
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Clinics use various treatment approaches in order to be seen as
successful. For example, a clinic with poor success results may be
inclined to transfer multiple embryos in order to maximize its chances
of a successful live birth.121 In the case of Octomom’s physician, a
look at data from the 2004 CDC Report shows that while the live birth
rate was the same as the national industry average, the average
number of embryos transferred was much higher than the industry
average.122 Octomom’s physician needed to transfer greater numbers
of embryos in order to keep his success rate at the industry average.
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act created
a vicious cycle. A clinic needs customers to be not only successful, but
to remain in business. A clinic also needs to show customers that it
has a high percentage of live births. The clinic is not motivated to
reduce the number of embryos transferred for fear of reducing the
number of live births. When “[t]he profitability of a particular practice
depends on its success, which in turn is measured by the number of
pregnancies and live births,”123 the end result is a large incidence of
multi-fetal pregnancies.124 Individuals who are paying for the proce-
dure using out-of-pocket funds have no incentive to reverse the cycle.
Because the industry is unregulated, it is not uncommon for
clinics to offer unorthodox methods to attract patients. A search on
the internet uncovered money-back guarantees to patients,125 dis-
counts for prepayment of multiple cycles,126 and loan programs.127
“In a perfect market, consumers [would]” carefully research their
options. They “[would] spend resources to obtain information in pro-
portion to the perceived benefit of that information.”128 When a
physician has slick marketing practices, however, patients may not
carefully analyze their options.129
121. Terrence Lee, Octuplets Doctor May Have Been Lulled by Past Poor Success,
FERTILITY FILE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2009), http://fertilityfile.com/2009/02/09/octuplets-doctor
-may-have-been-lulled-by-past-poor-success/.
122. Id. (The physician reported outcomes in 2004 and 2006, but not in 2005. In 2004,
for women under 35, his average number of embryos transferred was 3.8 as compared
to the national average of 2.5.).
123. Rosato, supra note 97, at 73 (citations omitted).
124. Josephine Johnston, Judging Octomom, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2009,
at 23, 23.
125. See, e.g., IVF Pricing Plans, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. OF CHI., http://www
.advancedfertility.com/ivfpr100.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (providing a 100%
guarantee plan).
126. See, e.g., Fertility Treatment Costs, REPROD. CARE CTR., http://www.fertilitydr.com/
fertility-treatment-cost.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (noting discounts for prepayment
of multiple IVF cycles).
127. See, e.g., Loan Programs, HOUS. IVF, http://www.houstonivf.net/BecomingAPatient/
FinancingInfertility.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (listing loan programs for IVF).
128. Moses, supra note 120, at 568.
129. Id.
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Insurance coverage can counter the vicious cycle that results from
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act. Physicians will
not be inclined to transfer multiple embryos if their insurance carrier
will not reimburse them. When a patient can rely on insurance rather
than out-of-pocket funds, she is more inclined to accept the physi-
cian’s decision to transfer fewer embryos because she can try again
if the cycle is unsuccessful. The additional attempt is not so daunting
if the individual patient does not have to finance the procedure with
out-of-pocket funds. If insurance covered in vitro fertilization, neither
physician nor patient would have an incentive for wayward conduct,
and the rate of multi-fetal pregnancies would decline.130
Clinics need patients to stay in business. More individuals would
probably utilize the procedure if it were covered by insurance.131 This
would create more business for physicians and reduce the need for
money-back guarantees and other such practices.132 In addition, the
insurance industry could help ensure that fees are not out of the ordi-
nary. Still another reason for mandating insurance coverage is that
many women do not have access to the procedure. Although infertility
affects women and men of all races and socioeconomic groups,
Currently, infertility treatments are typically used by better-
educated, upper-middle class white professional women. This is
a direct result of the high costs and lack of insurance coverage
for these procedures. For example, seventy-five percent of low-
income women in need of infertility services, a disproportionate
number of whom are African-American, do not have access to
those services.133
C. ASRM and SART Guidelines are Limited and Too Flexible
Several of Octomom’s critics suggested that her physician, Dr.
Michael Kamrava, should be punished for transferring six embryos
for implantation. Some suggested that legal action was warranted
because he did not follow industry standards.134 But, Dr. Kamrava
130. Also, insurance coverage would allow younger women, women of color, and less
economically-advantaged women to have the same access to the procedure. See Judith
F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 36-37 (2008).
131. Dorothy Roberts, Racial Disparity in Reproductive Technologies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29,
1998, at 19N (stating that, although infertility affects all races and classes, assisted repro-
ductive technologies “are used primarily by white people, in particular by affluent and
highly educated women”).
132. Stacey A. Huse, The Need for Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 35 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 555, 572 (1996-97).
133. Kerr, supra note 50, at 605 (citations omitted).
134. See Octuplets’ Mom On Welfare, supra note 5 (stating that two of the six embryos
split, and eight babies were born).
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did not violate industry standards. ASRM states the following about
its guidelines:
These guidelines have been developed to assist physicians
with clinical decisions regarding the care of their patients. They
are not intended to be a protocol to be applied in all situations,
and cannot substitute for the individual judgment of the treating
physicians based on their knowledge of their patients and specific
circumstances. The recommendations in these guidelines may not
be the most appropriate approach for all patients. Medical science
and ethics are constantly changing, and clinicians should not rely
solely on these guidelines.135
By its own statement, the ASRM acknowledges that its guide-
lines are flexible. In fact, they are so flexible that a recent study
shows that most clinics do not follow the recommended number of
embryos to implant.136 According to data from the Centers for Disease
Control, over eighty percent of clinics do not follow the guidelines.137
Although the ASRM and SART usually do not sanction or expel
members for failing to follow its guidelines,138 the ASRM expelled
Dr. Kamrava from its membership in September of 2009.139 In early
2010, the California Medical Board filed a disciplinary complaint
against Dr. Kamrava claiming that his conduct, as it pertained to
Octomom, was grossly negligent.140 The industry may be treating
Dr. Kamrava unfairly.
In November of 2009, the ASRM and SART guidelines were
updated in an effort to curtail multi-fetal pregnancies. The current
ASRM and SART guidelines are more structured than prior versions.
For example, in 1994, the guidelines did not mention a specific num-
ber of embryos that should be implanted. Instead, the recommenda-
tion was to transfer a number “so that no quadruplets and no more
than 1% to 2% triplet pregnancies were anticipated.”141 This was
extremely difficult to enforce. In 1998, the ASRM “suggested that
clinics create their own guidelines based on internally generated
135. Practice Committee Guidelines, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.asrm.org
/Guidelines/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
136. Reynolds, supra note 113.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Rita Rubin, ‘Octomom’ Doctor Expelled from Fertility Group, USA TODAY, Oct. 19,
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-10-18-octomom-doctor-fertility_N.html.
140. Jenny Booth, Nadya Suleman Octuplets Doctor Michael Kamrava Accused of
Negligence, TIMES (London), (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world
/us_and _americas/article6976514.ece.
141. Moses, supra note 120, at 592 (citation omitted).
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statistics.”142 The ASRM did make some recommendations in situa-
tions where there was not sufficient clinic data. The recommenda-
tions in 1999 were that physicians should transfer between three
and five good embryos for implantation, “depending on the patient’s
profile, taking into account factors such as age and prior treatment
history.”143
In the late 1990s, the ASRM began to recognize the correlation
between the increased number of embryos transferred and the in-
creased chance of multi-fetal pregnancies. So, in 1999, it shifted its
recommendation to suggest clinics transfer between two and five em-
bryos, while also “allowing adjustments for ‘individual clinic condi-
tions.’ ”144 ASRM removed from the guidelines descriptive words like
“good quality” to describe the embryos, but continued to emphasize
that flexibility was necessary so that there could be adjustments for
individual clinics and patients. Consider the following language:
Strict limitations on the number of embryos transferred, as re-
quired by law in some countries, do not allow treatment plans to
be individualized after careful consideration of each patient’s own
unique circumstances. Accordingly, these guidelines may be modi-
fied according to individual clinical conditions, including patient
age, embryo quality, the opportunity for cryopreservation, and
as clinical experience with newer techniques accumulates.145
The latest revisions to the guidelines state that only one addi-
tional embryo than that recommended in the guidelines should be
transferred, regardless of the patient’s prognosis.146 Additionally,
clinics may be audited if clinics have a multi-fetal pregnancy rate that
is two standard deviations above the mean rate for all reporting
clinics for two consecutive years.147 But, even with the revisions, the
United States is unlike other countries because physicians and clinics
do not face penalties if they violate the embryo transfer limit. ASRM
and SART continue to err on the side of flexibility.148 Even with the
new revisions, the ASRM guidelines are for use when a clinic does not
have internal data to make its own decisions about embryo trans-
fers.149 The guidelines are merely based on data generated by all clinics
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 592-93.





149. Alan Zarembo & Kimi Yoshino, Octuplets’ Mom Identifies Her Fertility Clinic in
Beverly Hills, L.A. TIMES L.A. NOW BLOG (Feb. 9, 2009), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com
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that provide assisted reproductive technology services.150 A look at
the language from the current guidelines shows that the organiza-
tions did not want to limit a physician’s ability to consider each
patient’s situation on an individual basis.
Those who chastise Dr. Kamrava point to language in the guide-
lines that were in effect before November 2009. Those guidelines
stated that when a patient is under the age of thirty-five, “consider-
ation should be given to transferring only a single embryo.”151 This
language applied, however, only to patients who had a “more favor-
able prognosis.”152 Even though the language suggested that “[a]ll
others in this age group should have no more than” two embryos
transferred,153 the language did excuse unique “individual circum-
stances.”154 The only requirement under the guidelines was that both
the physician and patient should agree on the number of embryos to
be transferred.155 Perhaps Dr. Kamrava, in his professional judgment,
believed Octomom to be an extraordinary circumstance. Octomom
has defended her physician’s decision.156
Before treatment from Dr. Kamrava, Octomom had tried unsuc-
cessfully for seven years to get pregnant; she had used fertility drugs
and artificial insemination.157 She claims to have had a history of
scarred fallopian tubes and miscarriages.158 Dr. Kamrava helped her
achieve pregnancy using in vitro fertilization. He transferred six em-
bryos for implantation in each of her other six pregnancies,159 and the
result in each of those pregnancies was four single-birth pregnancies
and a set of twins. Dr. Kamrava’s pregnancy and live birth rates were
below average, according to the 2006 CDC Report. For women under
35, the average number of embryos transferred in his clinic rate was
3.5 and the live birth rate was 13%. The national average was 2.3
embryos transferred and a 45% live birth rate.160 Additionally,
/lanow/2009/02/octuplets.html (stating that Dr. Michael Kamrava of the “West Coast
Infertility Medical Clinic, now named West Coast IVF Clinic,” transferred far more
embryos than the industry norms and recommendations prescribe).




154. Id. at 1519.
155. Id. at 1518.
156. See Zarembo & Yoshino, supra note 149 (noting that Suleman stated that the




159. See Octuplets’ Mom On Welfare, supra note 5 (stating that the octuplets were a
surprise; Suleman had expected twins at most).
160. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Octomom’s eggs had been cryopreserved, which often reduces the suc-
cess of a pregnancy.161 Given the past history and clinic data, neither
Dr. Kamrava nor his patient had reason to believe that eight babies
would result from the embryos. In fact, his professional judgment may
have led him to believe that transferring six embryos was necessary
to achieve the successful pregnancy.162
If Octomom had delivered only one or two babies, there would
probably have been no public outcry for legal actions against Dr.
Kamrava. In fact, there are known situations (before Octomom and
Dr. Kamrava) where physicians in clinics with poor conditions trans-
ferred large numbers of embryos to compensate for the poor labora-
tory conditions.163 While Dr. Kamrava has been demonized, other
physicians who have not followed the industry guidelines have been
lauded for creating a miracle birth. One such example is the Kell
family of Atlanta.164 The Kells had tried for several years and spent
several thousand dollars in an attempt to have a child. “Sheri Kell’s
doctor retrieved eight eggs from her ovaries, five of which were
healthy.”165 Three of those eggs developed into embryos after fertil-
ization and “were transferred into [her] body.”166 Sheri delivered a
son nine months later.167
Like Dr. Kamrava, Sheri Kell’s physician adjusted his treatment
to meet Sheri’s individual needs. If he had transferred only one em-
bryo, then she may not have had a successful pregnancy. Sheri had
spent thousands of out-of-pocket dollars on fertility treatments, and
financially, she needed to maximize her chances of having a success-
ful pregnancy.168 Even with the new 2009 ASRM guidelines, Sheri’s
physician might feel justified in transferring two or more embryos.
As ASRM and SART have declined to impose rigid guidelines and
penalties, a federal insurance mandate can strengthen the current
161. See Zarembo & Yoshino, supra note 149 (mentioning that Dr. Kamrava used
“breakthrough technology that revolutionized IVF, reducing risks to both the mother and
the child” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. Id.
According to statistics collected by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, his
clinics performed 20 in vitro procedures in 2006 on women under 35. Of those
procedures, four resulted in pregnancies and only two of those resulted in
birth. One of those women delivered twins. His pregnancy rate and live birth
rate are far below the national average, according to the statistics.
Id.
163. See Moses, supra note 120, at 588 (citation omitted) (stating that these clinics
transfer large numbers of embryos to increase their success rates).
164. Sonji Jacobs, Ethical Boundaries of Baby-Making, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 17,
2007, at 1A.
165. Id.
166. See id. (stating that three fertilized embryos led to Ms. Kell giving birth to her son).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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ASRM and SART guidelines. Insurers could use the industry infor-
mation from ASRM and SART to set guidelines for reimbursements
and then “mandat[ing] that coverage be provided only for clinics
that report according to federal law or adhere strictly to professional
guidelines.”169 Clinic reimbursements could be linked to a require-
ment that physicians either follow industry guidelines or justify why
they did not follow the guidelines. Mandated insurance coverage
strengthens the existing industry guidelines. This is a real practical
solution to the real problem of in vitro fertilization—multi-fetal preg-
nancies that pose health risks to both mother and child.
If insurance covered in vitro fertilization, perhaps Sheri Kell’s
physician might have encouraged her to transfer one embryo, know-
ing that if she was unsuccessful, she could try again. The Kells might
have agreed with their physician’s recommendation to transfer fewer
embryos because they could afford to try again if the pregnancy was
unsuccessful. Without such coverage, the incentive for both mother
and physician is to transfer multiple viable embryos to the mother
during a single implantation procedure.
The insurance industry could also structure coverage so that
there is a disincentive to participate in procedures that risk the
health of the mother and the children as occurs with multiple em-
bryo transfers:170
In practice, bringing insurance companies or other impersonal
providers into the equation would force a distinction between cases
of infertility, for example, between the twenty-seven-year-old wife
with blocked fallopian tubes, who would most likely qualify for
several cycles of IVF treatment, and the single fifty-three-year
old recovering cocaine addict and ex-felon, who would not.171
Because the low birth weight babies born from multi-fetal preg-
nancies are a public health risk, why not eliminate the risk by requir-
ing insurers to cover the procedure?172 Insurance coverage reduces
the desire to over-implant, which in turn reduces the number of
multi-fetal pregnancies. If insurance coverage were mandated, there
169. Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 68 (2009) (citations omitted) (adding that “[c]overage could also be
structured to disallow or to provide disincentives for risky procedures such as multiple
embryo transfer”).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citation omitted).
172. Catherine A. Clements, Note, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331, 343 (2009) (noting that some of the
problems created include significant increases in healthcare costs, and in the use of edu-
cational resources and social services).
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would not be a need to approach embryo transfers as “two for one”
because there would not be large out-of-pocket investments. Both
the patient and her physician would take comfort in knowing that the
patient could afford another cycle.173 This has been true in jurisdic-
tions where insurance coverage is mandated. For example, countries
where insurance covers in vitro fertilization have lower rates of em-
bryo implantation and lower rates of multi-fetal pregnancies than the
United States, where there is no mandatory insurance coverage.174
States with mandated insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization also
have lower transfer rates and fewer multi-fetal pregnancies, even
though there are loopholes in all of the state statutes.175
III. THE SUPREME COURT HAS DECLINED TO IMPOSE A
REQUIREMENT ON INSURERS AND STATE MANDATES ARE VARIED
AND INCOMPLETE
In vitro fertilization coverage is a relatively recent issue. As the
use of in vitro fertilization grew in the 1980s, most insurance plans did
not explicitly address the issue of coverage. Generally, if an insur-
ance contract does not explicitly exclude coverage for a particular
service, then that service is covered under the plan. So, women who
underwent the in vitro fertilization procedure would seek reimburse-
ment from their insurers. Unfortunately, even when insurers claimed
that they covered the procedure, they denied claims. Insurers rea-
soned that the denials were because the procedure was deemed to
be experimental or not medically necessary.176 Fertility advocates,
such as RESOLVE, began to counsel patients.177 They encouraged
individuals to carefully read their insurance policies. Many women
who were denied coverage sought recourse in court; they argued that
without the express exclusion in the policy the services were covered.
As insurers settled claims, they began to categorically deny coverage
for specific fertility treatments such as in vitro fertilization.
173. See DrRChristina, Comment to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. TIMES ROOM
FOR DEBATE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 12:49 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births/ (opining that “if
IVF was [sic] less expensive . . . I believe more people wouldn’t give in to the idea of ‘2 for
1’ as readily because they [would] feel comfortable knowing they can afford another cycle”).
174. Norbert Gleicher et al., New Debate: A Formal Comparison of the Practice of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Between Europe and the USA, 21 HUM. REPROD. 145,
145 (2006).
175. Id.
176. See ARONSON, supra note 42, at 296 (explaining that “most infertility services end
up excluded by inference—insurance companies classify them as ‘experimental,’ ‘not stan-
dard practice,’ or ‘not medically necessary’ ”).
177. Id. at xi.
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One of the first known lawsuits for denial of a medical benefit
was a case against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of California in
1987.178 After the Kaiser settlement, approximately 10,000 women
qualified for insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization,179 but the
settlement was very specific. It applied only to women “between the
ages of 18 and 45 who were enrolled in Kaiser and suffering from
infertility between July, 1983, and about July, 1985.”180 The settle-
ment did not include coverage for all Kaiser enrollees. For enrollees
requesting coverage for treatment after 1985, Kaiser denied coverage
based on a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ruling
that stated the procedure was “unusual, infrequently provided and
unnecessary to the health of the patient.”181
In the early 1990s, Jolene Sloter was part of a class action law-
suit against Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania.182 The insurance
policy did not specifically exclude in vitro fertilization. The company
denied her claim, however, when she sought reimbursement for the
procedure.183 Like Kaiser, Blue Cross agreed to pay a settlement, but
explicitly began to exclude regular coverage of in vitro fertilization
and other advanced reproductive technologies.184
In addition to Blue Cross and Kaiser, in April of 1998, Aetna U.S.
Health Care declared that it would not cover in vitro fertilization and
other advanced reproductive technologies.185 Aetna reasoned that
women chose the plan for its coverage and then left the plan after
benefiting from it.186 Currently, while many private health insurers
cover abortion, contraceptives, and sterilization, they do not cover
in vitro fertilization.187
178. Claire Spiegel & Harry Nelson, Kaiser Agrees to Cover In-Vitro Fertilization, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1987, § 1, at 3.
179. See id. (explaining “that Kaiser now concedes that in-vitro fertilization is not
experimental,” and thus, eligible women would be qualified for coverage).
180. Id.
181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. See Mackenzie Carpenter, Blue Cross Draws Line on In-Vitro Fertilization
Procedure, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 27, 1993, at A1 (noting that in 1991, Blue
Cross “estimated in a letter to officials at Magee-Womens Hospital that about 95 percent
of all its subscribers were covered for advanced infertility treatments,” including in vitro
fertilization).
183. Id.
184. Id. Jolene Sloter and other women in Western Pennsylvania were reimbursed for
expenses that Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania initially refused to cover because the
expenses related to infertility. Although Blue Cross did not specifically exclude coverage,
it argued that the procedures were experimental. After the settlement, Blue Cross decided
to state the exclusion in its basic group health insurance policy. Id.
185. Kerr, supra note 50, at 599.
186. Id.
187. D’Andra Millsap, Sex, Lies, and Health Insurance: Employer-Provided Health
Insurance Coverage of Abortion and Infertility Services and the ADA, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires that,
by 2014, certain essential benefits must be covered.188 Maternity and
newborn care is one of those essential benefits. In vitro fertilization
coverage should be a part of any maternity benefit.
Congress should address the issue because the Supreme Court
has opted not to impose such a requirement on insurers. Insurers are
not inclined to provide coverage on their own. Insurance coverage will
provide strength to the industry guidelines and eliminate the short
term need for a regulatory entity. Finally, a federal mandate is neces-
sary because state mandates are inadequate: ERISA prevents state
mandates from being comprehensive.
A. The Supreme Court Has Chosen Not to Impose Requirements on
Insurers
The issue of coverage for in vitro fertilization is an issue for
Congress because the Supreme Court has declined to rule on the
issue. Claims have been brought under both the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; circuits are
split. The issue should not be left to patchwork interpretation by
conflicting circuits. Rather, Congress should take action.
1. Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in
1978.189 It amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
protect pregnant women from workplace discrimination.190 The Act
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees and prohibits
discrimination in the workplace on the basis of “pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.”191 The Act also provides that
“[a]ny health insurance provided by an employer must cover expenses
for pregnancy-related conditions on the same basis as costs for other
51, 53-54, 57 (1996) (citing ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, UNEVEN & UNEQUAL: INSURANCE
COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 11, 18 (1994)).
188. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207).
189. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
190. Katherine E. Abel, Note, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance
Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 819
(2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). This act is meant “to prohibit sex discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy,” and begins by explaining that “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.” Id.
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medical conditions.”192 While abortion expenses were expressly ex-
cluded from the mandate, the Act is silent as to whether infertility is
a protected medical condition related to pregnancy.193
The Act appears to be clear on its face, but in vitro fertilization
was not a common procedure when the Act was passed. Thus, the
phrase “related medical condition” is ambiguous as it applies to in
vitro fertilization. Although the Supreme Court held in International
Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc. that “[w]omen who are either preg-
nant or potentially pregnant must be treated like others ‘similar in
their ability . . . to work,’ ”194 the Court stopped short of ruling that
the PDA requires insurance coverage of in vitro fertilization. Nor did
the Court rule that denial of such coverage is discriminatory.
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII provided
a viable claim to a woman who was allegedly terminated from her job
for undergoing in vitro fertilization.195
The Court reasoned that, although infertility afflicts both sexes
equally, the employer conduct under dispute nevertheless was
not gender neutral because only women take time off to undergo
IVF. Consequently, Nalco’s alleged policy of terminating employees
for undergoing IVF treatments was sexually discriminatory be-
cause only females would ever be fired on such grounds.196
The Seventh Circuit accurately placed in vitro fertilization within
the boundaries of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. This would set
the stage to prevent insurers from denying coverage for the procedure.
The Second and Eighth Circuits, however, have reached a different
result. In both Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.197 and Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Medical Center,198 summary judgment was granted to the
employer, showing that such circuits held that infertility does not
constitute a “related medical condition.” Those courts reasoned that
if men and women receive equal treatment under an insurance plan,
192. Facts about Pregnancy Discrimination, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http:// www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-preg.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
193. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
194. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2000)).
195. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008).
196. Employment Law—Title VII—Seventh Circuit Allows Employee Terminated for
Undergoing In Vitro Fertilization to Bring Sex Discrimination Claim—Hall v. Nalco Co.,
534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (2009) (citing Hall, 534 F.3d
at 648-49).
197. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting
summary judgment to the employer).
198. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting
summary judgment to the employer).
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then a plan that does not provide coverage for infertility procedures
is not discriminatory because the limitations affect both men and
women, and, therefore, are not gender specific.199
2. Americans With Disabilities Act
The Americans With Disabilities Act ADA “is an anti-discrimi-
nation statute passed with the intention of allowing qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities [to] enjoy the same employment opportunities
as people without disabilities.” 200 Scholars have also opined as to
whether the ADA extends to treatment for infertility. “When the ADA
was passed, many infertile advocates believed that if reproduction
was recognized as a major life activity under the ADA, then the ADA
would effectively force employers to accommodate employees who wish
to undergo infertility treatments and compel health insurers to in-
clude infertility insurance in their plans.” 201 This has not happened.
The Supreme Court held in Bragdon v. Abbott that reproduction
is a major life activity.202 Abbott sued under the ADA and claimed that
Bragdon, a dentist, had discriminated against her when he refused to
treat her because she was living with HIV.203 In order to qualify for
protection from discrimination under the ADA, one must have “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual.” 204 “Abbott argued that
her HIV status substantially limited the major life activity of repro-
duction,” and the Supreme Court agreed.205 Because her “HIV infection
substantially limited her ability to reproduce . . . she was afforded
protection from discrimination under the ADA.” 206 Because the Court
ruled that reproduction was a major life activity, scholars began to
discuss whether there is a basis to claim discrimination under the
ADA if an employer discriminates against an infertile employee.
Unfortunately, Bragdon has not had the effect that many hoped
for. In Saks, the district court held that failure to provide infertility
insurance was not a violation of the ADA because the plan “does not
199. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. at 198) (stating that “the exclusion of surgical impregnation techniques
limits the coverage available to infertile men and infertile women and, thus does not
violate Title VII”).
200. James B. Roche, After Bragdon v. Abbott: Why Legislation is Still Needed to
Mandate Infertility Insurance, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 220 (2002) (citation omitted).
201. Id. (citation omitted).
202. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
203. Id. at 628-29.
204. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2008).
205. Roche, supra note 200, at 220.
206. Id. (citations omitted).
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offer infertile people less pregnancy and fertility-related coverage
than it offers to fertile people. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Plan
does not violate the ADA.” 207
The ADA treats health insurance terms and conditions more
deferentially than actions such as hiring and firing of employees. “The
statute specifically provides a safe harbor for certain insurance plans
that are based on ‘underwriting risks, classifying risks, or adminis-
trating risks’ that are based on or not inconsistent with state law.” 208
Furthermore, “health insurance plans do not run afoul of the ADA
when they discriminate among types of disabilities so long as all the
employees, regardless of disability status, have equal access to the
available range of benefits.” 209
B. State Mandates Are Inconsistent and Can Never Be
Comprehensive
Critics of a federal mandate for in vitro fertilization often claim
that insurance is a state issue. The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows
states to regulate “the business of insurance” without federal gov-
ernment interference.210 The Act does not prevent Congress from
passing laws to regulate the “business of insurance.” 211 We have just
witnessed the passage of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.212
These new laws have expanded health care access and coverage. In
the same way that Congress passed legislation in the 1990s to require
insurers to cover a certain length of hospital stay after childbirth,213
Congress should now pass legislation to mandate that insurers cover
in vitro fertilization.
A typical search for states with statutes that address insurance
coverage of fertility treatments usually lists fifteen states.214 There
207. Saks v. Franklin Convey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
208. Colleen E. Medill et al., Coverage of Reproductive Technologies Under Employer-
Sponsored Health Care Plans: Proceedings from the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association of
American Law Schools, Sections on Employee Benefits and Employment Discrimination,
8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 523, 531 (2004) (quotation omitted).
209. Id.
210. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
211. Id.
212. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
213. Nduka U. Udom & Charles L. Betley, Effects of Maternity-Stay Legislation on
‘Drive-Through Deliveries,’ 17 HEALTH AFF. 208, 208 (1998).
214. Insurance Coverage in Your State, RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N,
http:// www.resolve.org/family-building-options/insurance_coverage/state-coverage.html
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is no uniformity among these fifteen states. In fact, several of these
jurisdictions receive kudos for what amounts to inadequate coverage.
In addition, even the most comprehensive state plan cannot go beyond
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) exemption
for self-insured plans. Such a provision leaves many individuals con-
fused as to why they live in a jurisdiction that mandates insurance
coverage for in vitro fertilization but their insurance plan does not
have to adhere to the mandate.
1. Massachusetts Is Good, But Not Good Enough
Massachusetts offers the most comprehensive state insurance
mandate.215 The state mandate applies to commercial insurers, non-
profit insurers such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and HMOs.216 Mas-
sachusetts requires any insurer that provides pregnancy-related
benefits to provide coverage for all non-experimental infertility diag-
nosis and treatment.217 In addition to in vitro fertilization, the treat-
ment includes artificial insemination, gamete intra fallopian transfers,
sperm, egg or inseminated egg procuring and processing, intracy-
toplasmic sperm injection, and zygote intra fallopian transfers.218
Even if every state followed that model and enacted mandatory in-
surance coverage, there would not be comprehensive coverage. ERISA
would exempt employers who self-fund their insurance. As approxi-
mately fifty-five percent of individuals with health insurance are
covered under self-insured plans,219 there is a serious need for a
federal mandate.
Massachusetts is perhaps where critics should look when they
suggest that premiums would increase with the mandate and ulti-
mately leave more individuals uninsured. Massachusetts has im-
posed no limit on treatment cycles and there are no lifetime caps for
benefits.220 Data suggests that a larger percentage of the population
[hereinafter Insurance Coverage in Your State] (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). These states
include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West
Virginia. Id.
215. 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 37.00 (LexisNexis 2010).
216. Id. at 37.03 (referring to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 1 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 1 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 1 (LexisNexis
2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 1 (LexisNexis 2010)).
217. Id. at 37.05.
218. Id.
219. Karrie Andes, Self-Insuring is a Way for Employers to Get ‘a Whole Lotta Cannoli,’
23 EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Mar. 2009, at 9.
220. See Carpenter, supra note 182, at A1 (noting that Massachusetts “mandat[es] that
all insurers pay for an unlimited number of cycles of in-vitro fertilization as part of a basic
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utilizes the services than when the service was not covered by insur-
ance. Even so, the data from Massachusetts shows that this mandate
on fertility treatments and drugs has only minimally affected insur-
ance premiums. “[T]he cost of insurance premiums has risen only be-
tween 0.2 percent and 0.5 percent annually, or about $1 a month
extra for an average policy, because of the coverage of in-vitro fertil-
ization.” 221 As costs are shared among the larger population, no one
is unduly burdened.
Massachusetts defines infertility as when an otherwise healthy
individual is unable to conceive or produce conception within a year.222
Although Massachusetts law states that insurers may set reasonable
eligibility requirements, such requirements may not be arbitrary.223
As such, this protects the patient when the insurer attempts to arbi-
trarily deny a claim. Insurers may look to the ASRM as a guide for
implementing standards.224 Furthermore, an insurer may not impose
additional deductibles, co-payments, waiting periods, benefit maxi-
mums, or other limitations on coverage for fertility benefits that are
not imposed on other services.225 The mandate applies to the policy
holder, as well as to the spouse or other dependents.226
There are higher utilization rates in Massachusetts and other
states with insurance mandates. Data from 2002 showed states with
comprehensive coverage had a three-fold utilization rate than those
states where there was no mandated coverage.227 This information
suggests that women and couples who are interested in infertility
treatments do not pursue the treatment because of the costs associ-
ated with the procedure.228 Given that the demand will increase, any
federal legislation should probably have some limits to curtail costs.
2. State Mandates Can Never Be Comprehensive Because of
ERISA Preemption
Although Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to address pension programs and ensure
that such programs are managed and funded properly,229 the Act goes
insurance policy”).
221. Id.
222. 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 37.03 (LexisNexis 2010).
223. Id. at 37.09.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 37.08.
226. Id. at 37.04.
227. Tarun Jain & Mark D. Hornstein, To Pay or Not To Pay, 80 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 27, 27 (2003).
228. Id.
229. Michael D. Miller, ERISA: The Unbridged Chasm of Health Reform—Challenges
for Massachusetts and Federal Action, HEALTH POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS BLOG
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beyond pension programs and governs all employee welfare benefit
plans, including disability and health benefit plans. As self-insured
health plans are a type of employee welfare plan, they are exempt
from state mandates. ERISA contains a broad preemption clause that
expressly preempts state laws that conflict with the federal regulation
of employee welfare benefit plans.230 Although there is a savings clause
within ERISA that exempts state laws regulating insurance, ERISA
deems that an employee welfare benefit plan is not an insurance
plan.231 Ultimately, ERISA leaves employees confused as to why their
insurer is not required to cover a service in spite of a state mandate.
Most individuals obtain their insurance through a group plan
offered by their employer.232 This will most likely remain true even
after the options provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act are in effect. While there is no federal or state requirement
that employers offer insurance coverage, once an employer chooses
to offer insurance, federal and state requirements exist. Employers
that do offer insurance coverage have a variety of options. They may
purchase the insurance directly from the insurer or insurance com-
pany. If they choose this route, they may choose from commercial com-
panies such as Aetna or Cigna,233 or a non-profit company such as the
various Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.234 Employers may also self-
insure and allow an insurance company or other third party admin-
ister the plan.235 Self-insured plans are those where an employer has
chosen to pool the risks of its employees and benefit from a healthy
work force.236
The employer’s goal is to provide quality care at low costs. So,
no matter which option an employer chooses to offer its employees,
plans under the option may include one or all of the following: Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Point of Service (POS), or Pre-
ferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).237 Generally speaking, an HMO
means tighter provider choices from a list of in-network providers,
whereas PPOs allow for greater individual choice.238 The POS is a
(Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.healthpolcom.com/blog/2008/09/09/erisa-the-unabridged-chasm
-of-health-reform-%E2%80%93-Challenges-for-Massachusetts-and-federal-action/.
230. Id.
231. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2010).
232. Health Insurance 101, RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.resolve
.org /family-building-options/insurance_coverage/health-insurance-101.html [hereinafter
Health Insurance 101] (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Medill et al., supra note 208, at 541.
236. Id.
237. Health Insurance 101, supra note 232.
238. Id.
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middle ground that offers an in-network option and a higher payment
scale if an individual chooses to use an out-of-network provider.239
Employees are often unaware of the type of plan, purchased or
self-funded, until a determination must be made with respect to cov-
ered services. Many erroneously assume that if they live in a state
with mandated coverage for in vitro fertilization, their insurers must
provide coverage for the procedure. Because ERISA does not require
self-funded insurance plans to adhere to state insurance mandates,
when an employer chooses to self-fund insurance benefits, its em-
ployees are not protected by any state insurance law mandates.240
“As of 2003, the majority of covered workers are in a plan that is
completely or partially self-insured.” 241 Thus, state mandates will
never be comprehensive.
The rationale behind the exemption of self-funded plans was that
large companies do businesses in several states. It would be more
than cumbersome to require such employers to adhere to state laws
in several states. Unfortunately, it is the employee who ends up
losing out, and she or he has no real recourse. Even in a state like
Massachusetts where there is comprehensive coverage for in vitro
fertilization, individuals in the state may find themselves not cov-
ered when it comes to in vitro fertilization. Thus, a federal mandate
is necessary. Such federal legislation would amend ERISA so that
such self-funded plans are not excluded from any insurance mandate
to cover in vitro fertilization.
3. State Coverage Is Too Varied and Too Incomplete
The states with statutory mandates for in vitro fertilization
coverage vary greatly with respect to requirements for coverage. Such
variances include age restrictions for patients who seek the service,
number of employees necessary for employers to be covered under the
legislation, residence of the insured, number of in vitro cycles covered,
number of embryos transferred per cycle or lifetime, whether donor
eggs may be used, and lifetime monetary caps.242 Some states limit
insurance coverage to women under a certain age. Others require
that the procedure be limited to situations where a woman’s eggs
are fertilized with her husband’s sperm.243 Also, when an individual
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY 124 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/
insurance/ehbs2003-1-set.cfm (follow “Download PDF: Entire Document” hyperlink).
242. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
243. See id. Maryland, Arkansas, Texas and Hawaii all require use of the husband’s
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works in one state but the insurance plan is from another state, she
is not necessarily covered by the state plan mandating insurance com-
panies to cover the procedure.244 Several jurisdictions reference the
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) or the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), requiring that
any procedures must be performed in clinics that conform to industry
standards.245 Some state mandates apply to HMOs, while others spe-
cifically exclude HMOs. Some of the legislation is written in a way
that allows for broad interpretation, while other legislation is straight-
forward. Some states define infertility and others do not. All of the
variables leave the patient confused and often uncovered in situations
where she thought coverage existed. “Recent statistics show that
insurance providers cover [in vitro] costs about thirty to forty percent
of the time in states that mandate at least some type of coverage. For
the thirty to forty percent who are covered, insurance pays an average
of fifty percent of the total cost.” 246
As previously stated, Massachusetts offers the most compre-
hensive legislative mandate.247 Maryland, Connecticut, Illinois, New
Jersey, and Rhode Island offer reasonably comprehensive mandates.248
These state laws may also be used as models to draft federal legisla-
tion, especially when there is a need to balance the risks and costs
sperm. Such restrictions may be de facto discrimination against single women and homo-
sexual couples. Id.
244. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (West 2010) (stating that the section applies to
health insurance policies issued or delivered in Maryland); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH- GEN.
§ 19-701 (West 2010) (characterizing the health maintenance organizations affected by
the statute as those operating in Maryland).
245. See Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214. States that require that fer-
tilization procedures follow the ASRM or ACOG industry standards include: Arkansas,
Hawaii, Illinois, and Texas. Connecticut requires fertilization procedures to conform to
both the ASRM standards and the Society of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility
guidelines. Id.
246. Thomas D. Flanigan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Insurance
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777, 781 (2000)
(citing Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Opinions, 22
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1217-18 (1997)).
247. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 175, § 47H (West 2010) (stating that insurance policies that provide pregnancy-related
benefits must also provide coverage for medically necessary expenses for the diagnosis and
treatment of infertility); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176A, § 8K (West 2010) (mandating
that under health insurance contracts, except those providing supplemental coverage to
Medicare or other governmental programs, infertility benefits be provided when coverage
is offered for other pregnancy-related procedures); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4J
(West 2010) (requiring that subscription certificates under individual or group medical
service agreements provide infertility benefits “to the same extent that benefits are pro-
vided for other pregnancy-related procedures”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176G, § 4 (West
2010) (listing treatment of infertility as a category of required coverage in a health main-
tenance contract); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 37.00 (West 2010) (stating that insurers must
provide benefits to insured spouses or dependants for required infertility procedures).
248. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
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associated with in vitro fertilization. Several states give an illusion
of coverage, when in practice, there are no real benefits to patients/
consumers. Arkansas, Hawaii, Montana, New York, Ohio, West
Virginia, and Louisiana have legislation that is less than compre-
hensive when it comes to coverage for in vitro fertilization.249 New
York and California explicitly exclude in vitro fertilization from their
mandates for infertility coverage.250 California and Texas only man-
date that insurers that cover pregnancy services offer coverage for
infertility treatment.251 Even though insurers must let employers
know that this coverage, is available, insurers are not required to
provide the coverage and employers are not required to include it in
their health plans.252 Thirty-five states have not addressed the issue
at all.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD PASS THE FAMILY BUILDING ACT—WITH
REVISIONS
A. The Family Building Act
In January of 2009, Congressman Anthony Weiner introduced
the Family Building Act (H.R. 697).253 To date the legislation has only
twenty co-sponsors.254 Although it has been referred to the committees
with jurisdiction over the issue, no action has been taken.255 A compan-
ion bill (S. 1258) was introduced in the Senate by Kirsten Gillibrand.256
There are no co-sponsors for the Senate bill.257
The legislation is a good start and a good way to bring the issue
of insurance coverage for in vitro fertilization into the public domain.
Federal legislation does not need to mandate that insurers cover
everything related to in vitro fertilization, and the Family Building
Act does have limitations.258 The legislation appropriately weighs the
costs and benefits of the procedure against any risks associated with
249. Id.
250. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(k)(6)(B)(v)(I) (Consol. 2010); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 1374.55(a) (West 2010).
251. CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(a) (West 2005); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.001-1366.059
(West 2009).
252. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
253. Zhang, supra note 13.
254. THOMAS (Library of Congress), H.R. 697 Cosponsors, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d111:HR00697:@@@P (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
255. Id.
256. THOMAS (Library of Congress), S. 1258 Bill Summary & Status, http://thomas
.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01258 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
257. Id.
258. The Family Building Act of 2009 covers assisted reproductive technologies.
Congressman Weiner introduced the legislation in the 109th and 110th Congresses. H.R.
697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 1258, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
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the procedure. The “right to procreate does not necessarily translate
into a right to have the cost of reproductive technologies covered by
the state. For example, in Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court held that
the right to an abortion did not include the right to state funding for
it.” 259 The same logic can apply to the “right to insurance coverage.”
Even if Congress mandates insurers to cover in vitro fertilization, it
does not have to be unlimited and everlasting.
B. Issues That Congress Should Discuss to Strengthen the
Legislation
The Family Building Act could have more depth. A comparison
to some of the state mandates suggests that there are provisions that
could make the document stronger. Ultimately, Congress would need
to garner support from physicians and insurers in order for the legis-
lation to pass. This task is not necessarily insurmountable.
RESOLVE currently has a list of questions that patients should
have answered by their current insurers as they determine whether
treatment for infertility is covered under their insurance plan.260 Many
of these questions should be answered as federal legislation is drafted.
Such questions include how to define infertility, whether the coverage
is limited only to infertile couples, age limits for any coverage, whether
less costly methods must first be exhausted before in vitro fertilization
is covered, whether coverage benefits apply only to married couples,
whether the woman’s eggs must be fertilized with her spouse’s sperm,
and whether insurance coverage should apply to donors.261 Other
questions that federal legislation should address include the issue
of pre-existing conditions, number of embryo transfers, coverage for
cryopreservation, and maximum benefits of coverage.
1. Offer Versus Cover
The Family Building Act of 2009 is a mandate for insurers to
provide coverage for in vitro fertilization.262 One of the first issues
to address is whether a federal mandate should only require that in-
259. Spar & Harrington, supra note 169, at 51 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)). “The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related
medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of
indigents . . . .” Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
260. Diane Clapp, Questions to Ask Series: When Choosing an Insurance Policy,
RESOLVE: THE NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/
insurance_coverage/coverage-at-work.html (follow “Questions to Ask Regarding Health
Insurance Policies” hyperlink under “For Employees”) (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
261. Id.
262. Zhang, supra note 13.
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surers offer an option. Those in favor of a mandate to offer argue that
a mandate for coverage requires individuals to pay for a service that
they will not use. This is true; however, each of us already pays for
services and treatments that do not apply to us. Although California
and Texas only require insurers to offer a plan, this is not the ap-
proach that federal legislation should take. A mandate to provide
coverage means that there is a larger pool over which to spread costs.
Thus, the overall cost to everyone is smaller than with only a man-
date to offer coverage. Any federal mandate should indeed require
all insurers who provide maternity benefits to provide coverage for
in vitro fertilization. “[T]he purpose of health insurance is to pool
risks in order to provide affordable health care for all members.” 263
2. Group Plans, HMOs, Individual Plans, or What?
What types of plans should be covered under a federal mandate?
The Family Building Act of 2009 appropriately mandates coverage
for group health plans, health insurance issuers offering group health
insurance, and insurance offered through the individual markets and
through the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plans, if such plan
provides obstetrical services. The Act applies to large or small group
markets and, presumably, does not limit the mandate to employers
who have only a certain number of employees. In contrast, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act applies to employers with fifteen or
more employees, and it includes federal, state, and local governments,
employment agencies, and labor organizations.264
Some state mandates apply only to group health insurers, and
others apply only to HMOs. For example, the West Virginia and Ohio
mandates apply only to HMOs.265 California limits its mandate to
group health insurers.266 Some states require a minimum number of
employees before the mandate applies to group health insurers. For
example, although the Maryland legislature enacted legislation that
mandated private insurance companies to cover infertility services,
including in vitro fertilization,267 the law applies only to policies issued
in Maryland, and only to employers with more than fifty employees.268
If a Maryland resident is insured under a policy issued in another
263. Jessica L. Hawkins, Note, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated Insurance
Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 224 (2007) (citing John
V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 312 (1997)).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
265. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
266. Id.
267. Jain & Hornstein, supra note 227, at 27.
268. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
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state, the Maryland statute is not applicable to such Maryland resi-
dent.269 If her employer has less than fifty employees, such employer
is also not covered by the state mandate.270 New Jersey similarly
limits its mandate to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization to em-
ployers with fifty or more employees.271 Illinois law applies to policies
that cover more than twenty-five people.272
Several states specifically provide a religious exclusion for em-
ployers who have a bona fide religious reason for not providing cov-
erage for in vitro fertilization. Those states are Connecticut, Illinois,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas.273 While the Family Building Act
does not mention such an exclusion, it probably should. In the alter-
native, a provision for a religious exclusion should be implemented
through any regulations.
3. Deductibles
Given that employers are not required to offer insurance cover-
age, a federal mandate should not be so onerous as to cause the
employer to eliminate health insurance benefits for its employees.
The Family Building Act is silent as to any caps on lifetime benefits.
It merely states that deductibles, coinsurance, and other cost-sharing
or limitations should not exceed those applied to similar services.
Comparatively, Maryland and Arkansas have lifetime maximum
benefits. In Maryland, that amount is $100,000, far more reasonable
than the $15,000 that the Arkansas law permits insurers to impose.274
This issue should be further addressed during committee hearings.
4. Embryos
Should a federal mandate restrict the number of embryos trans-
ferred for implantation? If so, what is the appropriate number of
embryos to be transferred? How much deference should be given to
a physician’s professional judgment? Should there be a penalty on
physicians who transfer more than a certain number of embryos?
Would Octomom’s physician, who transferred six embryos for implan-
tation, receive reimbursement for his services?
Multi-fetal pregnancies are significantly more frequent in the
United States than in Europe.275 The main reason is that the number
269. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(a)(1) (West 2000).





275. Gleicher et al., supra note 174, at 1949.
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of embryos transferred is significantly different. A physician in the
United States is far more likely to transfer multiple embryos than
a physician in most European countries. A comparison of situations
where a physician transferred four or more embryos shows this group
represented 31.9% of women in the United States but only 5.5% of
European patients.276 As the women were similar in age, the distin-
guishing factor appears to be insurance coverage for the procedure.
Coverage deterred the desire of women to request multiple transfers
and for physicians to perform multiple transfers.
“Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland limit implanta-
tions to three pre-embryos, at most, per cycle,” and the United King-
dom has a limit of two implantations.277 In Germany, it is a felony to
breach the number of embryos to transfer.278 But such a limit may not
be necessary in the United States. “In most states of Australia and in
New Zealand, there is no mandatory limit on the number of embryos
that may be transferred. Still, the number of embryos transferred per
cycle is on average significantly less than in the United States . . . .” 279
These results tend to suggest that coverage alone is enough of a
deterrent for physicians and patients.
The Family Building Act does not, and should not, restrict cov-
erage to a single embryo transfer.280 In fact, the bill does not state
how many embryos should be transferred for implantation. It only
requires that the medical facility conform to ASRM standards or any
standards set by an appropriate federal agency.281 This is a sound ap-
proach. A single embryo transfer sounds too much like government en-
tering the womb, which is not something the American culture would
readily agree to.282 Rather, it is reasonable to rely on the expertise of
276. Id. at 1947.
277. Rosato, supra note 97, at 86 (citation omitted).
278. See Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act],
Dec. 13, 1990, BGBL. I at 2746, § 1, no. 3 (Ger.) (stating that violations of the Act, includ-
ing “attempts, within one treatment cycle, to transfer more than three embryos into an
woman[,]” may result in imprisonment not exceeding three years); see also THE GERMAN
PENAL CODE 6 (Stephen Thaman trans. 2002) (defining felonies under German law as
“unlawful acts punishable by imprisonment one year or more”); Germany’s Embryo
Protection Law is ‘Killing Embryos Rather Than Protecting Them,’ HEALTH & MED. WEEK
(July 16, 2007), available at http://www.newsrx.com/newsletters/Health-and-Medicine
-Week/2007-07-16/2007162007515W.html (“The German embryo protection law, passed in
1991, stipulates that no more than three embryos can be created per cycle of IVF and all
three, regardless of their quality, must be transferred to the patient’s womb at one time,
and cannot be frozen or discarded.”).
279. Moses, supra note 120, at 596.
280. See H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (detailing the lifetime cap of six
retrievals); S. 1258, 111th Congress (1st Sess. 2009) (detailing the lifetime cap of six
retrievals).
281. Id.
282. Davi Stamford, Comment to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR
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ASRM and SART to provide guidance as to the range of acceptable
number of embryos to transfer.283 Clinics with lower success rates
should have to explain the conditions in which they perform the
procedure and explain why their rates are lower than the industry
average. Clinics with pregnancy rates too far removed from the in-
dustry average will not be reimbursed if they attempt to overcompen-
sate for their deficiencies with larger embryo transfers. This should
prevent another Octomom. A requirement that clinics adhere to in-
dustry guidelines in order to receive reimbursement from insurers
does not limit rights of a physician or patient, but it gives an incentive
for each to follow industry standards and explains why they do not
follow them.
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act could also
be amended such that twins and triplets do not count as “success”
when calculating successful pregnancies. This change, as well as cov-
erage for the procedure, may deter transferring larger numbers of
poorer quality embryos.
5. Cycle Limitations
How many cycles of in vitro fertilization should an insurer be
required to cover? There are at least two scenarios for an insurer to
consider: (i) the case where a woman tries to sustain a pregnancy on
multiple occasions yet she is unsuccessful, and (ii) the case when a
woman who successfully produced a child desires a second or third
child. At some point, it is not economically feasible for an insurer to
continue to provide coverage when a woman is not successful. Equally
important is whether an insurer should fund unlimited pregnancies.
After all, each of Octomom’s pregnancies was a result of in vitro
fertilization.
The Family Building Act caps the number of egg retrievals at
six.284 It is similar to the language in the Illinois statute, where “[e]ach
patient is covered for up to 4 egg retrievals. However, if a live birth
occurs two additional egg retrievals will be covered, with a lifetime
maximum of six retrievals covered.” 285 In contrast, Maryland allows
insurance companies to limit their coverage to three attempts per live
birth.286 Hawaii is extremely limited in that it only covers one cycle
DEBATE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes
.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births/ (“Keep the government out of the womb.”).
283. Stillman, supra note 17.
284. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 1258, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
285. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214. The statute applies to HMOs and
group health insurers, but it does not apply to employers with less than twenty-five em-
ployers or religious employers. Id. The limitations on egg retrievals seem to be reasonable.
286. Id. “The patient and the patient’s spouse must have a history of infertility for 2
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of in vitro fertilization.287 Connecticut limits coverage where there
are two implantations per cycle and only two cycles per lifetime.288
Generally, a woman has approximately a twenty-seven percent
chance of a successful pregnancy using in vitro fertilization.289 Al-
though this number varies with age and other factors, it would seem
to be a good starting point for determining the number of cycles an
insurer should be required to cover. If a woman may need at least
four cycles to sustain a successful pregnancy, then a minimum of four
covered cycles seems reasonable. If she was successful with in vitro
fertilization, two additional cycles does not appear to be unreasonable.
This issue should be addressed during Congressional hearings.
6. Clinic Standards
The Family Building Act requires any treatment to be performed
at a facility that conforms to the standards of the American Society
of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).290 Several states also have this
requirement, or one that is similar. Maryland requires that the pro-
cedure be performed in a clinic that conforms to the standards of the
ASRM and (or) the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists (ACOG).291 Other states with such restrictions include Connect-
icut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey and Texas.292 This is an excellent
way to add strength to the industry guidelines. There is no need for
the guidelines to impose penalties. The lack of reimbursement should
be enough to discourage physicians from straying from the industry
guidelines.
7. Definition of Infertility
Congressman Weiner and Senator Gillibrand acknowledge that
the primary purpose of in vitro fertilization is to assist infertile
couples. They define infertility as the inability to conceive after one
year of unprotected intercourse or the inability to carry a pregnancy
years or the infertility is associated with one of the following: endometriosis; DES exposure;




289. Richard Paulson, Patient Information: In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), UPTODATE,
http://www.uptodate.com/patients/content/topic.do?topicKey=~zWRuul233/Lo1SR (last
visited Nov. 22, 2010) (citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ET AL., 2005
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND
FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 85 (2007), available at http://cdc.gov/art/art2005/).
290. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 1258, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
291. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
292. Id.
178 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:135
to live birth.293 This definition does not require a couple to be married,
nor does it make length of time distinctions based on the age of the
mother. Most states that define infertility have language similar to
that used by Weiner and Gillibrand. The definition, however, is not
as liberal as the ASRM; nor is it as restrictive as some state legisla-
tion. A glance at states that have defined infertility results in a web
of confusion. For example, Texas and Hawaii appear to have the most
restrictive state definitions of infertility. In each state the patient
and her spouse shall have had five continuous years of infertility.294
Neither state requires the five year history if the infertility is caused
by one of the following conditions: endometriosis, DES, blocked or
surgically removed fallopian tubes, or oligozoospermia, an abnormal
male factor.295
Maryland and Arkansas require a history of infertility for two
years, but again provide an exception to the two year history if the
infertility is associated with endometriosis, DES, blocked or surgically
removed fallopian tubes, or abnormal male factors.296
New Jersey defines infertility differently based on the age of the
female partner, as does the ASRM. New Jersey defines infertility as
a two year period of unprotected sex when the female partner is under
thirty-five, and one year when she is over thirty-five.297 It also defines
infertility as the inability to carry a baby to term.298 The ASRM de-
fines infertility as the inability to conceive after one year for women
under thirty-five, and six months for women over thirty-five.299
Several states restrict mandated coverage to situations where
a married couple has been unable to conceive after a certain period
of time, or they require that a woman’s egg be fertilized with her hus-
band’s sperm.300 Montana and West Virginia do not define infertility.
The lack of uniformity leaves too much room for confusion and pos-
sible litigation when coverage for services is denied.
Insurance coverage should not be limited to only married couples.
Courts have already determined that coverage for contraceptives
293. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. § 2708(a)(2)(A) (1st Sess. 2009); S. 1258, 111th Cong.
§ 2708(a)(2)(A) (1st Sess. 2009).





299. Definitions of Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss, supra note 45.
300. See Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214 (referencing the statutes
of Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, Texas and Rhode Island). Rhode Island and Texas re-
strict their definitions of infertility to married individuals. Rhode Island defines infertil-
ity as married individuals who cannot conceive or produce conception during a two year
period. Id.
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applies to both single individuals and married couples. The same
rationale should apply to coverage for in vitro fertilization:
Some countries such as France, Finland, Australia and South
Africa permit single women and lesbian couples access to ART.
While Great Britain’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
of 1990 does not specifically forbid single and lesbian women from
use of ART, its “welfare of the child” provision . . . could allow
health care providers to discriminate against them if they deem
it to be in the child’s welfare.301
. . . .
The American Medical Association has taken the position gener-
ally that providers of health care should not discriminate against
persons due to sexual orientation and has encouraged all medical
practices and physicians to include “sexual orientation, sex or
perceived gender” in any nondiscrimination statements.302
As a result of the non-discriminatory language, coverage for the pro-
cedure should apply to single individuals and those with alternative
lifestyles.
If insurance coverage applies beyond married couples, then
coverage cannot be limited to circumstances where a wife’s eggs are
fertilized with her husband’s sperm. In fact, even if it were limited
only to married couples, the limitation that the wife’s eggs must be
fertilized with the husband’s sperm seems to be too limiting. Several
married individuals require the use of donors in order to have a suc-
cessful pregnancy. These circumstances should also be covered under
the federal mandate. It is also important that the mandate require
insurers to cover the services at the same deductible rates, coinsur-
ance, and out-of-pocket limitations as any other maternity benefit
provisions. Given these minimum requirements, we must address
the associated costs and determine how to balance them.
As infertility may be caused by male or female issues, the defini-
tion should define the term so that it applies to both men and women.
When the cause of infertility is known, a waiting period seems un-
necessary. In such instances, the federal legislation should borrow
those exceptions from Texas, Hawaii and Maryland. If the cause is
unknown, the federal legislation should follow ASRM and distin-
guish between women over thirty-five and under thirty-five. When
a woman under thirty-five has not been able to conceive or produce
conception through natural means for a period of at least a year, the
301. Susan B. Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 12 MICH. ST. U. J.
MED. & L. 33, 34-35 (2008).
302. Id. at 40.
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procedure should be covered. When a woman thirty-five or older has
not been able to conceive or produce conception through natural means
for a period of at least six months, the procedure should be covered.
Additionally, the federal legislation should keep the inability to carry
a pregnancy to a live birth language in its definition of infertility.
There is no real benefit to forcing an individual to endure multiple
miscarriages before labeling her as infertile.
8. Age Restrictions
The Family Building Act does not limit any insurance mandate
to women of a certain age;303 but should it? It is common knowledge
that fertility declines with age. Older women require more cycles of
in vitro fertilization in order to obtain a pregnancy. For example, data
from the Jones Institute of Reproductive Medicine shows their clinical
pregnancy rate per IVF transfer was 46.4 percent.304 These rates were
directly influenced by the age of the patient. The rate for women
under thirty-five was forty-two percent, women between the ages of
thirty-five and thirty-nine was thirty-six percent, and women over
forty was eighteen percent. In addition to the decrease in fertility,
even healthy older women have a higher chance for a riskier preg-
nancy. As maternal age increases, complications increase, including
hypertension, pre-eclampsia, diabetes, and placenta previa, even in
healthy women.305
In order to begin to balance the costs to insurers, as well as pro-
mote the health and safety of both mother and child, there should
be age restrictions for any mandate. Several states have age limits,
and Congress should look at those for guidance. New Jersey, Rhode
Island, New York, and Connecticut have put age restrictions on their
insurance mandates.306 These states recognized that there must be
a balance between comprehensive coverage and the costs associated
with high risk pregnancies. New Jersey limits coverage for in vitro fer-
tilization to women forty-five or younger.307 Connecticut limits its cov-
erage to individuals under the age of forty.308 Rhode Island’s coverage
is limited to women between twenty-five and forty-two.309 New York
303. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. § 2708 (1st Sess. 2009).
304. In Vitro Fertilization—IVF—Success Rates, THE JONES INST. FOR REPROD. MED.,
http://www.jonesinstitute.org/ivf-success-rates.html [hereinafter In Vitro Fertilization—
IVF—Success Rates] (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
305. Donor Egg (DE) Program, THE JONES INST. FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.jones
institute.org/donor-egg.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
306. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 27-18-30 (1956).
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limits its mandate for infertility coverage to women between age
twenty-one and forty-four.310
Age forty-five seems to be a reasonable age limit. Women are de-
laying childbirth, but the desire for a child must be balanced against
real medical risks to both mother and child. There are genuine medical
concerns that would allow any mandate to limit the age for coverage
without encouraging age discrimination claims.
9. Coverage for Surrogacy and Donors
The use of surrogates, donated eggs, or donated sperm raise con-
troversial issues. Some states avoid the controversy simply by refus-
ing to mandate coverage unless the woman’s egg is fertilized with her
husband’s sperm. Such states include Maryland, Arkansas, Hawaii,
and Texas.311 As discussed earlier, this may be de facto discrimination
against single individuals and individuals with alternative lifestyles.312
The restriction may also deny medically necessary treatment to both
married patients and single patients who may have absent eggs,
poor quality eggs, or eggs that might transmit serious diseases. While
the limitation removes the need to address complex issues associ-
ated with in vitro fertilization, any federal legislation should not have
such restrictive language. The claim that delaying childbirth results
in a need for donor eggs seems to be a myth. Data from the Jones
Institute shows the mean age for donor eggs was twenty-eight.313
There are non-conventional situations that may or may not war-
rant insurance coverage. Any federal mandate should remain silent
on these issues. It would be up to the insurer to determine whether
coverage is warranted. Consider the following example: Geraldine
Wesolowski was a fifty-three-year-old surrogate who carried and
birthed her grandchild. The baby was conceived from her son’s sperm
and his infertile wife’s eggs.314 Should such embryo transplants be
covered under insurance? In this case, there were three attempts
before success. Should it matter whether Geraldine was the surro-
gate for a younger couple, or whether she was pregnant with her own
child? Perhaps these gray areas are where we give the insurers
310. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(s)(3)(A) (McKinney 2010); see also N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 4303(s)(3)(E) (McKinney 2010) (expressly excluding in vitro fertilization as a covered
service).
311. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
312. See supra text accompanying note 243.
313. In Vitro Fertilization—IVF—Success Rates, supra note 304.
314. Lindsey Gruson, When ‘Mom’ and ‘Grandma’ Are One and the Same; Fairy Tale
Comes True When Orchard Park Woman Gives Birth to Her Grandchild, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1993, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/16/nyregion/when-mom
-grandma-are-one-same-fairy-tale-comes-true-when-orchard-park-woman.html.
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discretion as to whether to cover the service. Such discretion would
also apply to questions regarding what are covered benefits for a
donor. To attempt to address some complex issues in a statute could
create issues that are even more controversial and prevent passage
of the legislation.
10. Cryopreservation
Octomom’s octuplets were the product of cryopreserved (frozen)
embryos. Rather than destroy or donate her unused embryos, she
chose to have her physician transfer them for implantation.315 Some
European countries do not permit the ability to cryopreserve human
embryos. Such an approach would prevent an Octomom situation. The
subject of cryopreservation brings about a host of moral and ethical
issues in this country. Though controversial, there are married cou-
ples who benefit from cryopreservation. For example, suppose one
spouse has been diagnosed with cancer.316 Cryopreservation may be
the couple’s only chance of conceiving a natural child.317 In determin-
ing whether insurance should cover cryopreservation, some issues
to address have to do with whether, medically, the quality of the
embryos do not suffer with cryopreservation. Cryopreservation can
occur at various levels.
The Family Building Act does not address cryopreservation.
There probably will not be bipartisan support for any legislation that
addresses the issue.318
315. Kevin B. O’Reilly, Fertility Doctors Tighten Guidelines in Wake of “Octomom”
Controversy, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009
/11/09/prsc1109.htm. The issues associated with cryopreservation are beyond the scope of
this article.
316. Fertility Preservation, UNIV. OF CHI. MED. COLL., http://www.chicagofertility.org
/cryopreservation.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
317. See, e.g., Celine Dion: Her Story, Her Dream, CHEALTH, http://chealth.canoe.ca
/channel_health_features_details.asp?channel_id=2048&article_id=1201&health_feature
_id=378&relation_id=36843 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). Celine Dion and her husband Rene
Angelil began trying to conceive when she married in 1994. Id. She was in her twenties and
healthy, but they were not able to become pregnant. Id. After her husband was diagnosed
with cancer in 1999, they feared that Rene’s sperm might be affected by radiation from
chemotherapy. Id. In the process of freezing some of his sperm for later use, they dis-
covered that he had a low sperm count, and that was the cause of the couple’s infertility.
Id. After a procedure called “intracytoplasmic sperm injection,” Dion and Rene used in vitro
fertilization and she gave birth to a son in 2000. Id. At that time, she cryopreserved em-
bryos to use at a later date. Id. In November 2009, Angelil confirmed that, although Dion
was pregnant using those cryopreserved embryos, the pregnancy was unsuccessful. Id.
Nevertheless, after her sixth round of in vitro fertilization, Dion prematurely gave birth to
healthy twin boys on October 23, 2010. See Celine Dion Gives Birth to Twins, CNN.COM,
Oct. 23, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-23/entertainment/celine.dion.twins_1_rene
-angelil-twins-cesarean-section?_s=PM:SHOWBIZ.
318. A future article may compare the United States to other countries where cryo-
preservation is not allowed.
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11. Exhaust Less Costly Methods
The Family Building Act requires that less costly infertility
methods be exhausted before an insurer is required to cover in vitro
fertilization.319 Although several states also use this approach, it may
be more costly than covering in vitro fertilization, and it may also
produce more multi-fetal pregnancies. For example, intrauterine
insemination is a less costly alternative to in vitro fertilization. It is
a process where sperm is injected into a woman’s uterus after hor-
mone shots. It is a cheaper and less effective alternative to in vitro
fertilization. The pregnancy rate is lower than in vitro fertilization,
and there is no control over multi-fetal pregnancies.320 Jon and Kate
Gosselin conceived their sextuplets through intrauterine insemi-
nation (IUI).321 The cost of the intrauterine insemination, though
lower on the front end, was dwarfed by the cost of delivery and care
of sextuplets—costs ultimately paid by the insurer. “[A] recent study
led by Dartmouth Medical School suggested that because IUI often
requires repeated tries, it would ultimately lower both costs and the
risk of large multiple births if many patients avoided the procedure
and moved straight to IVF.” 322 Therefore, any mandate for in vitro
fertilization coverage should not be limited to circumstances where
less costly methods have proven to be unsuccessful.
12. What Not to Do
Federal legislation must provide real benefits to patients.
Louisiana, Ohio, Montana and West Virginia provide models for what
not to do. Louisiana and Ohio have permissive statutory language
that provides no real benefits. Louisiana does not require coverage
for fertility drugs or in vitro fertilization. It merely “[p]rohibits the
exclusion of coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of a correctable
medical condition, solely because the condition results in infertility.”323
Most insurance plans already cover the tests that diagnose infertility.
It is the treatment that is at issue.324 Ohio permits insurers to cover
in vitro fertilization and other ARTs, but the statute does not require
coverage.325 A statute is not necessary to give an insurer permission
for what it can do without a statute.
319. H.R. 697, 111th Cong. § 2708(b)(2)(A)(i) (2009).
320. Saul, supra note 105, at A14.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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Montana and West Virginia have statutory language that gives
insurers the ability to deny claims, in spite of the statutory mandate.
For example, West Virginia’s statute does not expressly define infer-
tility services, but requires HMOs to cover “basic health care services,
including infertility services, when medically necessary.” 326 The law
does not define infertility and does not mention in vitro fertilization.327
Similarly, Montana’s statute does not define infertility, but it does
require HMOs to cover infertility services as part of basic health care
services.328 These statutes are rather generic and leave room for open
debate (and litigation) about what is and is not covered. The legisla-
tion does not address the current issue of what is the effect of a policy
that does not address the coverage issue. The insurer has room to
deny the claim for what appears to be purely subjective determina-
tions. The Montana and West Virginia statutes may lead to denial
of claims, in spite of the so-called statutory mandate.
C. Garnering Support for the Legislation
Congress does not see the importance of the Family Building Act.
Mr. Weiner has introduced the legislation several times.329 Neither
the House nor the Senate has scheduled hearings or mark-ups on the
legislation. But two things are different during this Congress. First,
the Octomom saga has helped generate media attention about the
issue, and the general population is beginning to understand the im-
portance of the issue. Second, our nation is in the midst of health care
reform. Usually, the committees of jurisdiction—the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and secondarily the Committees on Education
and Labor, and Oversight and Government Reform—are not inter-
ested in health-related bills. Now, everyone is discussing health care.
Naysayers will argue that in the midst of such a crisis, rather
than concern ourselves with in vitro fertilization, we should be more
concerned about access to insurance for the millions of Americans
who lack health insurance and do not qualify for Medicaid or Medi-
care. These concerns should not be taken lightly. Access to basic care
is more important than infertility treatment for a few. Furthermore,
as there are already significant gaps in coverage, why focus on infer-
tility? It is certainly not the only area of treatment that is excluded
from insurance coverage. Is it justifiable to mandate infertility cover-
age while so many other healthcare needs remain unmet?330
326. Gwen Mayes, Infertility Insurance Laws, 1 INFERTILITY TIMES (Aug. 2003).
327. Insurance Coverage in Your State, supra note 214.
328. Id.
329. The legislation was introduced in both the 109th Congress and the 110th Congress.
330. Strong, supra note 90, at 276.
2010] OCTOMOM AND MULTI-FETAL PREGNANCIES 185
To focus on a single issue does not negate the importance of
other issues. In the mid-nineties, Congress mandated that insurers
cover a certain length of hospital stay after childbirth and delivery.331
The reasoning used then can apply to coverage for in vitro fertiliza-
tion today. There was concern that the quality of maternity care was
being sacrificed as a result of managed care. Several states passed
statutes to require insurance companies to “augment” their coverage
of maternity stays.332 Ultimately, federal legislation was enacted to
require a minimum of forty-eight hours of inpatient hospitalization
for a routine vaginal delivery, and ninety-six hours following a routine
cesarean.333 The legislation passed with bipartisan support. Physi-
cians and physicians groups lobbied and testified before Congress.
Medical journals began to discuss the issue. The American Academy
of Pediatrics, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and
the American Medical Association all supported the legislation.334 Al-
though the legislation was not without naysayers, it quickly addressed
an important issue.
Similarly, such support can be garnered for coverage of in vitro
fertilization. The problem of multi-fetal pregnancies is a public
health concern. A substantial amount of money is spent on reducing
preterm births. If the incidence of preterm births (and associated
risks and costs) can be reduced, and the cost to insurance companies
is negligible, then Congress should pass the legislation.
CONCLUSION
The United States is an “individualistic, market-driven, and
choice-focused” culture.335 Therefore, an additional regulatory agency
will not happen in the near future. Additionally, we will probably
never mandate a specific number of embryos to be transferred. Multi-
fetal pregnancies and the resulting preterm births remain health
issues that affect society. An insurance mandate is the most effective
way to address the public health issue associated with in vitro fer-
tilization without a new regulatory agency and without mandating
that a physician transfer a specific number of embryos.
331. Udom & Betley, supra note 213, at 208.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. David A. Hyman, What Lessons Should We Learn from Drive-Through Deliveries?,
107 PEDIATRICS 406, 407 (2001). (“[T]he Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act
(NMHPA) passed the Senate 98-0, and took effect on January 1, 1998.”). Newborns’ and
Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (1996) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 to -51 (1996)).
335. Nigel M. De S. Cameron, Pandora’s Progeny: Ethical Issues in Assisted Human
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 745, 749 (2005).
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The goal of in vitro fertilization is to produce a healthy single
baby. If an insurance mandate can reduce multi-fetal pregnancies,
not increase costs to insurers, and not negatively affect a clinic’s
overall success rate, then serious thought should be given to passing
such legislation.
As discussed previously, data suggests that in countries and
states with insurance coverage, there is less inclination for physi-
cians to transfer more embryos. This in turn decreases the risk of
multi-fetal pregnancies. America is one of the only developed coun-
tries without such a mandate. If coverage for in vitro fertilization
were nationally mandated, it would provide equal access and care
to all couples who suffer with infertility.336 While the insurance man-
date does not solve all policy issues associated with in vitro fertil-
ization, it does provide some necessary consistency with respect to
services covered. Currently, the treatment is tied to a patient’s place
of residence or financial status.337 The current scheme of state regu-
lation is not effective. Reproductive choice should not be so limited.
336. Jain & Hornstein, supra note 227, at 29.
337. E. Jungheim et al., Family Fertility Fund: Easing the Financial Burden of
Infertility Yields Dramatic Success Rates (Abstract P-675), 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY
S383 (2006).
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ABSTRACT
This article will investigate current state laws regarding the
change of a husband’s name to his wife’s upon marriage. Given that
tradition, and often law itself, discourage that practice, the lingering
gendered norms that perpetuate the historical tradition will be ex-
plored. Components of this article will include a brief historical
analysis of the origin of surnames and the law as it has developed
on that issue, including an examination of the place of tradition in
the law both empirically and normatively. A discussion of the psycho-
logical importance of names in the identities of men versus women
will be addressed, as will possible justifications for the distinction
between the rights of men and women in this regard. Finally, this
article will discuss the application of gender discrimination laws
and constitutional equal protection doctrine to current laws that
provide differing rights and privileges based solely on one’s status as
a wife versus a husband.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose we had a tradition that when blacks mar-
ried whites, the white name was always the name
used by the family. It would be an outrage and
racist. . . . [T]his is one of the last vestiges of sexism.
—Morrison Bonpasse1
There is something sacred about a name. It is our
own business, not the government’s.
—Henne v. Wright2
When I was eight years old I discovered a piece of mail apparently
addressed to my father; it bore his first and last name, but was pre-
ceded by the word “Mrs.” Obviously, the sender had made a mistake.
Highly amused at the identification of my father as a married woman,
and pleased as any eight-year-old can be at my cleverness in catching
the mistake, I showed the mail to my mother, expecting her to laugh
with me and shake her head at the sloppiness. Instead, she told me
that there was no mistake. The mail was not for my father, but for
her. Addressing a woman by her husband’s name was “just the way
things were done.” There was no explanation whatsoever as to the
logic or fairness behind the practice other than a vague notion of tra-
dition, which failed to satisfy any conceptions I had of either logic or
fairness. The issue was dropped; I was completely bewildered.
From that point on I have been fascinated and confounded by
marital naming conventions that exist—and persist—over time. By
the time I married in 2005, I had long since decided that I would keep
my name. While my husband was supportive, the decision immedi-
ately raised eyebrows and created issues with others: for example, how
would the minister announce us at the end of the wedding ceremony?
Mr. and Mrs. Anthony wouldn’t work; neither would Mr. Gandara and
Ms. Anthony—we were already that before we married. No one knew
quite how to handle it. The minister thought she had the solution:
“We should just announce you both with his name,” she decided,
“since according to the law, you will automatically have it anyway.”
Of course she was wrong about that, but I was stunned not only that
someone in the business of marrying couples could be so misinformed,
but that apparently the issue had never previously been raised for
1. Morrison Bonpasse, quoted in Chris Poon, The Name Game—A Bride Has to Decide:
Should She Change, Stay the Same, Hyphenate, or Invent?, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 17,
1999, at 8L.
2. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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her. Thus, I experienced the first of many marital name problems—
the practices surrounding which often still exemplify antiquated tra-
ditions, practices, and even laws—in a society whose gender norms
are, in our own collective estimation, supposedly enlightened. My hus-
band had not yet considered taking my name, but he decided to do so
shortly thereafter. It was then that I discovered exactly how unequal
our cultural marriage norms can still be—and how those norms often
have legal backing.
It is quite clear that times are changing when it comes to mar-
riage, family, and gender roles. Women are marrying later, and more
often not at all, than they have in the past. When they do marry,
couples often desire flexibility in choosing their last names. Their
reasons may vary: a woman may have professional accomplishments
under a birth name; she (or they) may decide on principle that they
want a more gender-equal naming solution; she may have a desire
not to lose her identity; she may have a strong connection with a birth
name or have children with her current last name. Whatever the
reasons for opting for an unconventional naming solution, the fact
is that the law has trailed behind the times when it comes to allow-
ing for the flexibility necessary to effectuate these choices. While a
woman can simply adopt her husband’s surname upon marriage, a
man faces a much more challenging process if he wishes to take his
wife’s surname.3
The law—especially family law—serves the function of channeling
people into certain socially preferred institutions and practices, while
discouraging those that are viewed as less acceptable. As such, the law
reinforces and encourages behavior considered desirable by society—
or, perhaps, behavior once considered desirable but not subjected to
recent critical examination. For example, there exists a plethora of
benefits that accompany marriage which cannot be achieved any other
way, a fact which serves to encourage people to enter the institution.4
Extending those benefits to those outside of the institution is often
derided as lessening the importance or “sanctity” of marriage.5 In
3. See Steve Friess, More Men Taking Wives’ Last Names, USA TODAY, Mar. 21,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-20-names-marriage_N.htm (“Only
seven states now allow a man who wishes to alter his name after his wedding to do so
without going through the laborious, frequently expensive legal process set out by the
courts for any name change. Women don’t have to do so.”).
4. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT 3, (1997); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT 1 (2004); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for
Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2694 (2004).
5. JAMES C. DOBSON, MARRIAGE UNDER FIRE: WHY WE MUST WIN THIS BATTLE 4 
(2007).
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many states, for example, the courts refuse to recognize cohabitation
agreements among unmarried couples who choose to arrange their
relationships in certain ways. Such a recognition, the courts contend,
would make marriage less attractive6—as if that alone were reason
enough to reject a policy out of hand.
The current law regarding names and name changes upon mar-
riage belongs exclusively to the states.7 While one might assume that
gender discrimination has disappeared from our laws, if not from our
social structure, as of 2010 the majority of states do not allow a man
to change his name to that of his wife by virtue of marriage, while
the woman can do so via a simple and straightforward process in
every state except one.8 Although there has been very little scholar-
ship on this issue, what exists points to this fact as overt discrimina-
tion against men, and therefore unconstitutional. Yet there is much
more to the issue than mere discrimination against men. Underlying
the policy is discrimination against women, in the form of a legal sanc-
tion of the social norms that once legally subsumed women within
their husbands’ identities. Thus, the law discourages and penalizes
men for making a “sacrifice” normally required, or expected, of women.
Although naming practices and policy may not appear to be as sig-
nificant as many other critical equality issues including employment
discrimination, intimate partner violence, or reproductive rights,
they are a fundamental representation of the notion of choice—the
choice to structure one’s own identity, life, and family as one sees
fit.9 As such, the current state of the law reinforces unequal cultural
norms and archaic gender roles, represents and implicitly supports
inequality, and violates the constitutional principle of equal protec-
tion of the laws.
I. ORIGINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SURNAMES
Before investigating the current state of marital name change
law, it is helpful to understand the history and development of both
custom and law on surnames. American legal and social custom on
names was handed down from the common law of England. In sev-
eral thousand years of recorded history, surnames are a “relatively
6. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL—CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Vol. 7, 15-
19 (2009); Name of Applicant to be Used in Passport, 22 C.F.R. § 51.25 (2010).
8. Louisiana law provides that “[m]arriage does not change the name of either spouse.
However, a married person may use the surname of either or both spouses as a surname.”
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (2009).
9. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is to Call Things by Their Right
Names, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 3 (1997).
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recent phenomenon,”10 supplementing the use of first names, which
has always been universal.11 Any current-day notion that surnames
are permanent is a gross misconception;12 surnames themselves did
not exist in England before the Norman Conquest in 1066.13 The word
“surname” originates from “sir” name,14 or “sire” name,15 and was ini-
tially used only by aristocracy, knights and gentry.16 Their use gradu-
ally spread down the social ladder, until eventually even peasants
used them regularly.17
After the Norman invasion, old Saxon customs, including those
regarding names, were replaced with Norman ones.18 Populations in-
creased and larger cities grew while the list of possible first names
was quite limited, resulting in confusion and the increasing need for
some other means of identifying individuals.19 Surnames therefore be-
came more common in thirteenth and fourteenth-century England.20
Adding to the necessity of more precise names, the state began to
require a way to identify and regulate its citizens.21 Kelly argues that
early naming conventions also developed as a way to shape and struc-
ture citizens’ lives to correspond with the dominant culture,22 a pur-
pose which is still extant today. The use of surnames was quite flexible
and inconsistent until the 1500s, however.23 Names themselves were
chosen by the bearer, sometimes according to local laws.24 A 1465 law,
for example, dictated that every Irishman living within specified dis-
tricts should “take to him an English surname of one town, as Sutton,
Chester, Trynn, Skryne, Corke, Kinsall; or colour, as white, black,
brown; or arte or science, as smith or carpenter; or office as cooke,
butler.” 25 Names changed quickly and easily through the fourteenth
10. WILLIAM DODGSON BOWMAN, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 13 (1932); L. G. PINE, THE
STORY OF SURNAMES 11-12 (3d ed. 1970); Cynthia Blevins Doll, Harmonizing Filial and
Parental Rights in Names: Progress, Pitfalls, and Constitutional Problems, 35 HOW. L.J.
227, 228 (1992).
11. Doll, supra note 10, at 228.
12. PINE, supra note 10, at 19.
13. Id. at 10.
14. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 9.
15. DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 25 (1980).
16. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8, 9.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-
Centered Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
19. Id.; Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 366 (1998).
20. PINE, supra note 10, at 11; Kelly, supra note 18, at 10.
21. Kelly, supra note 18, at 6.
22. Id.
23. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
24. PINE, supra note 10, at 10; BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
25. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
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century, and reflected a person’s trade, personal and physical charac-
teristics, or residence more often than their paternity.26 As a result
of this flexibility in name choice, members of the same family would
often have different surnames,27 and those names would frequently
change throughout one’s life.28 John Smith could have a daughter
named Maude Weaver and a son named Henry Short, who may also
be known as Henry Hill if he lived on a hill, or Henry Johnson as the
son of John. Surnames gradually began to be hereditary in the four-
teenth century due to state registration of citizens requiring more
naming consistency.29 As Kelly points out, many of the common
English names of today reflect important functions of fourteenth
century life.30 Yet surnames were not universal or firmly established
in all parts of England even by the early 1700s.31 Indeed, the British
royal family itself had no surname at all until 1917 when they
adopted the name Windsor,32 apparently as a means of distinguish-
ing the family from the Germans during World War I.33 Surnames,
therefore, developed out of a combination of “custom, convenience,
and law.” 34
The surnames of women in particular have not been well docu-
mented,35 which essentially writes females out of history as their
ancestry is so difficult to trace.36 Evidence suggests, however, that
girls were given names such as Alice Tomsdaughter, but these names
were largely lost in time because English custom developed such that
women tended to adopt the surnames of their husbands.37 Yet it is also
clear that there were exceptions to the norm; historically, if the wife
inherited property, then her husband and children would take her
last name in order to attach themselves to the estate.38 Tuttle argues
that the purpose of this was to ensure that the family and future gen-
erations might be “deluded” into believing in the consistency of the
male line.39 With time, however, the law imposed further restrictions
26. Doll, supra note 10, at 228.
27. Id. (citing Smith v. U.S. Casualty Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 (N.Y. 1910)).
28. PINE, supra note 10, at 15.
29. Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
30. Id. at 11-12.
31. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 10.
32. PINE, supra note 10, at 15.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Kelly, supra note 18, at 12.
35. Id. at 10.
36. SPENDER, supra note 15, at 24-25.
37. Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
38. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); see also PINE, supra note 10,
at 23; Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
39. PINE, supra note 10, at 24.
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upon women’s ownership of property, so that eventually only males
were permitted ownership by law. This effectively ended the practice
of men taking their wives’ names at marriage.
Although westerners tend to think of our naming structure as
set in stone and as representing the only reasonable approach, not
only did these structures vary within our own culture over time, but
worldwide many other practices have abounded.40 There are still no
surnames at all in many non-western societies.41 “Matronymics,”or
the practice of naming after the maternal line, exists in modern Spain,
medieval England, and amongst medieval Arabs and Jews.42 Indeed,
in medieval England children were often given the names of their
mothers, or assumed them voluntarily, even when they were not ille-
gitimate.43 In some cultures, surnames are narrative and are neither
patrilineal nor matrilineal.44
Clearly, then, there is a wide range of experience and custom
with respect to surnames, not only worldwide, but in our own cultural
history as well. Surnames today reflect both how the family is struc-
tured, and how we believe it should be structured.45
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF SURNAMES
The common experience of mankind . . . points up
the universal importance to each individual of his
own very personal label.
—O’Brien v. Tilson46
Surnames give an individual a personal identity
and selfawareness.
—Roe v. Conn47
Is our name really a trivial matter, one to which we should pay
little heed? Experience and evidence indicate otherwise: our names
are at the cornerstone of our lives; they make a statement both indi-
vidually and collectively. They serve as the symbol of one’s individu-
ality, lineage, family beliefs, religion, and community, all of which
40. Kelly, supra note 18, at 7 (noting the wealth of possible naming systems worldwide).
41. See id. (discussing the lack of surnames in the matrilineal Himalayan Bhutanese
society in Thailand) (citing See Her Hands, MOTHER-JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 40).
42. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
43. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 95.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Kelly, supra note 18, at 5-6.
46. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
47. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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are fundamental to identity.48 Names may also communicate certain
values, including those of equality.49 Indeed:
[F]or most of us, a name is much more than just a tag or a label.
It is a symbol which stands for the unique combination of char-
acters and attributes that define us as an individual. It is the
closest thing that we have to a shorthand for self-concept.50
In the context of surname choice at marriage, this may also reveal the
type of relationship a couple has or desires: independence, equality,
and a rejection of traditional gender roles may all be reflected by a
non-traditional last name choice.51 The use and regulation of names
is clearly anything but trivial.
Indeed, names often function as much more than a symbol of
one’s identity. They also constitute “linguistic correlates of social
structure,” 52 and have been used throughout history as a means of
oppression and control by stripping groups of their right to self-
determination and self-identification.53
One’s name also appears to have direct psychological effects on
others. Names are, in fact, “charged with hidden meanings and un-
spoken overtones that profoundly help or hinder you in your rela-
tionships and your life.” 54 One study found that married women who
retain their surnames are more likely to be viewed as independent,
assertive, well-educated, unattractive, feminist, and non-religious
than those who adopt their husband’s name.55 Women called “Ms.”
were thought to be less honest than those called “Miss” or “Mrs.” or
with no title at all.56 Indeed, Hillary Rodham Clinton exemplifies this
image problem. She retained her birth name when she married in
1975, going by Hillary Rodham alone.57 This fact caused significant
48. Michael Rosensaft, The Right of Men to Change Their Names Upon Marriage, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 186, 190 (2002); Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1-2.
49. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 10.
50. Leissner, supra note 19, at 329 (quoting ELSDON C. SMITH, THE STORY OF OUR
NAMES 277 (1950)).
51. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 10.
52. Id. at 2 (citing John Bregenzer, Naming Practices in South America, 35 J. MINN.
ACAD. SCI. 47 (1968)).
53. Leissner, supra note 19, at 330-31.
54. CHRISTOPHER P. ANDERSEN, THE NAME GAME 13 (1977).
55. Donna L. Atkinson, Names and Titles: Maiden Name Retention and the Use of
Ms., 10 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 37, 37 (1987); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name
Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 780
(2007) (describing the attorney general’s opinion that a woman who wants to retain her
maiden name is “odd” and “confused”).
56. Emens, supra note 55, at 780.
57. Michael Mahoney Frandina, A Man’s Right to Choose His Surname in Marriage:
A Proposal, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 155, 158 (2009).
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criticism of her husband during his Arkansas gubernatorial race: his
wife, it seemed, did not reflect important local values or present an
acceptable role model for Arkansas girls.58 He lost his re-election bid
in 1980.59 For the next race, Hillary dropped the name Rodham and
went by Hillary Clinton (and even Mrs. Bill Clinton).60 Her husband
then won the gubernatorial election in 1982.61 After Mr. Clinton
eventually became president, Hillary brought back Rodham, going
by Hillary Rodham Clinton.62 During her own campaign for president
in 2008, she dropped Rodham and was again Hillary Clinton.63 Other
common assumptions, which were often cited in court cases on the
issue, included the idea that couples with different last names must
be presumed unmarried, thereby stigmatizing children.64 A 2002 study
found that college students perceived men and women with hyphen-
ated names differently than those without them.65 Many viewed
women who kept their birth names as harboring less commitment
to the marriage,66 though the reality was found to conflict with that
assumption.67 Even the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service) considers it a red flag
impugning the validity of a marriage when the woman retains her
birth name.68
It is sometimes argued that the status quo with respect to marital
names is appropriate because men are more connected to their names
than are women. Certainly throughout most of modern history, society
has accorded the surnames of men much more importance.69 Names
have tended to be more transitory for women, and as a result, men
tend to hold more steadfastly to their names as a symbol of their
identity. The common conception is that only men have “real” names,
and their permanency is one of the rights of being male.70 As we will
see, that notion has made its way into the legal system, where the
58. Jennifer Christman, The Name Game Despite Options, 90% of Women Choose to





63. Id.; Frandina, supra note 57, at 158-59 (citing Larissa Dubecki, So What’s in a
Name? Maybe a Presidency . . . , THE AGE, May 12, 2007, at 3).
64. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 19.
65. Gordon B. Forbes et al., Perceptions of Married Women and Married Men with
Hyphenated Surnames, 46 SEX ROLES 167, 172 (2002).
66. David R. Johnson & Laurie Scheuble, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes
of College Students, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 750 (1993).
67. Betsy Rubiner, Married Women and Surnames: Tradition Still Plays a Large
Role, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996.
68. Kelly, supra note 18, at 28.
69. Doll, supra note 10, at 229.
70. SPENDER, supra note 15, at 24.
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courts have time and time again upheld a man’s naming “rights” with
respect to his wife and children. Whereas the identities of women
change based on their relation to others, men’s identities are solid
and consistent.71 Because of the fleeting nature of a woman’s name,
it is assumed that her investment in and connection to her birth name
must be less significant.72 Yet early research found that, contrary to
researchers’ expectations, both women and men identified strongly
with their last names, and people tend to underestimate the number
of women who do so.73 Emens argues that the psychological connection
of men to their names stands to reason, given that boys are taught
from a young age that their names are permanent markers of their
identity, while girls are only taught of their names’ contingent im-
permanence.74 A girl grows up:
knowing from a young age that her name would disappear and
be replaced by another name, if and only if she were lucky enough
to be loved enough to be given a new name. Her children would
bear that name as yet unknown to her, that name that would
mark her success in love.75
Thus, to the extent that men are in fact more psychologically tied to
their surnames, it is a result of a social structure that tells them their
names are more important. This alone cannot stand as a justification
for continuing the very conditions which created it: namely, women
and only women changing their names at marriage. Indeed, “current
preferences are likely to be endogenous to the state’s previous man-
datory regime. It would be surprising if women’s (and men’s) prefer-
ences did not adapt to that mandatory regime.” 76 Yet courts have
based decisions on this presumed male psychological connection with
their names, ignoring in the process women’s interests in their own
names,77 and assuming that “women merely inhabit names which
actually belong to their husbands.” 78
71. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 5 (stating the author’s realization that men do “not have
the same sense of possibility about the transitory nature of names or identity in relation
to others”); Leissner, supra note 19, at 355 (describing the “discontinuous, temporary, [and]
adaptive” nature of women’s names) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
72. Doll, supra note 10, at 231.
73. Leissner, supra note 19, at 363.
74. Emens, supra note 55, at 778.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 764.
77. Cf. Leissner, supra note 19, at 363 & n.223 (noting findings that respondents
often “underestimate the number of women who identify with their birth names”) (citation
omitted).
78. Doll, supra note 10, at 235 (analyzing Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307, 309
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979), in which a mother’s attempt to change the child’s surname to hers was
actually an attempt to change the child’s name to that of his stepfather).
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Yet the issue involves more than simply a psychological connec-
tion to one’s surname. There appears to also be a psychological desire
on the part of a man not simply to keep his own name, but to actually
have his wife give up her name in favor of his. Indeed, studies have
found that men are less likely to view it as acceptable for a woman to
keep her birth name at marriage (fifty-seven percent of men versus
ninety-two percent of women).79 Men tend to assume that such an act
evinces a lack of love for the husband.80 Stannard argues that “a wife
by any other name than her husband’s is offensive to men,” 81 while
the wife who keeps her birth name after marriage is considered “one
of those women.” 82
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF LAW OF SURNAMES AT MARRIAGE
My name is the symbol of my identity which must
not be lost.
—Lucy Stone83
[A]n application to change the name of a wife with-
out the concurrence and consent of the husband
is . . . wrong in principle.
—Converse v. Converse84
The question of what the law actually requires when it comes
to names at marriage has been anything but clear. There is, and in
theory, has always existed, a common law right to change one’s name,
provided the purposes were not fraudulent.85 Nevertheless, possessing
a right formally and being able to exercise it practically are sometimes
incongruous matters, especially when it comes to women.86
79. Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 750; see also Rubiner, supra note 67, at L6
(stating that although most women think it acceptable for a woman to retain her name at
marriage, ninety percent of women still plan to take their husband’s name).
80. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
81. UNA STANNARD, MARRIED WOMEN V. HUSBAND’S NAMES, THE CASE FOR WIVES
WHO KEEP THEIR OWN NAME 3 (1973).
82. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1 (emphasis added).
83. Lucy Stone, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 81, at 5 (a statement that became the
motto of the Lucy Stone League formed by Ruth Hale in 1921).
84. Converse v. Converse, 30 S.C. Eq. 535, 539-40 (1856).
85. Linton v. First Nat. Bank, 10 F. 894, 897 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882); In re McUlta, 189
F. 250, 253 (M.D. Pa. 1911); Doll, supra note 10, at 228; Yury Kolesnikov, Chapter 567:
Saying “I Do” to Name Changes by Husbands and Domestic Partners, 39 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 429, 430 (2008).
86. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 163 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant women the right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139
(1872) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause does not grant
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Lucy Stone was the first known American woman to keep her
birth name after marriage, when she married Henry Blackwell in
1855.87 A prominent abolitionist and suffragist, Stone and her hus-
band jointly read a statement at their marriage announcing their
intention to enter “an equal and permanent partnership.” 88 Stone
was also the first woman denied the right to vote because of the use
of her maiden name.89 The Lucy Stone League was formed in her
honor in 1921 to litigate the right of women to use their birth names
after marriage,90 and the League was rejuvenated in 1997 to work
for equality in naming more generally.91
When women began more frequently to assert their right to
retain their birth name after marriage, the legal response was quite
negative. Although a woman’s ordinary use of her name could not be
controlled, the law was employed as a punishment mechanism in the
context of activities such as voting, driving, suing, and obtaining pass-
ports.92 The justifications used were rather sparse, typically referenc-
ing “long-established custom.” 93 Courts would also occasionally speak
of the social shame that would attend a relationship that gives the
appearance of illicit cohabitation, claiming that children of the mar-
riage would therefore suffer ostracism if such a thing were allowed.94
A New York court declared that:
women the right to practice a profession). The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantees were not applied to women by the U.S. Supreme Court until Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
87. Claudia Goldin & Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage
and Beyond, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 143 (2004); Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name
of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 253, 254-55 (1997).
88. Leissner, supra note 87, at 255 (quoting Julia C. Lamber, A Married Women’s
Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 794).
89. Leissner, supra note 19, at 353. Although this was before women gained the right
to vote with the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, Massachusetts had granted women
the right to vote in school committee elections in 1879. November 2, 1915: Voters Deny
Massachusetts Women the Vote, http://massmoments.org/moment.cfm?mid=316, (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2010).
90. Leissner, supra note 19, at 389.
91. Emens, supra note 55, at 768 n.7.
92. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (discussing
driving); Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) (discussing voting); UNA
STANNARD, MRS. MAN 256 (1973) (discussing passports).
93. Rago, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
94. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (citing lower court’s
findings of fact and law); see also In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (Ind. 1974) (Indiana
lower court denied a woman’s name change, where the state argued it would embarrass
future children and be an “insult to her husband.” The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the trial court’s ruling.); In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(denying a woman the right to use a different surname from her husband’s because of the
social shame arising from the appearance of cohabitation); In re Lawrence, 319 A.2d 793,
801 (Bergen County Ct. 1974), rev’d, 337 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (disallow-
ing a name change because of the detrimental effect on future children).
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[f]or several centuries, by the common law among all English
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her hus-
band’s surname. That becomes her legal name, and she ceases to
be known by her maiden name. By that name she must sue and be
sued . . . and execute all legal documents. Her maiden surname
is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby.95
Service of process on a married woman in her birth name was held
to be inherently invalid in Texas.96 The Supreme Court of Alabama
held in 1937 that the general custom was for a wife to be designated
by the surname and first name of her husband, together with the
prefix “Mrs.,” and that this identification of married women was
“more perfect and complete” than one which used their own first
name.97 An Illinois appeals court held that a woman could be denied
the right to vote when she did not re-register in her husband’s name
after marriage.98 The court noted the “long-established custom, policy
and rule of the common law among English-speaking peoples whereby
a woman’s name is changed by marriage and her husband’s surname
becomes as a matter of law her surname.” 99 In effect, that court de-
cided that the state’s “interest” in women adopting their husbands’
names outweighed the constitutional right to vote.100 A Hawaii statute
required women to adopt the name of their husbands, and they were
forbidden from thereafter changing their names.101 The statute was
not repealed until 1976.102 A Massachusetts woman injured in a car
accident had her lawsuit thrown out of court because her vehicle was
registered in her birth name rather than her married name, and it
was therefore illegally registered and deemed a “nuisance” on the
road.103 The U.S. Department of State concluded that a woman’s legal
name was that of her husband, routinely refusing to issue passports
to married women in their birth names.104 One woman was even sus-
pended from her job with the county health department for refusing
to adopt her husband’s surname after marriage.105 Another married
95. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat’l. Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881).
96. Freeman v. Hawkins, 14 S.W. 364, 365 (Tex. 1890).
97. Roberts v. Grayson, 173 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1937).
98. Rago, 63 N.E.2d at 646.
99. Id. at 645.
100. Kelly, supra note 18, at 25-26 (citing the holding in Rago, 63 N.E.2d 642, 646
(1945)).
101. An Act to Regulate Names, 1860 Haw. Sess. Laws 32.
102. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 4 n.8, 8 n.23 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1
(1993)).
103. Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 152 N.E. 35, 36 (Mass. 1926).
104. STANNARD, supra note 92, at 256.
105. Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 523 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding plaintiff’s gender
discrimination claim).
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woman applying for naturalization was denied the right to retain
her birth name on her naturalization documents, the court contended
that such refusal would result in minimal harm to her.106 Interest-
ingly, the “no harm, no foul” argument arises today in the debate as
to whether a man should have the right to adopt his wife’s name at
marriage,107 as will be discussed in Part V.
Even the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the issue
in 1972 in the Forbush v. Wallace case.108 An Alabama woman brought
a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of an unwritten
Alabama regulation that required the driver’s license of a married
woman to be issued in her husband’s last name.109 A three-judge
federal district court upheld the regulation, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision without opinion.110 Forbush was relied
upon in a 1976 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case upholding a similar
practice in Kentucky.111 These cases catalyzed the modern movement
for birth-name rights at marriage.112 As late as 1996, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in an immigration case refused to even refer to the
female petitioner by her birth name by which she identified herself.113
Instead, they insisted on using her husband’s last name, while at the
same time denying the validity of her marriage in the immigration
context, a move seen by the dissent as “cruelly ironic.”114
Thus, the custom of women adopting the surnames of their hus-
bands, while originally not required, became so ubiquitous that it
eventually developed legal force.115 Indeed, “[c]ommon practice has
always made common law.”116 Kelly discusses the “dynamic synergy”
between social custom and the common law and its relevance in the
marital surname context.117 Clearly the common law evolves slowly
in response to changing conditions, but in the case of marital names,
that process can be excruciatingly slow.
When the women’s rights movement was in full swing in the
1970s, women’s autonomy in name choice was one of many de-
mands.118 Some women began to see the retention of their birth
106. In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
107. Leissner, supra note 87, at 264.
108. Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
109. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 219 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
110. Forbush, 405 U.S. at 970.
111. Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583 (1976).
112. Leissner, supra note 87, at 258.
113. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Doll, supra note 10, at 233.
116. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 699 (Me. 1975) (citing Whelton v. Daly, 37 A.2d 1 (N.H.
1944)).
117. Kelly, supra note 18, at 24.
118. Leissner, supra note 87, at 257.
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names as a representation of their equal partnership in marriage.119
They considered the adoption of husbands’ names to be perpetuating
male dominance and maintaining the existing unequal social struc-
ture.120 It was believed that one of the reasons behind the social expec-
tation was to encourage the woman to take on the identity, achieve-
ments, and status of her husband rather than attempting to forge
and develop her own.121
The 1970s witnessed the gradual reversing of such restrictive
common law principles.122 With individual court decisions, Attorneys
General opinions, and state statutes, the law became well-established
by the early 1980s that a married woman had the right to use any
name she chose after marriage.123 The women’s movement, having
achieved what it was after, moved on to other issues.124 It is remark-
able, then, that 40 years later, “a maiden who slips on a wedding ring
will still, most probably, simultaneously slip out of her name,”125
while her husband will almost never slip into hers.
Feminist scholars of the 1970s women’s movement predicted
sweeping changes in gender norms with respect to names, including
the eradication of all name prefixes (Mrs., Miss, Ms., and Mr.) and
even the elimination of gender-specific first names.126 Yet these rad-
ical speculations make no mention whatsoever of the possibility (or
legality) of a man choosing to take his wife’s name at marriage.127
Apparently the abrogation of all gender in naming was more con-
ceivable than the idea of a man taking on a traditionally female role.128
With the difficult battles women fought to achieve the right to keep
their names upon marriage, there was no consideration of allowing
for the reverse; the battle was deemed won, and there has been little
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 257-58.
122. See Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussing that a woman
could be awarded back pay after being suspended from employment at a county health
department for refusing to adopt her husband’s surname after marriage); Davis v. Roos,
326 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a woman cannot be refused
a driver’s license in her birth name); Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975)
(holding that a wife was not required to take her husband’s name for voter registration
purposes).
123. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 28 (stating that a woman can use any name she would
like); Leissner, supra note 87, at 266 (recognizing a woman’s right to retain her maiden
name).
124. Leissner, supra note 87, at 266.
125. Id.
126. See EDWARD J. BANDER, CHANGE OF NAME AND LAW OF NAMES 54 (1973) (discussing
the elimination of gender-specific names and prefixes).
127. Nowhere in Bander’s discussion of a unisex name future is there any mention of
how men’s names will change. Id.
128. Id.
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investigation of the issue since then.129 However, not only have women
failed to win the social acceptance that would make that right a true
one, they have also not yet won the legal right to easily enjoy an
option that men have always had: to marry a spouse who adopts their
name. The question is, “Will she change?” or “Will she keep?” while
a prospective groom is never asked whether he will keep his name
when he marries.130 Of the studies on marital names that have been
undertaken, the husbands’ names are scarcely even mentioned, let
alone actually studied.131 It is clearly still an issue for women only;
men are not expected to participate in efforts towards equality in
naming. As Emens explains, “[s]he may be choosing, but so long as
his name is not up for discussion, she’s choosing from a very limited
decision set.”132 The change in the law is incomplete because social
views have remained the same. A woman’s (and her husband’s, cer-
tainly) choices are highly influenced by societal and family pressure,
as well as by what options are available to them legally.
A. Current State Laws
The Maine Supreme Court stated in 1975 of woman that, “[s]he
is on the same footing as her prospective husband in that she may
insist, as a premarital condition, that the family surname for her
intended husband and herself be that of her choice.”133 The court
was highly out of touch with social reality and the state of the law
in that sentiment, given that a woman did not have the social capital
to insist on her husband adopting her name, nor did a man have the
legal right to do so as a part of the marriage process.
Both men and women have the common law right to change their
names as they choose—at marriage or any other time—so the claim
that a man does not have the right to adopt his wife’s name at mar-
riage requires some explanation. When a woman marries, her change
of name is simple and straightforward. She may either fill in her new
name on the marriage license application, or bring the marriage cer-
tificate to the Social Security Office or Motor Vehicle Department,
obtain new documents, and her name change is complete.134 In most
129. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 9 (citing Leila Obier Schroeder, A Rose By Any
Other Name: Post-Marital Right to Use Maiden Name: 1934-1982, 70 SOC. & SOC. RES.
290, 290 (1986)).
130. Emens, supra note 55, at 775.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 777.
133. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 701 (Me. 1975).
134. Name Change Options, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, THE CITY OF N.Y. MARRIAGE
BUREAU, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/name_change.shtml#procedure (last visited
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states this is not allowed for men; instead, a man who wishes to
change his name must go through an entirely separate and lengthy
court process for name change.135 A petition must be filed in court and
a filing fee paid (at least $319 in Cook County, Illinois).136 Normally
the person must also publish notice of the name change in a local
newspaper (with additional fees) continuously for a period of several
weeks, making quite personal information public, sometimes includ-
ing previous crimes and bankruptcies.137 The individual must then
appear before a judge and answer questions about the requested name
change.138 The process can be expensive, especially if a lawyer is re-
quired. What’s more, this statutory name change process is not always
guaranteed to be approved.139 Judges typically have discretion as to
whether to grant the change, the standard being what a court shall
deem “right and proper,” or for “substantial reason.”140 The petitioner
may also need evidence of “good character.”141 Under these standards,
a request may easily be denied for reasons that would not apply to a
woman changing her name at marriage.
In the exercise of their discretion, judges are free to apply what-
ever social norms (including personal gender role conceptions) they
find acceptable.142 One Florida man attempting to take his wife’s name
was told by a judge that getting married was not a good enough rea-
son for the change.143 In a number of cases, the right to change one’s
name was denied.144 Many cases have denied the right of a person to
adopt the last name of their same-sex partner, purportedly for rea-
sons of “public policy.”145 Though these cases were often overturned
Nov. 22, 2010); Five Filing Facts for Recently Married or Divorced Taxpayers, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. http:/www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105969,00.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., WHAT EVERY WOMAN SHOULD KNOW, 7, http://www
.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/10127.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
135. E.g., Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb.
10, 2000, at D2.
136. A Guide to Procedures in Change of Name Proceedings OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE,
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/county/change
_name.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
137. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 208.
138. E.g., In re Ross, 67 P.2d 94, 95 (Cal. 1937).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (“This provision permits the court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion to deny the application . . . .”); Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 189; Kolesnikov, supra
note 85, at 433.
141. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 11 (referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-4 (1999)).
142. Id. at 208.
143. Gonzales, supra note 135, at D2.
144. Cf. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 217-18 (noting that most marital name change stat-
utes are discriminatory, and that the Court should recognize the right to change one’s
name upon marriage as a “fundamental” right).
145. Emens, supra note 55, at 790.
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on appeal,146 they demonstrate the effect that judicial discretion—and
social norms—can have on the statutory “right” to change one’s name.
Furthermore, it is unknown how many cases were denied in which
the petitioner chose not to appeal. Clearly, any right that men have
to change their names through the statutory mechanism is not equi-
valent to the martial name change mechanism.
Currently only nine state statutes explicitly allow a man to
change his name through marriage with the same procedures as a
woman.147 Interestingly, it has been allowed in Maine since 1980 by
Attorney General opinion rather than statute.148 California was the
most recent to join that group in 2007, as a result of a lawsuit filed by
a man named Mike Buday, who desired to change his name to that of
his wife but was prohibited from doing so outside of the court pro-
cess.149 Rather than fight the lawsuit, California amended its law with
the Name Equality Act of 2007, which became effective in 2009.150 The
legislature noted the importance of names in Sec. 2 of the Act: “[T]he
choice to adopt or not adopt a new name upon marriage or registra-
tion of domestic partnership is a profoundly personal reflection of
one’s individuality, equality, family, community, and beliefs.”151
It should be noted that some states’ laws are not explicit, but
may be interpreted to apply to both women and men, and that male
name change at marriage may be allowed at the county level.152 This
results in what Emens identifies as “desk-clerk law,” where the law
essentially consists of whatever the person at the desk says it is.153
This results in interpretations that are incorrect and/or discourag-
ing of unconventional choices, with results being highly inconsistent
from one employee, and one county, to the next.154 In response to an
inquiry on a man’s name change, one clerk replied, “Society dictates
that the woman change her name. Now, you can decide to keep your
146. Id.
147. California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2009)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-33.1 (2010)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1 (West 2010)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 595.5 (West 2010)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 1D (West 2010));
New York (N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2010)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-03-20.1 (West 2010)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.220 (West 2010)). Louisiana’s
law provides that marriage does not change the legal name of either spouse, but spouses
may use each other’s names, and validly sign documents with either name or a combination
of the two. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (2009).
148. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-a, § 1401 (2009).
149. Martin Kasindorf, L.A. Man Sues to Take Wife’s Last Name USA TODAY, Jan. 11,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-11-man-sues-name-change_x.htm.
150. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2010).
151. Id.
152. Emens, supra note 55, at 819.
153. Id. at 765.
154. Id.
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maiden name or hyphenate your name or take his, whatever you
want. But men don’t normally change their names. I don’t know what
else to tell you.”155 Indeed, Mike Buday’s lawsuit challenged “how
state employees respond to a groom’s name-changing request with-
out a court order,” while the marriage license form itself varied from
county to county.156 Therefore, it is not exclusively state statutory law
that is in question; county and local practices may have as much ef-
fect (or more) on the name changing process as state law on the issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
Any woman is respectable who is commonly men-
tioned as Mr. Such-a-one’s wife, [but] Nothing can
make a man respectable who is commonly men-
tioned as Mrs. Such-a-one’s husband.
—Thomas Wentworth Higginson157
[W]e talk of you and Mrs. you.
—Henry James158
It should be acknowledged at the outset that there is much de-
bate within feminist theory about the legitimacy of marriage itself.159
155. Interview with Clerk in Jasper Cnty., Mo., (June 28, 2006) quoted in id. at 774.
156. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 432 n.28 (quoting Jim Sanders, Groom Alleges Bias
on Identity: Suit Says Man Was Blocked From Taking His Bride’s Last Name, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 7, 2007, at A3).
157. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 92, at 71 (noting
that Higginson’s article was published in Women’s Journal on September 27, 1873).
158. Letter from Henry James to William Dean Howells (Feb. 21, 1884), in HENRY
JAMES: A LIFE IN LETTERS 152, 154 (Philip Horne ed., 1999).
159. For examples of feminist critique of marriage, see JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE
OF MARRIAGE 13-14 (1972) (arguing that unhappy marriages are the result of societal
allocation of rewards and punishments on the basis of sex, because this practice creates
different marital experiences for the husband and wife); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE
DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 250-56 (1970) (arguing that
marriage promotes a “fundamentally oppressive biological condition,” and will continue to
be unsuccessful unless new alternatives are considered); MARILYN FRENCH, THE
WOMEN’S ROOM 35-37 (1977) (describing marriage and the convent as women’s only real
options, despite suffrage); GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 210-15, 234 (1971)
(arguing that the “marrying-and-living-happily-ever-after myth” has never and will
never be true); KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 208, 221-22 (1971) (describing how the
feminist view of women and the Sexual Revolution undermined traditional notions of
marriage); Sheila Jeffreys, The Need to Abolish Marriage, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 327,
327 (2004) (arguing for the general abolition of marriage). For examples of feminist
support of marriage, see ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, MARRIAGE: THE DREAM THAT
REFUSES TO DIE 44-45, 58-60 (2008) (arguing that marriage is intrinsically good, but that
notions of individual choices and rights has undermined the institution— turning it from
a special union to just a “lifestyle” choice); Mary Crawford, Marriage: The Telling & the
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Some contend that it is an inherently patriarchal institution that is
mired in sexist, heterosexist, religious, and exclusive rules and pre-
scriptions that are inextricable from the institution itself.160 It is
argued in various camps that marriage should be abandoned alto-
gether, modified, or replaced with civil union, or that it should at the
very least be supplemented with other equally acceptable forms of
relating.161 Yet that debate, while relevant, is not the focus of this dis-
cussion. The fact is that the vast majority of Americans will be mar-
ried within their lifetimes (over eighty percent by age forty),162 and
at this point at least, the institution is alive and well, despite the fact
that it is no longer the mandatory practice it once was economically
and socially. That being the case, the law regarding marriage should,
at a minimum, support gender equality on its face. Yet even this most
basic starting point has not been achieved.
The term “maiden name” itself likewise bears some brief discus-
sion. It is still the primary method of denoting “birth name” or “name
before marriage” for women, “maiden” meaning simply an unmarried
woman.163 After marriage, she is no longer a “maiden,” so her maiden
name is lost.164 Yet, despite the fact that the word “maiden” is no
longer used in common parlance to refer to an unmarried woman, we
have held on to the term when referring to names, which is further
evidence that our naming traditions have largely escaped critical
analysis. There is no male equivalent to the term “maiden name,”
other than perhaps the French ne (meaning born),165 which is unfa-
miliar to most Americans and rarely used in this country. Indeed, the
ubiquitous “maiden name” line on various forms has caused consid-
erable consternation in my own life, as I legally changed my surname
years before I married. Is my birth name then my “maiden name,”
even though it changed while I was still a “maiden?” The new name
also applied to me both as a “maiden” and a married woman, so do
Doing, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 313, 317 (2004) (arguing that the goals of feminism can
be fostered in committed relationships, like marriage, but that the emphasis should be on
the relational practices rather than the forms of the relationship); Vivienne Elizabeth,
To Marry, or Not to Marry, 13 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 426, 429 (2003) (introducing the
idea that marriage can have multiple meanings to different people and its mere existence
is not the issue).
160. GREER, supra note 159, at 187-94.
161. Id.
162. PAULA GOODWIN ET AL., WHO MARRIES AND WHEN? AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 5 (June 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db19.pdf.
163. Maiden Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.meriam-webster
.com/dictionary/maiden (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
164. Id.
165. Born Translation, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#en/fr/born
%0A (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
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I have two maiden names? There was lengthy and complicated dis-
cussion about this issue amongst myself, my husband, and multiple
hospital staff at the birth of my daughter, where confusion abounded
regarding the birth certificate forms regarding both my name and
my husband’s. Clearly the term—and all the documents employing
it—acknowledges only the standard naming structure, and thereby
continues to reinforce that structure.
There is a marked gap in feminist scholarship on the issue of
male name change at marriage. There has been some work that is
critical of our current naming customs and traditions with respect
to women.166 Very little research exists which addresses the issue of
a man choosing to adopt his wife’s name, as there is virtually no
acknowledgement even among feminists that the man even has a
choice to make. What little can be found focuses on the unconstitu-
tionality of the discrimination against men and the denial of their
equal protection rights.167 While this approach is clearly correct on
the surface, there is much more to the issue. What at first appears
to be discrimination against men is in reality discrimination against
women: the status quo represents a legal sanctioning of the social
norms that subsumed a woman within the husband’s identity. Be-
cause taking their husbands’ names at marriage was never really a
“right” of women, but rather a requirement, the “right” actually in-
heres in the man. In essence, women are still denied what men have
always enjoyed: the right to have a spouse adopt their name at mar-
riage. This is why, in a society that has almost never legally favored
the female over the male, and where men have always had the com-
mon law right to change their name whenever they chose, they are
nevertheless not permitted to do so at marriage.
Outside of the marriage context, compulsory name changing has
often been associated with cultural domination or assimilation.168
Nazis in the 1930s required Jews to add Sarah or Israel to their names
to mark them as “other.”169 Immigrants were regularly renamed at
Ellis Island in order to assimilate them into American culture, some-
times involuntarily.170 Slaves in America were often given no last
166. See, e.g., JUSTIN KAPLAN & ANNE BERNAYS, THE LANGUAGE OF NAMES 137-39
(1997) (taking a critical approach to the practice of women taking the husband’s name,
arguing that it leads to an inherently unequal marriage and the man’s consumption of
the woman’s identity); Leissner, supra note 19, at 364 (arguing that the technical and
bureaucratic obstacles that continue to accompany name change at marriage elicits a form
of “civil death” for women).
167. See, e.g., Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 188-89; Frandina, supra note 57, at 156-57.
168. Kelly, supra note 18, at 12.
169. Emens, supra note 55, at 770.
170. Kelly, supra note 18, at 16-17.
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names at all because, as property themselves, they could not have
an independent surname.171 When they did have last names, they
were named and renamed as they exchanged owners.172 This, in fact,
was when women first recognized that their own name changes from
father to husband seemed to signify a similar exchange of property.173
In the later words of one feminist scholar, “[l]ike a slave she was
brought to life by being given a name by her master . . . .”174 Although
this concept of surname as signifying ownership (of wife, children,
and property) is no longer overt, it is still undoubtedly present in our
social schema and naming framework.175
Courts litigating naming issues have talked of the “fundamental,”
“primary,” “natural,” and “time-honored” right of a father to the nam-
ing of his family,176 the presumption being that a practice so universal
must somehow be based in laws of nature.177 But aside from the fact
that the presumption of universality is factually inaccurate, it is also
logically fallacious; even a ubiquitous practice is not made just or right
by virtue of its ubiquity. Recent cases have discussed these male
rights in terms of the naming of men’s children, which has likewise
fallen under the patriarchal dictates of the male line, and against
which women continue to struggle.178 For example, an Oregon trial
court in 2006 granted an unmarried father’s demand to have his
child’s last name legally changed from the mother’s to his, for no
other reason than that he was the father.179 Court cases well into
the 1990s employed a tougher standard for mothers attempting to
change their child’s name after divorce than those who were never
married, suggesting that women still somehow give up naming rights
upon marriage.180 Leissner argues that despite some legal and social
changes, the right of naming still resides in the male.181 Under the
current naming scheme, women’s heritage is minimized. While a man
with no sons has his family line “die out,” no notice is taken of the
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Leissner, supra note 19, at 356.
174. Jeffreys, supra note 159, at 328.
175. See, e.g., Leissner, supra note 19, at 358 (arguing that a woman who gives up her
name has also given up no small part of her autonomy).
176. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr.
873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968) overruled by In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980).
177. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
178. Doll, supra note 10, at 227.
179. Doherty v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). The court overturned
the trial court decision, and granted the father’s request for name change of the child.
Id. at 466.
180. Doll, supra note 10, at 246.
181. Leissner, supra note 87, at 254.
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fact that the mother’s line dies out at the time of the marriage it-
self.182 There is no recognition that the mother is a part of the child’s
legacy—how often do women name their daughters after themselves
as men do?183 In fact, the current legal right of women to choose their
name after marriage is nothing more than an illusion, according to
Leissner, because of the remaining “strong legal preclusion from nam-
ing our children.”184 The denial of women’s right to name themselves
and their children are both elements of the same type of discrimina-
tion.185 Eliminating one means little without eliminating the other,
as most women do not want to be cut off from their families and chil-
dren, who will almost always be given the surname of the father.186
Allowing men to easily take the wife’s name would partially solve
this problem.
The same male “rights” logic was at one time applied to women
changing their names at marriage, though the principle is no longer
acknowledged outright, as it is now implicitly recognized that the
“natural right” argument may not be legally justifiable in that con-
text. Considering that well into the 1970s courts were still holding
that a woman must adopt her husband’s surname, the underlying
principle was strongly entrenched, and courts were eager to enforce
it.187 Presenting the issue as a requirement upon women rather than
a right of men makes it no less a male right in the eyes of the law.188
There has been little research into the actual last name choices
of both men and women.189 Studies are difficult to conduct because
data sets do not contain information on birth names and married sur-
names of women, much less of men.190 Some expectations and tradi-
tions are apparently so entrenched that we fail to even think to ask
questions about them. Most studies that have been conducted, how-
ever, find that seventy-five to ninety-five percent of all women still
182. Id. at 268.
183. Leissner, supra note 19, at 340 (“The fact that women cannot use indications, such
as II, III, Jr. or Sr., emphasizes the reality that ‘females are not regarded as part of a
dynasty.’ ”) (quoting Ralph Slovenko, Unisex and Cross-Sex Names, J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
249, 293 (Spring-Summer 1986)).
184. Leissner, supra note 87, at 254.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. There is even some evidence that courts considered this not just a right of indi-
vidual men, but of men collectively. In one case a trial court refused to allow a woman’s
name change even when the husband had consented, as if allowing it in one case would
taint the right of men in general. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 358-60 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (overruling trial court’s rejection of name change request).
188. See Leissner, supra note 19, at 333-34 (discussing gendered naming power).
189. Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 724.
190. Goldin & Shim, supra note 87, at 143.
210 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:187
assume their husband’s name upon marriage.191 The older and more
educated a woman is, the more likely she is to keep her own name,
but oftentimes highly educated professional women adopt their hus-
band’s name but incorporate their birth name as a middle name after
marriage—as did Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O’Connor.192
One 1994 study determined that ninety percent of women took their
husband’s name, and of the rest, only two percent used their birth
name exclusively with no change or name combination.193 There are
no studies about the numbers of men taking the names of their wives
at marriage—perhaps because the numbers are so small as to not
merit mention, or perhaps because it does not occur to researchers
to investigate such a phenomenon. The number, however, appears to
be increasing.194 Again we see the idea that she has a choice, but he
does not.
A. Women as Property and Social Expectations
Why is it then, decades after women ultimately won their legal
battle against conventional naming requirements, and at a time when
the legal identity of women is not formally absorbed by the husband’s
upon marriage, that the conventional choice is still preferred by the
vast majority of couples? History cannot be ignored or escaped when
investigating this question. The custom/requirement that a married
woman adopt her husband’s surname, quite simply, is rooted in patri-
archy. Historically, the wife was in fact the legal property of the hus-
band, so she took his name as a legal necessity.195 This is an element
of the system of coverture, whereby a woman’s identity is subsumed
into that of her husband.196 Jurist William Blackstone explained the
notion of coverture as it was understood in the eighteenth century:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
191. Id. at 144; Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 724; Christman, supra note
58, at F1; Hillary Drops her Maiden Name, BRISBANE TIMES, (Apr. 30, 2007, 9:37 AM),
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/world/hillary-drops-her-maiden-name/2007/04
/30/1177788007743.html; Rubiner, supra note 67, at L6.
192. Goldin & Shim, supra note 87, at 143.
193. Sue Shellenbarger, Odds and Ends, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1994, at B1.
194. Jessica McBride, More Grooms are Saying ‘I Do’ to Taking Bride’s Last Name—In
the Name of Love, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1999, at L1 (noting that the clerk
estimated the man took the woman’s name in one out of one-hundred couples in Milwaukee
County).
195. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
196. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *442.
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into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our
law—[F]rench a feme-covert, . . . and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.197
The wife was legally prohibited from, among other things, owning
property, entering into a contract, bringing or defending a lawsuit,
or keeping her own wages,198 as property can logically and legally do
none of these things. The practice of the wife assuming the hus-
band’s surname reinforced this legal and social absorption.199 “Cus-
tom said . . . that man owned what he paid for, and could put his
name on everything for which he provided money . . . . [H]is land, his
house, his wife and children, his slaves when he had them, and on
everything that was his.” 200 If the custom reinforced the underlying
inequality, does it not do the same today?201 Although such formal in-
equality has almost entirely disappeared from the law,202 it is still
present in our collective conscience; it would be virtually unthink-
able in law and policy for a man to want to be “owned” in that way by
his wife. Our language and naming continues to instantiate women
as objects, which is why it is so difficult to conceive of something so
objectively simple as a man taking his wife’s name: women do not,
and never have, owned men.203 This is presumably why the law still
does not allow for a man to take his wife’s name in most states.
Social pressure and expectations seem to play an important role
in the naming decision for couples, and they are bolstered and sup-
ported by the law. There appear to be strongly negative reactions to
nontraditional surname choices.204 Though it is presumed that we
have abandoned most traditional gender roles and norms, the simple
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. See, e.g., Mellot v. Sullivan Ford Sales, 236 A.2d 68, 70 (Me. 1967) (“In the eyes of
the common law upon marriage a husband and wife became one person and that person
was the husband. A married woman of any age was held incapable of entering into bind-
ing contractual relations and of acquiring or disposing of property. Upon marriage her
husband took over all her personal property and the use of her real estate for his life and
became responsible for her support, her debts and her torts”).
199. “Merger” was the term often used in the law, but it is misleading in that it implies
a combination of both identities into one whole, rather than the elimination of one in favor
of the other. If there is a “unity” of identity, it is situated in the husband.
200. Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW
& INEQ. 91, 138 (1985) (quoting Ruth Hale, But What About the Postman?, 54 THE
BOOKMAN 560, 561 (1922)).
201. See, e.g., SPENDER, supra note 15, at 25 (arguing that name change at marriage
reinforces the notion of women as property).
202. The law of marital names is a notable exception.
203. See SPENDER, supra note 15, at 26-27 (arguing that because women don’t “own”
men, there has been no need to make men’s marital status visible like women’s are).
204. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 9.
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fact is that much of American society has not. Sharply divergent and
gender-specific naming practices and expectations are both evidence
and results of that fact. It is rare for a man to actually take his wife’s
name at marriage. In fact, Emens calls the discouragement of naming
alternatives “the most robust feature of our current marital naming
conventions.” 205 Government agencies and forms are further evidence
and support for the status quo, when they ask the woman and only
the woman for her “maiden” name.
Aside from the psychological connection to names discussed
above, and the legal roadblocks that will be discussed below, there
also exists intense social pressure to follow prescribed norms.206
Women contemplating marriage hear comments such as, “I hope you
love your husband enough when you marry to take his name.” 207 It
would be unthinkable for a person to say the same thing to the man,
though presumably he loves his wife as well. As a result, a woman’s
choice to retain her name at marriage may, even today, be considered
“a political act,” rather than simply a choice based on personal or
family preferences.208
What is expected for women, then, is considered emasculating
for men. Men who consider adopting their wives’ names may have
concerns about how family and colleagues will react, and with good
reason; they have been called “gay,” “wimp,” “the feminine spouse,” 209
and not “real men,” 210 with references to drinking “sissy juice” and
“turn[ing] in your man card.” 211 One interviewee whose husband took
her name stated, “[w]e got tons of opposition from his mother. She
didn’t talk to us for a while. She got over it, but she threatened to not
come to the wedding. My parents were more supportive of it, but they
were like, ‘Can you do that?’ ‘Is that legal?’ ” 212 Outsiders believed
the wife was simply being controlling, forcing the husband into a de-
cision to which he was fundamentally opposed,213 because there is a
common belief that no “real man” would voluntarily give up his name.
California’s Name Equality Act of 2007 recognizes the strength of
such reactions and the damage they can cause by protecting both
parties in a marriage from “discrimination based on their name
choices” by those with whom they do business.214
205. Emens, supra note 55, at 764.
206. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
207. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting a friend of the author).
208. Leissner, supra note 87, at 266-67 (citing Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 387 (1991)).
209. Emens, supra note 55, at 781 (citation omitted).
210. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
211. Friess, supra note 3.
212. McBride, supra note 194, at L1.
213. Id.
214. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 436 (citation omitted).
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These social pressures and expectations naturally support the
laws that distinguish between the genders in naming. The law, of
course, often draws its principles from custom and practice, and jus-
tifies itself by reference thereto. Yet conversely, the law also works
to support or discourage certain social practices, and changing the law
is often the first step in altering societal perceptions and practice.
Indeed, “ ‘[t]he process by which law confers legitimacy on a struc-
ture of domination and dependency is primarily a system of symbols.
For a court to add the judiciary’s own special imprimatur of legiti-
macy on the symbolism of women’s dependency is particularly de-
structive.’ ” 215 It is not altogether surprising, then, that so few men
change their names at marriage, when they are not permitted to do
so in most states. The fact that policy and practice makes resisting
social trends more difficult speaks to our continuing patriarchal ten-
dencies. Our collective social attitudes about gender are accurately
reflected in the fact that most women still do not carry permanent
names of their own, but men do.216
While it is clear from the discussion above that names are cen-
tral to one’s self-concept and identity, they are also important in a
larger sense for what messages they send. Names taken at marriage
arguably define the relationship in some respects.217 If forcing a
woman to take her husband’s name potentially defines the marriage
as unequal,218 then preventing a man from taking his wife’s name
does the same thing. Naming choices send messages to children about
women’s status as inferior; children recognize at a young age that
their own family identity resides with their father, typically even
after a divorce.219 The message to children and to society in general
is that the male identity and perspective is the one that counts.220
There is even evidence that parents with biological children tend to
have a preference for boys, which may be related to the fact that only
boys carry on the family name.221 It is clear, then, that even if men and
women are both viewed as having a “choice” in their marital naming,
as they clearly do to some extent, the current framework formally and
informally preferences inegalitarian naming conventions.222
215. Leissner, supra note 19, at 331 (citing Kenneth Karst, A Discrimination So Trivial:
A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women’s Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 552
(1974) (alteration in original)).
216. See Leissner, supra note 87, at 254 (noting the lack of permanency might indicate
society’s belief that women’s roles are that of daughter, wife, or mother).
217. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 213.
218. Id.
219. Leissner, supra note 87, at 268.
220. Leissner, supra note 19, at 355.
221. Emens, supra note 55, at 784.
222. Id. at 764.
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V. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
[A] state’s decision to choose a rule that systemati-
cally harmed women . . . [is] the product of habit
or . . . invidious and indefensible stereotype, and
such decisions are inimical to the norm of impar-
tial governments.
—Rio v. Rio223
The United States has a long history of sex discrimination. The
Supreme Court has derided “stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes” and has held that state classifications based on sex are in-
herently suspect.224 At the same time, the law’s prescriptions and pro-
hibitions articulate certain conceptions of family, identity, and values
through the naming choices it makes available. Those choices are
currently limited based on gender. In the words of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the law’s rules derive from prevailing moral senti-
ment “ ‘avowed or unconscious, even [by] the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow men.’ ” 225 This is clearly the case with the
laws of marital names, which are based on moral sentiment, habit,
prejudice, and stereotype, and conflict with Supreme Court holdings
on equal protection of the laws.
The underlying basis of this particular legal disparity is not dis-
crimination against men. The fact is, however, that a disparate treat-
ment claim may be more likely to be upheld—and perhaps easier to
comprehend—when it is presented as discrimination against men,
so for practical purposes, that may be the best approach. This section
addresses the legal arguments that may be used to overcome the
gender disparity in the law.
While it is customary that a wife take her husband’s name, she
is permitted to keep her own. Thus, she is given a choice that in most
states the husband is not—he may only keep his name.226 The ques-
tion, then, is whether this gender disparity is constitutionally per-
missible. The law in question here constitutes gender discrimination
on its face. This does not in itself invalidate the practice; any such
provision is subject to intermediate level scrutiny, meaning that in
order to be upheld, the discrimination must be substantially related
223. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (App. Div. 1986).
224. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 688 (1973).
225. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 81, at 8 (alteration
in original).
226. See Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 441 (discussing some of the reasons why a man
may wish to adopt his wife’s name).
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to an important government interest.227 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that this standard applies whether it is women or men who
are disadvantaged under the law.228 Furthermore, courts have held
that naming choices implicate constitutional rights,229 particularly
when the law distinguishes between the naming rights of women
and men.230
It is therefore necessary to consider whether there is any gov-
ernment interest important enough to justify discriminatory marital
naming laws. The commonly cited interests include custom or tra-
dition, preserving the family unit, administrative convenience, fraud
prevention, and minimal injury (or de minimis injury),231 although
this last is not actually a government interest at all, but rather an
argument that the harm involved is so minimal as to not be worthy
of legal review.232 Yet none of these interests is likely to pass even
the lowest standard of constitutional review: the rational basis test.
Certainly none is an important government interest substantially
related to the marital naming policy such that it could pass interme-
diate scrutiny.233
A. Custom/Tradition
There is no dispute as to whether current state law on marital
names represents the standard custom; as discussed, it goes back
centuries. Yet that fact is meaningless in a constitutional analysis.
Custom is not in itself a justifiable reason for the maintenance of any
law, much less one that discriminates based on gender. Not only would
such a result be patently undemocratic, but the notion of “custom”
is also subject to interpretation and thus is easily manipulated.234
Indeed, “[t]o subject different groups to disparate treatment because
227. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding an Oklahoma statute allowing
females to purchase beer at a younger age than males unconstitutional, as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
228. See Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a statute making men alone criminally liable for statutory rape); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny to analyze a statute
with different standards of survivor benefits paid to women as those paid to men).
229. See, e.g., Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979) (noting the constitu-
tional rights involved in naming children).
230. See O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (discussing the equal
protection issue raised by a statute that allows a child to receive his/her father’s but not
his/her mother’s name).
231. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 437 (citing Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 200).
232. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 205.
233. See also Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 437-40 (discussing government interest in
marital naming).
234. Leissner, supra note 87, at 263.
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society historically has done so undermines the very purpose of equal
protection.” 235 Nor should the length of the custom make any differ-
ence in its justification.236 Equal protection jurisprudence is largely
a history of the courts overruling custom in favor of constitutional
rights.237 The court in Rio v. Rio rejected custom as a justification for
a required paternal surname for children, holding that such a pre-
sumption denies women’s equal protection rights.238 It is entirely un-
clear why tradition should ever be a guiding force in law simply for
its own sake. In fact, if tradition were held to be a legitimate state in-
terest when it comes to marital name practices, then the total subju-
gation of women should also be endorsed, as that was the custom for
the majority of United States history. In this sense, tradition often
amounts to bias and inequality, and neither is enough to legitimate
a discriminatory state law.
B. Preservation of the Family
Opponents of California’s Name Equality Act argued that the
state should not make it easier for men to take their wives’ last names
because doing so would weaken the traditional male role.239 They
argued that “[g]overnment needs to encourage men to be stronger
fathers who provide for and protect their families, . . . not to be sissy
men who abdicate their masculine leadership role because they’re
confused.” 240 Whereas it should be obvious at the outset that a man’s
surname has no bearing on how much he does or does not provide
for his family, the notion of “abdicating” one’s “masculine leadership
role” is important to the claim of family preservation.241 This view rep-
resents the idea that a family without a powerful “masculine leader”
is no family at all, and that a man without his birth name is by defi-
nition a failure in that regard.242 While such notions may underlie
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Marital
Women’s Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598, 598, 620 (1973)).
237. This took place with a number of once-traditional practices, including: segregation
(Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)); anti-miscegenation laws (Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1967)); reproductive rights (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 480, 485 (1965)); and gender discrimination (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209-10
(1976)).
238. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963-64 (App. Div. 1986).
239. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 441 (citing Frank D. Russo, Why Did 26 of 32
California Assembly Republicans Vote Against the Name Equality Act?, CAL. PROGRESS
REP. (May 9, 2007), http://californiaprogressreport.com/2007/05/why_did_26_of_3.html).
240. Id. at 441 n.126 (alteration in original) (quoting Randy Thomasson, President of
the Campaign for Children and Families).
241. Id. at 441 & n.126.
242. Id. at 441, nn.121, 126.
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some of the opposition to equality in naming, it is fair to assume that
no state today would make such an argument in a court of law.
Yet because children born in a marriage historically took their
father’s name, while “illegitimate” children took the mother’s,243 courts
have held that allowing women to use their birth name after mar-
riage would contribute to the breakdown of the family unit,244 partly
due to the stigma of illegitimacy. Feminists at the time believed this
issue to be largely irrelevant, because once the traditional naming
practices became less common, the stigma would disappear.245 Grant-
ing for the sake of argument that family preservation is an important
state interest, there is no reasonable connection between that interest
and the law in question here. There is no reason to assume that pre-
venting men from adopting their wives’ names with ease would have
any negative effect on the preservation of the family. The stigma
discussed above is much less pronounced today, but if the husband
adopted the wife’s name, there would likely be very little of such
stigma on a day-to-day familial basis, as there would be no presumed
illegitimacy of children. Even so, the Supreme Court has indicated
that stigma is not enough to justify a discriminatory law in itself.246
What’s more, the argument is even less viable when one considers
that a man can adopt his wife’s name by going through the court pro-
cess. The issue is that he is prevented from doing so by the same sim-
ple process that his wife is able to use. The state’s purported interest
in preserving the family unit is even less cogent, then, because only
the straightforward version of the process is prohibited; the alterna-
tive court process, with the same end result, is still allowed. Family
preservation is apparently not a very serious state interest after all.
Furthermore, if it is true that a male name change implies a non-
traditional marital relationship, then that is likewise not a sufficient
reason to uphold the discrimination. The state has no interest in en-
couraging any particular type of marriage at all. One could marry
out of love, greed, practicality, loneliness, lust, familial pressure,
religious beliefs—the list goes on. Couples applying for a marriage
243. Leissner, supra note 87, at 264.
244. Id. at 264-65 (citing Julia C. Lamber, A Married Woman’s Surname: Is Custom
Law?, 1973 WASH U. L.Q. 779, 805 n.106).
245. Id. at 265 (citing Roslyn Goodman Daum, The Right of Married Women to Assert
Their Own Surnames, 8 J. L. REFORM 64, 99 (1974)).
246. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (rejecting the argument that stigma
and prejudice directed toward a child based on an interracial marriage of the child’s mother
is a sufficient reason to prefer one parent over the other in a custody determination). The
Court stated that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Id.
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license are not asked about any of these issues any more than they
are, or should be, asked about gender roles within the relationship.
If a couple decides that the woman will work outside the home and
be the “breadwinner” while the man raises the children, cleans the
house, and cooks, what does the state have to say about that? Nothing,
of course—nor should it. Yet it retains the right to dictate gender roles
when it comes to the names spouses adopt upon marriage. If the state
cannot prohibit husbands from being stay-at-home fathers, surely
they cannot prohibit them from changing their name at marriage with
the ease and simplicity that the woman enjoys. The state’s interest
is in regulating marriage’s entry and exit alone. It has no interest in
such personal matters as gender roles within the relationship.
C. Administrative Convenience
States have argued in the past that disparities in naming rights
are necessary because the alternative would be over-burdensome
administratively.247 This argument fails as well. In O’Brien v. Tilson,
the Court held that a state law prohibiting a child of married parents
from being given any name other than the father’s was not justified
based on undue administrative burden.248 Invalidating the law as un-
constitutional, the Court stated that allowing the right would not de-
tract from the registrar’s ability to perform its necessary duties.249
In Jech v. Burch, Hawaii law required a child’s surname to be only
that of its father, mother, or a hyphenation of the two.250 The parents
wanted to name the child with a non-hyphenated combination of
their two surnames; the state refused to allow this, claiming that it
would have to alter its record-keeping system and would thereby con-
stitute too much administrative inconvenience.251 The court rejected
the state’s argument, stating that “[f]or reasons which have still not
been explained satisfactorily to me, the department is completely de-
feated by the problem of indexing a child’s surname . . . .” 252 The court
ultimately concluded that denying this right amounted to a denial of
the constitutional rights of both the child and the parents.253
247. See O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (noting the state’s
argument that the naming system facilitated efficient and correct recording of births).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Haw. 1979).
251. Id. at 718.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 721; see also O’Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 496 (1981) (stating that a statute
requiring a child born in wedlock to bear his father’s name violated a constitutional right
to privacy).
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These holdings, although dealing with the right to name chil-
dren, would certainly apply to a state practice that allows a woman
to change her name at marriage but prohibits a man from doing so.
What the state already does for women would surely be only a minor
and quite temporary inconvenience to do for men, and would mean
nothing more than perhaps adding an extra line on a form and an
additional field in a computer system.
D. Fraud Prevention
The prevention of fraud has long been one of the only reasons
citizens were prevented from changing their names under the com-
mon law.254 The rule exists for the protection of creditors who rely
on the ability to correctly identify individuals to collect debts.255 Case
law confirms that this is indeed a legitimate government interest.256
Given that fact, the question remains whether the discriminatory
name change practice is substantially related to supporting that in-
terest. The answer is quite clear: there is no reason to believe that
treating one spouse differently than the other will have any effect
on identity fraud. If there is no appreciable fraud concern for women
who change their name at marriage, then there should not be any
fraud concern for men who do the same. States have implicitly con-
ceded by their current practices that name change at marriage does
not implicate fraud. For this argument to be viable, the state should
not allow either men or women to change their names at marriage.
In an interesting twist, the fraud prevention argument was previously
used as a justification for requiring women to change their names
at marriage,257 so it seems highly disingenuous to use the same argu-
ment to prevent men from doing so.
E. Minimal Injury
Sometimes states have argued, and courts have agreed, that the
harm resulting from state action is “de minimis,” or so trivial as
to not warrant court intervention or constitutional protection.258
254. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 430.
255. See Leissner, supra note 87, at 263 (discussing the potential for fraud inherent in
the marital name changing process) (citing Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 211).
256. See Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d, 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a child’s
surname could fraudulently designate paternity).
257. Leissner, supra note 87, at 263-64 (citing Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1945)).
258. Id. (discussing the characterization of the injury as de minimis by the court in
Forbush v. Wallace).
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Considering the importance of names to society and individuals alike,
this claim is clearly specious. The argument has been used in the con-
text of marital name change because even when they are prohibited
from adopting their spouse’s name immediately at marriage, men are
permitted to change their name through the court system by statute.
As discussed, that process is nowhere near equivalent; it imposes sig-
nificant extra expense, time, and burdens on men choosing a marital
name change that do not apply to women. The fact that there is a
separate process sends a message to individuals and society at large
about the value of that choice.259 Even if there were some separate
method men could employ that did not greatly increase their burden
in the process, that would nevertheless fail to justify the state’s re-
fusal to allow men to utilize the same procedure that is allowed for
women. The court in Jech v. Burch stated, “[w]hat is the state in-
terest in refusing to allow parents to give their child at birth a name
which they may immediately confer by way of change of name? I fail
to see any such interest.” 260
It may also be argued that the common law in nearly every state
affords anyone the right to change their name simply by calling oneself
by that name,261 a right which numerous cases have upheld.262 As
such, it is argued, any injury resulting from discriminatory state laws
of marital surnames is minimal because a person can change his name
under the common law in any case by simply calling himself by the
new name.263 Yet this common law right of name change cannot legiti-
mately be considered a true right any longer, given that legal docu-
mentation is required to effectuate the name change on bank accounts,
passports, driver’s licenses, social security cards, professional licenses,
etc. The common law right imposes no obligation on others to accept
the name change.264 A statutory name change is required to fully
achieve a change of name,265 and failing to allow it for men in the
way it is allowed for women poses more than a de minimis injury.
F. Right of Privacy
Given that “one’s own name is one of the most personal belong-
ings of any individual,” 266 discriminatory and restrictive name change
259. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 210.
260. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D. Haw. 1979).
261. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 206.
262. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S. Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 950 (N.Y. 1910) (discussing the com-
mon law rule that a man may change his name at will).
263. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 205.
264. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 431.
265. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 212.
266. Leissner, supra note 87, at 262.
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laws implicate privacy rights, though this is not part of a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis. The right to adopt a spouse’s
name upon marriage is in fact central to the right of privacy.267 Sup-
porters of California’s Name Equality Act argued that the “ ‘people,
not the government, should decide basic issues like whose name to
take.’ ” 268 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that marriage
and family issues are private matters entitled to constitutional pro-
tection,269 stating:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.270
Whereas the issue in that case was procreative choice, the adoption
of a family name is likewise fundamental and personal, and is central
to the family relationship; there is no room for state compulsion here.
In O’Brien v. Tilson, the federal district court explicitly upheld the
privacy argument in the context of naming when it invalidated a
state law providing men more rights to the naming of children than
women.271 The court referenced the individual right to be free from
state interference in the making of private decisions, as well as the
right of individual expression.272
CONCLUSION
Whereas some state laws explicitly allow men to change their
names at marriage with the same ease as women, most do not. The
law’s imposition of outdated traditions not only fails to recognize the
changing needs and desires of individuals and families today, but it
267. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 442-43 (citing Press Release, Equality Cal., Bill Gives
Domestic Partners, Married Spouses Equal Opportunity to Take Surname of Choice,
(Feb 13, 2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/bill_gives_domestic
_partners,_married_spouses_equal_opportunity_to_take_surname_of_choice.shtml).
268. Id. (quoting Letter from James Vaughn, Dir., Log Cabin Republicans, to Assembly
Member Fiona Ma, Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 19, 2007)).
269. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords consti-
tutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
270. Id.
271. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
272. Id.
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clearly conflicts with constitutional rights and perpetuates tradi-
tional marital gender roles and archaic notions of women as prop-
erty. Whether it is considered discrimination against men, who do
not have the same ability to change their names as women, or dis-
crimination against women, who are denied the right to have their
spouse take their name and by social custom are still expected to give
up their own, it is clearly gender-based discrimination that evidences
no foundation in logic, fairness, common sense, or important govern-
mental needs.
It is time to critically examine this long-standing custom, and
the law that is based upon it, which have to date been largely taken
for granted. Our naming practices reinforce and reconstitute a legal
doctrine that no longer formally exists. In denying naming choices
based on gender, the law perpetuates, and implicitly supports, the
inferiority of women and the unimportance of their names and their
identities. The law has a responsibility to acknowledge the accept-
ability of egalitarian naming options. In doing so, it conveys a strong
social message that equality in naming is socially acceptable and
appropriate. Perhaps then this vestige of gender discrimination will
begin to disappear. Nearly forty years ago Una Stannard stated,
“whether common sense will prevail is not certain because emotion
not reason rules our legislators when they think about married
women’s names.” 273 The correctness of this sentiment and all that
it implies will be increasingly tested in the coming years.
273. STANNARD, supra note 81, at 17.
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Although a great many voices have been raised in the debate
over ethical questions in the biotechnology arena, over the issue of
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sex-selection practices1 there is a disquieting silence in the United
States. How is that silence to be accounted for? With the advent of
technologies capable of profoundly expanding reproductive options and
changing the very concept of reproduction itself, one might fully expect
an outcry for regulation. Yet, sex-selection practices are virtually un-
regulated in the United States at both the federal and state levels, and
there has been relatively little demand for such regulation.2
In fact, the United States is one of the few remaining countries
that still allows non-medical sex selection.3 Both the United Kingdom4
and Canada5 have significant pieces of legislation addressing sex
selection as well as a number of other areas concerning reproductive
technology.6 Members of the Council of Europe have banned sex
selection for non-medical purposes entirely.7 In some places, sex-
selection practices actually have criminal consequences. Of these,
Germany and the Australian state of Victoria have some of the most
1. Sex selection practices are methods, either preconception or prenatal, that allow for
parental selection of the gender of the child. See infra Part I (discussing the various sex-
selection technologies).
2. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effect of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 429 (1990); See, e.g.,
Margaret Foster Riley & Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review
of American Bioethics Commissions and Comparison to the British Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (noting a Senate
report stating that it is not “the responsibility of the Federal government to develop and
establish moral principles”).
3. Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Preferences:
Beyond Deadly Disease, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 245, 267 (2008). See also S. Soini,
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PDG) in Europe: Diversity of Legislation a Challenge
to the Community and its Citizens, 26 MED. & L. 309, 314 (2007) (examining the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’s explicit ban on non-medical sex-selection
practices found in article 14, which states “that ‘[t]he use of techniques of medically
assisted procreation shall not be allowed for the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex,
except where serious hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided’ ” (quoting Council of
Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 14, Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No.
164, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 817)).
4. See Press Release, Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, HFEA announces
sex selection recommendations (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/803.html (stating
that the British population exhibited “overwhelming support for sex selection techniques
to be regulated,” support that ultimately led to the United Kingdom’s ban on non-medical
sex selection practices in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008).
5. See Colin Rasmussen, Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Is it Scientific
Censorship, or a Reasoned Approach to the Regulation of Rapidly Emerging Reproductive
Technologies?, 67 SASK. L. REV. 97, 97-99 (2004) (discussing Canada’s proactive response
to the reproductive-biotechnology debate: approval of the Assisted Human Reproduction
Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.)).
6. This legislation will be discussed in greater detail in Part V, when this Note ex-
amines the Canadian and British legislation as potential models for the United States.
7. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1624
(2008).
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severe penalties.8 Germany’s 1990 Embryo Protection Act9 makes non-
medical sex selection a criminal act with a penalty of up to one year’s
imprisonment,10 and Victoria’s Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act
of 200811 makes non-medical sex selection a criminal offense for which
individuals may face up to two years’ imprisonment as penalty.12
There are a number of possible explanations as to why there has
been relatively little debate on this issue in the United States. The
rhetoric of “choice” supporting abortion rights may explain some of the
disparity between the United States and other countries, or at least
explain why feminists have not been at the forefront of the debate.13
It is also possible that the issue has simply been ignored under the
mistaken assumption that sex selection is not a pressing concern in
the United States.14 Demographic data, however, suggest otherwise.15
Politicians themselves may be reluctant to enter into the debate
because it is simply not politically advantageous to do so—these issues
are too politically divisive.16 Politicians are aware that they would
likely have to address the status of embryos, an area of political dis-
course that frequently leads to a stalemate, with both sides often
refusing to compromise their ideals, as has happened with the issue
of abortion rights.17
It is true that sex selection is more prevalent and presents a
greater threat in other parts of the world, particularly in Asian
countries such as China and India.18 Yet because these areas account
8. Edgar Dahl, Boy or Girl: Should Parents Be Allowed to Choose the Sex of Their
Children?, CARDIFF CTR. FOR ETHICS, LAW & SOC’Y, 1 (2005), http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk
/archives/publications/2005/dahlpaper.pdf.
9. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13,
1990, BGBL. I at 2746 (Ger.).
10. Id. § 3.
11. Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic.) (Austl.).
12. Id. c. 28.
13. See Mallika Kaur Sarkaria, Comment, Lessons From Punjab’s “Missing Girls”:
Toward a Global Feminist Perspective on “Choice” in Abortion, 97 CAL. L. REV. 905, 939
(2009) (“[T]he hard-won ‘right to choose’ has enough detractors without feminists them-
selves questioning its appropriateness . . . . The difficulty of applying ‘choice’ to sex-
selective abortions provides ammunition to anti-abortion activists in the United States.
Anti-abortion activists argue that sex selection is yet another ugly aspect of abortion.”).
14. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly
Third Committee: The Global War Against Baby Girls (Dec. 6, 2006), AM. ENTER. INST.
FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH, at 28 (noting that in the United States, although there is the
tendency to think that sex selection is not a major concern, there is real data showing
the contrary).
15. See id. at 27-28 (discussing the demographical trends in the United States towards
sex selection).
16. Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 321 (2008).
17. Id. at 322-23.
18. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9-12.
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for approximately forty percent of the world’s population,19 a response
by the United States is all the more necessary. Silence on this issue
sends a message of complicity to the world. It has become increasingly
important to address sex selection, because more and more couples
from other countries are coming to the United States for sex-selection
procedures to which they are denied at home.20 In fact, the United
States has been called “the ‘Wild West of reproductive technology.” 21
Sex selection is quickly becoming a multimillion-dollar industry in the
United States alone,22 an industry that must at least be acknowl-
edged, if not regulated, by government. There is also concern that if
fertility clinics continue to offer ethically questionable procedures
without any oversight, the public’s overall trust in the fertility field
may be threatened.23
In Part I, this Note will provide a brief explanation of the different
methods available for sex selection. Part II of this Note will provide a
thorough examination of demographic data concerning sex selection
and its effects, both globally and within the United States. Part III
will examine the underlying ethical issues raised by sex selection. Part
IV will look specifically at the feminist dilemma concerning reproduc-
tive rights and sex selection. Lastly, Part V will examine two potential
models for the United States: Canada24 and the United Kingdom,25
along with alternatives to governmental regulation. As for alternatives
to regulation, Part V will examine the possibility of using professional
19. Monica Sharma, Twenty-first Century Pink or Blue: How Sex Selection Technology
Facilitates Gendercide and What We Can Do About It, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 198, 200 (2008).
20. Baruch, supra note 3, at 267.
21. Sharma, supra note 19, at 206 (quoting Suzanne Leigh, Reproductive Tourism, USA
TODAY, May 2, 2005, at 7D). See also Garrison, supra note 7, at 1623.
22. Sharma, supra note 19, at 198.
23. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Pandora’s Progeny: Ethical Issues in Assisted Human
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 745, 771 (2005); Bratislav Stankovic, “It’s a Designer Baby!”:
Opinions On Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH.
3, ¶ 27 (2005).
24. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
25. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). Note that this Act has
been amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, which put into
statute the ban on non-medical sex selection that was previously in place only as a matter
of policy. The regulatory scheme outlined in the 1990 Act remains intact. Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.). See also Explanatory Notes to Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, ¶ 50 (Eng.) [hereinafter Explanatory Notes]
(“This provision enables sex selection not only for conditions which are clearly linked to sex
chromosomes . . . but also where there is a particular risk of gender-related conditions for
example . . . breast cancer where the mother . . . wishes to avoid passing this condition on
to a daughter.”). This is actually somewhat of a more lax standard for sex-selection
practices, as, previously, the more controversial use of sex selection for the prevention of
the birth of a daughter who was a carrier of an X-linked recessive gene was generally not
approved. Soini, supra note 3, at 314.
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societies that issue guidelines as a means to monitor, and ultimately
curb, sex-selection practices in the United States.26
This Note ultimately concludes that neither model would be a
good choice for the United States, due to the models’ various shortcom-
ings as implemented in those countries,27 and because they would be
ill-suited as a federal model for oversight and regulation in the United
States.28 Moreover, there are serious questions as to whether these
models of regulation could withstand constitutional scrutiny.29 There-
fore, while efforts must be made to address the issue of sex-selection
practices, federal regulation would be the least appropriate or desir-
able response.30 Relying instead on professional societies to issue
guidelines and standards, as well as to use extensive efforts to pro-
mote education and awareness, is the best possible option.
26. See Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing of Embryos: Practices and Perspectives
of U.S. IVF Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1053, 1057 (2008), available at http://www
.dnapolicy.org/resources/GeneticTestingofEmbryos.pdf (“A substantial majority of clinic
directors surveyed agree or strongly agree that professional societies are best suited to
create professional guidelines related to PGD and that they should do so.”).
27. See Amel Alghrani & Margaret Brazier, 16 MED. L. REV. 469, 471 (2008)  (reviewing
RUTH DEECH & ANNA SMAJDOR, FROM IVF TO IMMORTALITY: CONTROVERSY IN THE ERA OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2007)) (quoting the House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee calling the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s policy
development “highly unsatisfactory”); Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 97 (noting that the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act ultimately “is flawed in that it tries to cover too much
legislative ground”).
28. See Alison Harvison Young, Possible Policy Strategies for the United States:
Comparative Lessons, in REPROGENETICS: LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 226, 226 (Lori
P. Knowles & Gregory E. Kaebnick eds., 2007) (arguing that the “broad, national
regulatory framework like that provided by the British Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) or . . . the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, is unlikely to
be an effective or politically viable approach in the U.S. context”).
29. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 3.
30. See COLIN GAVAGHAN, DEFENDING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET: THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF SELECTING THE NEXT GENERATION 132 (2007) (noting that the prohibition by law
of sex selection is probably doing more harm than good to women in India). A logical
extension of this idea is that the same would be true of certain ethnic subgroups in the
United States, particularly the groups that demographers have demonstrated are the most
likely to use sex-selection practices. See Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 1 (setting forth the
idea that there is a “global war against baby girls”); Part II, infra (discussing sex-selection
figures); see also Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942 (“Rather than focusing on forcing women
to make the ‘right’ choice, cultural change campaigns should focus on expanding choices.
Rather than punishing women for making the ‘wrong’ choice of sex selection, they should
ensure that it is not the only choice for women.”). Again, although the article is speaking
out against governmental regulation or criminalization of sex selection in India, the same
principle should be emphasized with respect to ethnic groups in the United States. Finding
the balance between regulating sex selection and not punishing women for exercising their
“right to choose” is the task undertaken in this Note. It is important for the United States
to have a loud voice in what ultimately needs to be a global cultural discussion on sex-
selection practices for there to be for any real change.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SEX-SELECTION PRACTICES
Sex selection can be achieved in a number of ways. The focus of
this Note will be on the first two methods discussed, preimplantation
genetic diagnosis and sperm sorting, but it is important to bear in
mind all of the methods used for sex selection when considering the
significance of this issue and the appropriate responses to it.
A. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, involves egg extrac-
tion, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and the selection of embryos for trans-
fer back to the woman’s uterus.31 PGD was originally developed for use
by families that had known sex-linked genetic diseases in an effort to
screen embryos for the disease before transfer and implantation.32
Today, this technology is also being used for sex selection.33
In 2005, forty-two percent of IVF-PGD clinics reported providing
non-medical sex selections in PGD cycles.34 Forty-seven percent of
these same clinics stated that they “are willing to defer to parental
preferences and provide PGD for nonmedical sex selection under all
circumstances.” 35 Infertility patients have expressed a fairly strong
interest in preimplantation sex selection if there is no additional cost
to them.36 This technology is still relatively expensive. The American
Society for Reproductive Medicine stated that, in 2008, the average
cost of an IVF cycle in the United States was $12,400, while PGD cost
as much as $10,000 to $12,000 per cycle.37
Several European countries have reacted to the expansive use of
PGD, either through a total ban on the practice, or by limiting its use
to medical sex selection only.38 Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and
Austria have completely banned its use,39 while France, Greece, Hol-
land, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom have limited
its use to medical purposes only.40
31. Baruch, supra note 3, at 247.
32. Id. at 248.
33. Riley & Merrill, supra note 2, at 58.
34. Baruch et al., supra note 26, at 1056.
35. Id. at 1057.
36. See Sharma, supra note 19, at 199 (discussing a 2005 study that found that forty-
one percent of infertility patients would use preimplantation sex selection if there was no
additional cost for the procedure, and that half of that group would still use sex selection
even though it had to pay).
37. Baruch, supra note 3, at 251.
38. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 50.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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B. Sperm Sorting
MicroSort,41 or sperm sorting,42 is the newest development in
sex-selection technology.43 It is both a less costly and less intrusive
alternative to PGD.44 Used before conception, MicroSort is a tech-
nique that separates sperm that is likely to produce boys from that
which is likely to produce girls.45 Intrauterine insemination (IUI) is
then used to insert the sperm likely to create the desired sex.46 Al-
though MicroSort is more affordable than PGD,47 MicroSort’s proba-
bility of conceiving a child of the desired sex is lower: ninety-two
percent of parents who requested a female baby ended up with a
female baby, and eighty-one percent of parents who requested a male
baby ended up with a male baby,48 compared to the near-perfect
success rate of PGD.49 Like PGD, the primary medical purpose of
sperm sorting is to allow couples with a known risk of a sex-linked
genetic disease or disorder to select the sex of their child to avoid
passing on the sex-linked trait.50
Although some commentators consider the ethical or moral issues
to be the same for PGD and sperm sorting, others are far less comfort-
able with the use of PGD for sex selection.51 For example, commenta-
tors recognize that while one technique, sperm sorting, merely in-
creases the likelihood of a certain sex, the other, PGD, is nearly 100
percent effective.52 In addition, Jeffery Kahn, the Director of the
Center for Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, argues that
“ ‘[s]orting sperm is one thing–it’s quite another to create and test
embryos before they are implanted in a woman’s womb and discard
those of the ‘wrong’ gender, at least for many professionals and
41. Dahl, supra note 8, at 1. This procedure is sometimes referred to as flow cytometric
sperm separation. Id. at 2.
42. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1639. For a more thorough discussion of the science of the
sperm sorting process, see Ethics Comm. Of the Am. Soc’y of Reproductive Med., 
Preconception Gender Selection for Nonmedical Reasons, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 861, 861
(2001) [hereinafter Ethics Comm.].
43. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
44. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861.
45. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
46. Id.
47. Dahl, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that each attempt to artificially inseminate the
woman costs approximately 1,250 British pounds); Garrison, supra note 7, at 1639.
48. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
49. Jason Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 12, ¶ 18 (2002).
50. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
51. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 18.
52. Id.
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members of the public.’ ” 53 Sperm sorting thus remains a particu-
larly controversial method of sex selection.
C. Selective Termination of Pregnancies Based on Sex and
Infanticide
There are methods that are even more controversial for selecting
sex. Parents may also have the option of selectively terminating a
pregnancy once the sex of the fetus is known, a practice that is wide-
spread in China (and other Asian countries) and India, in particular.54
Although such practices have already revealed that female fetuses are
the target of selective abortions in these countries, sociological polling
on birth-order preference suggests that because a son is universally
preferred to a daughter as a first child, female fetuses are those most
likely to be the targets in any location.55
Scholar Nicholas Eberstadt, in an address before the United
Nations in 2006, reported the startling statistic that, “[a]t the very
minimum, half of all second-order (or higher) female pregnancies in
China are terminated on a gender-selective basis.” 56 Additionally,
infanticide, or the killing of the child after birth,57 is still practiced if
the child is not of the desired sex, and is most common in South Asia
and India.58 This practice almost exclusively results in the death of
female babies.59 One study reported that out of 8,000 abortions per-
formed in India, 7,999 were on female fetuses.60 Shockingly, female
infanticide has only been outlawed in India since 1996.61 Yet, clearly,
the practice is still widespread.62
II. FIGURES AND DATA IN THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBALLY
Demographers have reported some startling figures that reveal a
disturbing trend toward sex selection in the pursuit of male children
53. Id. (quoting Jeffery P. Kahn, The Questionable Future of Unregulated Reproduction,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/02/18/ethics.matters/index.html).
54. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9-12.
55. Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the Boomerang Effect of a Woman’s
Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 91, 93 (1997).
56. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 7. See also Sheila A.M. McLean, Sex Selection:
Intergenerational Justice or Injustice?, 24 MED. & L. 761, 766 (2005) (discussing China’s
“notorious one child policy” that leads to the abortion of female fetuses and the infanticide
of female children).
57. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 14.
58. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9, 23.
59. Id.; Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
60. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 15.
61. Id. ¶ 14.
62. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 23.
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across the globe.63 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has
reported that forty-three million females are missing from India’s
population.64 In 2001, the city of Punjab’s male-to-female ratio was 127
boys for every 100 girls.65 Economist Amartya Sen has similarly esti-
mated that around fifty million women are missing from Chinese
population figures.66 Demographic reports from South Korea, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan, and from Chinese ethnic groups in Singapore, also
reflect equally disturbing male-to-female ratios.67 Data have also re-
vealed alarming sex ratios in many other parts of the world, including
countries in Latin America and Europe.68
It is clear that, on a global scale, sex selection is having a pro-
found effect on populations–namely on the male-to-female ratio.69 Yet
proponents of “choice” in sex selection tend to dismiss the claims about
unbalanced sex ratios because they do not believe the imbalance is of
real concern in the United States or other Western societies.70
Nevertheless, the numbers in the United States reveal that we,
too, are not immune to this trend, particularly within certain ethnic
subgroups.71 Chinese-American, Japanese-American, Filipino-Ameri-
can, and other Asian-American populations exhibit the most disquiet-
ing sex ratios at birth.72 Most alarming of these is the Japanese-
American ratio, which rose from 99.7 boys to every 100 girls in 1975
to 108.9 boys to every 100 girls in 2002.73 Thus, as some commentators
have observed, allowing sex selection could introduce into American
society inequality along ethnic lines, as well as along gender lines.74
It is important to bear in mind the prevalence of sex-selection
practices globally and domestically, as well as the potential effect of
63. Id. at 9, 23; Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
64. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200 (noting also that even the Indian government, in its
2001 census, reported the odd figure of only 927 girl babies for every 1,000 boy babies).
65. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 13. This creates “the biologically impossible sex ratio
of 110 to 100.” Id.
66. Sharma, supra note 19, at 200.
67. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 9.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See Dahl, supra note 8, at 3-4 (“[A] readily available service for preconception sex
selection . . . is highly unlikely to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes in Western
societies.”); McLean, supra note 56, at 767 (“[E]vidence suggests that the spectre of 
demographic disaster is in fact a red herring.”).
71. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 27.
72. Id. Further, “the odds against seeing the[se statistics] reported by Asian-American
communities as an artifact of pure chance would rise into the tens of billions.” Id. at 28. See
also Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26 (noting that ethnic groups composed of immigrants from
the Asian subcontinent and China “are on the rise,” and that they “have a tradition of
overwhelmingly favoring male offspring”).
73. Eberstadt, supra note 14, at 27.
74. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26.
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these practices on demographics, when considering sex-selection reg-
ulation or alternatives to regulation. The issue has been too long
ignored in the United States, perhaps because there is little recogni-
tion of the startling data concerning population imbalances and the
aborting of female fetuses and killing of female babies.
III. BEYOND DEMOGRAPHICS: THE ETHICS OF SEX SELECTION
Although demographic data may alone suffice in demonstrating
that sex selection needs to be addressed, the number of pressing moral
and ethical concerns in the sex-selection debate present compelling
arguments that the issue needs to be addressed now. Commentators
on both sides of the issue, and particularly those against sex selection,
speak about sex selection in heated tones. Some feminist commenta-
tors go so far as to claim that sex-selection technology “could mean the
death of the female.” 75 Several commentators have termed the word
“gendercide” to describe the disproportionate effect of sex-selection
technology on women.76 Those who do not condemn sex-selection prac-
tices emphasize the importance of reproductive autonomy and ques-
tion whether the arguments advanced against sex selection are of
sufficient weight to justify limiting reproductive autonomy.77 Indeed,
as philosopher Mary Anne Warren has stated, “the value of freedom
‘cannot easily be overridden by the mere possibility of harmful ef-
fects—even rather significant ones.’ ” 78 Proponents of this position
point to the fact that although law, social practice, and ethics do not
necessarily view procreative liberty as absolute, individuals are ordi-
narily given substantial latitude in reproductive matters.79
There is also the important argument that in any pluralistic
society there are always irreconcilable differences on certain moral or
ethical issues, and that, in those cases, there ought to be a “presump-
tion in favor of liberty.” 80 Professor Julian Savulescu makes the
point: “‘[i]t is easy to grant people the freedom to do what is agreeable
to us . . . [but] freedom is important only when it is the freedom for
75. Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of ‘Choice’
in Sex Preselection, in MAN-MADE WOMEN: HOW NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
AFFECT WOMEN 74, 75 (Gena Corea et al. eds., 1987).
76. Sharma, supra note 19, at 199.
77. GAVAGHAN, supra note 30, at 128. See Stephen Wilkinson, Sexism, Sex Selection and
‘Family Balancing,’ 16 MED. L. REV. 369, 370 (2008) (discussing the view of some that
preserving the “‘free market’” in sex selection trumps concerns about “the wrongness of
‘playing [G]od’”).
78. McLean, supra note 56, at 769 (citation omitted).
79. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
80. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
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people to do what is disagreeable to others.’ ” 81 Coupled with this idea
are the principles that “[e]ach citizen should have the right to live his
life as he chooses so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of
others,” 82 and that “[t]he state may interfere with the free choices
of its citizens only to prevent serious harm to others.” 83 While these
may be valid assertions, many of the opponents to sex selection claim
that the more compelling argument is that “[s]election somehow vio-
lates the child’s ‘right to an open future,’ ” 84 so these “free choices”
do, in reality, cause serious harm to others.85 Opponents of sex
selection, therefore, argue that the state does have a legitimate right
to intervene.86
A. “Family Balancing” Through Sex Selection
Perhaps the most defensible use of sex selection for non-medical
reasons is for so-called “family balancing.”87 Parents may have a legiti-
mate interest in “evening things up [by] reducing or eliminating the
sex differential” within the family.88 There is some fairly persuasive
evidence that in Western nations, couples with two boys or two girls
are more likely to have a third child than families with only one child
of each, leading to, perhaps, a fair conclusion: parents who do not have
children of both sexes are attempting to “balance” their family with a
third child of the “missing” gender.89 This assertion is supported by
data collected from the Gender Clinic in Fairfax, Virginia showing
that more than ninety percent of couples who are seeking sex selection
for non-medical reasons are parents who already have two or more
children of the same sex and are attempting to have a child of the
opposite sex.90
“Family balancing,” then, may be more defensible than other non-
medical forms of sex selection because it is presumably less likely to
be a sexist process continually favoring males over females, which is
one of the primary concerns voiced by opponents of sex selection.91 The
argument is that, in “family balancing,” the focus is on achieving
81. McLean, supra note 56, at 769 (citation omitted).
82. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
83. Id.
84. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 374 (citation omitted).
85. See Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862 (noting several of the potential harms of
sex selection to children and society in general, including increased marital conflict).
86. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1640.
87. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 371.
88. Id.
89. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 370-71.
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gender balance, rather than on having a child of a particular sex, so it
may be less likely that there are sexist motives at play.92 This argu-
ment is not particularly strong, though, as the “balance” desired by the
parents may have more to do with traits or assumptions about a par-
ticular sex, such as wanting children who are aggressive and who
have “sporting prowess,” 93 than with the actual biological sex.94 In that
case, parents are engaging in sexist stereotyping just as much as any
other parents using sex-selection methods for non-medical reasons.95
Thus, although motivations for sex selection “may vary, by definition
there are no non-sexist reasons for sex selection except in cases of pre-
venting sex-linked diseases.” 96
B. Ethical Considerations of Sex Selection and the Bounds of Re-
productive Choice
A number of the most significant ethical concerns of sex selection
were addressed in the American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s
2001 Ethics Committee Report, including: “the potential for inherent
gender discrimination, inappropriate control over nonessential charac-
teristics of children, unnecessary medical burdens and costs for par-
ents, and inappropriate and potentially unfair use of limited medical
resources.” 97 Other concerns include “psychological harm to sex-se-
lected offspring . . . and reinforcement of gender bias in society as a
whole.” 98 There also exists the oft-cited “playing God” concern99 and
the question about whether such meddling is “unnatural.” 100 Each of
these objections deserves attention.
C. Inherent Gender Discrimination
The argument for inherent gender discrimination in sex selection
is relatively clear: parents will select sex based on certain assumptions
about appropriate or expected gender behaviors, thus inevitably
92. Id. at 384. See also McLean, supra note 56, at 765 (noting that “Dickens has argued
that ‘[p]rohibitions are unnecessary and oppressive where there is no sex bias but only a
wish to balance a family with children of both sexes. . . .’ ” (quoting B.M. Dickens, Can Sex
Selection be Ethically Tolerated?, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 335, 336 (2002))).
93. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 388.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 26.
97. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Dahl, supra note 8, at 2.
100. Id.
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fostering discriminatory gender stereotypes.101 Underlying sex-selec-
tion decisions is the idea that “one sex is superior to, or more appropri-
ately suited for certain social tasks.” 102 Coupled with this idea is the
argument that the psychological well-being of the sex-selected child
will be at stake, as the child will likely “be expected to act in certain
gender-specific ways when the technique succeeds and who may
disappoint parents when it fails.” 103 There is also always the possi-
bility that a “misdiagnosis” will lead to the birth of a child of the
“undesired sex,” in which case the child might then suffer due to
“parental disappointment.” 104
Professor Rosamund Scott challenges the claim that sex-selection
practices are not discriminatory, even in nations that “show ‘no signifi-
cant overall preference for one sex over the other.’ ” 105 She argues that
even though there may not be an overall preference for one sex in a
given society, individuals certainly do have preferences.106 To dem-
onstrate her point, she contrasts a society in which there is no
racism with a society in which fifty percent of the population dis-
criminates against black people and fifty percent discriminates
against white people, concluding that the former society is the
better society in which to live, even though the ratios in the latter
society are ultimately even.107
She then asks and answers in the affirmative whether prefer-
ence for one sex over the other is the same type of discrimination
and raises the additional point that society may, in fact, be condon-
ing inherent gender discrimination by allowing non-medical sex
selection.108 This is the exact concern expressed by those opposing
non-medical sex selection.
D. Inappropriate Control of Nonessential Characteristics of
Children
Opponents also note that the inappropriate control of nonessential
characteristics of children is another ethical concern.109 “Essential
characteristics,” although not a particularly well-defined term, seems
101. Maneesha Deckha, (Not) Reproducing the Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other:
A Feminist Response to Canada’s Partial Ban on Sex Selection, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
15-17 (2007); Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 385, 388.
102. Wilkinson, supra note 77, at 385.
103. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
104. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 38.
105. ROSAMUND SCOTT, CHOOSING BETWEEN POSSIBLE LIVES: LAW AND ETHICS OF
PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS 320 (2007) (citation omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 320-21.
109. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 861-62.
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to be limited in scope to traits connected to “clinical expressions of dis-
ability or disadvantage.” 110 This includes selecting sex to avoid sex-
linked diseases, which seems to be generally accepted.111
The World Health Organization (WHO) has a broader definition
of “health,” which includes an affirmative right to both mental and
social well-being, rather than just a right to the absence of disease or
disability.112 Some have invoked this definition to argue that the realm
of “essential” characteristics should perhaps be expanded to traits that
could affect the child’s mental and social “non-clinical” health as
well.113 The extension of “essential” characteristics would be problem-
atic, though, for those who question the use of genetic screening even
for genetic disorders because they fear that allowing screening and
testing of fetuses for sex-linked diseases could lead to unfair discrimi-
nation against people with disorders.114 Their primary concerns are
that the dignity and human value of people with disorders will be
questioned,115 and that terminating fetuses with these disorders will
“send[] a message that a life with the disability is not worth living at
all.” 116 In response to this point, some commentators call attention to
the important distinction between the actual disability and people
with disabilities, noting that while “[s]election reduces the prevalence
of the former, [it] is silent with respect to the value of the latter.” 117
E. Limited and Scarce Medical Resources for Nonessential
Purposes
Tied to the argument against control over nonessential character-
istics of children is the idea that sex-selection practices would deplete




114. Soini, supra note 3, at 316.
115. Deckha, supra note 101, at 16; Soini, supra note 3, at 316. Soini includes several dif-
ferent views regarding this argument. For example, Soini contrasts the idea that select-
ing an embryo for its desired health involves a valorization of human nature and  the life
worth living with the WHO’s statement that ultimately “ ‘knowledge-based, goal-oriented
individual or family choices to have a healthy baby do not constitute eugenics . . . .
Eugenics is directed against whole populations, whereas the work of today’s clinical
geneticists is directed towards individuals and families.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
116. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 13. See also Deckha, supra note 101, at 16 (describing how
sex-selection practices “send a discriminatory and demoralizing message to persons already
living with disabilities that it would have been better for all concerned had they not been
born”).
117. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 13. (emphasizing that “ ‘it would be a drastic step in favor
of equality to inflict a higher risk of having a child with a disability on a couple . . . to
promote social equality. . . . To attempt to prevent accidents which cause paraplegia is not
to say that paraplegics are less deserving of respect’ ” (quoting Julian Savulescu, Procreative
Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 423 (2001))).
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valuable and already scarce medical resources for nonessential medi-
cal purposes.118 The obvious counter-argument is that, as a free soci-
ety, we already allow for many nonessential medical procedures.119
Cosmetic surgeries, such as face-lifts and liposuction, are clear exam-
ples.120 Thus, even if these sex-selection practices were to have some
aggregate downward effect on scarce medical resources, in a society
that accepts non-medical cosmetic surgeries, “one could not, without
calling [the entire] system into question, condemn a practice merely
because it uses medicine for lifestyle or child-rearing choices.” 121
F. Concerns about the “Slippery Slope” and the Creation of
“Designer Babies”
Opponents of sex selection also invoke the “slippery slope” argu-
ment: allowing parents to select for the sex of their children will open
the door to so-called “designer babies,” so that parents will be able to
select several of the nonessential characteristics of their children, such
as hair or eye color.122 There is a general concern that allowing for sex
selection or any other “designer” options may “turn[] the process of
having child [sic] into a consumer experience, giving it a measurable,
commodified value.” 123 Some believe that an inevitable consequence of
this “consumer experience” will be the substantial and inappropriate
emphasis placed on a child’s genetic make-up, rather than on the
child’s “inherent worth.” 124
Professor Dahl disagrees, ultimately concluding that the creation
of “designer babies” is an unfounded concern.125 He states that the
arguments against sex selection are not actually against sex selection,
but rather, “against its alleged consequences.” 126 He also argues that
“[i]t is perfectly possible to draw a legal line permitting some forms of
selection and prohibiting others.” 127 Finally, he concludes that he does
not envision devastating social effects resulting from this sort of par-
ental control: if “some parents [are] foolish enough to spend their
hard-earned money on genetic technologies just to ensure their child
118. Roberts, supra note 49, ¶ 16; Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862.
119. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3; Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 863.
120. Dahl, supra note 8, at 3.
121. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 863.
122. Dahl, supra note 8, at 4.
123. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 34.
124. Ethics Comm., supra note 42, at 862. There is also a strong argument that an
increase in genetic testing in reproductive matters could lead to an entirely new under-
standing of parenthood, wherein genetic ties are emphasized over other forms of familial
relationships. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 38.
125. Dahl, supra note 8, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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will be born with big brown eyes and black curly hair. . . . I cannot
see that this would herald the end of civilization as we know it.” 128
IV. THE FEMINIST DILEMMA
Feminists unquestionably face a dilemma when confronted with
sex-selection practices. Abortion and reproductive rights are arguably
at the core of feminism and women’s rights.129 Yet sex-selection prac-
tices, which can be perceived as merely an extension of reproductive
rights, simultaneously implicate a number of additional significant
gender and feminist issues.130 As discussed above, women are dispro-
portionately the targets of sex selection, and there is a significant
argument that sex selection leads to the furtherance of gender stereo-
types and inherent gender discrimination.131 As one commentator has
noted, “[t]he conflict between preserving reproductive autonomy and
ending gendercide is, of course, quite problematic. Resolution of the
issue will require intensive effort and political acumen.”132 It is of the
utmost importance, then, that the feminist voice and, more generally,
the female voice, contributes to the discussion.
A. The Rhetoric of “Choice” and the Western Liberal Conception of
Reproductive Rights
One of the dilemmas underlying the feminist position in the
United States with respect to sex selection is the rhetoric of “choice”
surrounding abortion and reproductive rights.133 Since Roe v. Wade134–
the case in which the Supreme Court first recognized a woman’s right
to not be denied an abortion (during the first two trimesters of her
pregnancy)135–the emphasis has been on the fact that it is the woman’s
choice to control her pregnancy.136 The term “pro-choice” is now en-
trenched in the feminist vernacular: feminists and women who sup-
port abortion rights identify themselves as “pro-choice.” 137
This rhetoric of “choice” has pervaded all reproductive areas, in-
cluding sex-selection practices, to the detriment of feminists and
128. Id. at 4-5.
129. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 905.
130. See supra Parts II, III (discussing sex selection’s disparate impact on females and
promotion of inherent gender discrimination).
131. Id.
132. Sharma, supra note 19, at 204.
133. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 907-08.
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Id. at 164; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 937.
136. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 937.
137. Id.
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women who might otherwise speak out against sex selection.138 As one
commentator notes, applying the “choice” paradigm to sex selection
creates a potential double standard: some reproductive choices given
to women, such as aborting a fetus for reasons other than sex selec-
tion, are acceptable, yet other reproductive choices, such as aborting
a fetus as a means of sex selection, are not acceptable.139
The feminist emphasis on personal autonomy and reproductive
choice has manifested itself in interesting ways. The 1985 Wertz study
revealed that female doctors may actually be substantially more
comfortable performing sex-selection procedures than male doctors.140
The study showed that “ ‘U.S. women [doctors] were twice as likely as
men to say that they would perform sex selection, usually out of re-
spect for patient autonomy.’ ”141 Women are understandably hesitant
to undermine the “hard-won ‘right to choose’ ” and the procurement
of reproductive autonomy in the wake of sex-selection choices.142 In
fact, they may be the strongest advocates of providing such autono-
mous choices.143
Several commentators discuss the problem with framing repro-
ductive rights as choice-based and suggest that perhaps there is an
alternate approach that would be less problematic to feminists and
women in general.144 These commentators agree that “choice” is often
a delusion, especially in non-Western societies, but also in developed,
liberal societies.145 For example, the reproductive justice movement
acknowledges that many women do not have real “choice” due to
racial, economic, physical or social constraints.146 Even women in lib-
eral societies may also feel these same pressures, including pressure
from male partners to engage in sex selection.147
The “choice” paradigm, then, is somewhat misleading, in that sex-
selection “choices” are often “less an expression of a woman’s individ-
ual ‘choice’ for what is best for herself and more her response to the
pressures created by” society.148 Interestingly, even in the wake of a
recognition of reproductive rights such as abortion, there was initial
feminist opposition to the practice, based on the idea that abortion did
138. Id. at 939 (“ ‘What was once hailed as the choice that would free all women has come
to shackle the future of women as a gender.’ ” (quoting Kohm, supra note 55, at 96)).
139. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940.
140. Kohm, supra note 55, at 111.
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 939.
143. Id.
144. Kohm, supra note 55, at 125.
145. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940-41.
146. Id. at 940.
147. Kohm, supra note 55, at 116.
148. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 941.
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not actually empower women, but, in fact, relinquished male respon-
sibility for pregnancy.149 The issue of “choice” within reproductive
autonomy has clearly never been a simple expression of a woman’s
autonomy in the sex-selection context,150 and so should not be treated
as such.
Some commentators believe that feminists, and women as a
whole, must work outside the paradigm of “choice” and individual
autonomy to create a position that works to the benefit of women
collectively.151 Expanding on this point, one commentator recalls the
philosophy of David Hume: “[p]ersonal liberty cannot be secured in sol-
itary subsistence, but only through a strong connection with a society
that respects and mutually protects that liberty.” 152 Noted feminist
Catherine MacKinnon has similarly “proclaim[ed] that feminist juris-
prudence is the analysis of law from the perspective of all women. All
women, if truly meant to be all inclusive, ought to mean all women
living, dead, and yet to live . . . .” 153 Feminists must, therefore, begin
to take into account the disparate impact sex selection has had, and,
undoubtedly, will continue to have, on the female population.
B. A New Feminist Perspective Not Based on a Binary “Choice”
Framework
Borrowing from MacKinnon’s view, perhaps the best possible
approach for both feminists and women more generally is a view that
does not focus on a binary right-or-wrong understanding of choice.154
The focus of the feminist contribution to the sex-selection debate
should not be on creating a regulatory structure that punishes women
for making the “wrong” choices.155 Instead, it should facilitate a greater
understanding of the significance of these choices and ensure that sex
selection is not the only option for women, particularly in cultures and
societies where the practice is widespread.156 One feminist commenta-
tor explains this approach best:
A woman pregnant with a female fetus does not respond to punish-
ment for her desire to have a son instead of a daughter, but might
149. Kohm, supra note 55, at 116.
150. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 940.
151. See id. at 940-41 (“The global feminist approach . . . stems from the belief that the
practical and philosophical difficulties that result from [using] . . . a rights-based frame
of reference can be overcome only by accepting that rights are discursively constituted.”).
152. Kohm, supra note 55, at 102.
153. Id.
154. Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
155. Deckha, supra note 101, at 37; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
156. Deckha, supra note 101, at 37-38; Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 942.
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be encouraged to choose life for her daughter if she were given the
moral framework for valuing baby girls as much as she values
baby boys.157
V. REGULATORY OPTIONS AND NON-REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE UNITED STATES
A. Canada and the United Kingdom: Potential Models for the
United States?
Canada and the United Kingdom have responded to the growth
of sex-selection practices through legislative regulatory measures.158
Both countries’ measures offer a potential model for the United States,
and yet, both models ultimately fall short. Non-regulatory options,
such as the promulgation of professional guidelines and increased
emphasis on expanding choices for women and promoting education
and moral values, appear to be the best answers to the difficult ques-
tions that sex-selection practices present.159 Furthermore, professional
societies present less of a threat of limiting individuals’ personal liber-
ty, which is a concern of many who oppose sex-selection regulation.160
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act161 and the United
Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act162 both create a
national ban on sex-selection practices for non-medical reasons.163 The
Assisted Human Reproduction Act bans “any procedure . . . that would
ensure or increase the probability that an embryo will be of a particu-
lar sex, or that would identify the sex of an in vitro embryo, except to
prevent, diagnose or treat a sex-linked disorder or disease.” 164
England’s legislation had a similarly narrow allowance for sex se-
lection in 1990, but, in 2008, the scope was expanded to include “sex
selection not only for conditions which are clearly linked to sex
157. Kohm, supra note 55, at 118.
158. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.); Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.).
159. Not only is this choice best in a liberal society that values individual freedom, it also
works in conjunction with the feminist concerns discussed in Part IV.
160. See Dahl, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the importance of the “presumption of
liberty” in the political discourse of free societies when weighing reproductive rights).
161. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
162. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). Note that this Act has
been amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, which puts into
statute the ban on non-medical sex selection that was supported by the HFEA’s Code of
Practice. Isabel Karpin & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Going out on a Limb: Prosthetics, Normalcy
and Disputing the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction, 16 MED. L. REV. 413, 434-36 (2008).
163. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 § 5(e) (Can.); Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (Eng.).
164. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2  § 5(e) (Can.).
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chromosomes . . . but also where there is a particular risk of gender-re-
lated conditions for example . . . breast cancer where the mother . . .
wishes to avoid passing this condition on to a daughter.” 165 The Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) issues licenses
for PGD, and does so on a case-by-case basis under these guidelines.166
As with any case-by-case decision-making process, the HFEA’s discre-
tionary method inserts a high degree of uncertainty into the reproduc-
tive-technology field. Bright line rules promulgated through either a
bureaucratic regulatory agency or professional societies would at least
provide greater legal clarity for parties interested in sex selection.
Commentators have found numerous flaws in both Canada’s and
the United Kingdom’s attempts to address the questions presented by
sex-selection practices and other reproductive technologies.167 The
Assisted Human Reproduction Act is criticized for “lag[ging] well
behind reproductive technology,” 168 as the Act was passed in response
to data contained in a report from the late 1980s.169 Others have voiced
concern that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act–and the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act for the same reason–is flawed in
that it does not prevent a woman who becomes pregnant naturally
or through artificial insemination from finding out the sex of the
fetus and then aborting the fetus if it is not the desired sex.170 They
claim, therefore, that the regulations only achieve a partial ban on
sex selection.171
Britain’s House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
has criticized the Act, stating that the HEFA’s policy development was
“highly unsatisfactory,” 172 and acknowledging that a number of aca-
demics believe that “the HEFA’s ‘conditions were arbitrary and
ethically muddled, and that overall the regulation . . . in the UK lacks
coherence and consistency.’ ” 173
Perhaps the greatest problem with bureaucratic regulation of new
technologies like the various sex-selection techniques is the inability
of such entities to respond to future changes in the technology174 or to
165. Explanatory Notes, supra note 25, ¶ 50.
166. Aaron R. Fahrenkrog, Note, A Comparison of International Regulation of Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis and a Regulatory Suggestion for the United States, 15
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757, 769 (2006).
167. E.g., Deckha, supra note 101, at 7; Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128-31.
168. Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128.
169. Id.
170. Deckha, supra note 101, at 7.
171. Id.
172. Alghrani & Brazier, supra note 27, at 471.
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 128 (arguing that this is one of the biggest prob-
lems with Canada’s Act).
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properly define terms used in the regulations.175 In its consultation
document, the Health Canada Assisted Reproduction Office uses the
“serious condition” standard to limit the use of sex-selection PGD, but
acknowledges that it is a difficult term to define.176 This inability to
define terms or create any bright line regulation, like the HFEA’s case-
by-case decision-making process, suffuses uncertainty into the repro-
ductive-technology field.
Further, the Brave New World report notes that patient “access
to PGD in Canada ‘is currently controlled by the medical profession,’ ”
where clinicians define for themselves what constitutes a “serious con-
dition.” 177 If this assessment is correct, then the bureaucratic regula-
tions may, in fact, be less far-reaching and effective than oversight by
professional societies. Professional societies would at least be com-
posed of members of the medical field who have the expertise and the
ability to promulgate more straightforward guidelines. Overall, with
several of these technologies being so new, any “attempts to draft regu-
latory guidelines may suffer from ambiguous or uncertain language.
[Yet d]espite the potential difficulty of interpreting words such as
‘serious,’ it and other similarly ambiguous words are commonly used
in regulatory guidelines . . . .” 178 As such, guidelines promulgated by
professional societies may be the better option for regulating sex-
selection practices.
B. Constitutional Considerations
Although these reasons alone may be enough to make Americans
wary of adopting a similar regulatory structure, there are also a num-
ber of constitutional issues surrounding any potential sex-selection
regulation adopted within the United States. There is certainly a
strong argument that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion,179 which has been held to include a right of privacy,180 encom-
passes the right to make all reproductive decisions, including those
regarding sex selection, free from government intrusion.181 Commenta-
tors have argued that making sex selection illegal could be seen as an
175. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 769; Karpin & Mykitiuk, supra note 162, at 431.
176. Karpin & Mykitiuk, supra note 162, at 431.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 769.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
180. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives and aiding or abetting the use of contraceptives). The
Court described the protected interest in obtaining contraception as a “right of privacy.” Id.
at 486.
181. King, supra note 16, at 326. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking
down a Texas law banning abortion).
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invasion of privacy and a restriction of fundamental liberties.182
Furthermore, important Supreme Court decisions like Lawrence v.
Texas183 show that these commentators are perhaps correct in ac-
knowledging a “judicially recognized preeminence of personal auton-
omy” and an end of “morals legislation.” 184
To this point, leading voice on reproductive rights and liberty,
Professor John Robertson has argued that “procreative liberty extends
[even] to prebirth sex selection.” 185 Robertson claims that any decision
“ ‘centrally connected with reproductive choice’ ” should be within “the
sphere of protected procreative liberties.”186 Robertson also argues that
“ ‘[o]nly substantial harm to tangible interests of others should . . .
justify restriction.’ ” 187
Supporters of Robertson’s position argue that in a democratic
society there exists “a presumption in favor of liberty, including rights
to privacy and to procreative autonomy.” 188 A narrowly-tailored gov-
ernment regulation for which there is a “legitimate and significant
state interest” 189 might pass constitutional muster, and it is very likely
that any such regulation will face constitutional challenges, perhaps,
first and foremost, from women who see any attempt to regulate as an
abridgment of their reproductive rights and a threat to their reproduc-
tive autonomy. For feminists concerned about a state-authorized ero-
sion of abortion rights, then, professional societies may be the most
acceptable means of addressing sex selection.190
C. Professional Societies: The Best Option for the United States
Non-regulation in the form of guidance from or action by profes-
sional societies is perhaps the best option for the United States at this
time. In the first place, adding another layer of regulation might be
unwise because sex selection involves areas that already are engrossed
in a “complex web of regulation[],” namely genetic testing and assisted
182. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 9.
183. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
184. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 57. Although not directly pertaining to reproductive
choices, the case does support the argument that the notion that “[m]oral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause,”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring), may have application in the sex-
selection context.
185. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1625-26.
186. King, supra note 16, at 327.
187. Garrison, supra note 7, at 1625 (quoting JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 39, 41 (1994)).
188. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 20.
189. King, supra note 16, at 326-27.
190. See Sarkaria, supra note 13, at 939 (discussing the fact that the call for government
regulation of sex-selection practices would only provide fuel for anti-abortion activists).
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reproduction.191 Furthermore, no entity currently collects or is able to
provide comprehensive data about the use of these technologies within
the United States.192 Therefore, the first step should perhaps be col-
lecting data on the status of sex-selection practices within the United
States, which would provide a more complete picture when attempting
to define the interest in regulation of the industry.
Some commentators argue that “[t]he medical profession is far
better situated to self-regulate health practices, including the morally
debatable ones,” and that the government’s role should be limited to
“influenc[ing] and encourag[ing] the appropriate professional societies
to take action.” 193 Ninety-five percent of clinic directors surveyed in
2006 obviously agree, at least in the case of the use of PGD.194 It is also
significant that eighty-five percent of clinic directors recognize that the
current industry ought to have more professional guidelines regarding
PGD.195 These statistics indicate the willingness of clinics to adhere to
professional guidelines without the need for a bureaucratic regulatory
and penal structure.
Medical and professional societies such as the American Society
of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology (SART) could offer educational services and de-
velop regulatory guidelines for practice.196 Certainly the flexibility of
regulation through professional societies is hugely advantageous,
given the rapidly changing nature of the technologies.197 Although
professional societies do not have the power to criminally prosecute
members for non-compliance, the power to revoke a clinic’s member-
ship might be a powerful incentive for members to comply.198
Similarly, the educational services component of the professional
societies ought not to be dismissed, as creating a greater understand-
ing of the consequences of sex selection might make clinics a lot less
likely to offer or engage in such practices. Furthermore, expanding
knowledge and education for women should be a primary objective of
professional societies so that women have a framework for evaluating
their decisions and assessing their priorities.199 Ultimately there is a
191. Deckha, supra note 101, at 36-37.
192. Baruch, supra note 3, at 252.
193. Stankovic, supra note 23, ¶ 55.
194. Baruch, supra note 26, at 1057. “Ninety-five percent of clinic directors agree or
strongly agree that professional societies are best suited to create standards and guide-
lines relating to PGD.” Id.
195. Id.
196. King, supra note 16, at 324.
197. Fahrenkrog, supra note 166, at 778. This particular author, however, does not think
this argument carries much weight. Id.
198. King, supra note 16, at 325.
199. See discussion supra Part IV (highlighting the conflict between preserving
“choice” and ending gendercide). This is an important objective from the feminist
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strong argument that professional societies, through a combination of
their expertise, flexibility, and ability to respond to rapidly changing
technologies, are capable of “more nuanced oversight” than is possible
through legislative regulation.200
CONCLUSION
With the advent of technologies capable of profoundly expanding
reproductive options and changing the very concept of reproduction
itself, it is imperative that the United States–“the ‘Wild West’ of repro-
ductive technology”–recognize its responsibility to provide leadership
in this field, both at home and abroad. The disquieting silence over the
issue of sex-selection practices must come to an end.
“Qui tacet consentit:” America’s silence sends a message of com-
plicity to the rest of the world. Most Americans would rightly be ap-
palled if the experience of bringing a child into the world were reduced
to a “consumer transaction,” with the child turned into a mere “com-
modity” through the use of sex-selection technology. Once a culture of
commodification is established, it will become ingrained in American
society, and resistance to it will begin to break down.
This relative silence over sex-selection practices in the United
States has come about for several reasons: an ignorance within the
general public of the realities of the practices; a reluctance on the part
of politicians to enter the debate in the political arena; and an unwill-
ingness among women, the group that suffers the most harm from
such practices, to speak out against sex selection for fear of losing
hard-won reproductive rights.
If the silence is not broken, the “Wild West” approach in which
sex-selection practices are virtually unregulated will yield grim re-
sults. The consequences of inaction are undeniable. Demographic data
clearly reveal the dangers of sex-selection practices; a resulting imbal-
ance of the male-to-female sex ratio is very much a reality. The first
step toward preventing this outcome is to acknowledge the frightening
realities of sex selection which threaten our world.
Other consequences of sex selection are perhaps more subtle, but
are equally problematic. There are significant arguments concerning:
the inherent sexist motivations of sex selection; inappropriate control
of nonessential characteristics of children; inappropriate use of scarce
medical resources on nonessential procedures; harmful effects on
children and the commodification of reproduction; and even the
perspective in that it seeks to expand choices for women without stringently limiting their
reproductive autonomy.
200. King, supra note 16, at 324.
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creation of a “slippery slope” leading to a world of “designer babies.”
Feminists have their own significant concerns about entering the
debate, given their long fight for reproductive autonomy. Yet perhaps
their voices ought to be the loudest: female babies, even in the United
States, will be disproportionately targeted by sex selection.
Throughout its history, America has had a gift for choosing self-
governance, on which real freedom rests, over government’s use of
force through regulation, which denies freedom. In light of this tradi-
tion, bringing an end to the “Wild West” approach would be best
served through action taken by professional societies, rather than
through government regulation. With a far greater capacity to under-
stand the rapidly-changing nature of biotechnologies than the govern-
ment, these professional societies have shown a willingness to lead,
something politicians clearly have not. That eighty-five percent of
clinics support the idea that there should be more professional
guidelines relating to PGD strongly attests to the willingness of
clinics to follow professional guidelines. This path, which rests on
winning over hearts and minds through education and building a
consensus, is to be preferred over having to resort to regulation
through bureaucracy. Finally, this approach to reproductive technolo-
gies is the one most in accord with the Constitution.
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INHERENT (GENDER) UNREASONABLENESS OF THE
CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF
MANSLAUGHTER COMMITTED IN THE HEAT OF PASSION
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MALE-DOMINATED LEGAL SYSTEM
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
III. REASONABLENESS AND VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
I seriously wonder how many men married five, 
four years would have the strength to walk away
without inflicting some corporal punishment.1
—Hon. Robert E. Cahill
Judge Robert E. Cahill uttered this statement during his sentenc-
ing of Kenneth Peacock, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
for killing his wife after catching her in bed with another man.2 Judge
Cahill ultimately sentenced Peacock to eighteen months in prison.3
Although Judge Cahill admitted that he personally believed Peacock’s
actions were justified by his wife’s indiscretions, the Judge felt that his
hands were tied, and that punishment was legally required.4
The statements made by Judge Cahill in the Peacock case reveal
the male bias pervasive throughout the American legal system and,
more specifically, in the law of voluntary manslaughter, which is
grounded in the traditional notion of men’s crimes.5 Male bias can be
seen in the many layers of the male-dominated legal system, from the
prevalence of male decision-makers,6 to the inherent sex-bias in jury
1. Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994,
at A18.
2. Peacock, a long-distance trucker, came home early from a run and found his wife
of five years in bed with another man. Peacock chased the man away, and, after hours of
“drinking and arguing, shot his wife in the head with a hunting rifle.” Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Judge Cahill, who has since refused to discuss the case, originally said that al-
though he wished he did not have to subject Peacock to such a sentence, he knew he had
to “ ‘to make the system honest.’ ” Id. (quoting Hon. Robert E. Cahill).
5. See Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 262 (1996) (arguing that the way in which current legal
doctrines are “grounded in traditional notions of men’s crimes” makes it hard to accom-
modate the female perspective and experience).
6. A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN IN
THE LAW 3 (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN], http://www.abanet.
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selection,7 to the male-oriented laws,8 and to the lingering influence of
the “reasonable man” standard. This institutionalized male bias is a
product of a larger male-dominated society that promotes gender ste-
reotyping and categorization.9 The effects of gender bias on the concept
of reasonableness is particularly stark in cases like Peacock that in-
volve killing in the heat of passion.10
Male defendants who kill in the heat of passion often find protec-
tion in the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter.11 The flexible sentenc-
ing associated with voluntary manslaughter emerged in the common
law as an alternative to the rigidity of murder sentences in order to
afford leniency to males who have committed violent acts in response
to provocation.12 Today, voluntary manslaughter continues to accom-
modate men who kill their wives in the heat of passion, but not women
who kill their husbands for the same reason,13 due to the gender bias
inherent in the concepts of objective and subjective reasonableness.14
An important aspect of the modern definition of voluntary man-
slaughter is the focus on the reasonableness of the perpetrator’s
actions.15 Although many crimes require the use of a basic standard of
org/women/CurrentGlanceStatistics2009.pdf. Women are underrepresented in both state
and federal courts. In 2009, women made up only twenty-seven percent of U.S. Circuit
Court Judges, twenty-five percent of U.S. District Court Judges, and thirty-two percent
of justices on state courts of last resort. Id.
7. Cameron McGowan Currie & Aleta M. Pillick, Sex Discrimination in the Selection
and Participation of Female Jurors: A Post-J.E.B. Analysis, 35 JUDGES J. 1, 2, 4 (1996).
8. Keller, supra note 5, at 262.
9. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A
Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510,
515 (2004).
10. An expert on domestic violence was quoted as stating that, through its Peacock
decision, “ ‘[t]he court is saying that [killing in the heat of passion] is socially understand-
able for a man to do.’ ” Lewin, supra note 1, at A18 (quoting Elizabeth Schneider).
11. The notion that the law treats men who kill in the heat of passion less harshly than
others who commit homicide is underscored by Peacock’s extremely light eighteen-month
sentence. Id.
12. See, e.g., Bartram v. State, 364 A.2d 1119, 1152-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)
(discussing the difference between first-degree murder and homicides committed in “hot-
blooded fury” and stating that the latter “may lower the blameworthiness from the murder
level to the manslaughter level”); see also Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and
Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1061-62 (2005) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND
THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003)) (explaining
that “[b]y recognizing that a reasonable heat of passion could negate the malice required
for murder,” the law of voluntary manslaughter saved male defendants who killed while
engaged in brawls from the death sentence).
13. Indeed, just “a day after the [Peacock] judge acted, another Baltimore judge handed
down a three-year sentence to a woman who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for
killing her husband after 11 years of abuse.” Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
14. In general, juries think it is understandable that a man will act out violently
against his wife when he learns about her adultery. Id.
15. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010) (adopting a definition of voluntary
manslaughter that judges the adequacy of provocation by comparing the actor’s response
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reasonableness, the way in which the “reasonable man” standard is
applied in cases of voluntary manslaughter is particularly harsh for
women perpetrators who fall victim to the genderized reasonable
man.16 When the reasonableness standard is objectively applied, it is
the image of the stereotypical male that is invoked, and strict gender
divides ensure that women are seen as the excluded “other.” 17 Volun-
tary manslaughter originated to accommodate men and has adapted
accordingly.18 Today, women are still viewed as outsiders who find
little place and protection in the law of voluntary manslaughter.19
Conversely, when reasonableness is subjectively applied by states
that follow the Model Penal Code’s approach,20 and the effect that a
defendant’s gender has on the reasonableness of his or her actions is
considered, women defendants fall victim to societal stereotypes and
are judged against prescribed female gender roles.21 In cases involving
voluntary manslaughter, reasonableness is a double-edged sword for
women who are not accommodated in the traditional male conception
of reasonable provocation, and who also face discrimination at the
hands of a subjective reasonable standard plagued by stereotypical
gender roles.22
One thing that is striking is the lack of studies that focus on the
gender element of crimes committed in the heat of passion.23 Further,
scholars have been highly critical of the narrow scope of those studies
to that of the objective reasonable person), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962) (taking
a highly subjective approach to reasonableness by focusing on the actual viewpoint of
the defendant).
16. Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (discussing the disparate impact of the provoca-
tion defense on women). Current defense law is based on the reasonableness standard,
and, in most jurisdictions, self-defense is justified if the defendant reasonably believed that
the force was necessary to prevent an imminent threat of unlawful physical force. Richard
Klein, Race and the Doctrine of Self Defense: The Role of Race in Determining the Proper
Use of Force to Protect Oneself, 4 J. RACE GENDER ETHNICITY 30, 30 (2009).
17. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 (1983) (“[O]bjectivity—the nonsituated, univer-
sal standpoint, whether claimed or aspired to—is a denial of the existence or potency of
sex inequality that tacitly participates in constructing reality from the dominant point
of view.”).
18. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (discussing how the common law expanded
to recognize a category of provocation based on a man witnessing his wife’s adultery).
19. See Keller, supra note 5, at 255 (pointing out that women who kill an intimate
partner or spouse often receive harsher prison sentences).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
21. Keller, supra note 5, at 272.
22. Id. at 268 (“ ‘[M]yths, biases, and stereotypes about women pervade the judicial
decision-making process and often affect the outcomes of cases.’ ”) (quoting CYNTHIA K.
GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 191 (1989)). Women are also frequently targets for
“ ‘victim blaming.’ ” Id.
23. See id. at 258 (noting that the studies regarding such violent crimes often do not
take into account factors that are frequently associated with sex).
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that do exist.24 Although some studies of sex disparities in sentencing
have concluded that, generally, women spend less time in prison than
men who have committed identical crimes, these studies fail to account
for legally relevant and important variables, such as a defendant’s pri-
or criminal record, or the severity of the offense.25 Such variables are
significant, in light of the fact that approximately eighty percent of
women who kill or assault their partners have no prior criminal
record. This alone may explain why women offenders generally receive
lesser sentences than men who kill or assault their partners.26 Cur-
rently, the extent to which women are actually penalized by the male
bias pervasive in both the objective and subjective reasonableness
standards in the context of voluntary manslaughter is unclear.27 Com-
prehensive studies are therefore needed to present a clearer picture of
the discriminatory application of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
Policymakers need to re-examine the statutory definitions of vol-
untary manslaughter and crimes committed in the heat of passion.
The gender bias inherent in the concept of reasonableness as it relates
to voluntary manslaughter must be exposed from behind the guise of
objectivity. Though examining statutes and the concept of reasonable-
ness is a start, the true problem is that prevailing sex stereotypes
make it reasonable for a man to kill his wife to “defend his honor,” but
treat a wife acting violently for the same reasons as completely irra-
tional.28 Ultimately, society must recognize that this unequal power
24. See id. at 257-58 (discussing the shortcomings of the available studies, which fail
to control for important variables or to adequately define “violence”); Emily L. Miller, Com-
ment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code,
50 EMORY L.J. 665, 667 (2001) (explaining that intimate violence studies that do exist
fail to identify the instances in which the defendant successfully claimed voluntary
manslaughter).
25. Keller, supra note 5, at 257. For example, a 1995 study by the U.S. Department
of Justice that reported that “wife” defendants were less likely to be convicted and to
receive severe sentences when compared to “husband” defendants seemingly failed to take
into account the individual defendant’s prior criminal records. PATRICK A. LANGAN &
JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2 (Sept. 1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/SPOUSMUR.PDF.
26. Geris Serran & Philip Firestone, Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the
Male Proprietariness and the Self-Defense Theories, 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
1, 10 (2004).
27. For cases involving female defendants who killed in the heat of passion, see Hoyt
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Scroggs v. State, 94 S.E.2d 28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956); Bartram
v. State, 364 A.2d 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
28. See Keller, supra note 5, at 262 (contending that women usually kill men they are
intimately involved with “defensively,” whereas men kill their wives as “an offensive act”).
Because legal doctrines are “grounded in traditional notions of men’s crimes,” they often
fail “to accommodate a woman’s perspective and experiences.” Id.
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structure within intimate relationships serves to encourage spousal
abuse and intimate violence.29
Part I of this Note, provides a brief introduction into the discrim-
inatory facets of America’s male-dominated legal system, focusing on
the role of judges and juries within that system. This information will
serve as the backdrop for Part II, which discusses the history and ori-
gins of voluntary manslaughter before considering modern develop-
ments in the law. This section also breaks down the legal elements of
voluntary manslaughter, comparing state statutes to the language of
the Model Penal Code. Part III focuses on the “reasonableness” aspect
of voluntary manslaughter, and on demonstrating how tests of reason-
ableness—whether objectively or subjectively applied—are actually
gendered in nature. Finally, the Conclusion proposes legal and societal
reforms to help remedy the existing gender problems pervasive in the
law of voluntary manslaughter.
I. THE MALE-DOMINATED LEGAL SYSTEM
From the top down, the American legal system is male-dominated
and has been shaped by male influences.30 The system is epitomized
by the majority presence at the bench of male judges.31 These judges
implement legal doctrines enacted by male legislators32 and “grounded
in traditional notions of men’s crimes.” 33 That this system fails to
accommodate the female perspective and experience may also function
to affect sentencing determinations.34 The high percentage of male
homicide perpetrators and victims indicates that homicide itself is an
29. See Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 10 (focusing on how feelings of
possessiveness and the male need to control his partner encourages abuse and increases
the risk of homicide within intimate relationships).
30. See Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Critiquing the Law: Themes and Dilemmas in Anglo-
American Feminist Legal Theory, 19 J.L. & SOC’Y 423, 423 (1992) (arguing that the
“Anglo-American legal systems . . . favour men’s interests and actually reinforce male
domination”).
31. See CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN, supra note 6, at 2 (providing statistics showing
the disparity between male and female judges at both the state and federal levels).
32. Women currently hold less than seventeen percent of the seats in the 111th U.S.
Congress, and at the state level, women make up less than twenty-five percent of elected
legislators. Facts About Women Legislators, NAT’L FOUND. FOR WOMEN LEGISLATORS,
http://www.womenlegislators.org/women-legislator-facts.php (last visited Nov. 22,
2010). For more information on female representation at both the state and federal
level, see, Facts on Women Officeholders, Candidates, and Voters,  RUTGERS UNIV. CTR.
FOR AM. WOMEN & POLS., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/index.php (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010).
33. Keller, supra note 5, at 262.
34. Id.
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overwhelmingly male act.35 Additionally, the circumstances under
which men and women kill and the identity of their victims tend to
vary along gender lines.36
Throughout American legal history, the law of homicide has pri-
marily focused on the control and punishment of male violence because
the vast majority of homicide defendants are male.37 Furthermore,
“criminal law has been developed by male common law judges, codified
by male legislators, enforced by male police officers, and interpreted by
male judges and juries.” 38 Voluntary manslaughter is no exception;
the legal standards that define “adequate provocation” and “reason-
ableness” reflect a very male view of the concept of justifiable homi-
cidal violence.39
As demonstrated by Judge Cahill’s statement included at the
beginning of this Note,40 male common law judges responsible for
developing the law bring with them their male perspectives, which are
often influenced by societal gender stereotypes.41 In spousal-killing
cases, judges may ultimately treat male defendants with increased
leniency, based on the perception that unfaithful wives goad their hus-
bands into the act of killing through their improprieties.42 This
35. “In 1984, eighty-seven percent of those arrested in the United States for homicide
and seventy-five percent of homicide victims were male.” Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked
Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1679 (1986). A 2007 Department of Justice Report corroborates those
statistics: in 2005, men were nearly ten times more likely than women to commit murder.
Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Trends by Gender, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, [hereinafter Homicide Trends], http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
homicide/gender.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). Additionally, men were murdered at
nearly four times the rate of women in 2005. Id.
36. Women rarely kill, but, when they do kill, they most often kill male intimates.
Taylor, supra note 35, at 1680-81. According to the Department of Justice, “[b]oth male
and female offenders are more likely to target male victims than female victims.” Homicide
Trends, supra note 35. It should be noted that statistics have long shown that when
women kill intimates, they do so as a measure of self-defense in response to beatings.
Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698. This propensity is often connected to Battered Women’s
Syndrome, a subject relevant to the discussion of female homicide and voluntary
manslaughter but outside the scope of this Note. For further information about
Battered Women’s Syndrome, see Daniel D. Angiolillo, Seeking Truth, Preserving
Rights—Battered Women’s Syndrome/Extreme Emotional Distress: Abuse Excuse or
Syndrome Defense, 24 PACE L. REV. 253 (2003); Alene Kristal, Note, You’ve Come a Long
Way, Baby: The Battered Women’s Syndrome Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 111
(1991); Pamela Posch, Comment, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the Battered
Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 485 (1998).
37. Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
38. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1681.
39. Id. at 1679.
40. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
41. Id. (discussing how Judge Cahill’s statements reflect the male gender perspective
in heat-of-passion killings).
42. Keller, supra note 5, at 268.
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deserving-victim concept works in conjunction with another model
based on female stereotypes: the evil-woman hypothesis, which pre-
dicts that male judges will treat female defendants more harshly,
based on the view that deviant women are an anomaly to the image of
the stereotypical “virtuous woman.”43 Although over-simplified, these
kinds of gender stereotypes can be highly influential during sen-
tencing, and may ultimately lead to the development of prejudicial
case law.44
Another factor that leads to the dominance of the male perspective
is sex discrimination in jury selection, which results in the wrongful
exclusion of female jurors (and their female perspectives) from partici-
pating in the judicial process.45 This is problematic because, ultimately,
jurors are given the power to determine the guilt or innocence of a
defendant in most cases involving voluntary manslaughter.46 A lack of
female jurors can have dire consequences for the defendant.47 Due to
the lack of comprehensive studies on the subject, though, it is unclear
whether female and male jurors do decide cases involving murder com-
mitted in the heat of passion differently, and whether those decisions
are affected by the defendant’s gender.48 What is clear, is that, given
the responsibility entrusted to jurors to decide whether voluntary man-
slaughter is appropriate based on the facts of a case,49 the stakes are
too high for criminal defendants’ futures to have to depend on the
gender makeup of a jury.
Jurors themselves are discriminated against in the jury
selection process.50 Yet, when making decisions, juries as a whole
seem to rely on gender stereotypes that dictate that it is reasonable for
43. Id. at 270. Put another way, the admittedly simplistic “ ‘evil woman’ hypothesis
predicts that judges will view a convicted female as a ‘fallen woman’ and throw the book
at her in disgust.” Id. (citation omitted).
44. Many feminist groups believe that sentencing in situations similar to that in the
Peacock case “reflect a widespread acceptance of male violence against women.” Lewin,
supra note 1, at A18.
45. Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 6. There was a time when juries were made up
almost entirely of men; women were not required to serve on juries. See Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57, 65 (1961) (citing a Florida statute that provided that no woman would be
required to perform jury service, though she could volunteer for it).
46. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (“ ‘In the present condition of our
law it is left to the jurors to say whether or not the facts and circumstances in evidence are
sufficient to lead them to believe that the defendant did . . . commit his offense under a
heat of passion.’ ” (quoting People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1122 (Cal 1917))).
47. See Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 65 (holding that a woman’s conviction for killing her
husband in the heat of passion by an all-male jury did not violate her rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 41 (discussing “the shortcoming of all gender-
difference [jury] studies,” including the failure to take into account factors other than
gender, such as race, age, income, and religion).
49. Berry, 556 P.2d at 780.
50. Currie & Pillick, supra note 7, at 6.
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a man to react hastily when he learns about his wife’s acts of adul-
tery.51 This suggests that gender stereotypes condoning male domi-
nance and aggression are so pervasive that they are internalized by
both male and female jurors.52
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Voluntary manslaughter first emerged in the sixteenth century to
protect men who engaged in the common practice of defending their
honor through physical attack or mutual violence from the death
penalty.53 Eventually, the common law expanded “to include the ‘sight
of adultery’ ” as a category of provocation,54 mitigating the punishment
for men who killed their adulterous wives.55 The definition of protect-
ing one’s honor was merely expanded to incorporate societal norms
dictating that a “respectable” man would not only be inclined to “phys-
ically retaliate against any perceived affront,” 56 but that he should also
be expected to retaliate against any trespass on his most precious
property: his wife.57
The expansion of the doctrine of provocation to include discovering
adultery reflects the historical treatment of wives as the property of
their husbands.58 As noted by the English House of Lords, “jealousy
is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of prop-
erty. . . . [A] man cannot receive a higher provocation.” 59 Today,
51. See Lewin, supra note 1, at A18 (noting how jurors often flinch from convicting of
murder a man who kills his wife after finding her in bed with another man).
52. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Framed Before We Know It: How Gender Shapes Social
Relations, 23 GENDER & SOC’Y 145, 145 (2009) (asserting that gender provides one of
culture’s “primary frame[works] for organizing social relations”); Judith Taylor, The
Problem of Women’s Sociality in Contemporary North American Feminist Memoir, 22
GENDER & SOC’Y 705, 711 (2008) (contending that, through their memoirs, feminist
thinkers “convey the belief that women treat each other poorly because they have been
emotionally marred by . . . gender socialization”).
53. Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62. In the early days of the doctrine of voluntary
manslaughter, the law of provocation saved male defendants who were torn between
upholding the code of honor that dictated that men should retaliate when attacked or in-
sulted and the prospect of receiving the death penalty in cases of murder. Miller, supra
note 24, at 671.
54. Burke, supra note 12, at 1062.
55. See Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904) (explaining that a husband is
justified in killing either the man who he catches in bed with his wife or his wife). Finding
“no difference in the degree of the crime, whether the betrayed husband slays the faithless
wife or her guilty paramour,” the court that held both instances constitute manslaughter,
not murder. Id.
56. Miller, supra note 24, at 671.
57. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1062 (“[P]rovocation law reflected not just a judicial
understanding of the physical reactions of men, but prevalent norms about women as
male property.”).
58. Burke, supra note 12, at 1062.
59. Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (Q.B. 1707).
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though women are no longer legally viewed as property of their hus-
bands, “the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter continues to perpetu-
ate a violent form of male subordination of women.” 60
In today’s society, where duels for honor have been eradicated, the
typical paradigm for the use of voluntary manslaughter is exemplified
by the facts of the Peacock case: an unsuspecting husband comes home
and catches his wife in bed with another man.61 Blinded by rage, he
retaliates against her in a way that ultimately proves fatal for her.62
The wife’s only role within this paradigm is as the blameworthy vic-
tim.63 This “presents a further substantive barrier to judging fairly the
culpability of female homicide defendants” who claim that their
violent acts should receive the protection of the doctrine of volun-
tary manslaughter.64
It is not just the typical voluntary manslaughter paradigm that
has been slow to accommodate women; the legal imposition of that
doctrine has been equally slow in expanding to protect women and still
fails to provide gender parity.65 In 1946, 275 years after English courts
first recognized what they called the “defense of provocation,” 66 an
English court finally stated that women who kill their adulterous
husbands can avail themselves of the provocation defense.67
The American common law doctrine of voluntary manslaughter is
also characterized by its historical and continued lack of protection for
women.68 Historically, the law specifically defined the legally permissi-
ble categories of adequate provocation in cases of voluntary man-
slaughter to include adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and violent
60. See Miller, supra note 24, at 667-68 (arguing that although women have achieved
near gender parity in many areas of their lives, they continue to face subordination
through liberal application of the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter to male defendants).
Additionally, while the notion that women are the property of their husbands is far less
pervasive throughout American society than in other cultures, there is still a sense that
American men have power over their wives’ “sexual and reproductive capacities.”
Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3. It seems safe to say, then, that “ ‘men around
the world [still] think and talk about women and marriage in proprietary terms.’ ” Id.
(citation omitted).
61. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18.
62. Id.
63. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
64. Id.
65. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339 (1997) (discussing how the O.J. Simpson trial led
journalist Susan Estritch to call for legislatures to abolish the heat of passion defense
because of the considerable disadvantages it imposes on women).
66. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1694.
67. Holmes v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 588.
68. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1694 (discussing how the “honor defense” allowed courts
to simply acquit a male defendant who killed in the heat of passion caused by learning of
his wife’s adultery).
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assault.69 These narrow categories were created by judges who had the
propensities of the average adult male in mind.70 In some states, a hus-
band’s killing of his adulterous wife upon discovering her in bed
with another man was considered justifiable homicide until as late as
the 1970s.71 Although the modern conception of voluntary manslaugh-
ter makes no specific reference to gender and purports to be gender
neutral, the doctrine cannot escape its clear gendered roots.72
Today, voluntary manslaughter often mitigates the sentence of a
homicide that would otherwise be murder73 when the homicide is com-
mitted due to an “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” 74 The justification for the
partial defense provided by voluntary manslaughter is that an individ-
ual who kills while under the influence of intense emotional or mental
disturbance is “less deserving of punishment than” someone who com-
mits premeditated murder.75 Accordingly, those who kill in the heat of
passion are treated as lacking the requisite malice.76 This reduces the
individual’s culpability in the eyes of the law.77 Additionally, in cases
of voluntary manslaughter, a degree of culpability is assigned to the
victim as the provoker, in order to justify the reduced sentence.78 The
69. Nourse, supra note 65, at 1341. These four categories, referred to as the “ ‘nine-
teenth century four,’ ” found justification in the traditional male code of honor. Id. at 1340-
41 (internal quotation omitted).
70. See Keller, supra note 5, at 266-69 (describing the role that judicial discretion plays
in sentencing defendants). Keller argues that the clearest explanation for disparate sen-
tencing of men and women “is the negative bias against women held by a large number of
judges.” Id. at 267.
71. Lewin, supra note 1, at A18. For example, until 1974, Texas viewed a violent
revenge by a “victimized” husband on his adulterous wife as justified in the eyes of the law.
Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3.
72. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1061-62 (comparing the lack of gender neutrality in
the application of the crime of voluntary manslaughter to similar shortcomings in the uti-
lization of the concepts of “retreat and imminence in the self-defense context”).
73. The Model Penal Code classifies voluntary manslaughter as a second-degree felony.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
74. Id.
75. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060.
76. See, e.g., People v. Najera, 138 Cal. App. 4th 212, 215, 220 (2006) (explaining that,
in cases of voluntary manslaughter, a complete lack of malice is not assumed, but a defen-
dant found to have acted in the heat of passion is said to have lacked the malice necessary
for murder). Most United States jurisdictions divide murder into two degrees. First-degree
murder requires a defendant’s premeditation and deliberation, whereas second-degree
murder is categorized by the absence of these two elements. Taylor, supra note 35, at
1683. Further, “[i]f the absence of premeditation and deliberation stems from a total loss
of self-control caused by adequate provocation by the victim, and if the defendant killed
without an opportunity to cool off or regain control, then the homicide is classified as vol-
untary manslaughter.” Id. (citation omitted).
77. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060.
78. The victim is said to share in the liability for the provoked murderous act. Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1720.
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adulterous actions of unfaithful wives have been treated as “especially
provoking” and deserving of shared culpability.79
Voluntary manslaughter80 is categorized by the presence of
serious provocation.81 Notably, the common law as codified by some
states and the Model Penal Code differ as to how “reasonableness”
should be judged.82 According to the Model Penal Code, a homicide is
categorized as manslaughter if it “is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse.” 83 Thus, the Model Penal Code takes a more
subjective and nuanced approach, judging reasonableness “from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances
as he believes them to be.” 84 Conversely, the common law has devel-
oped a more objective approach, which uses a “reasonable person”
standard to determine the adequacy of provocation. In Georgia, a
state that has adopted the common law approach,
A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he
causes the death of another human being under circumstances
which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result
of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person . . . .85
Under the common law approach, the key element is that the provoca-
tion must have been sufficient to cause a reasonable man to lose his
sense of self-control.86 The common law standard does not ask if a rea-
79. Id. at 1721-22.
80. There are four elements of heat of passion: “ ‘(1) adequate provocation; (2) a passion
or emotion such as fear, terror, anger, rage or resentment; (3) [the] homicide occurred
while the passion still existed and before a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool;
and (4) a causal connection between the provocation, passion, and homicide.’ ” JOSEPH
G. COOK ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 546 (6th ed. 2008) (quoting Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297,
1308 (10th Cir. 1999)).
81. Id. at 545.
82. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010) (adopting an objective common
law standard of reasonableness) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (defining
reasonableness under a subjective approach that considers the individual actor’s
circumstances).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
84. Id.
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (West 2009).
86. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 653 (2d ed. 1986). It is
important to note that it is not the duration of the provocation that is determinative;
rather, it is the intensity of the provocation that must be measured using a reasonable man
standard. See People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 570 (1991) (concluding that although the
two-week period of torment by the defendant’s wife may have been sufficient to justify a
heat-of-passion instruction, the instruction was not appropriate given the long duration
of the provocation.).
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sonable man would kill in such a situation,87 as killing is rarely viewed
as legally justifiable.88 Instead, the law treats the provoked homicide
as an understandable response89 deserving of less severe punishment.90
Objective reasonableness, on the other hand, simply looks at the defen-
dant’s actions and asks if the provocation would be sufficient to trigger
the same heat of passion response in the reasonable person.91
Many modern categories of provocation have their roots in the En-
glish common law system.92 For example, English courts found ade-
quate evidence of provocation when the provoker made a physical
assault or threat, or when the provoker’s actions were unlawful or
deemed immoral.93 Allowances for provocation caused by immoral acts
applied specifically to the actions of adulterous wives.94 American
courts later adopted these categories, which became the foundation
of the common law formulation of reasonableness and adequate
provocation.95
Common law has since expanded from the rigidity of the “nine-
teenth century four” categories of adequate provocation.96 Most ques-
tions regarding adequate provocation now go to the jury.97 The trend
to put these decisions in the hands of the jury has been described as
follows: “rigid definitions of provocation have given way to a general-
ized ‘reasonable person’ standard of provocation that jurors are
87. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 654.
88. Id. Provocation is rarely regarded as a justification and is usually treated as an
excuse. Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assess-
ment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation
Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 22 (1998).
89. Heller, supra note 88, at 22; Taylor, supra note 35, at 1687.
90. Heller, supra note 88, at 23.
91. Burke, supra note 12, at 1047. The fundamental inquiry is whether the defendant
was provoked “to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition
liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather
than from judgment.” People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (quoting People v.
Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1123 (Cal. 1917)).
92. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1686-88. Today, though the modern common law doctrine
of voluntary manslaughter remains very similar in England and the United States, the
doctrine has proven difficult to apply to other cultures and societies. Id.
93. In the seventeenth century, the doctrine of adequate provocation was seen as a way
to rebut the element of malice under the theory “that the cause of the killing lay not in
some secret hatred or design in the breast of the slayer but rather in provocation given by
the deceased which inflamed the slayer’s passions.” A. J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provo-
cation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 292-93 (1976).
94. Id. at 294.
95. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1686.
96. Nourse, supra note 65, at 1341.
97. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976). The Ohio Supreme Court has
attempted to provide some guidelines concerning when a voluntary manslaughter jury
instruction should be given. In Shane v. State, 590 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ohio 1992), the
court stated that such a jury instruction is only proper “when the evidence presented at
trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the charged crime of murder and a
conviction for voluntary manslaughter.”
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entrusted to apply.” 98 Modern common law, however, continues to
view certain categories of provocation as inherently unreasonable.
The most notable of these categories is provocation alleged to have
been brought on by mere words or other verbal provocation.99 The ma-
jority position throughout common law jurisdictions is that words
alone cannot constitute adequate provocation.100 Many state courts
have held that because verbal provocation does not constitute an im-
mediate assault on one’s person or property, mere words—no matter
how offensive or insulting—will not furnish adequate provocation for
homicide.101 In such jurisdictions, words are insufficient justification
for murder as a matter of law, which means that the jury is not given
a chance to determine the reasonableness of the response for the pur-
poses of adequate provocation and voluntary manslaughter.102
A minority of jurisdictions are, however, beginning to shy away
from this bright line rule by allowing juries to consider voluntary man-
slaughter in cases involving verbal provocation.103 This reflects the
approach of the Model Penal Code, which focuses on subjective
98. Burke, supra note 12, at 1060. The jury’s crucial role sheds light on the potential
negative impact of both gender bias in the selection of jurors and jurors’ reliance on gender
stereotypes in cases of voluntary manslaughter. See discussion supra Part I.
99. See Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (“ ‘[I]nsulting words or
gestures, no matter how opprobrious, do not amount to an affray, and standing alone, do
not constitute adequate provocation.’ ” (quoting Sims v. State, 573 A.2d 1317, 1322-23
(Md. 1990))). Words can constitute adequate provocation, however, if they are accom-
panied by conduct indicating a clear intention to cause harm. Id.
100. Id.; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 655 (“[I]t is often held that a reasonable
man may be provoked into a passion when he . . . is hurt by violent physical blows, or
is unlawfully arrested or discovers his spouse in the act of adultery; but that he can
never be provoked by mere words . . . .”). There has been a tendency for the law of
voluntary manslaughter to attempt to provide categories of what constitutes reasonable
provocation. Id.
101. See, e.g., People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989) (discussing the rule
that no matter how aggravated, abusive, or indecent, mere words are insufficient provoca-
tion to allow for a mitigated sentence of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Castro, 592
P.2d 185, 187 (N.M. 1979) (holding that the provocative words uttered by the victim
during a phone call with the defendant did not, as a matter of law, constitute adequate
provocation).
102. In such jurisdictions, words are insufficient provocation as a matter of law, so cases
in which the sole provocation at issue is verbal do not go to the jury. Girouard, 583 A.2d
at 722-23 (explaining that words, no matter how offensive, are insufficient to reduce
homicide from murder to manslaughter).
103. COOK ET AL., supra note 80, at 555. This approach is more in keeping with the
Model Penal Code, which avoids making bright line rules regarding reasonableness by
requiring consideration of the mindset of the individual at the time of the killing. Id. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 655 (“In modern times, however, there seems to be
a growing realization that what might or might not cause a loss of self-control in a rea-
sonable Englishman of a century ago might not necessarily produce the same reaction in
the reasonable Anglo-American of today.”). Scholars predict the continuation of the “trend
away from the usual practice of placing the various types of provocatory conduct into
pigeon-holes.” Id.
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reasonableness and requires examination of the individual’s actual
motivations.104
Both the common law and relevant statutes further narrow the
scope of voluntary manslaughter by disallowing any meaningful
cooling-off period between the provocation and the homicide.105
Accordingly, the defendant must have killed before he had time to
process the provocation and calm down.106 Under the modern common
law conception of voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must demon-
strate: reasonable provocation; that he or she was, in fact, provoked;
that a reasonable individual would not have cooled off between the pro-
vocation and the homicide; and that the defendant did not cool off
during this lapse of time.107 Many state statutes have incorporated this
no-cooling-off requirement.108 This constraint is justified by the notion
that after a reasonable period of time, provoked individuals are
expected to have had a chance to calm down and gather their
thoughts.109 Under the common law, any killing that occurs after a
period of reflection is presumed to have been committed with premedi-
tation and deliberation.110
Conversely, the Model Penal Code does not contain any language
requiring that the defendant not have had a cooling-off period in cases
of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.111 This is because “ ‘[a]n
104. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
105. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West 2010). Georgia’s statute provides that if
there is “an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of
reason and humanity to be heard . . . the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge
and be punished as murder,” instead of as voluntary manslaughter. Id. Other states’
statutes have adopted similar wording. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(2) (LEXISNEXIS
2010) (stating that the act must occur before a reasonable cooling-off( period); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707.4 (West 2010) (emphasizing that there must not be an interval of time
“between the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temper-
ment would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14.31(A)(1) (2009) (explaining that there must not be a period of time for a person to cool
between the provocation and the homicide).
106. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 667 (explaining that under the majority
objective reasonableness standard, a defendant will be found to have cooled off if a rea-
sonable amount of time lapsed, even if the defendant had not, in fact, cooled off at the time
of the killing). Similarly, if a defendant actually cooled off quickly following provocation,
he may not claim the defense of voluntary manslaughter just because the “reasonable
person” would not have been cool and calm at the time of the killing. Id. at 663. In this
way, the common law objective standard does, to some extent, take into account the mind-
set of each defendant.
107. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Taylor, supra note
35, at 1687 (laying out similar components for the heat of passion defense).
108. Burke, supra note 12, at 1047; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 661.
109. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 86, at 663.
110. See Sheppard v. State, 10 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 1942) (“[T]he law says the injured
husband must reflect, must not brood over his hurt, then slay the wife or her paramour.
If he does, he is guilty of murder.”).
111. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962) (failing to address whether the defendant
must have acted without first having had time to cool).
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action influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that
is necessarily so spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a
significant mental trauma has affected a defendant’s mind for a sub-
stantial period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and
then inexplicably coming to the fore.’ ” 112
Due to these differences in the legal limitations and treatment of
those convicted of voluntary manslaughter under the Model Penal
Code and common law approaches, the standard adopted by each state
may significantly affect how a voluntary manslaughter case proceeds
in a given jurisdiction. In recent years, states have begun to adopt the
Model Penal Code’s subjective standard in provocation cases.113 Still,
many states have chosen to retain the common law approach by con-
tinuing to rely on an objective reasonableness approach.114 More impor-
tant is the fact that though precise statutory language varies from
state to state, the “reasonable person” remains a key concept in the
law of voluntary manslaughter.115
III. REASONABLENESS AND VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Whether the objective common law approach or the Model Penal
Code’s subjective approach is used, the concept of reasonableness is
central to the law of voluntary manslaughter.116 Interestingly, no
matter the approach actually adopted by a particular state, when
jurors are asked to envision “the reasonable person,” it is assumed that
they conjure up an image of the average person who is statistically
similar to most other people.117 Some experts posit, however, that
112. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 676 (1980) (quoting People v. Patterson, 39
N.Y.2d 288, 303 (1976)).
113. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(1)(B) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
54a(a) (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 641 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(a)
(Consol. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(b) (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §  163.135(1)
(West 2009); see also State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 828, 830-31 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986)
(adopting a subjective view of emotional disturbance and stressing that reasonableness of
perception does not equal accuracy of perception).
114.  E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(2) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (West
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31(1) (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West 2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050(1) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West
2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(4) (West 2010). Common statutory language in the
laws of these jurisdictions indicates that the provocation or excuse must be reasonable
or adequate to provoke the passions of the reasonable or ordinary person and does not
mention the actual actor.
115. The Model Penal Code also uses the term “reasonableness,” which is determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, as opposed to relying on an objective societal view of reasonable
conduct, as does the common law. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
116. Id.
117. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1047 (describing the empirical notion of
reasonableness used in defense law, which “ask[s] jurors to decide what a typical person
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jurors’ “reasonable person” does not accurately reflect the average
person, but rather, serves as a personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior.118 This creates “an objective and largely unitary
standard” that may seem gender neutral but, in reality, has clear gen-
dered roots.119
The concept of reasonableness, then, is itself characterized by
idealized—and genderized—notions of reality.120 Both objective and
subjective reasonableness add to this distorted reality by presenting
their own sets of respective gender issues that have been largely
minimized or ignored by the legal community.121 The primary dif-
ference between objective and subjective reasonableness lies in the
extent to which the jury is permitted to consider a defendant’s indi-
vidual characteristics.122
Objective reasonableness is inextricably tied to the purportedly
gender-neutral “reasonable person” standard.123 Many American courts
have adopted the objective reasonableness standard to accommodate
the belief that the law should be based upon a standard of conduct
that is generally accepted.124 Theoretically, there is an element of jus-
tice in an objective standard that holds all members of a community to
the same standard,125 but this advantage is neutralized by the
would have believed, felt, or done in the defendant’s circumstances” and addressing the
argument that this is “the sole measure of reasonableness”).
118. Mark A. Rothstein, The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Law and the Courts,
83 JUDICATURE 116, 118 (1999) (contending that “[t]he hypothetical reasonable person is
not the average person . . . but the personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior”); cf. Heller, supra note 88, at 17-18 (explaining that, in self-defense cases, jurors
must be biased to the norms of their communities in order to “[e]nforc[e] the conscience
of the community”).
119. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 118 (discussing how the reasonable person standard
was once the reasonable man standard); Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689-92 (“Rather than
developing a separate standard for women, criminal law has held and continues to hold
female defendants to a male standard of reasonableness.”).
120. See Nourse, supra note 65, at 1387 (“[T]he law’s technique, its personification of
the defense, leads quite naturally to the feminist argument that the law asks questions
about men to define gender.”).
121. E.g., Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689 (stating that the homosexual male receives no
separate consideration under the objective “reasonable man” standard).
122. Burke, supra note 12, at 1051. Naturally, subjective reasonableness allows the
decision-maker to consider more of the defendant’s personal characteristics when
determining reasonable behavior. Id. at 1043; Heller, supra note 88, at 4.
123. Many statutes make direct reference to the “reasonable person.” See supra note 114
and accompanying text (identifying several statutes that include the concept of reason-
ableness and the reasonable person in the statutory language).
124. See Heller, supra note 88, at 4 (evaluating the argument “that subjective standards
of reasonableness are antithetical to” certain fundamental standards of criminal law).
125. Id. at 9 (noting that the American legal system was founded on the idea that apply-
ing the law justly means applying the same general rule to different cases and
defendants).
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standard’s lack of meaningful objectivity and equality in the way in
which it is applied.126
Despite a facade of neutrality, the supposed “reasonable person”
standard cannot escape its gendered roots in the tradition of the rea-
sonable man:127 the “reasonable man” standard that first emerged in
England in the middle of the nineteenth century birthed the “reason-
able person” standard.128 The history of the “reasonable man” standard
reveals centuries of discrimination towards women.129 It was com-
monly held that the standard did not apply to female defendants, who
were thought to be incapable of reasonable, rational thought.130 Instead
of developing a new standard free from a history of sex discrimination
and free of gendered language,131 the legal community continues to
hold females to a standard of reasonableness clearly rooted in the male
experience.132 As a result, women have no real place in either the past
or the present of the reasonable person standard.133
Not only is objective reasonableness not inherently gender-neu-
tral, judges and jurors add to the problem by relying on their own gen-
der prejudices and stereotypes in applying the standard to criminal
defendants.134 Even though society has progressed in its views of the
marital relationship, thousands of years of viewing women as the mar-
ital property of their husbands is not easily erased.135 This culturally
ingrained tradition of male dominance and ownership may lead jurors
to find a woman’s act of adultery more “provoking,” than adultery
126. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1690 (contending that the seemingly gender-neutral “rea-
sonable person” standard “masks a profoundly gender-based and sex-specific standard”).
127. Id. at 1691.
128. Rothstein, supra note 118, at 118.
129. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
130. Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 41-42 (1873) (“No one would ordinarily expect, and
the defendant had no right to expect, from a young woman thus situated . . . the same de-
gree of competency, which he would expect of ordinary men under like circumstances . . . .”).
Indeed, “[t]here is not a single common-law reference to a ‘reasonable woman.’ ” Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1690.
131. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 61-63 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (arguing that the rea-
sonable man standard cannot be de-genderized by merely changing the word “man” to
“person”; there must also be change to the underlying male model upon which the stan-
dard is based). Even basic linguistics show the extent of women’s exclusion under the
standard, as “ ‘man’ does not include ‘woman,’ nor are the terms interchangeable.” Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1691-92 (citation omitted).
132. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
133. Id.
134. Keller, supra note 5, at 268 (noting that gender prejudices and stereotypes are
often pervasive in the judicial decision-making process and can even impact the outcome
of a case). See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1045-46 (discussing juror reliance on biased
social norms).
135. Though antiquated, the view that women are men’s sexual property lingers even
in today’s common law. Miller, supra note 24, at 672.
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committed by a husband.136 Jurors may not even be aware of their own
gender biases, because such biases are deeply ingrained in societal
norms.137 Such cultural biases lead, however, to disparate application
of the already male-biased objective reasonableness standard.138
In addition to the problems of inherent gender prejudice, the
whole idea of trying to accommodate the behavior of men and women
into one simplistic standard ignores the fact that criminal behavior
is not gender neutral.139 In particular, research indicates that men and
women react differently to spousal infidelity.140 This identifiable differ-
ence in reaction means that male behavior will be treated as the norm;
though the law purports to be neutral, it often actually favors the male
experience by conflating it with the human experience.141 Ultimately,
female defendants fall victim to a legal theory that makes no attempt
to accommodate or even understand the female experience.142 As one
scholar argues: “[a]sking a woman to behave as a reasonable man
places her violent behavior—when it does not comport with a male
norm—outside the boundaries of reason.” 143
An objective standard based on the behavior of men clearly makes
it difficult to judge women equitably.144 Perhaps more troubling is the
fact that because gender discrimination underlying the common law
notion of “objective” reasonableness is hidden behind a facade of
gender-neutral language, detection of the true discriminatory nature
136. Jurors are far more willing to view homicide committed by men as having been rea-
sonable when triggered by female infidelity. Burke, supra note 12, at 1045. See also Taylor,
supra note 35, at 1721 (asserting that the law of voluntary manslaughter “has always con-
sidered a woman’s act of adultery especially provoking”).
137. See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 510 (describing the theory among scholars
that “gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for constituting people as
two significantly different categories, men and women, and organizing social relations
of inequality on the basis of that difference”).
138. See Burke, supra note 12, at 1045 (theorizing that juror reliance on biased social
norms allows male defendants to invoke the claim of provocation more successfully than
female defendants).
139. Studies of intimate homicide reveal that men and women kill under different cir-
cumstances and with different motives. Id. at 1062; Serran & Firestone, supra note 26,
at 2.
140. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 3 (noting that this may be because infidelity
has distinct consequences for men). For example, it may raise uncertainty as to the pater-
nity of any children born, which may then lead to escalated frustration and violence. Id.
This male desire to control female reproductive capacities may be one reason the law of
voluntary manslaughter and adequate provocation has long recognized and accommodated
the male struggle against female infidelity. Id.
141. MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 658 (“When [the state] is most ruthlessly neutral, it
will be most male . . . .”).
142. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691-92.
143. Id. at 1692.
144. Id. at 1725.
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is prevented.145 Whereas laws that are more noticeably discriminatory
are quick to raise public concern, the concept of objective reasonable-
ness hides the fact that women are largely treated as the unprotected
“other.” 146 A closer look reveals both the widespread social acceptance
of male violence against women who stray from their “duty” to honor
their husbands,147 and the law’s willingness to grant leniency to men
who retaliate against their unfaithful wives, but not to women who kill
their adulterous husbands.148
Subjective reasonableness, as adopted by the Model Penal Code,149
provides an increasingly popular alternative to the common law’s ob-
jective reasonableness standard.150 The Model Penal Code conception
of voluntary manslaughter “was designed to sweep away ‘the rigid
rules that have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular
types of provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never be
enough.’ ” 151 Adopted by several states,152 this standard judges the rea-
sonableness of one’s explanation or excuse “from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.”153 This approach furthers the Model Penal Code’s general
requirement of inquiring into the defendant’s mindset to ascertain
whether he or she had the requisite mens rea, and to determine appro-
priate punishment.154
Unlike the rarely used pure subjective standard,155 the Model Pe-
nal Code actually incorporates a basic level of objectivity by requiring
145. Id. at 1690. See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1062 (“[T]he adultery-provocation
doctrine purported to be gender-neutral, but had an unquestionably disparate impact
by gender.”).
146. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1683, 1687 (acknowledging that, from the inception of the
reasonableness standard, the law “has referred to one sex only”: the “reasonable man”)
(emphasis added).
147. For statistics indicating the stark contrast between the number of female and male
victims of intimate violence in America, see Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
148. Keller, supra note 5, at 272-73.
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
150. In recent years, states have begun to embrace the Model Penal Code’s approach.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 679 (1980) (citation omitted). See also Nourse,
supra note 65, at 1339 (“The Model Penal Code (MPC) represents the height of the liberal
reform movement and the culmination of the law’s move away from categorical rules.”).
152. Heller, supra note 88, at 69.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
154. See Leah Durland, Comment, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar: Applying a Pur-
poseful Mens Rea Requirement to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 571, 591
(2009) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s widely followed formulation of mens rea).
155. Heller, supra note 88, at 69. It should be noted that there are different conceptions
of subjective reasonableness, each of which controls for different factors. See id. at 54-55
(discussing the emergence of new subjective standards and the purely subjective stan-
dard). However, as these other approaches are less commonly used, they will not be con-
sidered in this Note.
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that the defendant’s provoked response also be objectively reasonable,
though the reasonableness of that response is analyzed under the cir-
cumstances as the defendant believed them to be at the time he or she
acted.156 It follows that in order to qualify under the doctrine of volun-
tary manslaughter, provoked actions must be objectively reasonable
at their core.157 The only place where subjectivity comes into play is in
determining the defendant’s perceptions of the circumstances, not in
assessing the reasonableness of the resulting emotional response.158
Application of the Model Penal Code’s approach requires the
finder of fact to ask two basic questions: 1) how did the defendant per-
ceive the situation?; and 2) did the defendant respond reasonably
based on his or her perceptions?159 In order for the defendant’s actions
to fall under the protections of the doctrine of voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the defendant’s perception of the situation must have caused him
or her to “act under extreme emotional disturbance.” 160
It is often not possible for the trier of fact, particularly a jury, to
fully understand and appreciate a defendant’s unique perceptions as
they are called to do under the subjective approach.161 Jurors are
forced to rely on certain key, distinguishable features present in all
individuals to help them surmise how the defendant felt and per-
ceived the situation.162 Gender is one of the key features most pre-
sumed to influence greatly individuals’ general perceptions of the
world and their reactions in specific situations.163
As previously discussed, the Model Penal Code approach is not a
purely subjective standard, as its application requires consideration
of the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s “explanation or ex-
cuse.” 164 Under the Model Penal Code approach highlighted in
Casassa, jurors are not meant to consider each individual trait and
156. Id. at 68.
157. Id. (“Perceptions do not have to be objectively reasonable under the MPC standard;
reactions to perceptions, however, still do.”).
158. Id. at 68-69.
159. Id.
160. People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 678-79 (1980).
161. See Miller, supra note 24, at 678 (highlighting the problem of “jury confusion”
resulting from the hybrid subjective-objective Model Penal Code approach). Miller
discusses a case where, at the trial for a man charged with killing another man over a
parking spot, the jury sent a note to the judge asking him to clarify the standard for
evaluating reasonableness. Id.
162. See Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 680 (rejecting the idea that the trier of fact can and
should consider all the idiosyncratic characteristics of an individual and holding that
some personal traits and feelings, such as those stemming from a mental disability, are
too peculiar to be worthy of mitigating force).
163. See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 511 (explaining that gender beliefs about
men and women are at the core of our cultural and our social structure).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962); Heller, supra note 88, at 68.
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idiosyncrasy of a defendant.165 Yet when jurors attempt to analyze the
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions “ ‘from the viewpoint of a per-
son in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defen-
dant believed them to be,’ ” 166 they must have a manageable way to
place themselves in the defendant’s shoes.167 One of the easiest ways
for jurors to do this is to take into account the defendant’s gender.
How gender is believed to influence one’s perceptions and thought
process will accordingly nearly always play a role in the reasonable-
ness analysis.168
Other obvious characteristics, such as age and race, are also rela-
tively easy to determine and, like gender, carry with them readily iden-
tifiable stereotypes.169 Gender categorization is unique though, as it
serves as the foundation of our society’s structure.170 Gender can be
distinguished from age or race because gender is dichotomous: there
are only two sexes, each with clearly defined gender parameters.171
This is a dichotomy in which the male perspective and experience is
165. See Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 680 (distinguishing those normal individual traits that
the jury should consider from those which are too “peculiar”). But see Heller, supra note
88, at 69 (arguing that “the MPC standard’s category of ‘reasonable’ self-defensive and
provoked acts encompasses any act that a reasonable person with the defendant’s unique
perceptions would have committed” (emphasis added)).
166. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 678 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney
1998)).
167. See Miller, supra note 24, at 678 (explaining that juries find it difficult to
understand the “balance between the objective and subjective inquiries into a defendant’s
perception of the alleged affront”).
168. Studies show that widely held gender beliefs do exist in our contemporary society.
The holders of these beliefs ascribe certain stereotypical characteristics to individual
men and women based solely on their gender. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of
(Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from
Perceived Status and Competence, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 880 (2002)
(analyzing paternalistic stereotypes); Lloyd B. Lueptow et al., Social Change and the
Persistence of Sex Typing: 1974-1997, 80 SOC. FORCES 1, 2 (2001) (assessing the impli-
cations of change and stability in sex typing through study of measures of femininity and
masculinity); Janet T. Spence & Camille E. Buckner, Instrumental and Expressive
Traits, Trait Stereotypes, and Sexist Attitudes: What do They Signify?, 24 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 44 (2000) (exploring college students’ self-perceptions, gender attitudes, and
sexist stereotypes).
169. See Fiske et al., supra note 168, at 879-80 (discussing various levels of stereo-
typing along race, gender, and age lines).
170. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 511 (“Widely held gender beliefs are in effect
cultural rules or instructions for enacting the social structure of . . . inequality that we
understand to be gender . . . . Thus, while cultural beliefs about gender are indeed stereo-
types, they have a substantially broader social significance than our common under-
standing of the phrase suggests.”).
171. See id. at 513 (“[A]bstracted, hegemonic understandings of men and women are
roughly consensual in that virtually everyone in the society knows what they are and
likely expects that most others hold these beliefs.”).
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granted superiority.172 Conversely, stereotypes involving race and age
do not fit neatly into just two distinct hierarchical categories.173
Ultimately, when jurors try to perceive things as the defendant
would have in order to determine the reasonableness of his or her
actions, it is likely that the gender of the defendant plays a particularly
large role in shaping the jurors’ perceptions.174 Under the Model Penal
Code approach, therefore, jurors are likely to ascribe gender stereo-
types to a female defendant when asking if the defendant acted as a
reasonable person would have in the defendant’s situation.175 Underly-
ing this inquiry lies the question of whether a “reasonable woman”
would, or rather, should experience extreme emotional disturbance,
as defined under the doctrine of adequate provocation, as a result of
discovering her husband’s infidelity.176
Male acts of aggression in response to spousal infidelity have long
been considered reasonable under the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter,177 and male defendants have long received greater protec-
tions under the law of voluntary manslaughter, in part due to the
societal belief that spousal infidelity is more shameful for a man than
it is for a woman.178 On the other hand, the act of a wife killing her
unfaithful spouse during a fit of rage is a far less common and
172. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1691.
173. Id. at 514 (“[R]esearch demonstrates that male or female is usually the first
category that people sort self and other into in social relational contexts, possibly because
it is a simple, binary classification while other classifications are usually more complex.”).
For articles discussing the nature and impact of race and age stereotypes and class-
ifications, see Candice P. Holliday, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967:
Issues Litigated at the Supreme Court Level, 84 FLA. BAR J. 20 (2010), available at http://
www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/; Angela James, Making Sense of Race
and Racial Classification, 4 RACE & SOC’Y 235 (2001); Kristen A. Myers & Passion
Williamson, Race Talk: The Perpetuation of Racism Through Private Discourse, 4 RACE
& SOC’Y 3 (2001).
174. Burke, supra note 12, at 1079-80 (“[S]tereotypes can affect jury decisionmaking
whenever reasonableness is part of the doctrinal landscape.”). For example, women are
generally “seen as less competent” but “ ‘nicer’ and better at communal tasks.” Ridgeway
& Correll, supra note 9, at 513.
175. Cf. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1692 (“Asking a woman to behave as a reasonable man
places her violent behavior—when it does not comport with a male norm—outside the
boundaries of reason.”).
176. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513, 519. There is support for the idea that
men and women are grouped into two distinct gendered categories in which the pre-
vailing gender stereotypes are then projected onto all individuals in that category. Those
who do not comport with their prescribed gender stereotype are treated as abnormal and
threatening to one’s social standing. Id.
177. The typical paradigm in heat of passion cases is presented in Peacock. Lewin, supra
note 1, at A18.
178. Burke, supra note 12, at 1077-78. The level of shame felt as a result of a spouse’s
infidelity may be viewed as affecting a defendant’s level of emotional disturbance, which
then serves as the gauge for the existence of adequate provocation under the doctrine of
voluntary manslaughter. Id.
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acceptable occurrence.179 This can partially be attributed to the fact
that women “are not socialized to express their anger through aggres-
sion.” 180 Instead, women are taught not to be surprised by male infidel-
ity, and to respond to their husbands’ indiscretions in a less violent
manner than would be expected from husbands discovering their
wives’ infidelities.181
Under the standard application of the subjective Model Penal
Code approach, gender is presumed to affect women’s perceptions of
what is reasonable, so the answer to the question of whether a woman
has acted reasonably is often based on gender stereotypes.182 As an
initial matter, female homicide defendants do not, and cannot, conform
to gender stereotypes, as homicide is a “male” crime.183 Accordingly,
a woman who kills in the heat of passion has strayed much further
from social norms than men who kill under similar circumstances.184
The history of the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter serves as a
protective measure for men “provoked” to kill by their unfaithful
wives and completely excludes the female experience.185 Women who
kill are already outliers, and women who kill in the heat of passion fall
even further outside gender and societal norms.186 Though studies
have been inconclusive on this point, this different view of men and
women murderers may result in the imposition of more severe penal-
ties on women who kill in the heat of passion.187 This is not to say that
all jurors are inherently sexist in their application of the law, but most
seem to be influenced by the prevalence of gender stereotypes in
modern society.188
179. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698 (describing women’s place in the typical volun-
tary manslaughter paradigm as the adulterer, undeserving of sympathy, as opposed to as
the enraged, provoked, and justified male spouse).
180. Miller, supra note 24, at 680. For articles that compare male and female stereo-
typical traits in more depth, see Michael M. Conway et al., Status, Communality, and
Agency: Implications for Stereotypes of Gender and Other Groups, 71 J.  PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 25 (1996), and Fiske et al., supra note 168, at 878-80.
181. Miller, supra note 24, at 669. Women are taught to respect their husbands and be
loyal in their relationships; men are conceived as being “prone to infidelity.” Id.
182. See id. (arguing that because of these stereotypes, women are less likely to benefit
to the Model Penal Code’s approach to subjective reasonableness).
183. Again, men are almost ten times more likely than women to commit murder.
Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
184. Miller, supra note 24, at 681.
185. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
186. Miller, supra note 24, at 669-70.
187. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1732 (discussing how a woman whose experience and
reaction differs from that of most other women may actually be penalized by a sub-
jective double standard).
188. Jurors often cannot escape exposure to gender stereotypes, as such stereotypes
“are institutionalized in the media, government policy, [and] normative images of the
family.” Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513. See also Burke, supra note 12, at 1053
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In its application, the Model Penal Code approach of limited sub-
jectivity is not as progressive or gender-sensitive as it may initially
appear.189 It is true, however, that the subjective approach does avoid
the facade of gender neutrality inherent in the objective approach,
which really just masks the conflation of the male experience with
the human experience.190 The subjective approach reflects the notion
“that sensitivity to the genders of the victim and the offender is neces-
sary to avoid equating male behavior with human behavior, and thus
too easily excusing the killing of women by men whose gender roles
are threatened.”191 Although male behavior is not equated with human
behavior under the subjective standard, the male experience is still
preferred and normalized.192
As long as the male and female experiences are equally valued,
there is nothing inherently problematic about considering a defen-
dant’s gender as part of a reasonableness standard. The reality, how-
ever, is that the male experience has always been favored and normal-
ized.193 Adding to this bias inherent in the concept of reasonableness
is the fact that the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter was not con-
ceptualized to include women;194 rather, voluntary manslaughter was
meant to accommodate a wholly-male experience.195 Accordingly,
taking gender into account may ultimately do female defendants
who do not fit the voluntary manslaughter paradigm a disservice.196
CONCLUSION
Although both objective and subjective reasonableness are
plagued by problems of gender inequality, the Model Penal Code’s sub-
jective standard of reasonableness is “more retributively” just than
the common law’s objective reasonableness approach, which fails to
(discussing the unlikelihood of neutralizing juror bias through jury instructions); Miller,
supra note 24, at 690 (“When a jury makes its determination, its decision is inescapably
colored by the cultural bias in favor of men.”).
189. See Heller, supra note 88, at 69-71 (discussing the shortcomings of the MPC’s
limited subjectivity standard and calling for a standard that “embrace[s] a determinist
account of human perception, assuming that how an individual perceives the world is
causally determined by her personal characteristics”).
190. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1723.
191. Id.
192. Miller, supra note 24, at 690-91.
193. “Male culture is a lens through which we are all trained to see, [and] which dispro-
portionately values male experiences and perspectives,” while simultaneously devaluing
women’s beliefs and lives. Id. at 690.
194. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1689-92.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1734 (discouraging the desire to confine women’s behavior to specific
categories).
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take into account the defendant’s actual perceptions of the external
circumstances that provoked his or her homicidal act.197 Due to the ad-
vantages that applying this restrained level of subjectivity has over
applying the objective approach, the use of an even more subjective
approach may seem like an attractive option for remedying some of the
shortcomings of the Model Penal Code’s mixed subjective-objective
approach. By taking jurors’ attention away from surface character-
istics like gender, jurors may apply the heat of passion doctrine to
women more fairly than they currently do.
In practice, however, a more subjective approach may actually not
be favorable for women because the more particularly the jury defines
the relevant reasonable person under the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter, the more likely it will be to find a defendant’s response
reasonable.198
This is an undesirable outcome for women, as women are more
often victims in cases of spousal homicide and other intimate or sex-
related killings.199 Accordingly, an approach that treats homicide de-
fendants with leniency would have a disproportionately positive effect
on males by influencing juries to apply the doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter more liberally with male defendants. This would result in
lesser sentences for males who commit violent crimes in the heat of
passion.200 Ultimately, a more purely-subjective standard could actu-
ally increase the rate of violence against women.201
The Model Penal Code standard is workable. The problem lies in
the fact that America’s patriarchal society values the male experience
over the female experience.202 Women who do not comport with pro-
scribed gender stereotypes, such as women who murder their hus-
bands, are seen as threatening to mainstream society and must be
controlled through legal measures.203 America’s male-dominated legal
197. Heller, supra note 88, at 86 (positing that the common law objective approach fails
to take into account an individual’s characteristics). Under the common law approach,
“[a]cts attributable to character are freely willed and nonexcusable; acts attributable to
overwhelming circumstances are determined and excusable.” Id.
198. Id. at 71. Juries applying the Model Penal Code approach are already more likely
to find a defendant’s provoked act to be reasonable compared to juries applying the objec-
tive approach. Id. Making the standard more subjective would only increase the likelihood
that a jury would find the defendant’s actions to have been reasonable.
199. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1692; Homicide Trends, supra note 35.
200. Burke, supra note 12, at 1045 (“[J]uror reliance on biased social norms permits
majority culture defendants to claim self-defense and provocation more successfully than
nonmajority defendants . . . .”).
201. See Taylor, supra note 35, at 1696 (“The law of provocation endorses men’s
ownership of women’s sexuality by expressly sanctioning violent reactions by husbands to
their wives’ infidelity.”).
202. Miller, supra note 24, at 690-91.
203. Cf. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 13 (“In the case of women killing their
partners, the victims tend to initiate the violence during the homicide altercation . . . .
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system was built around a society tolerant of male violence, and no-
where are its gendered roots more noticeable than in the history of the
doctrine of voluntary manslaughter. Male violence should no longer be
treated as an inevitable fact of life, and aggression in male defendants
should not be so readily accepted as a natural reaction to attacks
against male dignity and honor. Women today have achieved gender
parity in many aspects of life, but the doctrine of voluntary manslaugh-
ter continues to perpetuate male violence as an effective means of sub-
ordinating women.204
At the same time, efforts need to be made to attempt to under-
stand female violence. Although most women who receive protection
under the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter kill in self defense,205
it may also be reasonable for women, like men, to react “offensively”
to provocation. Women who kill in the heat of passion should not be
treated as more blameworthy then their male counterparts. In order
to accomplish this gender parity, the female experience must be
incorporated into the understanding of what constitutes reasonable-
ness under voluntary manslaughter.
At a more basic level, unequal power relations promoted by gender
hierarchies encourage abuse and increase the risk of male violence
within intimate relationships.206 Patriarchy has long been accepted
and internalized by both men and women.207 Male dominance and
ascribed male superiority has its roots in American history, and the
pervasiveness of the male bias has led to complacency by both men
and women in continuing to perpetuate repressive gender stereotypes.
Accordingly, the legal community has yet to question seriously either
the standard of objective reasonableness, which equates the male ex-
perience with the human experience, or the subjective reasonable-
ness standard, which ultimately also favors the male experience.
Justifying and excusing male violence has had, and will continue
to have, dire consequences for women. As a male in a position of great
legal authority, Judge Cahill’s statement included at the beginning of
this Note is very telling. As the Peacock case illustrates, gender norms
have long dictated that corporal punishment is an appropriate and
justifiable response to female infidelity. Women must be set free
from their historical role as victims in the sexist paradigm that is the
Battered women have little reason to believe the criminal justice system will protect them.”).
204. Miller, supra note 24, at 667-68.
205. Taylor, supra note 35, at 1698.
206. Serran & Firestone, supra note 26, at 13 (“The law and the patriarchal hierarchy
have legitimized wife beating and control, resulting in unequal power relationships
between men and women.”).
207. Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 9, at 513-16 (describing how both men and women
project gender stereotypes onto themselves and onto one another).
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doctrine of voluntary manslaughter. Progressive standards alone are
clearly insufficient when their application in a gendered society
prevents meaningful equality, as is the case when women are held
to a male standard of reasonableness under the voluntary manslaugh-
ter paradigm. Until society addresses the patriarchal gender hierar-
chy, women will continue to play the dual role of deserving victim and
unprovoked assassin in the context of murders committed in the heat
of passion.
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INTRODUCTION
I am in Dublin trying to write about a wrong that seems to have
escaped our collective radar screen. It is quite difficult to understand
why the Castle Rock1 case has caused relatively little, if any, response
from the Colorado Legislature, the Colorado battered women’s com-
munity, or the advocacy community nation-wide. Here in Ireland,
when I explain what happened in Castle Rock, the response is unre-
served disbelief at the “Alice through the Looking Glass” logic applied
by the majority.
But there is more to this puzzle. In addition to the anemic re-
action by legislatures and advocates, much of the post-Castle Rock
scholarship accepts the terrain constructed by the Supreme Court.2
While critical of the decision, scholars do not contest the assump-
tions that structure the majority opinion. This article does just that,
and more.
In this article I reject the Supreme Court’s decision, not because
it failed to find a property interest in the enforcement of an order of
protection, but because of the values that structure the decision and
its rationale. It is my contention that nothing could or would have
influenced the Court to find for Jessica Gonzales because it adhered
to crabbed notions of collective responsibility in defense of the polit-
ical, economic, and legal status quo.
This article also raises the rather thorny issue of our failure to
contest the decision politically. The silence is deafening and destruc-
tive. No attempts have been made to reform immunity statutes that
shield the police from suit when they refuse to follow mandates. No
reforms have been initiated to correct the holes in mandatory arrest
statutes. Rather, Castle Rock and its progeny reinscribe the callous
disregard for women’s lives and the lives of their children that was
first conceived in DeShaney.
In Part I, a brief history of the Battered Women’s Movement will
acquaint the reader with the radical and feminist moorings of the
movement. Indeed this movement was shaped by the second wave
1. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Amber Fink, Every Reasonable Means: Due Process and the (Non)Enforce-
ment of a Restraining Order in Gonzales v. Town of Castle Rock, 24 LAW & INEQ. 375,
381-82, 394 (2006) (stating and working within the Castle Rock holding); Laura Oren, Some
Thoughts on the State-Created Danger Doctrine: DeShaney is Still Wrong and Castle Rock
is More of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 59-60 (2006) (providing a cri-
tique of the Castle Rock decision); Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s
Legacy, the Court’s Assault on New Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of
a Restraining Order Is a “Sham,” “Nullity,” and “Cruel Deception,” 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321,
332-38 (2006) (describing and working within the structure of the majority opinion).
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of feminism in both ideology and methodology, locating male intimate
violence as a manifestation of gender asymmetry in law and culture.
To understand the importance of mandatory arrest, it is essential
to place it in an historical context, rather than view it as either a
“free-form” strategy or a policy crafted by governmental bureaucrats.
Mandatory arrest was a statement of women’s equality before the
law, with the survivor worthy of state protection and the perpetrator
worthy of collective condemnation.
Part II lays out the facts of both Castle Rock and a Third Circuit
case that incorporates the Castle Rock ruling and rational. In Burella
v. City of Philadelphia,3 the Third Circuit relied on Castle Rock in re-
jecting a battered woman’s claim that the Philadelphia police violated
the procedural due process prong of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In
denying Jill Burella’s substantive due process claim, the Third Circuit
also incorporated the DeShaney ruling. Part II then sets out Castle
Rock’s rationale, but from a decidedly different approach. I charac-
terize the trilogy of DeShaney, Castle Rock, and Burella as cruel
deceptions or lies because they pretend to leave open the hope that
mandatory arrest statutes can be reformed to pass constitutional
muster, specifically in relation to Fourteenth Amendment conceptions
of substantive and procedural due process.
Part III is at once my kernel of truth and the guts of this article.
I argue that the guiding hand in Castle Rock is Justice Rehnquist
and his belief that the Constitution is a negative rights document,
casting protection of battered women outside the ambit of constitu-
tional concern. Moreover, I reject the terrain constructed by the Court
by introducing the idea that Castle Rock is no more than a reification
of the legal, political and economic status quo, and that because it de-
fends the status quo, nothing that Gonzales, Burella, or state legisla-
tures could argue or enact would satisfy the position of this Supreme
Court. As a result, any hope in due process protection is misplaced.
I unpack, as my theorist friends would say, what I mean by “the
reification of the legal, political, and economic status quo,” and what
drives it. Part of what drives this process is the mistaken distinction
between passive and active conduct: the age-old legal duty argument
which flows from the void. Throughout the article, you will note that
I do not use the phrases “failure to respond” or “failure to act.” This
is not a consequence of literary license, but rather a deliberate recog-
nition that affirmative police conduct occurred when the police chose
not to enforce the order held by Jessica Gonzales. Critical to the
3. 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 143, 145-46.
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Court’s position is its defense of state political and economic power
embedded in police discretion and protected by the public duty doc-
trine. Such conceptions of state conduct, power, and economic primacy
operate at the expense of battered women and their children.
In Part IV, I turn the focus on the advocates and state actors.
Using Colorado as an example, I try to understand why there has not
been any movement to reform, radically alter, or confront the prob-
lems with Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute or the Governmental
Immunity Act. Consequently, I examine the decision not to respond
to the situation created by Castle Rock, and more recently, Burella.
In this section, I draw from my own experience as a scholar, teacher,
and member of the Battered Women’s Movement, and from inter-
views with advocates in Colorado and New York.5
Finally, in Part V, I propose an antidote to Castle Rock by craft-
ing a legislative alternative to the miasma created by the decision
that specifically addresses liability and mandatory language for
arrest statutes.
I. IN THE BEGINNING G-D CREATED THE BATTERED
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
A. A Brief Initiation to the Battered Women’s Movement
In the 1970s a new movement joined the myriad political move-
ments of that decade—the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM).6 The
BWM was a corollary of the second wave of feminism and a direct out-
growth of the social, political, and economic upheavals of the 1960s.7
Questions of race, gender, and sexual orientation were on the political
front burner. Activists critiqued the position of women, men and
women of color, gays and lesbians within the social fabric.8 As a
consequence of this critique, the relationship or status between men
and women in the family, and the placement of this unit within the
socio-political spectrum came under scrutiny.9
5. Interviews were conducted in the summer and fall of 2007, and included members
of the advocacy, legal, and judicial communities. All interviewees requested anonymity and
therefore shall remain anonymous. Notes from the interviews are retained by the author.
6. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 248 (2005);
see also SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 29 (1982) (discussing the rapid emergence of the
Battered Women’s Movement in the 1970s).
7. Miccio, supra note 6, at 248 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 248-49 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 249.
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Feminists, long aware of the violence perpetrated in the family,
named the violence, the women abused, the perpetrators, the male
intimates, and the socio-political and legal structure that supported,
condoned, and codified the violence. This was radical in the 1960s just
as it is radical now. I imagine a colleague or two might recoil at the
explicit naming of victim/perpetrator. But name we must, giving voice
to the victim and charting accountability. Truth may enlighten but
it is also painful. Indeed, one need only ask the millions of women
beaten annually or the families of the 2000 to 4000 women beaten to
death each year.10 One only need ask Jessica Gonzales or Jill Burella.
B. The Rise of Mandated Arrest: Antidote to Systemic Misogyny?
I use the “M” word (misogyny) decidedly, which, I trust, creates
more of a stir than the “F” word. To the skeptics I ask: How else can
we explain social acceptance of male intimate violence? How else can
we justify the verity of the marital rape exemption, legally incapaci-
tating wives from withholding consent to sex?11 And, how do we
explain away the police’s, courts’, and prosecutors’ refusal to prose-
cute violence against women in the home?12
Subtle chastisement and corrective action were code words
for beating and treating wives along a fault line of power—where
power was based on the gender and status of the parties.13 I think
10. MICHAEL L. PENN & RAHEL NARDOS, OVERCOMING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
GIRLS: THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ERADICATE A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM 71 (2003)
(citation omitted).
11. John Stuart Mill wrote in 1859:
The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards
himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power
which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely
disregarded in the case of the family relations . . . . The almost despotic power
of husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon . . . .
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 116 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1991) (1859) (alteration in original); see also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 575
(N.Y. 1984) (declaring that the marital rape exemption in New York’s penal law violated
equal protection under the New York Constitution); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:
THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 94 (1987) (discussing the marital rape exception).
12. See RUTH W. MESSINGER & RONNIE M. ELDRIDGE, N.Y. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE CITY’S RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 18, 40, 58
(1993) (reporting the failure of the New York courts and police officers to respond to family
violence); see also SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 158 (“[B]attered women’s cases ‘dis-
appeared’ as they proceeded through the criminal justice system . . . .” (citation omitted));
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 343, 349 (2007) (discussing how the police treated domestic violence as “technical”
violence (quoting Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy,
and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 701 (2006))).
13. See SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 216-18 (discussing the history of battering being
used to chastise wives).
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that “misogyny” actually understates the problem. Perhaps, as
Andrea Dworkin notes, such violence is much more than misogyny,
it is gynocide.14
Male intimate violence is gendered.15 We know that four battered
women are killed every day in the United States.16 If four Jews or
four African Americans were killed and the state stood by, we would
call that state-sponsored genocide. Or as Professor Sarah Buel noted,
“[i]f foreign terrorists were attacking [four Americans per day] . . .
the Department of Defense would likely have long ago fired up the
F-16’s and dispatched elite, special forces . . . .”17 What have we
learned? That context is key.
Male intimate violence, like racial or homophobic violence, is a
problem embedded primarily in the structure of the social order—not
in the psyche of individual men.18 Battered women’s advocates appre-
ciated this: they, not unlike their sisters in the suffragist movement,19
understood that male privilege, of which intimate violence is a mani-
festation, is about power.20
The police, the critical law enforcement actor, systematically
refused to arrest male intimate partners.21 Such conduct was neither
a consequence of coincidence, nor a matter of police discretion, as
touted by Justice Scalia in Castle Rock. Rather it was a result of
policies promulgated by the police and their counterparts in the law
enforcement community. For example:
14. See ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 93-150 (1974) (examining how certain acts
of violence against women constitute gynocide); see also MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE
METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM 233-34 (1974) (viewing medical violence against women
as gynocide).
15. The federal Violence Against Women Act recognized this phenomenon and I
would challenge anyone to assert, much less prove, that the U.S. Congress is a bastion
of feminism.
16. Sarah Buel & Margaret Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer’s Duty
to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 452 (2006) (citing CALLIE
MARIE RENNISTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003)).
17. Id. at 453.
18. Michèle Harway, Battered Women: Characteristics and Causes, in BATTERING AND
FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 34-36 (Marsali Hansen & Michèle Harway
eds., 1993); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 94-95 (1998).
19. See ELLEN DUBOIS, The Last Suffragist: An Intellectual and Political Autobiography,
in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 3-5 (1998) (discussing how suffragists con-
centrated their efforts on the inequality of the sexes in the political and social spheres).
20. David Adams, Treatment Models on Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 178-88 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds.,
1988); SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 20-24.
21. SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 158 (citation omitted).
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[T]he Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration (LEAA)
created six model projects to train officers in “crisis intervention”
to respond to domestic violence calls. The therapeutic profes-
sionals who designed the training and who urged crisis interven-
tion believed that most cases involving intimate violence were
in fact devoid of violence. Such incidents were viewed as “family
squabbles,” where the male partner was emasculated by the
female partner. Officers were to take on the role of “counselors
and mediators, trained in the skills of crisis intervention.” Arrest
was perceived as totally inappropriate.22
Two cases in the 1970s illustrate what I term “police arrest
avoidance”—a strategy employed by police personnel regardless of
jurisdiction. In 1976, the class action suit Scott v. Hart, was filed
against the police in Oakland, California, on behalf of women battered
by their male intimate partners.23 Two months after the California
case, in Bruno v. Codd, advocates filed suit in New York against the
New York City Police Department (NYPD).24 Both cases alleged that
police refused to respond when called in cases where women were
physically attacked.25 In Bruno, the litigants claimed that the police,
courts, and probation departments chose not to comply with the laws
of New York.26 The trial court allowed the suit to continue against
the police, opining that the police department’s blanket prohibition
against arrest, and in favor of crisis intervention, presented a color-
able equal protection claim.27 Two years later, the NYPD, via a settle-
ment, agreed to change procedures and arrest offenders where there
was probable cause to believe that a felony, misdemeanor, or viola-
tion of a stay-away order issued by family court had been violated.28
Hart and Bruno informed advocates’ strategies in terms of work-
ing with the state and with the criminal justice system in particular.
Nationally, Hart and Bruno resonated with advocates. In Colorado,
the Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence worked with the
police to change policies concerning arrest in domestic violence cases.29
22. G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective Responsibility
for Male Intimate Violence, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405, 412 (2009).
23. Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 28, 1976); see SCHECHTER, supra
note 6, at 159-60 (discussing Scott v. Hart).
24. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev’d, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App.
Div. 1978), aff’d 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
25. Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 974; Scott, No. C-76-2395.
26. Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
27. Id. at 977. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the claims against the
family court and the probation department. Bruno v. Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (App.
Div. 1978).
28. SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 160.
29. Interview with advocate in Colorado (2005).
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Not unlike the advocates in New York and California, Colorado activ-
ists changed police procedures by working with the police, judges,
and probation departments.30 Lawsuits were a potential threat, but
as one advocate stated, court challenges would be used only as a last
resort—the “fist inside the velvet glove.” 31 Hart and Bruno provided
the necessary incentive in shaping procedures where arrest was now
internally mandated—not imposed by statute.
By 1994, the landscape changed dramatically. In June of 1994 a
plethora of legislation came out of state houses. It is not a coincidence
that June 17, 1994 was the date O.J. Simpson was charged with the
murder of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman.32 The lethality of male
intimate violence was part of our collective consciousness, and politi-
cians, being political in nature, finally passed mandatory arrest legis-
lation.33 In New Jersey and New York, the state legislatures passed
mandatory arrest statutes.34 By 1994, thirty-two jurisdictions man-
dated that the police must make an arrest in cases of family violence.35
30. Id.
31. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
32. Raymond Hernandez, The Simpson Case: The Pursuit; A Spectacle Gripping and
Bizarre, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/18/us/the-simpson
-case-the-pursuit-a-spectacle-gripping-and-bizarre.html.
33. To illustrate that passage of mandatory arrest statutes was a consequence of
political expediency rather than an understanding that male intimate violence was part
of a dominate/subordinate paradigm, the New York Legislature passed the Family
Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, which included mandatory arrest.
Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, 1994 N.Y. Sess. Laws
ch. 222 (McKinney). Mandatory arrest bills had languished in legislative committees for
ten years, never once getting to the floor of either the Senate or the Assembly. In June
of 1994, the legislature brought it to the floor in both houses and voted to pass it. Id.
Advocates across the state attributed this sudden conversion to the political fallout that
would have occurred if New York had not passed the bill and had been upstaged by New
Jersey and her sister states. How do I know this? I was one of the authors of the manda-
tory arrest piece of the Family Violence Prevention Act and a consistent voice in the New
York State Legislature seeking its passage.
34. I was the co-author of New York State’s mandatory arrest provisions for both the
Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, Article 8. Because of my work as the
founding director of the Center For Battered Women’s Legal Services, I have first-hand
knowledge of the legislative advances in both jurisdictions. There is something to be said
for longevity, if not age.
35. By 1992, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah and
Wisconsin passed legislation mandating arrest for domestic violence. See R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 156, 206-07
(1992) (discussing potential legislative and judicial action to combat domestic violence).
The majority of states passed mandatory arrest laws in 1994; most provisions were
drafted with mandatory arrest language and a concept of the batterer regardless of sex,
but arrest records would show that most batterers arrested were male and most victims
were female. Alaska, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin currently mandate arrest
when there is probable cause to believe that a violation of a protection order has occurred.
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II. CASTLE ROCK, BURELLA AND THE LIES THEY CONSTRUCT
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Castle Rock.36 Two years later, in September 2007, the Third
Circuit released its decision in Burella, reinforcing both the ruling
and the dicta in Castle Rock, and dashing, once and for all, any hope
that Castle Rock’s reach would be limited or that it was the result of
a truly bad nightmare.37 For all practical purposes, mandatory arrest
has been rendered impotent and all avenues of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process redress have been foreclosed to battered women
and their children. Since a majority of states have crabbed notions
of state accountability in tort—it appears that battered women have
no avenue to enforce state mandates.38 Indeed, what we have is the
illusion of protection, which is worse than no protection at all.
Both Castle Rock and Burella, in lengthy recitations of the facts,
acknowledge the tragedy inherent in the murder of three little girls
and the shooting of a wife by her police officer husband.39 Both opin-
ions demonstrate the moral paucity of our conceptions of collective
accountability now grafted onto the constitutional interpretation of
due process. Thus, their attempts at compassion are not only mis-
placed, but a cruel deception.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2)
(West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509(b)
(West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(14)(e) (West 1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.070(1) (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a3) (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-6(D) (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-0.7.1-11(1) (West 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.310(3) (West 1999);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(1), (2) (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)(2) (West
1996); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(b) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-
2.4 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(a) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(7)(b) (West 1994). Alaska, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington currently man-
date arrest when there is a finding of domestic violence regardless of whether a protection
order has been violated. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.530(a)(1) (West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN § 13-3601(B) (2001); D.C. CODE § 16-1031(a) (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)(b)
(West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 4012(5) (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-21(a)(1) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(1) (West 1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(3) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(c) (West 2001).
See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1855 n.42 (2002) (listing states with mandatory
arrest statutes).
36. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 748 (2005).
37. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2007).
38. See, e.g., Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-
101 to -120 (West 2007) (providing immunity to public entities and employees).
39. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751-55; Burella, 501 F.3d at 134-38.
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A. Castle Rock and Burella: The Facts
1. The Castle Rock Case
Just as in thirty-one other jurisdictions, the police in Colorado
were mandated to arrest or secure a warrant where “[t]he restrained
person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a protec-
tive order.” 40 Jessica Gonzales received an order that covered her
and her children with the additional proviso that the respondent
father, Simon Gonzales, would be subject to arrest if he violated any
of the provisions contained in the order.41 In June of 1999, Simon
Gonzales took the three children from their home without notice to,
much less consent from, their mother.42 Simon Gonzales’s conduct
was a cognizable violation under Colorado’s must-arrest statutes.43
Jessica immediately notified police when she realized that her
three little girls were missing and correctly intuited that Simon had
taken them.44 When notified by Jessica, the police chose to do nothing.
Over an eight-hour period the police chose not to enforce the order.45
In the early morning hours following the children’s abduction, Simon
appeared at the police station and opened fire with his shotgun.46
Then and only then did the Castle Rock police begin to investigate.47
They then recovered the bodies of the three little girls in the cab of
the pick-up truck driven by Simon Gonzales, shot to death before his
arrival at the police station.48
Jessica Gonzales sued the State of Colorado under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that the State violated the Due Process Clause be-
cause the City of Castle Rock and its police department had arbi-
trarily deprived her of the right to the enforcement of the order
without due process of law.49 The district court dismissed the claim
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, in part,
the district court’s decision, finding that the Colorado Legislature, in
passing its mandatory arrest provisions, created a property interest
in the enforcement of orders of protection.50 On June 27, 2005, the
40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)(I) (West 2004).
41. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751-52.
42. Id. at 753.
43. Fink, supra note 2, at 375 (citing Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 748-54).
44. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753.
45. Id. at 753-54.




50. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004).
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U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court in its now
infamous decision.51
2. The Pennsylvania Case
In January of 2000, Jill Burella was shot by her police officer
husband, George Burella, who then turned the gun on himself.52 Their
marriage was marked by repeated assaults and Jill’s repeated re-
quests to the Philadelphia Police Department (PDD) to enforce the
numerous orders of protection issued by the courts.53 The police
allowed George into the marital home after he threatened his wife,
refused to arrest him for the harassing and threatening phone calls
that they witnessed, permitted his continued possession of his service
revolver after the close of his shift, and recognized his presence on the
force even after he refused to submit to psychiatric counseling as
ordered by the department’s psychiatrist.54 The threats, entry into
the marital home, and continued possession of his service revolver
were all explicit violations of the protective order.55
On January 8, 2000, Jill was shot by her husband.56 Subse-
quently, she filed suit against the City of Philadelphia under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.57 On September 13, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, relying on the ruling in Castle Rock, reversed
the district court ruling that denied the police qualified immunity.58
B. The First Lie: DeShaney Redux
To understand Castle Rock or Burella, one must understand
DeShaney v. Winnebago County.59 In 1985, the Rehnquist Court
severed one connection to state accountability in the now infamous
DeShaney case. In spite of evidence that the State of Wisconsin had
knowingly returned five-year-old Joshua DeShaney to his abusive
father, the Rehnquist Court found that the State’s actions did not
violate the little boy’s substantive due process rights.60
51. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 769.
52. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2007).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 137-38.
55. Id. at 136-38.
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id. at 135, 139.
58. Burella, 501 F.3d at 135-36, 146, 149-50.
59. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
60. Id. at 202. Joshua DeShaney was beaten by his father numerous times. Id. at 192-
93. After one particularly vicious attack, Joshua was hospitalized. Id. at 192. Because
of the severity of the attack, the State of Wisconsin refused to release the little boy back
into the father’s home absent an agreement where Child Protective Services would monitor
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What drove the majority in DeShaney was Justice Rehnquist’s
belief that the Constitution is primarily a negative rights document
that rules out positive rights claims because “nothing in the lan-
guage of the Due Process Clause . . . requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to
act . . . .” 61 Consequently, there is no affirmative duty to protect
unless the danger or harm is created by the State—and “created . . .
by the State” is narrowly construed to mean only those acts that
directly cause the harm or occur while the individual is in the
State’s custody.62
Here, the Court characterized the cause of the violence as
private because the direct actions of Joshua’s father put Joshua into
a vegetative state.63 The majority disaggregated the State’s act of
returning Joshua to an abusive father from the harm and re-charac-
terized state conduct as inaction.64 The juridical wisdom of the
majority treated the State as mere observer to Joshua’s beating.65
As an observer, the Court found no connection between the State
and Joshua’s injuries; no connection to the victim’s injuries meant
there was no tie or connection to the victim.66 Absent a link to the
plaintiff, the State could not have violated Joshua’s rights.
DeShaney effectively slammed shut the door to claims of sub-
stantive due process violations by the State, except where the victim/
survivor was in the State’s physical custody or when the State itself
created the danger.67 This crabbed notion of state action is the death
the child’s condition in the home environment. See id. (detailing the agreement). As part
of a contract between the county and the father, the State would visit the home to check
on the little boy. See id. (stating visits by Child Protective Services were part of the agree-
ment). On a number of occasions, Joshua’s father refused entry to the case-worker. See id.
at 193 (stating occasions where entry was refused). The State chose not to petition against
the father in family court, and it continued to allow the child to stay in the father’s home.
Id. at 192-93. Moreover, Child Protective Services did not enforce the agreement. See id.
(detailing that Child Protective Services ignored violations of the agreement and did not
act upon evidence of further abuse). Subsequently, the child was beaten into a vegetative
state. Id. at 193. Joshua’s biological mother filed suit against the State of Wisconsin
alleging that its actions violated the child’s due process rights. Id. at 192-93.
61. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
62. Id. at 197, 199-203.
63. Id. at 201-03.
64. See id. at 200-01 (discussing that the Due Process Clause is triggered when the
state’s action, not the action of a private individual, causes harm to a person).
65. See id. at 200-03 (stating that, even if the State knew of the danger to Joshua, it did
not have to prevent the harm because it was not a part of the danger).
66. See id. (stating that the State had no part in the creation or infliction of Joshua’s
harm).
67. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing that the state-created danger theory is
narrowly constructed due primarily to narrow notions of affirmative conduct).
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knell for Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, not
only when battered women assert state refusal to enforce protective
orders, but in cases where any person interposes such an argument.
C. The Second Lie: Castle Rock and Burella
DeShaney, Castle Rock, and Burella are an unmitigated night-
mare. Quite simply, these cases are enraging not because the Court
continues traditions that are morally despicable, but because it does
so wrapped in the Constitution or, more aptly, what it opines to be
the correct version or interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Brennan may have identified the heart of this trilogy when
he claimed in DeShaney, that “oppression can result when a State
undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it.” 68 Brennan did not mince
words here, so neither shall I. The legacy left by these three decisions
casts the Fourteenth Amendment as a mere aspiration.
In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court held that Colorado failed to
create a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in the enforcement
of a protective order.69 In what I term the “yeah, but” theory of con-
stitutional analysis, the Court dismissed not only Jessica’s claim, but
also implicitly the claim of anyone in any of the thirty-two jurisdic-
tions where mandatory arrest provisions exist.
The Court starts from the position that the Colorado statute
permits police discretion, and so is not mandatory.70 But even if the
statute is mandatory, because it allows for two options, arrest or seek
an arrest warrant, and the latter is procedural rather than “an end in
itself,” the legislation is not mandatory.71 “[E]ven if the statute man-
date[s] a nondiscretionary duty on the part of the police,” the duty
does not create a private right or entitlement but rather a public
duty or “public end” à la criminal law.72 Additionally, even if it does
create an entitlement, it is not a due process type entitlement, be-
cause enforcement does not have a “monetary value” 73 and enforce-
ment is “an incidental benefit of a general duty.” 74
Let’s first take the Court’s claim that Colorado never actually in-
tended to do away with police discretion when it passed its mandatory
68. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).




74. See id. (arguing that the Supreme Court decision rendered the Fourteenth
Amendment toothless and that based on the legislative intent of the Colorado mandatory
arrest statute and its plain language the Court should have found a property interest).
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arrest statute. The Court starts from the position that the police
have always had discretion when dealing with crime, crime victims,
and perpetrators.75 Scalia asserts, “[w]e do not believe that these
provisions of Colorado law truly [make] . . . enforcement of restrain-
ing orders mandatory,” because “[a] well established tradition of
police discretion has long co-existed with the apparently mandatory
arrest statutes.” 76
As Roger Pilon points out in a provocative examination of Castle
Rock, tradition has trumped not only the text of the statute but
the legislative history of two-thirds of the states. And while Pilon
raises an important issue about tradition, he mischaracterizes
tradition as police discretion. What drives Scalia’s decision to
trump thirty-two jurisdictions’ legislative history is . . . adher-
ence to the tradition of treating the Fourteenth Amendment as
a negative rights provision.77
Thus, no duty owed, no way, no how.
Think for a minute of what the majority uses to trump Colorado’s
enactment of mandatory arrest. First, the Court uses a 1980 report
from the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.78 The year 1980 is crit-
ical here because mandatory arrest was not on the horizon, much less
a policy, in a majority of states. The issue of male intimate violence
was just coming to the attention of the American people and the crim-
inal justice system. Indeed, some of the first national discussions
had only occurred in the late 1970s, and the findings of the Attorney
General’s Task Force were not part of water cooler discussion much
less legislative strategy.79 Moreover the idea of mandatory arrest was
in its infant stage. Therefore, it would have been impossible for the
ABA to have contemplated, much less factored in, the reasons for
arrest mandates in its report.
As for the second reason, Scalia claims that the arrest or seek a
warrant provision cannot possibly mandate behavior because “seek-
ing . . . an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to [do] nothing but
procedure.” 80 “And where there is a procedure there is discretion, thus
the statute does not form the ‘basis for a property interest.’ ” 81
75. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005).
76. Id. at 760.
77. Miccio, supra note 22, at 420 (citing Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock, Executive
Indifference, Judicial Complicity, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. L. REV. 101, 116 (2005)).
78. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760-61 (citation omitted).
79. ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT iv, vi, vii, 2 (1984).
80. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 764-65.
81. Miccio, supra note 22, at 422.
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The police, not unlike judges, must decide whether there is prob-
able cause. But once probable cause is established, either by law
enforcement or the bench, there is only one course of action—arrest
or issuance of a warrant. Characterizing the function of the police or
judges under mandatory arrest statutes as discretionary misstates
or misapprehends “discretion.” The probable cause determination by
a police officer or a court is not a discretionary act. It requires assess-
ment of the evidence. It is ministerial. Moreover, an officer or a judge
is not empowered to disregard the mandate once probable cause is
found to exist. Mandates replace a universe of potential action with
one option: arrest/warrant. I do not believe for one moment that Scalia
was so imperceptive as to not understand the nature of “shall” in the
context of law enforcement. “Scalia’s argument here is simply too
precious to be credible.” 82
Scalia’s third and fourth points are equally specious. Scalia
claims that Jessica Gonzales’s protection vis-à-vis enforcement of
the order was incidental.83 Yet, to claim that Jessica was an indirect
beneficiary of the must arrest statute is revisionism at its worst.
While Simon Gonzales would have been the subject of police attention,
Jessica was the object of the protective order. As a battered woman
she was within the ambit of protected person as contemplated by the
legislature and the Battered Women’s Movement.84 Jessica Gonzales
was a member of a specific class of individuals singled out by the
statute for protection.85
The Court’s final justification is as Byzantine as the prior three.
Scalia believes that since a monetary value cannot be ascribed to
enforcement, Gonzales fails to raise a cognizable property interest
protected by due process.86 But Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth87 tells us something entirely different, a message that Scalia
refuses to recognize much less acknowledge. Property interests are
varied and encompass more than “real estate, chattels, or money,”
because they include intangibles “relat[ing] to the whole domain of
82. Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock, Executive Indifference, Judicial Complicity, 2005
CATO SUP. L. REV. 101, 118 (2005).
83. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 749, 766-67.
84. The raison d’etre of mandatory arrest is to abate the violence. See Roederer, supra
note 2, at 323-24 (detailing the Colorado statute and its intended beneficiaries).
85. See Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 143 (Or. 1983):
[S]tatutory arrest provisions . . . identify with precision when, to whom and
under what circumstances police protection must be afforded. The legislative
purpose in requiring the police to enforce individual restraining orders clearly
is to protect the named persons for whose protection the order is issued, not
to protect the community at large by general law enforcement activity.
86. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768.
87. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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social and economic fact.” 88 And while this may be an inartful way
to describe property, it does get to the heart of the matter. Scalia
dismisses conceptions of property worthy of due process protection
by adopting a narrow definition, one that has been rejected by both
the dissent in Castle Rock and the majority in a raft of Supreme
Court decisions.89
As I reread Castle Rock, the questions that emerge are troubling.
Why did Scalia not use the 1993 Federal Violence Against Women
Act Report that found that police arrest avoidance contributed to the
continued perpetration of male intimate violence?90 Why did Scalia
not refer to the plethora of amicus briefs that discussed in exacting
detail the reasons why discretion was removed from the police?91
88. Id. at 571-72, 577 (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646,
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 430
(1982) (stating that one characteristic of property rights is that they vary).
89. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 773-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972). The Court has found property interests created by state-conferred
social benefits. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (disability benefits); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (public education); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970) (welfare benefits).
90. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
OF 1993, S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993) [hereinafter VAWA SENATE REPORT].
91. See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers and the Nat’l Crime Victims Bar
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328201 (discussing the consequences of
domestic violence and failure of police to enforce mandatory arrest statutes); Brief for
the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-22, Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328202 (explaining how the police fur-
ther endanger victims of domestic violence when they fail to enforce protection orders);
Brief for the Nat’l Black Police Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27-
30, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328203
(discussing police protocol with respect to domestic violence); Brief for the Nat’l Network
to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, 28-30, Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353608 (discussing
pervasiveness of domestic violence and the likely increase in such violence to result from
failure to enforce protection orders); Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 4-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 353692 (discussing domestic violence in the specific context of elder abuse); Brief
for the Family Violence Prevention Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
4-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353693
(discussing domestic violence and its consequences for children); Brief for Peggy Kerns,
Former Member of the House of Representatives of Colo., and Tex. Domestic Violence
Direct Serv. Providers, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-14, 18-21, Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353694 (discussing the
societal impact of domestic violence and the danger of allowing police too much discretion
in enforcing protection orders); Brief for Nat’l Coal. Against Domestic Violence and Nat’l
Ctr. for Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-17, Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353985 (explaining police
procedure and the increased danger to domestic violence victims that results from failure
to enforce protection orders); Brief for Int’l Law Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 27-28, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 328200 (discussing the impact of police failure to enforce protection orders on
U.S. treaty obligations).
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And finally, why did Scalia effectively overrule the legislative his-
tory that supported the plain language of the Colorado statute? He
did so, not merely to reinforce police discretion and crabbed notions
of “property,” but to reinforce the traditional negative view of consti-
tutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the
third and final deception.
III. THE THIRD AND DEADLIEST LIE—THE “WHY”
Don Coreleone said it better than anyone, “keep your friends
close, but your enemies closer,” 92 and while I do not consider the
Supreme Court an enemy, I do find their ruling and rationale in Castle
Rock inimical to the welfare, rights, and lives of battered women
and their children. And if we take Castle Rock together with Burella,
the stakes are raised even higher because the promise of the Due
Process Clause is forever outside the reach of battered women.93
After Castle Rock, advocates believed that if we did what Scalia
told us to do, specifically go back to the legislative drawing board and
make our laws “more mandatory,” 94 the promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause would be attainable in our lifetime.
Remember, Scalia told us that “shall,” meant “maybe or maybe not,”
dismissing out of hand the legislative history of thirty-two states and
the plain statutory meaning of the word.95 I guess to the good Justice,
the Ten Commandments are merely the ten suggestions. From a
policy standpoint, I cannot envision how one makes “a peace officer
shall arrest, or . . . seek a warrant,” more mandatory.96 Perhaps, if the
Colorado Legislature had appended the words, “and we really, really
mean it, no kidding,” it would have satisfied the majority. But I think
not. Nothing would have satisfied this Court. The question is why.
A. The Legal “Why”
Since DeShaney in 1985, scholars have commented on the neg-
ative rights aspect of the U.S. Constitution. Barbara Woodhouse
profoundly understood that the turn of events in the Twentieth
92. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 623 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting THE
GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount Pictures 1974)).
93. Clearly, if the composition of the Court changes and Justices who have a his-
torically correct and more compassionate view of the Due Process Clause are appointed,
then the effect of Castle Rock may be reversed. Indeed, one can hope that the Court will
follow the example of Lawrence v. Texas by reversing itself. I do not, however, think that
this outcome is probable in the near future. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
94. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
95. Id. at 760-61.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2004).
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Century, which reduced the Due Process Clause to a reactive rather
than proactive proviso, would have devastating effects on women and
on issues particular to violence against women.97 Essentially, the
modern reading of Fourteenth Amendment due process is basically
a “keep your laws off my body” approach. This affected the decision
in Harris v. McRae,98 in which the Court held, inter alia, that because
the state did not create poverty, it has no duty to provide poor women
with abortions.99 Thus, the State can restrict access to abortions by
restricting the flow of funds to poor women for this medical proce-
dure.100 And because the “negative” aspect of the theory of negative
rights adopts a restrictive view of state action, legal guarantees move
beyond women’s reach.101
Let us go back to DeShaney for a moment to decode the negative
rights position of the Court. First, one has to start from the premise
that the Constitution is a negative rights document. Second, if it is
a negative rights document, there is no duty for the state to act or
be proactive. Third, if there is no constitutional duty to act, then
duty arises only where state conduct is characterized as affirmative.
This is illustrated in the Rehnquist Court’s treatment of the harm to
Joshua DeShaney. Here the Court privatized the harm because it was
Joshua’s father who beat him so severely that Joshua suffered brain
damage.102 And the Court concluded that the State of Wisconsin did
nothing to cause Joshua’s injuries; it merely failed to act or to pro-
tect.103 The state’s return of the child to his father was not affirmative
conduct, so state conduct was recast as inaction.104 Because the action/
inaction paradigm is a natural corollary of negative rights theory,
97. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution, and the Legacy
of Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 483 (2001) (noting that the
substantive due process decisions share the failings of treating “commerce and labor, the
family and market as even playing fields”).
98. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
99. Id. at 316-17.
100. Id. at 316; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum:
Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 330, 330-32, 336 (1985) (discussing how the abortion funding cases raise questions
about negative versus positive rights).
101. Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon wrote:
If one group is socially granted the positive freedom to do whatever it wants
to another group, to determine that the second group will be and do this
rather than that, no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the
second group will make it the equal of the first. For women this has meant
that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctly subordinated and
deprived of power, has been placed beyond the reach of legal guarantees.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 164-65 (1989).
102. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 193 (1989).
103. Id. at 203.
104. Id.
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where there is no affirmative duty the Court must find affirmative
conduct in order to impose liability.105
The lexicon reaffirms crabbed notions of state action. In DeShaney,
the state’s conduct is described as a failure or omission to act.106 As
any first-year law student knows, where there is a failure/omission to
act, one must find a legal duty to act. Just as first-year law students
learn that the beachcomber, surfer, or sun worshiper has no duty to
rescue the drowning swimmer, the state has no duty to rescue because
the state is treated no differently than Beachcomber Bill.107 Thus,
if we characterize the state’s “act” as inaction (omission) we need to
find a legal duty before we can hold the state liable. And because the
police (the state) owe only a generalized, and not a particularized,
duty of care, the characterization of the act is critical when claiming
a constitutional tort.108
But what if we thought about conduct differently? What if we
recognized that conduct has both positive and negative elements? For
example, if I am driving my car and hit a pedestrian, characterizing
my conduct as continuing to drive would be just as correct as charac-
terizing my conduct as failing to apply the brakes. By applying my
theoretical paradigm to the facts in DeShaney, negative acts, or in-
action, are transformed into positive or affirmative actions. The State
of Wisconsin returned Joshua to his father with the knowledge that
the boy had been beaten so severely by his father that he had been
hospitalized.109 And, the State continued Joshua’s placement even
though his father violated the agreement by refusing Child Protective
Services (CPS) access to his son.110 The “failure to protect,” is not
based on inaction but on the actions taken by the state, which placed
little Joshua in a known zone of danger—no different than if CPS
had placed the child in front of a speeding car. Not unlike the glass
half-empty/half-full conundrum, how we characterize conduct flows
from our perspective.111 While such characterizations are harmless in
105. Id. at 195, 199-200.
106. Id. at 203.
107. See G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty,
and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 141 (2005) (citations
omitted) (analyzing tort theories as applied to the state, including duty and conceptions
of active/passive conduct, arguing that these standards permit the state to escape re-
sponsibility for the perpetuation of harm to women from male intimate partners and that
these standards have been imported into conceptions of a negative rights Constitution
and state accountability).
108. Id. at 117, 146. I would argue that the idea of a generalized duty of care flows from
the priority to protect the state from lawsuits, and monetary damages, and reinscribing
the reach of the Public Duty Doctrine (qualified immunity). Id. at 118.
109. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
110. Id. at 192-93.
111. Miccio, supra note 107, at 147 (rejecting the action/inaction paradigm).
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the context of the glass parable, they are devastating in the context
of battered women’s lives. So why does the Court take such a narrow
view of state conduct?
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s adherence to a negative rights standard
is rooted in principles of federalism that foster clear and unequivocal
lines of demarcation between state and federal power.112 As Michael
J. Gerhardt notes, Rehnquist wants to maintain separate spheres of
state and federal authority, recognizing only a “coterminous” inter-
section between state and federal power when the state violates
clearly defined negative restraints.113 For Rehnquist, a negative rights
approach safeguards the delicate balance that federalism constructs,
and perhaps more importantly, preserves.
Yet Rehnquist’s narrow interpretation of the Due Process Clause
is antithetical to its origins. The Reconstruction Amendments, and
specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
were enacted to provide protection when states refused to protect the
fundamental rights of their citizens.114 The Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to act as an antidote to states’ turning a blind eye to
violations of citizens’ life, liberty, and property interests by the state
or by private actors.115 It was to be a haven in a heartless world.
What of Castle Rock and Burella? One could argue that my
analysis up to this point seems misplaced because Castle Rock and
Burella, in part, raise procedural and not substantive due process
claims. What does DeShaney or the negative/positive rights debate
have to do with a procedural claim? Everything.
First, the distinction between procedural and substantive is arti-
ficial because “all rights, including procedural rights, are ultimately
substantive”116 because “what we refer to as process is merely the
enforcement given to the natural rights of ‘life, liberty, and estate.’ ”117
I understand that this position is troubling for jurists and scholars
who adhere to a strict reading of the Constitution and have an aver-
sion to collapsing both the distinction between substantive and
112. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effect of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 429 (1990).
113. Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 553 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the approach of the Slaughter-House Court to the question of coterminous
jurisdictions).
114.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (3d ed.
2006).
115. Id.
116. Pilon, supra note 82, at 110.
117. Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral Rights—Mostly
Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827, 1858 (2006) (examining the moral position taken by
Rehnquist as a young man and how that position influenced his thinking and rulings as
a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court).
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procedural, and the categories under a rubric of “natural” rights. My
critics will claim that this theory gives currency to judicial activism
where rights are invented, such as “privacy” in the reproductive
rights cases. But for scholars such as Roger Pilon and Michael J.
Gerhardt, jurists such as William J. Brennan, and philosophers such
as Immanuel Kant, conceptions of life, liberty, and property flow
from what we call the dignity of the individual.118 Moreover, the very
purpose of the state is to protect our life, liberty, and property, not
because these notions are elevated to the status of rights or constitu-
tionally protected interests, but because they are at the core of what
it means to be human.119 Protection is not conditioned upon the
private/public nature of the violation or the violence. Jessica Gonza-
les had the right to governmental protection because as a member
of the body politic she delegated that enforcement to the govern-
ment.120
I can only imagine the degree of discomfort felt by the reader
when I invoke notions of “natural rights,” but I have spared you a
lengthy discussion of conceptions of “natural rights,” “the state of
nature,” and “the social contract theory.”121 I have also spared you
118. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the United States has a “tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice”);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
105, 105 n.1 (H. J. Paton trans., Routledge 1991) (explaining that the basis of moral law is
to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a subject capable of rational
will, and stating that “[a] rational being himself must be . . . the ground for all maxims of
actions. . .”); Gerhardt, supra note 112, at 427 (“The dual purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, permeating through all of its provisions were (1) to provide constitutional
protection for the fundamental or ‘God-given’ or ‘natural’ rights of all United States citi-
zens by (2) radically altering the design of federalism . . . to invest the federal government
with complete authority to punish the infringement of such rights by either state or private
action.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness,
in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 48 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (stating that Rawls’s conception
of justice centers on equal liberty for all persons).
119. See, e.g., John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of
Civil Government (1690), reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 53 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
[lives, liberties, and estates] . . . .”).
120. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 102-03 (1960) (discussing that, by the delegation of power, law-makers must
be “the servants of the people”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing
liberty and equality in relation to justice); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
15 (1947) (stating the social contract theory, under which the people cede their will to the
common will).
121. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR, THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 103-12 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier
Books 1962) (1651) (natural laws); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 120 (natural rights);
ROUSSEAU, supra note 120 (social contract theory).
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a lengthy discourse on the whittling away of the promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment starting with the Slaughter-House decision
in 1873.122 Why? Jessica Gonzales had more than a philosophical claim
to protection vis-à-vis social contract theory. She had an order of pro-
tection, issued by a state court with the proviso that if Simon violated
the order, for any reason, the state would enforce that order by either
arresting him or by seeking an arrest warrant.123 The guarantee of
enforcement was reinforced by not only the plain language of the
order,124 but by legislative prerogative.125 Jessica asked only for the
Court to honor the Fourteenth Amendment, which took fundamental
rights and transformed them into national rights that deserved pro-
tection from state interference or neglect.126 The majority would not
honor this commitment, further eviscerating the amendment and the
power vested in the people.
B. The Political is Personal: The Political Why
In the late 1960s feminist activists coined the phrase the “per-
sonal is political.”127 While anti-feminists ridiculed this axiom and
the feminists who created it, feminists were merely transforming
liberalist philosophers’ conception of the “I,” the core or raison d’être
of government.
For the traditional liberalists, women were excluded from the
“I,” because autonomy, as a corollary of individualism, was synony-
mous with maleness.128 The autonomous person was “self-sufficient,
122. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protects privileges and immunities incident to national citizenship, not
state citizenship); Gerhardt, supra note 112, at 412-13 (noting that Slaughter-House has
made it easier for courts to erode the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005) (citing the protection
order).
124. Id.
125. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-109 (West 2010).
126. Clearly Slaughter-House, which eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and DeShaney, which neutered substantive due process protection, are in play. But both
turn the logic and history of the amendment on its head. See Gerhardt, supra note 112, at
426-27 (discussing the history of and motivation behind the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1ST SESS. 2765 (1866) (statements of Senator Howard on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
127. Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:
WOMEN’S LIBERATION, MAJOR WRITINGS OF THE RADICAL FEMINISTS 76, 76 (Shulamith
Firestone & Anne Koedt ed., 1970).
128. In classical philosophy, the autonomous individual was gendered, and conceptions
of the liberal self were inherently masculinist, because women were confined to descriptive
categories rooted in irrationality and immaturity. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 101,
at 121 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 133 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
1974)) (“Representation of the world . . . like the world itself, is the work of men; they
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separate, and distinct—the rational, ubiquitous being—standing
‘above the fray,’ as Lorraine Code comments, ‘to view from nowhere
the truths the world reveals.’ ”129 The truly autonomous individual
was a rational, (male) disembodied self, “freed from the vagaries of the
body and the senses—disconnected from the self and from others.”130
The autonomous person was not confined to the private sphere, or
cut-off from civil society.131
By claiming the personal is political, feminists exploded concep-
tions of the autonomous self, the “I,” by making real women’s agency
within the family. By recognizing that women’s experience was polit-
ical, vis-à-vis conceptions of power, they turned women’s experience
into an authentic political truth.132 Part of this truth was the recog-
nition that men battered and raped their wives and were protected
by the political, cultural, and legal status quo.133 The law provided not
only the excuse, but also the cover for such violence. As Catharine
MacKinnon notes, violence against women is a means of social con-
trol, maintaining the political status quo in both family and society.134
describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.”); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that classical
liberal conceptions of autonomy are “essentially and irretrievably masculine”); see also
Miccio, supra note 6, at 246, 310 & n.327 (theorizing about the gendered nature of Kantian
notions of autonomy and human agency).
129. Miccio, supra note 6, at 310 (quoting Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy
& the Subjection of Women: Discourses of Social Advocacy at Century’s End, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 181,
185 (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000)); see also IMMANUEL KANT, An
Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (Hans
Reis ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970) (positing that individual autonomy is an achievement
of enlightenment—one’s achievement of “emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”).
130. Miccio, supra note 6, at 310.
131. Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy & the Subjection of Women: Discourses
of Social Advocacy at Century’s End, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 181, 185 (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie
Stoljar eds., 2000); KANT, supra note 129, at 54-55; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 657 (1983).
132. Marjory Fields, Wife Beating: Government Intervention Polices and Practices,
Address at the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Jan. 30, 1970), in U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 20-21 (1978) (“Perhaps the
most serious problem for the individual who has suffered from assault is the failure of the
police to respond to call[s] for help.”).
133. Id. at 3-14.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 131, at 657:
The private sphere, which confines and separates us, is therefore a political
sphere, a common ground of our inequality. In feminist translation, the
private is a sphere of battery, marital rape, and women’s exploited labor; of
the central social institutions whereby women are deprived of (as men are
granted) identity, autonomy, control, and self determination . . . . If the most
private also most “affects society as a whole,” the separation between public
and private collapses as anything other than potent ideology.
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While Castle Rock is intensely personal to and for battered women,
I have reformed the feminist axiom because Castle Rock does more
than negate the political reality of women’s lives: it distorts the
balance of power between the people and the courts.
1. A Delicate Balance: The People and the Courts
From our first history class, Americans learn about the unique
balance between the three branches of government. It is a delicate
balance, where executive, legislative, and judicial actors honor their
different roles. We know that government derives its power from
the governed, the people, and the people are represented by the leg-
islature.135 That body is our voice in political discussions, debates,
and ultimately enactments meant to prescribe individual and collec-
tive behavior.
Rehnquist understood the delicate balance. He also understood
that the people are the “ultimate source of authority.”136 What could
Rehnquist have meant by this? Essentially, we, the people, speak
through our duly elected representatives, and when we speak our
voices must be honored by the executive and by the courts.
In DeShaney, Rehnquist’s use of the negative rights paradigm
did not disturb the balance between the people and the courts. Though
it was problematic for a myriad of reasons, the negative rights inter-
pretation did not insert the Court’s voice over, or to the exclusion of,
the people’s. Why? Because Wisconsin had not enacted legislation
to compel the police or Child Protective Services to act in a specific
manner or produce a specific outcome.137 The same is not true with
Castle Rock or Burella.
In Colorado and Pennsylvania, both state legislatures passed
mandatory arrest legislation as a direct response to police arrest
avoidance in male intimate violence cases.138 Their experience with
law enforcement paralleled that of the other thirty states where man-
135. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed . . . .”); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, . . .
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America”); see also Locke,
supra note 119, at 29 (“The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative
power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of
any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust
put in it.”).
136. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
696 (1976).
137. DeShaney  v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1988).
138. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN
§ 6113 (West 2001).
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datory arrest became law: the police were refusing to arrest in cases
where the perpetrator was intimately connected to the survivor.139
Indeed, the hearings for the 1993 Federal Violence Against Women
Act record in exhaustive and graphic detail just how pervasive police
arrest avoidance was in the fifty states; Colorado and Pennsylvania
were no exception to this time honored yet loathsome practice.140
By refusing to accept the statutory scheme of the Colorado State
Legislature, the Court invaded the province of the legislature and dis-
rupted the delicate balance between court and citizen. It is important
to note that, in Castle Rock, the Court never claims that the enactment
of positive liberties by the legislature violated the Federal Constitu-
tion; rather, the Court finds that Colorado’s conduct contradicted the
beliefs or values held by the majority.141 Scalia penned a decision that
primatized a set of beliefs that effectively ran roughshod over the will
of the people and upset the balance struck by the Founders.
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that Coloradans had sought
to level the playing field and to remedy police arrest avoidance by
passing mandatory arrest legislation.142 To Stevens, the majority
substituted its judgment for that of the people.143 But it is more than
mere substitution or paternalism. As Professor Kmiec believes, it is
judicial arrogance of the worst kind because it negates the positive
aspects of political discourse and action: debate, principled compro-
mise, and tolerable outcome.144 The mandatory arrest process in-
tegrated and validated the voices of the people—people who were
diverse ethnically, politically, and economically. Scalia’s opinion,
and that of the remaining six justices from the majority, reduced the
voice of the people to a mere whisper, shifting power from the people
to the Court.145
2. The Political is Personal: Reliving History
After Castle Rock, the word on the street was that the police did
not have to arrest. They could, if they chose, revert back to the old
139. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
140. VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 41-45; see also G. Kristian Miccio, With
All Due Deliberate Care: Using International Law and the Federal Violence Against Women
Act to Locate the Contours of State Responsibility for Domestic Violence Against Mothers
in the Age of DeShaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 641, 670-77 (1998) (discussing the
impact of the Violence Against Women Act).
141. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005).
142. Id. at 779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 773-77.
144. Kmiec, supra note 117, at 1863-64.
145. Id. (“It is hard to read the majority as saying anything more than ‘We, your judicial
elders, disagree or think this effort imprudent.’ ” (citation omitted)).
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days when arrest was the exception rather than the rule. Although
there is only anecdotal evidence to support the word on the street,
it definitely is not a good time to be battered vis-à-vis the system.146
But then, it has never been a good time.
Castle Rock takes us back before mandates, when the police
did anything but arrest. Cases such as Sorichetti, Hart, Bruno, and
Thurman were cruel reminders that legal and cultural misogyny were
very much alive.147 Mutilated children and the bodies of murdered and
disabled women at the hands of boyfriends and husbands were not
only part of legal history, but of our collective consciousness. Manda-
tory arrest requirements burst onto the political scene, lost momen-
tum,148 and then were revived with the Brown/Goldman murders.
There was a sense that politicians finally understood what feminists
had been saying for years—that women deserved equal justice and the
right to live their lives free from terror and home-grown violence.
After the Castle Rock decision was publicized, the Denver Post,
on its web site, held a vote as to whether or not Jessica Gonzales had
the “right” to sue the police.149 It seems that the Fourth Estate be-
lieves that the right to protection should be determined by a show of
hands.150 Castle Rock is more than a Supreme Court decision con-
tained in a reporter that will in time collect dust. It is a seismic shift
146. See Court: Police Can’t Be Sued For Not Enforcing Restraining Order, DENVER
NEWS, June 27, 2005, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/4655165/detail.html [herein-
after Restraining Order] (discussing the town of Castle Rock’s response to the outcome in
Castle Rock v. Gonzales).
147. See supra Introduction, notes 21-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Hart and Bruno. Sorichetti v. N.Y. Police Dep’t resulted in the largest settlement against
the New York City Police Department when police failed to enforce an order of protection
against the respondent-father who disemboweled his daughter and mutilated her so
severely that she remains in a vegetative state twenty-five years after the attack. 482
N.E.2d 70, 70-74 (N.Y. 1985). Thurman v. City of Torrington was the first section 1983 case
involving a battered woman who was beaten in the presence of a police officer who, while
Ms. Thurman was being stomped on by her husband, remained in his police car and did not
come to her aid. 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524-26 (D. Conn. 1984).
148. Mandatory arrest stalled in states because there was much discussion and concern
about its effect on communities of color among activists in the BWM. There was a belief
that women of color, i.e., African-American women, would not call the police because of
racism within the law enforcement community and the courts. This perception was prob-
lematic after a study found that African-American women were more likely to call police
than their white counterparts. Ira W. Hutchison & J. David Hirschel, Abused Women:
Help-Seeking Strategies and Response Utilization, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 436,
451-54 (1998) (reporting that low-income and African-American women who were battered
were more likely to rely on police response than were higher-income and white women who
were battered).
149. Restraining Order, supra note 146.
150. THOMAS CARLYLE, The Hero as Man of Letters, Johnson, Rousseau, Burns, in 1
CARLYLES’ WORKS SARTOR RESARTUS: HEROES AND HERO-WORSHIP 377, 386-87 (Boston,
Estes & Lauriat 1884) (“Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.”).
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which holds the political power to determine how the people shall
live, order themselves, and express compassion. Mandatory arrest
was one way that Colorado and her sister states demonstrated to
battered women and their children that they heard, recognized, and
validated not only their stories, but also their pain. Castle Rock
changed this, and it is political as well as very personal.
C. The Economic Why: To Serve and Protect the Interests of the State
This result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat
the Fourteenth Amendment as a “font of tort law.”151
To this Court, not only is the Fourteenth Amendment a negative
rights provision, but police arrest avoidance cases are matters best
left to state courts.152 Negligence claims in state court are the appropri-
ate vehicle to raise issues of state accountability, not the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. But the confluence of the Public
Duty Doctrine (PDD)153 and, in Colorado’s case, the Governmental
Immunity Act (GIA)154 bars litigants, such as Jessica Gonzales, from
filing negligence claims against the state.
In police negligence cases, the PDD recognizes a duty to the
public, not to individual citizens,155 unless a particularized connec-
tion exists between the police officer and the citizen—and the courts
and the legislatures narrowly construe this connection.156 In Colorado,
151. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 768-69.
153. It is important to draw a distinction between the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and public duty. The latter is a tort doctrine created by statute that limits immunity while
at the same time creating a narrow conduit through which suits against the state must
pass. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 88 (2001).
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine rooted in the British common-law system
where the Crown was immunized from suit. According to Justice Holmes, “A sovereign is
exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
154. See Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-110 (West 2010)
(limiting the liability for public entities to actions that were “willful and wanton”).
155. Cynthia Zellner MacKinnon, Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Re-Defining
the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 720, 724-29 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon,
Negligence of Municipal Employees] (discussing cases accepting or rejecting the PDD);
see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599-600 (Ariz. 1982) (noting that certain areas of im-
munity for state actors remained protected even after “removing the public/private duty
doctrine”); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Conn. 1982) (discussing
the distinction between public and private duties); Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 861
(N.Y. 1968) (“[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the
powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of
tort liability for police protection to [individual] members of the public.”).
156. See MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 155, at 721 (dis-
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the GIA adds an additional hurdle severely restricting one’s ability
to sue state actors by requiring willful conduct on the part of the
tortfeasor.157 Thus, for Jessica Gonzales, the PDD and GIA were
impenetrable barriers that could not be overcome. And, the Court
knew this.158
Why was the Court so duplicitous? Because preservation of the
economic status quo was more important than the truth; and the
truth is, a miserly process exists at the state level providing little if
any comfort or recompense for battered women and their children.
1. The Floodgates Argument
The Court bought the town’s floodgates argument. The “flood-
gates” argument is quite simple: if the Court rules in favor of Respon-
dent Gonzales, battered women will come out of the woodwork to sue
the state. If this happens, and liability claims against the state are
allowed and successful, potential judgments would severely cut into
public monies earmarked for services.159 And such a reduction would
result in either cutbacks or the elimination of much needed public
services.160 Indeed, the Denver Post, in one of its less than thoughtful
articles, parroted the floodgate argument.161 This “Chicken Little the
Sky is Falling” defense was premised on nothing more than unadul-
terated conjecture. It was hyperbole at its best.
Amici for the Town of Castle Rock sounded this alarm, repeat-
edly.162 As the Petitioner noted, the “flood[gates]” would open and
states would go bankrupt.163 Rubbish. Why rubbish? Because DeShaney
and restrictive policies under state tort law have shut the door on
negligence claims. Hence, this argument is unfounded. As a result,
there is no way to test whether a more open and flexible policy on
cussing the particularized connection requirement and law enforcement cases that found
that such connections did not exist).
157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-105(1) (2010); see also Miccio, supra note 107, at 131
(citation omitted) (discussing the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act).
158. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 769 n.15 (2005).
159. MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 155, at 727-29; see
also THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. HAVERY HAGGARD, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 300, 385-87 (4th ed. 1932)
(discussing an officer’s liability in private suits); EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 18 THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04.25, 193-209 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the negative effects
of imposing liability on municipalities).
160. Casey v. Geiger, 499 A.2d 606, 614 (Pa. 1985).
161. Restraining Order, supra note 146.
162. Brief for Int’l Mun. Lawyers Ass’n. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
3-4, 8-9, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278).
163. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2004)
(No. 04-278).
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state accountability would produce the outcome suggested by the
majority, the town, or the town’s friends. Simply put, the floodgates
argument is mere speculation and a contrived “what if” game.
2. The Cost of Male Intimate Violence
We do know the price if male intimate violence is left unabated.
Yet, the Court’s adoption of the floodgates argument ignores the socio-
economic cost of police refusal to protect in male intimate violence
cases, as is reflected in the economics of violence, depletion of human
capital, and lack of accountability. As one advocate correctly noted,
“It’s either pay now or pay later.”164
Just what are the economics of male intimate violence? Accord-
ing to the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),
intra-familial violence is pervasive, and it disproportionately affects
women.165 Indeed, Surgeons General—from Koop to the present—
have warned that male intimate violence is the leading cause of in-
jury to women in the 15-44 age group.166 Studies undertaken after the
1992 public hearings held by the Judiciary Committee confirm that
male intimate violence is at the epicenter of violence against women
and that it is very costly in terms of hospitalization, lost wages, court
costs, and incarceration.167 In his dissenting opinion in Morrison,
Justice Souter noted that Congress estimated the cost of domestic
violence at three billion dollars a year.168 And as Joan Zorza points
164. This comment was made by an advocate in New York City.
165. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(commenting on the financial costs of domestic violence (citation omitted)); see also VAWA
SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 38.
166. VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 38 (1993) (“Violence is the leading cause
of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings,
and cancer deaths combined.” (citing Surgeon General Antonio Novella, From the Surgeon
General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3132 (1992))); see also PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii-iv (2000) [hereinafter USDOJ NVAW
SURVEY], http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf (documenting the results of a study
of violence against women); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 2 (1998), http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172837.pdf (document-
ing the results of another study of violence against women).
167. See, e.g., USDOJ NVAW SURVEY, supra note 166, at 59-61 (reporting that violence
against women is predominantly intimate partner violence and detailing the social costs
of such violence).
168. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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out, male intimate violence is the primary factor in women and
children’s homelessness.169
There are hidden costs as well. When male intimate violence
remains unabated in families, it is used to sever the mother-child
bond.170 In New York City, the former Child Protective Services
(CPS)171 routinely petitioned against battered women when evidence
was present that children were in the home at the time that violence
occurred.172 In such cases, the State charged that battered women
“ ‘engaged in domestic violence.’ ”173
Another possible outcome in child abuse/neglect cases is the
placement of children in foster care. A family law attorney with exten-
sive experience in representing children in New York City’s Family
Court remarked that the combined effect of domestic violence with
the AIDS epidemic taxed the foster-care system in New York.174 In-
deed, this attorney speculated, and the studies support her belief that
169. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 383, 384 (1994).
170. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843-44 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing an in-
stance where a mother was separated from her child by the state as a result of suffering
domestic violence); see also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child:
The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 566-
78 (2004) (discussing the increasing frequency of removal of children from their battered
mothers’ homes and arguing that it is wrong to charge battered women with child abuse
or neglect for failing to protect a child from witnessing domestic violence); G. Kristian
Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the
Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 105 (1999)
(“The state’s refusal to intercede as an affirmative protector of the mother-child relation-
ship, while being altogether too willing to separate the child from her, makes the mother
a disengaged stranger to the law.”); G. Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and
Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the “Protected
Child” in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1095 (1995) (“Furthermore, be-
cause of the frequency and unpredictability of violence against women by intimate part-
ners, strict liability portends a culture in which removal of children, the break-up of the
family (mothers and children), and state control over mothers and children become the rule
and not the exception.”) (internal citation omitted).
171. It is interesting to note that New York’s CPS has undergone a series of name
changes—from Child Welfare Administration to Child Protective Services to the New York
City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS). It appears that these name changes
coincide with public scrutiny that has focused on the inadequacies within the agency. See,
e.g., Sorry, Rudy, You Had It Right the First Time, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1996, at A38 (dis-
cussing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s creation of the Administration for Children’s Services
amid criticism of the City’s “Child Welfare Administration”).
172. See, e.g., Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 842-43 (“Plaintiffs alleged that ACS, as a matter
of policy, removed children from mothers who were victims of domestic violence because,
as victims, they ‘engaged in domestic violence’ and that defendants removed and detained
children without probable cause and without due process of law.”).
173. Id. at 842.
174. Interview with Bonnie E. Rabin, Esq., N.Y., N.Y. (Summer 2004).
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if placements continued at current rates, the foster-care system in
New York City would collapse by the mid-twenty-first century.175
There also are costs in terms of human capital. By human capital,
I refer to human resources, such as time, energy, emotion, and psychic
energy that individual women must expend to survive from day to
day. When children are involved, such costs dramatically increase.
Martha Mahoney observed that battered women are constantly
mediating, planning and strategizing so as to survive from day to
day, week to week and month to month.176 By engaging in resistant
self-direction, women’s inner resources are depleted. And when such
resistance must be part of daily life, the expense to the individual
is incalculable.
Of equal importance is how the gendered nature of such conduct
remains invisible and unobserved. The failure to hold institutions
accountable for such practices creates a communal as well as indi-
vidual harm. VAWA hearings documented the pervasiveness of male
intimate violence.177 Moreover, the hearings identified myriad issues
concerning the gendered nature of state conduct—and how such con-
duct contributed to the perpetuation of violence regardless of whether
such conduct is characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance.178 The
Senate Judiciary Committee found crimes that “disproportionately
affect[ ] women are often treated less seriously than comparable
crimes affecting men.”179 In Washington, D.C., even though police pro-
tocols mandate arrest in domestic violence cases, arrests were made
in less than fifteen percent of cases where the survivor was bleeding
from her wounds.180
In Navaro v. Black, the Sheriff’s Department in Los Angeles
County, California was alleged to routinely classify domestic violence
175. Id.
176. Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
177. See, e.g., VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 41 (“[I]n over 85 percent of the
family violence cases . . . police did not arrest her abuser. Moreover, family violence
accounts for a significant number of murders in this country. One-third of all women who
are murdered die at the hands of a husband or boyfriend.”) (internal citations omitted).
178. See id. at 1-3 (demonstrating the breadth of issues addressed within the Act and,
impliedly, during the U.S. Senate hearings).
179. Id. at 49.
180. See id. at 41 (citing KAREN BAKER, ET AL., JOINT PROJECT, D.C. COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & WOMEN’S LAW & PUBLIC POLICY FELLOWSHIP PROJECT AT
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., REPORT ON D.C. POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
44 (1989)) (noting that arrests are not made in eighty-five percent of instances where the
survivor is bleeding).
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911 calls as emergency procedure calls.181 Instead all domestic vio-
lence calls were routed to the bottom of the response list.182 Such
dumping of domestic violence 911 calls occurred even when battered
women made allegations of protective order violations.183
Yet, due to crabbed notions of accountability vis-à-vis the Four-
teenth Amendment and state tort law, the courthouse door slammed
shut. And, when mandates are not worthy of enforcement; account-
ability is eclipsed.
***
Well, there you have it. The Court has spoken and the news is
not good. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
a worthless proviso in relation to the protection of battered women
from the vagaries of their batterers and from the state’s refusal to
follow mandates. But not because Colorado failed to create a valid
mandate or because Jessica Gonzales did not have a valid order of
protection. And certainly not because the language of Colorado’s
mandatory arrest statute lacked a commanding tone or lexicon. The
Court’s nullification of Colorado’s mandatory arrest law is due to its
application of the negative rights theory articulated so clearly by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in DeShaney.184 In Castle Rock, Rehnquist
was the invisible hand guiding Scalia’s pen.
IV. IS SISTERHOOD POWERFUL?
Failure is impossible.
—Susan B. Anthony185
Since Castle Rock, I’ve noted an anemic response to the Court’s
neutering of states’ mandatory arrest statutes. It is particularly un-
nerving that no viable political response has emerged from state-wide
advocacy groups in Colorado. Advocates have not lobbied to revise
the Governmental Immunity Act or to locate the contours of state
181. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995), appeal after remand sub
nom. Farjado v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999) (petitioner filed
constitutional claim against state).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 715 (noting that “there were no clearly delineated guidelines for respond-
ing to domestic violence calls, and that as such, the dispatchers were allowed to exercise
unbridled discretion”) (citation omitted).
184. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1988).
185. LYNN SHERR, FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANTHONY IN HER OWN WORDS 324
(1999).
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accountability in domestic violence provisions that permeate state
penal and family court acts. The question is why?
In Colorado, it appears that “reforming immunity statutes is out
of the question politically.”186 Out of the question politically—what
could that possibly suggest? If we decode this phrase, I suspect it
implies that immunity reform is unachievable. And in seeking such
reform, political and economic consequences could be levied against
domestic violence programs in the state. I understand the concerns
and fears associated with swimming against the political tide. And I
have the utmost respect for my sisters and their desire to be cautious.
But I have learned, through personal experience, that there is always
a price to be paid for stretching our collective consciousness by de-
manding accountability or, as written in the Talmud, by “speaking
truth to power.”187 And the truth is, unless accountability is incorpo-
rated into every policy related to male intimate violence, marginali-
zation of battered women will continue unabated. This is what Castle
Rock teaches. This is the hard lesson we should have learned by now.
But for some, impossibility was just another word for “nothing left
to lose.”188
By all standards, the struggle to enfranchise women was out of
the question politically as well in 1776, when Abigail Adams sent John
off with the exhortation, to “[r]emember the [l]adies,” she understood
that women’s political and civil rights were invisible, not merely im-
practical.189 Susan B. Anthony knew that the Declaration of Women’s
Rights, which grew out of the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848,
would not result in enfranchisement nor would such enfranchisement
come without a cost.190 Yet, for over 140 years, suffragists resisted the
impossible. And the cost? The cost was jail, forced feedings, ridicule,
beatings, and, in some instances, death.191
In Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr., re-
minds us that “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor;
it must be demanded by the oppressed,” and it will cost the oppressed
186. From a confidential e-mail received by the author in May 2008.
187. RABBI SYDNEY SCHWARTZ, JUDAISM AND JUSTICE: THE JEWISH PASSION TO REPAIR
THE WORLD 81-82 (2006).
188. JANIS JOPLIN, Me and Bobby McGee, on PEARL (Columbia Records 1971).
189. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE FEMINIST
PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 10, 10-11 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973).
190. BILL SEVERN, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL: HOW WOMEN WON THE RIGHT TO VOTE 66,
69, 74 (1967).
191. Id. at 75. During a public address in 1905, when she was “literally deluged with
floral tributes” when she rose to speak, Susan B. Anthony recalled the difficult periods of
the movement, stating “[t]his is rather different from the receptions I used to get fifty years
ago. They threw things at me then—but they were not roses.” IDA HUSTED HARPER, 3 THE
LIFE AND WORK OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 1365 (The Hollenbeck Press 1908).
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dearly.192 Our historical memory evokes images of civil rights workers
during the Mississippi Freedom Summer, who were murdered while
helping to register black voters.193 Registering black voters was not
just out of the question politically, it was deadly—something that
Mickey Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman came to
understand.194 Yet, their deaths did not stop the freedom trains. Dur-
ing that summer, students not only registered voters, they operated
Freedom Schools;195 pragmatism would not trump action or political
courage. The stakes were too high. And so it was for trade unionists,
women’s liberationists, and gay and lesbian activists.196 And so it
was for battered women’s activists. But something has changed: the
sisterhood’s power has dissipated. I wonder, what would Susan B.
think of us?
A. The Final Lie: It Pays to Play Nice
During the past year, I have spent time with advocates in
Colorado and New York. I have spoken with women who were in-
volved with the BWM and have left, some who are relatively new
and some who have been involved for a long time and continue to
participate. What I have heard from many of the women who entered
the movement in the 1960s and 1970s is that the movement has
been conservatized. What started as a grass-roots political move-
ment morphed into a social services entity. Yet, the observation of the
Colorado and New York activists in 2007-2008 is not new.197 In 1980,
192. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
82 (1963).
193. In 1964, hundreds of college students joined the freedom train and buses to help
register black voters during Freedom Summer. Organized by the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Council (SNCC), black and white kids packed up and left for Mississippi. Eyes
on the Prize, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eyesontheprize/story/09_summer
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). They were beaten and shot at and some were murdered.
The faces of the dead, images on a TV screen, are imprinted on my memory.
194. Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman were murdered by members of the Klu Klux
Klan in the summer of 1964. Shadi Rahimi, Ex-Klansman, 80, Gets 60 Years in Prison
for 1964 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/
national/23cnd-killen.html. Their beaten bodies were found in an earthen dam by the FBI.
Id. The men accused of the murder were acquitted by a local jury, however all but one
of the defendants were convicted of violating the three civil rights workers’ civil rights
in federal court and were sentenced to terms ranging from three to ten years. Id.
195. Freedom School Curriculum, EDUC. & DEMOCRACY, http://www.educationand
democracy.org/ED_FSC.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
196. See, e.g., DANIEL JACOBY, LABORING FOR FREEDOM: A NEW LOOK AT THE HISTORY
OF LABOR IN AMERICA 94 (1998) (discussing the Ludlow Massacre in Colorado resulting
from union miner strikes); RACHEL KRANZ & TIM CUSICK, GAY RIGHTS 167-184 (rev. ed.
2005) (outlining the chronology of events in the gay rights movement).
197. See Lois Ahrens, Battered Women’s Refuges: Feminist Cooperative vs. Social Service
Institutions, RADICAL AM. 41, 41 (May-June 1990) (discussing the phases of development
2011] THE DEATH OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 311
Lois Ahrens wrote that the shelters had devolved from “feminist, non-
hierarchical, community-based organizations [in]to institutionalized
social service agencies.”198 Ahrens predicted that the core of the BWM,
the shelters, would shift from political to social; ideologically disag-
gregating the cause from its political roots, gender dominance, and
methodologically abandoning the collective process model for a tradi-
tional top-down organizational structure.199
I do not believe that Lois Ahrens understood the significance of
her 1980 piece. It presaged not only the political shift of shelters,
but of a critical core within the movement. Ahrens’s analysis of what
happened to a shelter in the American Southwest charted a seismic
change nationally that reallocated power from resident to staff, re-
situated male intimate violence from gender violence to family vio-
lence, and recharacterized women’s actions as passive—a consequence
of learned helplessness.200 Because battered women’s shelters were
the nucleus or ideological center of the movement, their shift from a
political entity to a social services entity is critical because it altered
the ideological construct of the movement. The changes, cataloged
by Ahrens and her contemporaries, profoundly affected not only the
movement, but also social policy that was generated by movement
activists and state actors. As an advocate from Colorado opined, the
movement was transformed into discrete agencies that looked no dif-
ferent from the social service agencies that served the mentally handi-
capped, abused children, and the elderly.201 Their political edge was
lost,202 as was their political agenda, which named the violence,203
of social service entities as refuges for battered women).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 41-42; see also Miccio, supra note 6, at 248-56 (analyzing the intellectual and
political history of the battered women’s movement through the lens of mandatory arrest
and conceptions of autonomy and will).
200. Ahrens, supra note 197, at 42.
201. Interview conducted in summers of 2005 and 2007.
202. A good example of the dull blade wielded by the advocates is the issue of judicial
training raised by members of the Access to Justice Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association. At a series of meetings, advocates correctly identified the judiciary as a
problem in the Denver courts. Two judges were invited to give their opinions and
insights, and interestingly, they reinforced what advocates had been saying about judicial
ignorance of the law and of best practices when dealing with battered women. It was
decided that advocates should have a hand in setting up training, developing a
curriculum for the judges, and facilitating such trainings for new and existing judges.
The group correctly identified the need to have a hands-on approach in training the
judiciary. A member of the committee was instructed to contact the person charged with
judicial training. As the minutes of this meeting indicate, judicial training was placed
on the back burner, because the state actor charged with such training really was not
interested in the Bar Association’s help and there was already training by the Office of
Court Administration. See Colorado Bar Association, Family Violence Program Legal
Representation for Domestic Violence Survivors Committee Minutes (Jan. 9, 2008),
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the perpetrators, and the need for accountability by the state and
state actors.
This political fact of life has had a profound affect on how battered
women’s advocates interact with state actors. After Castle Rock, a
meeting was held in Denver at the Sturm College of Law, attended
by advocates, state actors, and members of law enforcement.204 At this
meeting, it appeared as if the advocates were backpedaling on the
issue of mandatory arrest, rather than examining how non-compliance
undercuts the “mandatory” part of the arrest statute.205 For example,
much discussion centered on the “fact” that mandatory arrest should
be renamed “probable cause arrest” so as to instruct police officers of
the minimum standard for arrest.206 But, if such practices were in fact
commonplace, then law enforcement needed a lesson in constitutional
predicates for detention, which could not be accomplished by simply
renaming a statutory mandate.
Colorado is not the only state where no viable plan has emerged.
In spring of 2007, I was part of a conference call that brought to-
gether advocates from various states and former advocates-turned-
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Family%20Violence/Legal%20Represenation%20for%
20DV%20Survivors/Minutes/2008 %20Minutes/1.9.08%20Minutes.pdf. I understand the
reticence of non-lawyers, and in some cases lawyers, to challenge the perception and
conduct of members of the judiciary and their counterparts in state government, but the
issue of judicial compliance with the law will reoccur unless it is treated as worthy of legal
and political action.
203. Adrienne Rich understood the power of naming. She recognized that empowerment
of a people is derived, in part, through the act of naming—naming the source of oppression
and the site of pain. READING ADRIENNE RICH: REVIEWS AND REVISIONS, 1951-81 100
(Jane Roberta Cooper ed., 1984). The power of naming gives voice to social phenomena,
while making visible the invisible. And it constructs how we interpret certain experiences.
Descendants of slaves, named by their slave masters—whose surnames were passed from
generation to generation—understood this most basic of human dignities. Perhaps that
is why Malcolm X cast off the slave name “Little” and replaced it with an “X” to remind
us that naming is an act of empowerment and a claim of identity. MALCOLM X, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 216-17 (1965). Naming, as the Talmud tells us, breathes
life into a person, into a people. LIVING TALMUD, THE WISDOM OF THE FATHERS AND ITS
CLASSICAL COMMENTARIES 69 (Judah Goldin trans., 1957) (“If not I for myself, who then?
And being for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?”). “Language is a system through
which meaning is constructed and cultural practices organized and by which, accordingly,
people represent and understand their world, including who they are and how they relate
to others.” Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 34 (1988) (postulating that
language is the means by which “people represent and understand their world”).
204. Meeting at Sturm College of Law discussing Castle Rock (Sept. 2005) (author in
attendance). Present at the meeting were members of the Colorado Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, the Denver Police Department, the Sturm College of Law Civil
Litigation Clinic, and Human Services Agency of the City of Denver.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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academics.207 During this conference call, Castle Rock was gently
raised by the law professors and quickly dispatched by the advocates
from at least four state-wide coalitions.208 The feeling that drove such
a choice not to act was that Castle Rock was too confusing, or too dif-
ficult to understand.209 While I do not doubt for a moment that the
opinion reads like an unsolved mystery, perhaps there was something
we could have done to turn a sow’s ear into silk. But nothing came
of the conference call or the meeting at Strum.
Again the question is why? Some would argue it has to do with
money and funding streams that may flow from the state.210 And
while funding did change the composition of shelters and therefore
the movement, this would be an interesting claim for the Colorado
BWM.211 Colorado is one of two states that does not provide funding
to domestic violence programs for overall operational expenses.212 It
appears that the movement in Colorado has been co-opted even before
it has received money from the political establishment.
But there must be more to this. Perhaps advocates are uneasy
about mandatory arrest. If this is indeed the case, then we need to
have a serious discussion about mandates, especially in the age of
Castle Rock. In Colorado and a handful of other states, doctors are
mandated to notify law enforcement if an injury seems to be the re-
sult of domestic violence.213 From 2004 to 2006, I conducted a study
involving close to 400 doctors in the Denver and Eagle Counties.214
Sixty percent of doctors who responded reported that they do not
207. Conference call with advocates facilitated by the Battered Women’s Justice Project
(2007) (author was a participant in call).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. There is no doubt that funding streams and their requisite demands played an
inordinate part in the conservatization of the BWM. See Miccio, supra note 6, at 256-58
(discussing the history of the BWM); see also Ahrens, supra note 197, at 41-47 (discussing
the effect of funding on the development of shelters into social service entities and the
importance of remaining true to feminist ideals); SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 93-98
(declaring that money was a “mixed blessing” for shelters and detailing how the funding
“undermined important movement principles” in some shelters).
211. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. The Legislature has given money for legal services; however more than twenty-two
percent of the $500,000 in 2008 was awarded to Legal Services of Colorado. Memoranda
on file with author.
213.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135 (West
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(F) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-9 (West
2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 91.003 (West 2010).
214. G. Kristian Miccio, Study on the Reporting of Domestic Violence (2006) (unpub-
lished study) (on file with author). 800 surveys were sent to doctors in Denver and Eagle
Counties. 365 doctors responded, and of those who responded 60% claimed that where
injuries were likely caused by domestic violence, the doctors did not make the required
reports.
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make reports to law enforcement.215 Perhaps mandates should be on
the table, regardless of whether those mandates compel the police or
doctors, because they are not being followed and, with Castle Rock,
they are unenforceable. But this issue is not part of the legislative
conference, or discursive agenda of the leaders of either the state-
wide or national advocacy community.216
The failure of the BWM to address Castle Rock is emblematic of
a much larger problem. It is not about a difference of political opinion
or strategy; rather, as illustrated by the goings on in Colorado, the
BWM lacks a cogent political platform, a political strategy, and the
requisite political courage to make the changes in policy and law
foisted upon it by Castle Rock. It is as if we have battened down the
hatches and kept our heads down while deciding to play nice. But as
social movements before us learned, nice girls (and boys) are irrele-
vant when the struggle is about the liberation of a people, and here
it is about the liberation of women and children from homes marked
by terror.217 And while I have the utmost respect for my sisters and
brothers in the BWM, I am concerned that our failure to confront
Castle Rock head on is a missed opportunity, a missed opportunity to
raise and address the issue of state accountability in an age of denial.
V. WHAT SHALL WE DO?
What shall we do? The answer rests in reforming state tort law,
not in attempting to raise constitutional torts. The Supreme Court’s
adherence to a negative rights constitution makes any claims analo-
gous to Castle Rock a worthless enterprise unless the Court is recon-
stituted with Justices who view the Constitution as a compendium
of negative and positive liberties. Thus, we need to look to negligence
actions against the state. This will require reworking state tort law
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., COLO. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, avail-
able at http://www.ccadv.org/images/2009_CCADV_Annual_Report.pdf (demonstrating
a general lack of public focus on the arrest mandates for police officers or the medical
reporting mandates for doctors); NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE’S 14TH NAT’L
CONFERENCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CONFERENCE AGENDA (2010), http://www.ncadv
.org/files/2010%20Detailed%20Agenda%2062210.php (demonstrating a general lack of
public focus on the arrest mandates for police officers or the medical reporting mandates
for doctors).
217. See Introduction: Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 278, 280 (1994)
(describing the correlation between the more aggressive activist-minded nature of indi-
viduals and the progress of the gay and lesbian agenda from a social movement to a liber-
ation movement); Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context
and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2003) (describing the transformation of the Black
Freedom Movement marked by insistent “demands for justice” and protests that were
“ ‘more vigorous, sustained, and multifaceted’ ”) (citations omitted).
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by limiting the affect of the PDD and, where applicable, state immu-
nity acts in cases of police refusal to enforce orders of protection.
We know that tort law plays an “epistemic role in our soci-
ety . . . by illuminating relationships in the light of our public stan-
dards of responsibility.” 218 It not only attempts to remedy injustice;
it also exposes normative cultural beliefs concerning legal relation-
ships “between parties by articulating and applying conceptions of
responsibility.” 219
The normative beliefs that define state accountability vis-à-vis
police conduct are disturbing because, when police accountability is
part of the calculus, common sense is abandoned and replaced by an
obtuse notion of responsibility. For example, the construct of the
police officer-as-ordinary-citizen denies the integral position that law
enforcement should play in our communities. Moreover, by situating
the police officer on the same level as the ordinary citizen, we obscure
how law enforcement’s negligent conduct contributes to the perpetu-
ation of male intimate violence.
Such formalized equality belies the fact that the police are em-
powered to enforce the cultural prescriptions and prohibitions that
shape individual and collective behavior. Yet the law regards law en-
forcement officers as no different from ordinary citizens, wishing away
the training, power, and authority consonant with their professional
and community status.
The confluence of the PDD with conceptions of duty creates a
non-accountability paradigm that distorts notions of responsibility,
adversely affecting the lives of battered women and the community.220
The question that remains is: What shall be done?
A. The Reformation: Toward a Principled Notion of State
Accountability
The law’s actual effect in the world matters more than the law’s
existence. It means that if we are not getting socially positive results
from law as it is, we need to focus more on law as it should be.221
218. Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation
and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 504 (2005).
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 167-183 and accompanying text (detailing the cost of domestic
violence).
221. See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING & LEGAL THEORY 6 (2006)
(“Concrete and stable legal successes are grounded, consciously or not, on theoretical foun-
dations. If theories don’t work in practice, they are not very good theories.”).
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You need spend only a few minutes with Jessica Gonzales to
know that the current accountability paradigm is not working. And
if you have never spoken with a battered woman, simply read the
narratives of women-survivors contained in the pages of testimony
from the VAWA, the state court reports, or the hearings conducted
by the Attorney General and the Commission on Civil Rights.222 Their
words remind us that accountability is lacking, even where policies
mandate police conduct, such as arrest, in cases where battered
woman have called the police.223 The police are ignoring mandates
with impunity.
And why shouldn’t they? Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that “shall,” as in “shall arrest,” means “maybe or maybe not.” 224
According to the Court, mandatory policies do not compel conduct—
they merely suggest behavior.225 Although this approach seems tor-
tured, it logically follows notions of a negative-rights Constitution,
and on the state level, of public duty and private rights in police pro-
tection cases.226 If a police officer is treated as the ordinary disengaged
stranger, protecting individual citizens cannot be compelled. It is this
“logic” that needs reforming.
B. Making Public Policy Accountable to Battered Women and to
the Community: A Higher Standard of Care
It is essential that, where legislation mandates police behavior,
public policy explicitly includes a presumption of duty between the
police and the object of the mandate. The raison d’etre for such man-
dates is to abate violence directed against battered women. Further-
more, where legislation mandates arrest for violent felonies such as
aggravated assault or battery, or violation of a stay-away or no-contact
order, the subject of the mandate is the perpetrator and the object is
the battered woman. Consequently, a duty to care for battered women
derives from the mandate and the fact that the battered woman is
a member of a specific class of individuals singled out by the statute
for protection.
222. See, e.g., COMM’N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., GENDER AND JUSTICE IN
THE COURTS 1-3 (1991) (reporting the pervasiveness of gender bias in domestic violence
cases in the courts and the testimonies heard by the courts).
223. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY
PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: EVALUATION OF THE
MANDATORY ARREST PROVISIONS 45-48 (2001) [hereinafter MANDATORY ARREST] (noting
that even with the mandatory arrest provision in New York’s Criminal Procedure Law,
some police officers in the eight sites studied were not making arrests for a myriad of
spurious reasons); Miccio, supra note 6, at 298 (discussing the report).
224. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
225. See id. (noting that there is police discretion).
226. See id. at 760-66 (determining that Gonzales did not have a personal entitlement).
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Moreover, police status creates the duty, regardless of statutory
mandate. Here, all citizens are dependent upon the police to address
crime and to provide protection. The police, not the individual citizens,
are trained to spot crime, conduct investigations, and effectuate an
arrest, even with force. Reliance upon police protection then is a given,
unless we are willing to devolve into a society where vigilantism de-
fines protection. I doubt that we are willing to endorse either vigi-
lantism or self-help. Consequently, accountability constructs should
reflect the reality concerning the police, the citizen, and protection.
We are not out of the woods yet, however. Legislation must
clearly articulate standards concerning foreseeability and harm. And
the appropriate standard should be determined by the nature of the
policy initiative.
Where legislation or administrative directive mandates behavior,
foreseeability of the harm is irrelevant. What controls is the existence
of the harm and whether the plaintiff and the defendant are members
of the class defined by statute. Once harm and class are established,
accountability is required and liability should be assessed. Essentially,
mandatory legislation creates a type of strict liability.
Where legislation creates a quasi-mandatory directive or a policy
where discretion remains undisturbed, a hybrid objective/subjective
standard should define foreseeability; thus, constructive knowledge
would suffice.227 Knowledge of the harm by one officer is imputed to
all officers at a specific precinct.228 Particularized knowledge would
not be required and should be specifically excluded from a statutory
or administrative scheme.
There is ample evidence to support this position. Culturally, male
intimate violence has achieved notoriety, as have the social policies
that sanctioned the violence. Indeed, if nothing else was gained by the
O.J. Simpson trial, the American viewer was schooled in how male
privilege and police unaccountability make for a deadly combination.
It is hard to forget the 911 call by Nicole Brown Simpson through
which rage, anger, and violence were indelibly marked on our collec-
tive memory.229 It is also hard to forget how the police took O.J. on
the proverbial walk around the block—even with mandatory arrest
227. A hybrid standard raises the question: What should a reasonable, prudent police
officer have known under the circumstances? The reasonably prudent police officer is sub-
jectively qualified. A balance is struck between the mythical objective person, which in this
case is a police officer, and circumstances particular to the officer on the scene.
228. Constructive knowledge is not a novel approach. The court in Sorichetti v. City of
New York used constructive knowledge. 482 N.E.2d 70, 76 (N.Y. 1985). This standard was
reaffirmed in subsequent cases, such as Cuffy v. City of New York, when assessing liability
on the part of the police. 505 N.E.2d 937, 940-41 (N.Y. 1987).
229. Transcript excerpts of Nicole Brown Simpson call to 911 (Oct. 25, 1993), available
at http://walraven.org/simpson/911-1993.html.
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policies in force in California.230 Consequently, what responding offi-
cers knew in the O.J. case should have been imputed to every officer
from the Brentwood precinct; thus, what one should know derives
from common knowledge of the collective.
The question of harm is more textured, however, because it raises
critical questions as to harm’s constitutive nature. Where legislation
imposes mandatory arrest for violations of stay-away orders, no-
contact provisions, or violent felony offenses, should the police’s
“failure” to secure either an arrest or warrant constitute per se harm?
Or should public policy require “failure plus,” with “plus” amounting
to subsequent violations, physical injury, or both?
To answer this we need to refer back to findings by the Civil
Rights Commission, the U.S. Attorney General’s report, the state task
force reports on women and the courts, and the Federal VAWA.231 All
recognized that systemic neglect contributes to perpetuation of male
intimate violence.232 All specifically pointed to police arrest avoidance
as a major factor in systemic accountability failures.233 Moreover, an
examination of the legislative findings during the debate on manda-
tory arrest produces the same result—the social harm that mandatory
arrest was thought to abate was two-fold: the violence perpetuated
by the batterer and the violence that police neglect created. If we
follow this logic, then police arrest avoidance constitutes the harm.
Thus, failure to arrest or secure an arrest warrant would meet the
harm requirement; “failure plus” is contrary to legislative intent.
While I recognize the validity of this approach because it is sup-
ported by legislative findings nationwide, I am sympathetic to those
who claim that it could overlook the police’s (failed) efforts to arrest
or secure a warrant. Additionally, such a stringent standard could
produce a draconian response from the police where mutual arrest
of battered women and batterers becomes the rule rather than the
exception; a shield transformed into a sword.234
It is also important to note that feminists who crafted mandatory
arrest laws were more interested in infusing care and accountability
into police behavior than in upping the number of arrests made or
230. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 836 (West 2010).
231. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); supra notes 79, 223,
224 and accompanying text.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
233. Id.
234. In State v. Lucas, Ohio attempted to hold a battered woman criminally liable as an
accomplice to a contempt of court charge when she permitted her ex-husband to attend
their child’s birthday party. 795 N.E.2d 642, 642-43 (Ohio 2003). The prosecutor claimed
that she helped her husband violate a stay-away provision in the protective order by allow-
ing his attendance at the party. Id. at 643. Fortunately, the Ohio Supreme Court struck
down her conviction. Id. at 648.
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warrants issued.235 Therefore, legislation should create a rebuttable
presumption that the state can refute by evidence of due diligence
on the part of the police. This standard strikes a balance between
accountability interests and financial concerns. What should consti-
tute the harm is police behavior that marginalizes male intimate vio-
lence as opposed to failure to arrest or secure a warrant.
Unlike mandatory arrest provisions, where police discretion is
retained, a rebuttable presumption is appropriate. The standard to
refute the presumption, however, should be reasonable police ef-
forts.236 If the state can show that police conduct was reasonable,
then the state will prevail, even though the police failed to arrest or
secure a warrant.
Finally, where restrictions on police discretion are necessary to
ensure protection, legislation that merely creates the restriction is not
enough. Any statutory or administrative scheme must contemplate
how accountability is to be measured, and where appropriate liability
is to be assessed. Experience has taught us that merely articulating
“shall” does not create accountability because cultural and legal pre-
rogative protects the state at the expense of the individual. If we
learned anything in the years since imposition of mandatory arrest
statutes, it is that public policy must specifically enumerate ac-
countability standards or else “shall” will be construed as merely
rhetorical or unworkable abstraction.
CONCLUSION
You have afforded me a courtesy that my own
country has not afforded me, in allowing me to tell
my story for the first time.237
—Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales)
On March 7, 2007, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights heard Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) recount the horror that
235. I was one of the authors of New York’s mandatory-arrest law. I therefore speak
from first-hand experience. The motivation for New York’s law was accountability, not
filling jails with batterers. See Miccio, supra note 6, at 240.
236. I would agree with scholars who opine that courts should not substitute their
judgment for that of the police in jurisdictions where discretion has been retained. See,
e.g., Nicole M. Quester, Note, Refusing to Remove an Obstacle to the Remedy: The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Continues to Deny Domestic Violence
Victims Meaningful Recourse, 40 AKRON L. REV. 391, 421-22 (2007) (noting the Supreme
“Court substituted its own policy judgments for those of the Colorado Legislature”
(citation omitted)).
237. Paul Wochter, The Long Wait for Justice, COLUM. L. SCH. MAG., Spring 2008 at
46, 49 (quoting Jessica Lenahan Gonzales).
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eclipsed all emotion on June 9, 1999.238 For the first time, a legal tri-
bunal was privy to the pain, the lost promise, and the unmitigated de-
spair associated with the murder of three little girls while the Castle
Rock police turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to their mother’s re-
peated requests to enforce an order of protection.
March 7, 2007, marked more than Jessica’s chance to speak, but
gave a voice to her three children. It is a shameful reminder that for
battered women and their children, the Fourteenth Amendment is
a hollow promise, a cruel deception. Yet, March 7 is more than a re-
minder of a constitutional failure or a miscarriage of justice; it tells
us that our laws and courts will not extend to battered women the
protection that they deserve. Today battered women are disengaged
strangers to law and to compassion. But there is more to this lesson.
We have deserted Jessica Lenahan, and by we, I include myself
along with the BWM. It is as if her story was a headline today only to
be forgotten tomorrow. Perhaps this is a consequence of shortsighted-
ness or political naïveté. But it really does not matter what the rea-
sons are; the result is that public policies such as “mandatory” arrest
are futile because accountability is absent. And we, the movement’s
movers and shakers, have collaborated in this cruel deception.
I suspect that some may find my critique harsh. I find our silence
harsher.239 So what shall we do? Act.
My hope is that we will find the political courage to write account-
ability into every piece of public policy that affects the lives of battered
women and children regardless of the political cost. My hope is that
we will live the dream of Susan B. Anthony and the advocates who
understood that change is costly, it is painful, and it is inescapable.
And because change is inescapable, the question is whether we shall
be the architects of that change or defer, out of misplaced caution or
abiding fear, to those whose craven sense of justice and compassion
marginalizes battered women’s lives and rights.
As Hillel said, “if not now, when?” 240
238. Ms. Lenahan is represented by the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School.
Professor Caroline Bettinger-Lopez and her students seem to be the only advocates still
standing beside Ms. Lenahan as she fights her battle to bring accountability into our
discourse on justice.
239. At this juncture, I need to recognize the incredible work of Professor Joan Meier
and her clinic at George Washington Law School. The Domestic Violence Project con-
sistently inserts the voice of battered women in appellate cases that have a profound
effect on the way we parse rights/responsibility. And while I have raised these difficult
questions, my concern rests with the battered women’s movement, or rather the estab-
lished domestic violence community, as opposed to individual advocates, many of whom
are tireless in the struggle for battered women’s rights.
240. PIRKE ABOTH 34 (R. Travers Herford ed. & trans., 3d rev. ed. 1945).





In light of the 2008 presidential campaign, Gregory S. Parks
and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski wrote an extensive analysis, titled A Better
Metric, likening the campaign to an interview process and hiring
decision for a high-ranking job. Though unpublished, their work
spawned a number of published articles, book chapters, and a book
on the role of unconscious race and gender bias in the evaluations of
President Barack Obama, First Lady Michelle Obama, and Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton. In light of the analogy between voting and
hiring decisions, this article argues that questions about sexism and
gender bias along the campaign trail implicate the law. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from gender bias in
the workplace. While modern conceptions of how such bias actually
operates, largely drawn from social and cognitive psychology, should
aid legal decision-makers in determining whether bias indeed occurred
in any particular case, greater insight into the intersection of psychol-
ogy and the law is needed. Here, we explore the roles that sexism and
implicit, or unconscious, gender bias played in the 2008 presidential
race, analyzing these factors through the lens of Title VII. Further, we
buttress the proposition put forth by a growing body of legal scholars
that the role of implicit attitudes in decision-making has significant
implications for Title VII jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE INFLUENCE OF SEXISM ON WOMEN’S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION AND POWER
II. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR EXPLICIT SEXISM?
A. Sexism and the Electability of Women Candidates
B. Sexism and the Clinton Campaign
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III. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS?
A. Implicit Bias: A Definition





As a chief executive, commander-in-chief, foreign policy director
and legislative leader, the President of the United States has a
complex and challenging job. Yet despite the positional power and
authority associated with the job, it is a job nonetheless.1 Accordingly,
presidential elections can be likened to an employment context. When
U.S. citizens vote for a presidential candidate they attempt to eval-
uate who would be the best person for the job. Like employers, the
American people are tasked with hiring (electing), promoting (re-
electing), and—through their representatives—firing (impeaching
and removing) job incumbents. Like employees, candidates are chal-
lenged to demonstrate their qualifications for, interest in, and fit to
the position. Overall both sides strive to achieve an optimal fit be-
tween a job candidate and a position.
According to political theorists, voters select candidates who sup-
port and implement policies they favor.2 More specifically, based on
psychological theories of similarity and attraction,3 voter preferences
are posited to be for candidates who match their attitudes toward
certain policies. The results of research on voting behavior, however,
tell a somewhat different story as voters’ candidate preferences have
been shown to correlate with individual perceptions of candidates’
traits, and emotional reactions to the candidates themselves.4 As is
1. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election ‘08, and the
Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 659, 676-77, 686, 701 (2010); Gregory
S. Parks et al., Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210, 215 (2009), available at http://www
.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=20; Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson,
Michelle Obama: A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through
the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3-4 (2009); see also Jim Acosta et al.,
Clinton: ‘Think About This as a Hiring Decision,’ CNN.COM, May 18, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/ 2008/POLITICS/05/18/campaign.wrap/index.html (referring to the
U.S. presidency as a job and the race for it as a job interview).
2. See J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 174 (1979) (describing
different motivations of voters).
3. See DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 247-50 (1971) (discussing how simi-
larity and attraction might apply in the context of candidates and voters).
4. Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Public Opinion and Political Action, in 2
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true in employers’ hiring decisions,5 subjective factors influence indi-
vidual assessments regarding who is the “best person” for the job.
The 2008 presidential race provides a useful context in which to
explore gender perceptions and attitudes, specifically how those factors
influenced voting behavior during Hillary Clinton’s presidential run.6
If citizens held certain perceptions of Clinton’s abilities relative to
those needed to be an effective president or had emotional reactions
to her and her candidacy, then it is reasonable to envisage that such
factors influenced citizens’ behavior as voters. Furthermore, if elec-
tions and hiring decisions are analogous, implicit attitudes research
sheds light on gender discrimination in the employment context. As
such, contemporary Title VII scholarship and certain aspects of the
2008 presidential election may reciprocally illuminate one another.
By likening the 2008 presidential election to personnel selec-
tion, we consider broadly whether Clinton would have a viable claim
against the American people for sex-based employment discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Specifically, this article provides three parallels:
1) the role of gender in politics; 2) the role of gender under Title VII;
and 3) the distinction between conscious/explicit and unconscious/
implicit gender biases and their roles within politics and employment
discrimination law. Part I of this article discusses women’s political
participation as both voters and candidates and reflects on the role of
sexism in these political processes. Part II draws upon political sci-
ence research to investigate voting behavior in elections with female
candidates, and considers the potential role of sexism and gender bias
in Clinton’s campaign. Part III further explores unconscious gender
biases and their influence on employment discrimination and ex-
trapolates from jurisprudence in this area to make inferences about
whether Clinton could file a successful Title VII claim for implicit
gender bias in her quest to become President of the United States.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF SEXISM ON WOMEN’S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION AND POWER
As discussed in Parks and Rachlinski’s A Better Metric, women
have long been disenfranchised in the political arena.7 Dating as far
back as the late 1700s, few women—and ultimately only free white
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 690, 690-91 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds.,
Random House 3d ed. 1985).
5. Paul R. Sackett & Filip Lievens, Personnel Selection, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419,
429-30 (2008).
6. Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of Unconscious
Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Race 32-33, 35-38 (Cornell Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-007, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1102704.
7. Id.
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men—were allowed to vote.8 When it came time to agitate for women’s
right to vote, it was not the major political parties of the day that
fought for women.9 Rather, it was middle- and upper-class women.10
After Congress ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, southern white
men opposed female suffrage out of fear that it would increase the
number of black voters.11 Opponents also argued that voting “was
not a right but [rather] a privilege,” and that women were virtually
represented by men.12
During its evolution, “[t]he women’s suffrage movement witnessed
three stages.”13 The first stage began in 1848 when the Women’s
Rights Convention, with an emphasis on political rights, adopted its
declaration.14 During the second stage, which was bolstered by the
Civil War, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony led the
Women’s National Loyalty League, which “backed Senator [Charles]
Sumner’s insistence that the [Civil W]ar be a battle for . . . universal
emancipation.”15 When Congress refused to send the states an amend-
ment, analogous to the Fifteenth Amendment but in respect to gender
and voting, suffrage leaders focused on the Fourteenth Amendment,
which they believed protected a woman’s right to vote.16 During the
final stage, in and around 1869, women founded the National Woman
Suffrage Association—to pressure Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment that would enfranchise women—and the American
Woman Suffrage Association, which focused its efforts on constitu-
tional conventions and state legislatures.17 In 1890, these organiza-
tions combined, forming the National American Woman Suffrage
Association (NAWSA).18 It was due to the efforts of NAWSA and
other women’s organizations that Congress ratified the Nineteenth
Amendment, which gave women the right to vote.19
8. Id. at 6 (citing DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 117-18 (2004)).
9. Id. (citing DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 119 (2004)).
10. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE LAW 120 (2004).
11. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 117-
22).
12. Id. (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 121).
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125-27).
15. STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 127.
16. Id. at 129.
17. Id. at 131-32.
18. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125,
131-33).
19. Id. at 7 (citing STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 125-33, 182).
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The efforts of women suffragists had a slow but critical impact
on women’s political power in the United States. From 1917—when
the first woman joined Congress20—until the early 1990s, few women
were elected to Congress.21 In 1993, however, women nearly doubled
their congressional ranks from thirty-four to fifty-five.22 As of the
110th Congress (2007-2009), the number stood at ninety-four,23 which
shows that gender still matters to voters, including women, who
comprise fifty-four percent of the electorate.24 It is the change in law,
but far slower change in a potential outcome of the law, which under-
scores the potential that individual attitudes have to effectuate change
in human behavior. The point being, “the law can only truly make a
difference if underlying discriminatory attitudes change as well.” 25
II. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR EXPLICIT SEXISM?
It is no surprise that a political candidate’s gender has long
predicted electability.26 This article argues that politics is analogous
to the employment context. In both, an individual is presumably seek-
ing a position, often in competition with others, and is at the mercy of
those who must decide to elect (in the political context) or hire (in the
employment context) that individual.27 If such an analogy is apropos,
then Title VII is instructive in how one might examine the 2008 presi-
dential election—under Title VII, employers may not discriminate
because of an applicant’s sex.28 In its Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
20. I’m No Lady, I’m a Woman of Congress: Women Pioneers on Capital Hill, 1917-
1934, WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-essays/essay
.html?intID=2 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
21. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 7.
22. Women Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 102nd Congress,
WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives
-senators-by-congress.html?congress=102 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011); Women Representa-
tives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 103rd Congress, WOMEN IN CONGRESS,
http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives-senators-by-
congress.html?congress=103 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
23. Women Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1917-Present: 110th Congress,
WOMEN IN CONGRESS, http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives
-senators-by-congress.html?congress=110 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
24. See Kathleen Q. Seelye & Dalia Sussman, Clinton Has Support of Women But Faces
Skepticism, Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at A1 (noting that fifty-four percent of the
electorate was female in 2007).
25. Laura Bacon, Note, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice
for Housing Choice Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2006).
26. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 32-33.
27. See Jim Acosta et al., supra note 1 (likening Clinton’s presidential campaign to a
traditional hiring decision).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
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decision, the Supreme Court clarified what constitutes sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII.29 “[W]hen a plaintiff . . . proves that her gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid . . . liability only by proving . . . it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into
account.” 30 In deciding Price Waterhouse, the Court looked to gender-
stereotyping language used by company partners and representatives
during their partnership selection process.31
An expert witness, psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske, “testified at
trial that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was
likely influenced by sex stereotyping.” 32 Dr. Fiske predicated her
analysis on “the overtly sex-based comments of partners” and their
“gender-neutral remarks” that “were intensely critical of [plaintiff-
respondent].” 33 According to Dr. Fiske, given that plaintiff-respondent
was “the only woman in the pool of candidates” 34 and the evaluations’
subjectivity, the highly critical remarks were probative of gender
bias.35 The Supreme Court found that in previous years when evalu-
ating partner candidates at Price Waterhouse, partners favored those
who maintained their femininity over those who did not.36
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that sex-stereotyped remarks
in the employment context are not automatic proof of gender discrimi-
nation.37 Where, however, the employee demonstrates that the em-
ployer relied on gender in making its decision, stereotyped remarks
can be “evidence that gender played a part” in the hiring decision.38
It also placed the burden on the employer to show that it had a legiti-
mate reason for an employment decision where there is both a pos-
sible legitimate and discriminatory motive.39
A. Sexism and the Electability of Women Candidates
As Parks and Rachlinski have noted, “sex-role stereotyping . . .
has hampered women’s ability to be considered as serious candidates
for elected office.” 40 This is in part due to gender stereotyping, which
29. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 258.
38. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 252. “The employer . . . must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone,
would have induced it to make the same decision.” Id.
40. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 32 (citing KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR
WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 8-9, 59-67 (2004)).
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continues to pervade American electoral politics.41 Even beyond voter
behavior, women’s lack of traction as political candidates also has
to do with political parties’ gate-keeping activities, as party leaders
are aware of gender stereotypes and the electoral chances of women
vis-à-vis men.42 It is not only men whose voting decisions are influ-
enced by gender; women’s are as well, with women supporting female
candidates more than male candidates.43 While there is evidence of the
influence of gender on voting behavior, the political outcomes of such
gender effects have been mixed. For example, research shows that
once on the ballot, women have been as successful as men at gaining
elected office.44 In addition, reviews of U.S. House of Representatives
elections revealed no significant differences in the success of male
versus female candidates.45 One conclusion might be that the role of
sexism in political processes has substantially diminished in recent
years. The results of research on sexism and the electability of female
candidates may also reflect the types of positions for which women
have primarily run. Because few women have pursued a major-party
presidential nomination,46 we have little insight into the effects of
41. Id. (citing RICHARD LOGAN FOX, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
173-75 (1997); Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attribution
of Leadership Traits, 46 POL. RES. Q. 527 (1993); David Niven, Party Elites and Women
Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57 (1998); Kira Sanbonmatsu, Gender
Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002)). For example, women can-
didates who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a disadvantage, par-
ticularly in terms of male voters. Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen, The Consequences
of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office, 46
POL. RES. Q. 503, 517-18 (1993). Moreover, when contemplating who to elect for President,
voters who view terrorism, homeland security, and U.S. involvement in Iraq as the most
important problems facing the U.S. believe that a man will do a better job of handling such
issues. Erika Falk & Kate Kenski, Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for
Women as Presidents in Times of War and Terrorism, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1, 12 (2006).
42. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 33 (citing KIRA SANBONMATSU, WHERE WOMEN
RUN: GENDER & PARTY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 2-3, 22, 26-30, 37-86, 97-115, 118 (2006)).
43. Id. at 33 (citing KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC
EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 92, 101 (2004); Craig Leonard Brians, Women for
Women?: Gender and Party Bias in Voting for Female Candidates, 33 AM. POL. RES. 357,
359 (2005); Paul S. Herrnson et al., Women Running “as Women”: Candidate’s Gender,
Campaign Issues, and Voter Targeting Strategies, 65 J. POL. 244, 249-50 (2003); Eric
Plutzer & John F. Zipp, Identity Politics, Partisanship, and Voting for Women Candidates,
60 PUB. OPINION Q. 30, 40 (1996)).
44. Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate Evaluation:
Good News and Bad News for Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS
29, 30 (Victor C. Ottati et al. eds., 2002).
45. RICHARD A. SELTZER ET AL., SEX AS A POLITICAL VARIABLE: WOMEN AS CANDIDATES
AND VOTERS IN U.S. ELECTIONS 79, 82-83 (1997); Alice H. Eagly et al., Experimental Tests
of an Attitudinal Theory of the Gender Gap in Voting, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL., 1245, 1256 (2003).
46. Sean Alfano, The Quest to Become Ms. President: Female Politicians Discuss the
Prospects of a Woman Leader, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 5, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2006/02/05/Sunday/main1281736.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
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sexism on female candidates’ qualifications for, and ability to succeed
in, the position of President of the United States. Further, because
gender may play a stronger role when determining a person’s fitness
for specific roles,47 consideration of the relationship between gender
and electability at higher levels is needed. Research suggests that men
are favored over women when vying for authority positions, such as
military officerships, given that such positions tend to be traditionally
occupied by male incumbents and therefore are male-dominated.48
“Individuals may be comforted by male leadership for the simple fact
that they are accustomed to viewing men as authority figures and
women as subordinates.” 49 Therefore, in examining the 2008 presi-
dential race, there are factors that suggest that Clinton would have
a case against the American people for sex-based employment dis-
crimination if the race had been a job interview.
B. Sexism and the Clinton Campaign
Hillary Clinton first entered national consciousness in 1992 after
her husband, Bill Clinton, became a candidate for the Democratic
Party’s presidential nomination.50 After President Clinton won the
nomination and the election, and subsequently assumed office, Mrs.
Clinton was a trailblazer and an unconventional First Lady in many
ways—becoming the first to (1) hold a post-graduate degree and pro-
fessional career, (2) have an office in the West Wing of the White
House, and (3) be a visible policy-maker in her husband’s administra-
tion.51 “Hillary Clinton was arguably the most openly empowered First
Lady in American history, save perhaps for Eleanor Roosevelt.” 52
Although she was a polarizing figure in American politics for nearly
a decade and a half,53 she was enormously popular in New York,
47. See Eugenia Proctor Gerdes & Jane Hutson Kelman, Sex Discrimination: Effects
of Sex-Role Incongruence, Evaluator Sex, and Stereotypes, 2 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 219, 224 (1981) (explaining study results indicating that evaluators are influ-
enced by traditional sex roles as well as the gender of candidates).
48. Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111
PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 7 (1992); Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and
Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1315, 1325 (2000).
49. Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1325.
50. John F. Harris & Ann Devroy, Her Way Versus the Washington Way: Ambition and
Suspicion in the First Year Are Redounding on Hillary Rodham Clinton, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 1996, at A1.
51. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 34 (citing Christopher Hanson, Clinton
Invites the People In: President Opens the White House to Ordinary Citizens, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 1993, at A1; Harris & Devroy, supra note 51, at A1; Jasmin
K. Williams, Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30, 2006, at 28).
52. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 34.
53. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Who Is More Electable?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A31
(noting fear that Clinton’s political history—since her husband’s 1992 election—would keep
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winning a landslide U.S. Senate re-election in 2006.54 Clinton’s 2008
presidential run put to the test Americans’ willingness to elect a
woman as president, and poll data boded well for her candidacy.55
Calling into question her candidacy was, in part, the result of an
immense dislike of her held by many political conservatives.56 Part of
their animus likely stemmed from the fact that Clinton was deemed
to be “polarizing.” 57 It may have also resulted from an attitude among
some that Clinton failed to conform to or respect normative wife-and-
mother behavior.58 For example, Clinton is famous for noting that,
as First Lady, she did not want to “stay at home, bake cookies and
give teas.” 59
Accordingly, while poll data should have provided the Clinton
campaign with signs of optimism, it should have also been foreboding.
On one hand, some women voters paid more attention to the presi-
dential race and were more likely to vote because of Clinton’s candi-
dacy.60 While 80% of Americans told Gallup pollsters in a November
2007 poll that they expected female voters to be the deciding factor in
Clinton’s election to the presidency, 77% of women polled reported
that they had not made up their minds.61 On the other hand, polls
her from winning votes).
54. Patrick Healy, In a Field of Heavy Hitters No Sure Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2007, at 27.
55. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 35 (describing polling data that was favor-
able for Clinton) (citing Bonnie Erbe Scripps, Will Women Vote for Women?, DESERT NEWS,
Jan. 28, 2007, at G04; Andrea Sarvaday Feldhahn, Does Sen. Hillary Clinton’s Gender Hurt
Her Chances to be Elected President?, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2007, at 79).
Moreover, in a general election match-up with then-leading GOP contender Rudy Giuliani,
Clinton’s lead was partially credited to women voters. Alex Spillius, Hillary Drawing
Increasing Support from Women in Blow to Giuliani, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 2007, at
21. Furthermore, while women held more positive views of “all of the leading Democratic
candidates” than did men, “winning the support of women . . . [was] especially important
to Mrs. Clinton,” because women constituted fifty-four percent of voters in the 2004 presi-
dential election. Seelye & Sussman, supra note 24, at A1.
56. Marianne Means, Hillary Clinton is Battle-Ready, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 21, 2007, at G4.
57. Id.
58. Carol Marin, Michelle Obama Standing by Her Man, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20,
2008, at 25.
59. Id.
60. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 36. In a Lifetime Networks poll during the
2008 campaign, twenty percent of women “said they were more likely to vote because
Senator Clinton [was] running.” Id. (citing Ann McFeatters, Just How Strong is Hillary
Clinton’s Sisterhood?, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Nov. 12, 2007, at YY). Twenty-five
percent of women noted that they paid more attention to campaign news “simply because
[Clinton was] running.” Id.
61. Ann McFeatters, Just How Strong is Hillary Clinton’s Sisterhood?, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Nov. 12, 2007, at YY.
330 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:321
consistently revealed a “gender gap, even among Democratic voters,”
with Clinton receiving less support from men than from women.62
As Parks and Rachlinski articulated, Clinton’s response to a
question raised in a New Hampshire diner63 demonstrated how gender
role perceptions might influence voter attitudes. Clinton’s teary-eyed
response to a concerned voter’s question in regard to how Clinton
managed to keep pace during the long primary season,64 “might have
signaled a kind of kinship” between her and her female supporters.65
This is no surprise. Even though overt emotional displays by women
risk playing into the stereotype that they lack the toughness to handle
difficult situations,66 Clinton’s expressiveness might have worked—
winning her New Hampshire precisely because it helped her connect
even more with women voters.67
While views regarding gender roles may have negatively influ-
enced some voter perceptions of Clinton’s electability, such views may
have also had concurrent positive effects. Consistent with former
President Clinton’s announcement during his first run for the presi-
dency, then-Senator Clinton may have allayed some concerns among
voters with her two-for-the-price-of-one proposal.68 In a June 3, 2007
CNN debate, she said her husband would serve in a roving ambas-
sador’s role during her administration.69 Although there was concern
among some Americans about having her husband’s influence back
62. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 37. In a July 2007 poll of likely Democratic
caucus-goers, conducted by the University of Iowa, “Clinton had 30 percent support among
women and only 18 percent among men.” Matt Stearns, Campaign 2008; Clinton Failing
to Make Inroads with Male Voters: Democrats’ Lead Candidate Fighting Wide Gender Gap,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2007, at A4; see also Jerry Zremski, New Women Voters Could Put
Clinton in the White House; The Gender Card May Be Her Edge, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov.
25, 2007, at A1 (reporting that a Zogby International poll indicated that Senator Clinton’s
lead over Senator Obama in November “was entirely due to her support from women”). In
contrast, Obama received twenty-one percent equally from men and women. Stearns,
supra note 62, at A4. In the same poll, thirty percent of women strongly indicated that
Clinton was the strongest Democratic candidate; nearly half that percentage of men felt
similarly. Id. Thirty-two percent of women strongly believed that Clinton was electable,
while less than half of that percentage of men felt similarly. Id.
63. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 38.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Chris Rovzar & Jessica Pressler, Hillary Clinton: Minority Candidate,
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 9, 2008, 3:15PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/01/hillary
_clinton_minority_candi.html?imw=Y).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Michael Fauntroy, Don’t Overplay the Bradley Effect, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-fauntroy-phd/dont-overplay-the
-bradl_b_80810.html).
68. David Broder, What of a Dual Presidency if Hillary Clinton Wins?, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 19, 2007, at B9.
69. Robin Toner & Jeff Zeleny, Iraq is the Flash Point as Eight Democratic Rivals
Clash, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at A14.
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in the executive office, male voters may have felt sufficiently at ease
with a male presence in the White House to vote for her.70
Within the traditional Title VII paradigm, Clinton appeared to
experience sex discrimination. First, popular T-shirts and bumper
stickers were sold in reference to Clinton with phrases like “Bros
Before Hoes,” 71 “How Do We Beat the Bitch,” 72 and “Life’s a Bitch:
Don’t Vote For One!” 73 Actor and rapper Ludacris, a candid Obama
supporter, called Clinton a “bitch” in a 2008-released song—prompting
a rebuke from Obama.74 In the employment context, women who are
subjected to vulgar and offensive epithets like “whore” and “bitch” can
establish a sexual harassment claim, even if gender-neutral reasons
motivated the abuse.75 Clinton’s campaign was also subject to a num-
ber of gender-role-based remarks. For example, when she campaigned
at a New Hampshire high school a man yelled from the audience,
“Iron my shirt!” 76 There were also T-shirts and bumper stickers with
a silhouette of a woman vacuuming and the phrase “Hillary ‘08”
depicted on them.77 Arguably, such statements and images are mere
isolated remarks which provide little useful insight into the perva-
siveness of gender-biased attitudes. Nonetheless, gender stereotyp-
ing is evidence of sex discrimination in the workplace,78 particularly
where women are defined by domestic roles.79 However, in employ-
ment discrimination cases where plaintiffs—in order to demonstrate
70. Camille Paglia, She Won’t Go Easy, SALON.COM (May 14, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://
www.salon.com/opinion/paglia/2008/05/14/tarantella/index.html.
71. Bros Before Hoes Dark T-Shirt, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://www.cafepress.com/+bros
_before_hoes_dark_tshirt,218487144 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
72. How Do We Beat the Bitch?, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://shop.cafepress.com/design/
23630617 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
73. Life’s a Bitch Don’t Vote for One—Funny Bumper Stickers, AMAZON ONLINE
STORE, http://www.amazon.com/Lifes-bitch-dont-vote-one/dp/B000ZW27QI (last visited
Jan. 31, 2011).
74. John Horowitz, Clinton Supporters Demand Obama Denounce Ludacris, OBSERVER
.COM (July 30, 2008, 2:37 PM), http://www.observer.com/2008/politics/clinton-supporters
-demand-obama-denounce-ludacris; Some Say Ludacris Song Won’t Damage Obama in
November, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 4, 2008, at B6.
75. Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996); see also
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that “[a]
female worker need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual in-
nuendo” in order for a sexual harassment claim to lie and holding that names such as
“bitch,” “slut,” and “cunt” directed to a female employee amount to harassment based on
her sex); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he per-
vasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and addressed
to female employees personally may serve as evidence of a hostile environment.”).
76. Sarah Wheaton, ‘Iron my Shirt,’ THE CAUCUS BLOG (Jan. 7, 2008, 7:44 PM),
http://the caucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/iron-my-shirt/.
77. Hillary ‘08 T-Shirts and Clothing, CAFEPRESS SHOP, http://shop.cafepress.com/
design/25416564 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
78. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
79. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004).
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pretext—produce evidence of comments made by a non-decision-
maker or decision-maker unrelated to the employment action, courts
may dismiss such “stray remarks.” 80 Some circuits, however, reject
this “stray remarks” doctrine.81 The Supreme Court, in its Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. decision, suggested that even
where stray remarks are not made in the context of the employment
decision in question, they are still probative in assessing discrimina-
tory animus, potentially supporting a plaintiff’s argument of pretext.82
Blatant and express attitudes about Clinton’s gender played a
role in the 2008 presidential race.83 Contrary to public opinion, how-
ever, gender’s influence by-and-large benefitted Clinton. This is evi-
denced by the results of the twenty-nine primaries for which there
were exit polls, in which a higher percentage of individuals voted for
Clinton in fourteen of those states.84 In those fourteen states, voters
indicated that gender influenced their votes.85 Conversely, Obama
prevailed in only four of the states whose voters indicated that the
candidates’ gender influenced their votes.86 This analysis excludes
Illinois, as this was a predictable win for Obama, and New York and
Arkansas, as predictable wins for Clinton. Interestingly, the four
states in which Obama prevailed were states with a high percentage
of blacks in their populations.87
III. COULD HILLARY CLINTON FILE A SUCCESSFUL TITLE VII CLAIM
FOR IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS?
When people expressly indicate their attitudes, beliefs, and
thought processes, many times they are inaccurate because individ-
80. See McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288,
301 (1st Cir. 1998) (providing two examples of courts declining to give weight to what they
determined to be “stray remarks”); Bright v. Standard Register Co., 66 F.3d 171, 173
(8th Cir. 1995).
81. See Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that admission of “stray remarks” is permissible in some cases); Fisher v.
Pharmicia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that “stray remarks”
are not irrelevant); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that “stray remarks” are relevant when “it may be possible to infer that decision
makers were influenced” by the remarks) (quoting Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649,
652-53 (7th Cir. 2000)).
82. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 152-53 (2000).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (providing examples of the blatantly
gender-based expressions of anti-Clinton sentiment).
84. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 42-43 (noting that Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Mississippi
have black populations of thirty percent or more).
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uals sometimes lie when a factual portrayal of their beliefs would be
offensive to others.88 Additionally, more often than not people are
wholly unaware of what lies within their own minds, as “an intuitive,
gut reaction against a candidate can dictate choice. The rational
account only follows later, and provides a fully accurate account of the
decision.” 89 What may explain this is the fact that people rely on par-
allel and distinct cognitive systems.90 Comparatively, they are rapid
versus slow, intuitive versus deductive, and unconscious versus con-
scious.91 Whereas the rapid system dictates choice, for example, the
slow system lags behind, searching for logical reasons for the choice
that at least hints at the accessible parts of memory.92 Voting seems
to fit within this decision-making paradigm, where “intuition and emo-
tion play significant roles in voter choice.” 93 It is no surprise, then,
that political advertisements are designed to manipulate emotionally-
driven decision-making,94 and often have that intended effect.95
A. Implicit Bias: A Definition
Psychology research highlights the influence of unconscious cog-
nitions about gender on judgment and decision-making.96 They operate
outside of an individual’s conscious awareness, are largely uncon-
trollable,97 and may conflict with expressly-held egalitarian values
88. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 40 (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E.
Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and
Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 121-23, 125, 127 (1978)) (“People’s reports of their cog-
nitive processes are often not consistent with their judgments.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2007)).
92. Id. (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports
about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 118, 125, 127
(1978)).
93. See id. (citing DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN
DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007)) (discussing data from several presidential
campaigns suggesting that voters rely on emotion in making decisions).
94. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 40 (citing Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive
Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005)).
95. Id. (citing William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional
Response to Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237,
250 (1985); George Marcus & Michael MacKuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The
Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 672, 677-78 (1993)).
96. See Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 24-25 (citations omitted) (reviewing the
research on implicit bias related to gender, and its affect on employment evaluations).
97. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). “The very existence of implicit bias poses
a challenge to legal theory and practice . . . because they can produce behavior that
diverges from person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.” Id.
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or beliefs.98 Furthermore, implicit attitudes may influence evaluations
of others in the voting context.99
Within the social and behavioral sciences, the typical “method of
attitude measurement [has been] the collection of self-reports” that
reflect individuals’ explicit attitudes.100 For example, when research-
ers want to ascertain subjects’ attitudes toward someone or some-
thing, they usually ask participants to select one of several
responses or to use a rating scale.101 The drawback in using these
methods is that sometimes research respondents’ answers to ques-
tions and measures can be highly dependent on the context, e.g.,
who asks and how they ask.102 As such, it is presumed that research
participants are unaware of the relationship between these mea-
sures of automatic attitudes and the attitudes they are employed to
ascertain.103 Indirect measures also seem to minimize respondents’
strategic responding incentives and attitudes.104
One popular measure of automatic attitudes is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), one of the most widely-used measures of
implicit attitudes and biases.105 The IAT is based on the assumption
that response times will be quicker for categories that are consistent
with individual attitudes.106 For example, to assess implicit gender
attitudes, the IAT pairs male and female names with career and
family words and assesses respondents’ reaction times on association-
matched (e.g., “Sally” and “Children”) and association-unmatched (e.g.,
“Sally” and “Corporation”) pairs.107 The difference in average reaction
times provides a measure of respondents’ association between the two
98. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Age 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 53, 56-57 (2006) (finding that explicit racial bias dissipates with age, while implicit
racial bias remains constant).
99. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 25-27 (citations omitted) (reviewing implicit
bias in relation to prejudice and discrimination).
100. Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz, Introduction to IMPLICIT MEASURES OF
ATTITUDES 1, 1-2 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
101. Id. at 2.
102. SEYMOUR SUDMAN ET AL., THINKING ABOUT ANSWERS: THE APPLICATION OF
COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO SURVEY METHODOLOGY 80 (1995); see ROGER TOURANGEAU ET
AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 197 (2000) (“As survey researchers have dem-
onstrated repeatedly, the same question often produces quite different answers, depending
on the context . . . .”).
103. Wittenbrink & Schwarz, supra note 100, at 3, 8.
104. Id. at 3.
105. See Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 427, 431 (2007) (noting that techniques that assess response times are the most
widely used methods for ascertaining implicit attitudes).
106. Id.
107. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 101,
108-09 (2002).
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pairs of concepts.108 Thus, a person with strong attitudes toward tra-
ditional gender roles would more quickly categorize stimuli consistent
with such attitudes, such as pairing female names with family words
rather than pairing female names with career words.109
B. Implicit Gender Bias, Title VII, and the Clinton Campaign
The American legal system struggles with the distinguishing ex-
plicit from unconscious bias.110 For example, an employer who makes
it clear that he does not believe women are appropriate for a particular
job would easily fall within the law’s prohibition against discrimina-
tion in the workplace.111 Unconscious bias, on the other hand, is more
elusive and difficult to detect.112 Just because an individual holds
automatic gender biases that operate to disadvantage women does
not mean that individual is aware of these biases.113 Even so, there is
a good chance that the same individual might evaluate male job can-
didates more favorably than female job candidates without conscious
awareness of such behavior.114
Linda Hamilton Krieger, in her early assessment of unconscious
bias’s role in employment discrimination, articulated three broad
ideas: (1) stereotyping is a natural phenomena, and what underlies
it is how people categorize and process information;115 (2) people un-
intentionally stereotype out-group members;116 and (3) stereotypes are
automatic, i.e., unconscious.117 In her application of these principles to
employment discrimination law, Krieger made four points. The first
was that Title VII leaves little room for the role of unintentional dis-
crimination,118 but rather requires proof of differential treatment re-
sulting from purposeful or intentional discrimination.119 The second
108. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 109.
110. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 42 (citations omitted) (“Judges, legislators, and
reformers have long struggled with the difference between explicit and unconscious bias.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 42-43.
114. Id. at 43.
115. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88
(1995) (citing W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes as Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 229,
229 (1957)).
116. Id. at 1188.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1166-67.
119. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 43 n.337(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993)) (“[The plaintiff has] the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” (alteration in original)). Few
cases have acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping. See, e.g., Sweeney
v. Bd. of Trs., 604 F.2d 106, 113 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming judgment for plaintiff
because the district court reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote her was
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focuses on the assumption that there is a dichotomy of rationality on
one hand and discriminatory intent or motive on the other,120 while
such an assumption makes it difficult to prove intentional employment
discrimination.121 The third focuses on the fact that disparate treat-
ment122 jurisprudence fails to account for the fact that an employer
may be wholly “unaware of the effect of an employee’s [gender] on the
[employer’s] decision making process.”123 Krieger’s fourth and final
point focuses on the assumptions that employers are sufficiently in-
trospective, allowing them to discern the motivations behind their
employment-related decisions, and that non-biased employers comply
with Title VII while biased ones do not.124 In light of data such as this,
at least some courts have begun to consider the role of unconscious
bias in Title VII cases.125
The social scientific literature underscores the reality of uncon-
scious gender bias and stereotyping, showing that people make a host
of automatic assumptions and evaluations of women. For example,
women are automatically perceived as more caring and interdepen-
dent, but less ambitious and competitive than men.126 Women are eval-
uated as less self-reliant and less aggressive than men,127 and status
is less readily misattributed to unknown women than to unknown
men.128 Males are more strongly associated with status and power,129
“determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against women faculty”).
120. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1167 (“[D]isparate treatment analysis assumes that,
unless they harbor discriminatory intent or motive, decisionmakers will act objectively and
judge rationally.”).
121. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that “[p]roof
of such discrimination is always difficult”).
122. In order to prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie
case of discrimination. Texas Dep’t Of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The defendant then
bears the burden of producing a legitimate and nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision
to engage in the action that the plaintiff has identified as discriminatory. St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff can prevail only if it proves that the defendant’s
proffered reason was not the true reason for the decision, but merely “a pretext for
discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254-56.
123. Krieger, supra note 115, at 1167.
124. Id.
125. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 6, at 45-46 nn.359-60, 362 (citations omitted)
(reviewing the limited case law).
126. Marianne Schmid Mast, Note, Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An
Implicit Gender Stereotype, 63 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 107, 110 (2004).
127. Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272, 275-76 (1993).
128. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping
in Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86, 189-93 (1996)
(attributing “fame” more strongly to unknown male than to unknown female names).
129. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit Self-Concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender
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and males in leadership roles are evaluated more favorably than their
female counterparts.130 Moreover, attitudes about gender and power
influence career expectancies. For example, men are perceived to be
more closely aligned with science-based careers while women are
more closely aligned with education- or humanities-based careers.131
Based on the results of such psychological research, as well as re-
search demonstrating the influence of unconscious bias on voting,132
it is possible that unconscious bias affected Clinton’s candidacy in
the race for President of the United States. Clinton perceived these
unconscious biases, articulating in her campaign concession speech,
“ ‘like millions of women, I know there are still barriers and biases out
there, often unconscious . . . .’ ”133 She may have been correct, in light
of comments made by media pundits such as Mike Barnicle, Chris
Matthews, John Neffinger, and Mark Rudov. For example, Barnicle
contended that she, “ ‘look[ed] like everyone’s first wife standing out-
side a probate court.’ ”134 Chris Matthews argued that:
The reason she’s a U.S. senator, the reason she’s a candidate for
president, the reason she may be a front-runner is her husband
messed around. That’s how she got to be senator of New York . . . .
She didn’t win there on her merit . . . . She won because everybody
felt, “My God, this woman stood up under humiliation,” right?135
Neffinger stated, “[w]henever she raises her voice, there’s a danger
that she starts to sound a little bit shrill.”136 And Rudov opined,
“[w]hen Barack Obama speaks, men hear, ‘Take off for the future.’
And when Hillary Clinton speaks, men hear, ‘Take out the gar-
bage.’ ”137 Though there is no indication that these commentators
Stereotypes: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1164, 1167-68 (2001).
130. Rudman & Kilianski, supra note 48, at 1319-23.
131. Nosek et al., supra note 107, at 101, 107-08 (2002); Michael J. White & Gwendolen
B. White, Implicit and Explicit Occupational Gender Stereotypes, 55 SEX ROLES 259, 263-
64 (2006).
132. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 25-27.
133. Adam Nagourney & Mark Leibovich, Clinton Ends Campaign with Clear Call
to Elect Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at 1, 31 (quoting Senator Hillary Clinton,
Concession Speech at the 2008 Presidential Democratic Primary (June 7, 2008)).
134. Katharine Q. Seelye & Julie Bosman, Critics and News Executives Split Over
Sexism in Clinton Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, June, 13, 2008, at A1 (quoting Mike Barnicle).
135. Bill Maxwell, Why Hillary Stood by Bill, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 16, 2008, at A08
(quoting Chris Matthews).
136. What’s Been Said About Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A24 (quoting John
Neffinger, Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 16, 2007)).
137. Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast Jan. 4, 2008), avail-
able at http://mediamatters.org/research/200801050004.
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harbored any overt sexist attitudes towards or about Clinton, their
stray remarks are probative of their possible implicit unconscious
gender bias.138
The above examples provide some evidence of the implicit biases
about gender that existed during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Contrary to most cases of gender-based stereotyping,139 attitudes to-
wards Clinton were not favorable in content. Although female candi-
dates are typically viewed as more compassionate, honest, warm, and
expressive than men,140 such characteristics were not attributed to
Clinton. Interestingly, however, traditionally male characteristics,
such as competence, decisiveness and strength,141 were also not attrib-
uted to her. Instead, Clinton was challenged to deal with a “dual”
gender bias, i.e., being characterized by unfavorable, stereotypical
female traits, while simultaneously not being characterized by favor-
able, stereotypical male traits.
While the evidence that Clinton’s campaign suffered from im-
plicit gender bias is not robust, there is evidence that such biases may
have been amplified by political conservatism, which has been shown
to be associated with unconscious in-group bias.142 Such effects should
not be surprising given that “[o]ne major criterion continually re-
appears in distinguishing left from right: attitudes toward equality.
The left favours greater equality, while the right sees society as in-
evitably hierarchical.”143 As such, female Democratic candidates fare
better among more liberal voters, and male Democratic candidates
138. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination,
73 MO. L. REV. 83, 96 (2008).
139. John T. Jost & Aaron C. Kay, Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and Complementary
Gender Stereotypes: Consequences for Specific and Diffuse Forms of System Justification,
88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 498, 498 (2005).
140. KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: HOW THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN
CANDIDATES 8 (2004).
141. Id.
142. Cf. William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1336 (2004)
(examining the relationship between political ideologies and implicit prejudices);
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 958 (charting the difference between implicit
and explicit prejudices); John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory:
Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25
POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 902 (2004) (examining the interaction between group membership
and political ideology to predict implicit and explicit attitudes); Brian Nosek, The Politics
of Intergroup Attitudes, Presentation at Duke University’s The Psychology of Voting
and Election Campaigns (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.electionstudies.org/
conferences/2006Duke/transcripts/Nosek.pdf (arguing that implicit biases are relevant
to political views).
143. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 40
(1998).
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fare better among more conservative voters.144 Thus, one might
predict that Clinton fared much worse than Obama among more
right-leaning Democrats. Here, we use proxies to gauge political
conservatism among Democratic primary voters. Although age,
education, and socioeconomic status have long predicted political
orientation, with those who are older,145 less educated,146 and poorer147
being more politically conservative, statistics from the 2008 presiden-
tial election highlight contrary patterns. Specifically, “those who
voted for Senator Clinton . . . tended to be older, poorer, and less
educated than Senator Obama’s supporters.”148
CODA
Hillary Clinton’s historic campaign not only elevated the issues
of sexism and unconscious gender bias to the national stage, it accom-
plished several other things as well. It opened the door to a compar-
ative look at sexism and unconscious gender bias on one hand and
racism and unconscious race bias on the other. In turn, it also raised
the issue of reverse gender and race discrimination. Furthermore, her
failed bid at the presidency and her inability to shatter this nation’s
highest glass ceiling, likely left open the opportunity for Governor
Sarah Palin to achieve that feat.149 In her effort to do so, Governor
Palin’s (and Senator John McCain’s) campaign cries of sexism150
raises the question of where—on the Left or the Right—the largest
reservoir of sexism resides. Additionally, it begs the question as to the
role of the “gender card” and how it may help or hinder the advance-
ment of women.
144. Monika L. McDermott, Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: Candidate
Gender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary United States Elections, 41 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 270, 278 (1997).
145. Francis D. Glamser, The Importance of Age to Conservative Opinions: A Multivariate
Analysis, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 549, 551-52 (1974).
146. Id.; Jaime L. Napier & John T. Jost, The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited:
A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism, 64 J. SOC. ISSUES
595, 612 (2008).
147. Napier & Jost, supra note 146, at 612.
148. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 34.
149. See, e.g., Rick Klein, Palin on Possible 2012 Run: It Will Be ‘To Win It,’ ABCNEWS
.COM, THE NOTE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010, 9:52 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2010/11/
palin-on-possible-2012-run-it-will-be-to-win-it.html (noting Palin’s potential 2012 bid for
the presidency).
150. See, e.g., Julie Mason, Palin Cries Sexism, Let’s Review the Evidence, WASH.
EXAMINER, BELTWAY CONFIDENTIAL BLOG (Nov. 17, 2009, 12:28 PM), http://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-confidential/Palin-cries-sexism----lets
-review-the-evidence-70285867.html (discussing Palin’s claim that Newsweek’s recent
use of a photo depicting her in running clothes was sexist).
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First, Clinton’s supporters were angry, primarily with the media,
over the pervasive sexism that they saw.151 Even Geraldine Ferraro,
former vice presidential candidate, was convinced that “sexism im-
pacted [Senator] Clinton’s campaign . . . .”152 It is difficult, however,
to discern just how disadvantaged Clinton was because of her sex
without ascertaining just how much she benefited because of her
race. In fact, there is a lingering question that political pundits and
commentators have raised but have been unwilling to tackle: are
Americans “more sexist or more racist?”153 Despite the boldness of
Gloria Steinem’s New York Times op-ed, Women Are Never Front-
Runners, even she was unwilling to tackle the issue despite pronounc-
ing that “[g]ender is probably the most restricting force in American
life . . . .”154 Though sexism and racism are arguably twin halves of
the same oppression,155 they are not the same. In fact, where re-
searchers analyze race/ethnicity and gender together, with particu-
lar regards to stereotyping, race/ethnicity provides more predictive
power.156 Historically, within the domain of politics and the pursuit
of political empowerment, black men gained the right to vote a full
fifty years before women.157 It is doubtful that white men extended
this right to black men because they saw black men as their equals
more so than white women. First, after ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment, southern whites opposed women’s suffrage out of fear
that it would double the number of black voters.158 Second, (white)
women, unlike blacks, did not experience nearly 100 years of efforts
to subvert their right to vote once they obtained it.159 Even in the
151. E. J. Dionne, Jr., ‘Look What They’ve Done to Her,’ WASH. POST, May 30, 2008, at
A13.
152. Geraldine A. Ferraro, Healing the Wounds of Democrats’ Sexism, BOS. GLOBE,
May 30, 2008, at A15.
153. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Americans Are Too Racist for Barack. Americans Are
Too Sexist for Hillary. Discuss, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2006, at B2.
154. Gloria Steinem, Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at
A23 (“I’m not advocating a competition for who has it the toughest.”).
155. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-72 (1991) (“Racism and sexism are interlocking, mutually-
reinforcing components of a system of dominance rooted in patriarchy.”).
156. Jeffrey M. Timberlake & Sarah Beth Estes, Do Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes
Depend on the Sex of Target Group Members?: Evidence from a Survey-Based Experiment,
48 SOC. Q. 399, 419-20 (2007).
157. Compare DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RACIAL LINES: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 15 (Peter Lang ed., 1998), with STEPHENSON, supra note 10,
at 182, 185 (stating that black men gained the right to vote before women, and describing
the fear white men had that this would lead to female suffrage).
158. STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 122.
159. See HUDSON, supra note 157, at 15 (noting successes of black candidates and the
rapid growth of black voter registration); V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE
AND NATION 555-643 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1949) (discussing literacy tests, poll taxes, and
white primaries).
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modern political era, there is no equivalent to the “Bradley Effect”
for women politicians the way there is for black politicians.160 During
the Democratic primaries, with regard to explicit biases, Clinton not
only benefitted from her gender,161 but also from her race.162 In states
where voters indicated that race influenced their voting decisions,
Clinton prevailed in sixteen states, compared to twelve states for
Obama.163 When we subtract those states that Clinton and Obama
would likely have won given their prior affiliations—“Arkansas and
New York for Clinton and Illinois for Obama—Senator Clinton still
benefits.”164 Further, moving to an analysis of unconscious bias, this
benefit is still evident.165 The same proxies used to predict political
conservatism and subsequently unconscious gender bias, also pre-
dict unconscious race bias.166 In essence, some of those who voted for
Clinton found a way to move beyond their unconscious gender bias—
but not their unconscious race bias—to vote for her. The converse can-
not be said to the same degree. This, at least in part, has to do with
the fact that unconscious gender and race bias are different in both
kind and degree. For instance, unconscious race bias functions such
that whites prefer whites over blacks.167 In addition, while individuals
harbor unconscious gender stereotypes,168 women prefer women while
men show no preference either way.169 Comparatively, 71.5% of whites,
67.5% of Asian Americans, and 60.5% of Hispanics have a preference
for whites over blacks.170 Interestingly, researchers Rory McVeigh
and Juliana Sobolewski also discovered that occupational racial and
gender segregation are greater in red (Republican) counties than blue
160. The “Bradley Effect” has come to define black politician electoral losses, or wins
by smaller margins than expected, when wins are expected. See Patrick Reddy, Does
McCall Have a Chance?: Yes, He Does, but Black Candidates for Top State Offices Face
an Uphill Climb, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 20, 2002, at H1 (explaining the origin of the term
and its meaning).
161. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 12-15, 18-19, 39. The Bradley Effect is attrib-
uted to white voters lying to pollsters about who they are likely to vote for in elections
where one candidate is black and the other is white.
162. Id. at 5, 7, 10, 33.
163. Id. at 42-44.
164. Id. at 14.
165. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (stating that both unconscious
race and gender bias can be predicted by political conservatism).
166. Id.
167. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 956.
168. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (stating that individuals harbor
subconscious gender stereotypes).
169. Laurie Rudman & Stephanie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic In-
Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More than Men Like Men?, 87 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 497-98 (2004).
170. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 957-58.
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(Democratic) counties,171 which may support the notion that uncon-
scious gender and racial bias increase the further right one goes on
the political spectrum.
Second, in understanding voter support for both Clinton and
Obama, one must acknowledge not only those who would reject them
based on gender or race, but also those who would support them based
on these demographic variables. This allows for an argument of reverse
discrimination. Courts have traditionally found reverse race dis-
crimination actionable under Title VII.172 Some voters’ preference
for Obama based, at least in part, on his race would not likely stand
muster under Title VII, but it illustrates that some Americans are
stretching to reach for an egalitarian racial ideal. Non-white voters’
support for Obama suggests that at least some portion of those who
harbor unconscious racial bias against blacks have moved beyond the
status quo and are actually voting against their own unconscious
race biases. With regard to black voters’ overwhelming support of
Obama,173 their voting behavior can be understood in light of their
unconscious racial biases. Studies indicate that like whites, blacks
demonstrate an alarming degree of anti-black/pro-white implicit bias.
For example, in an Internet-based study, participants expressed a
notable preference for whites over blacks.174 Additionally, by age
thirteen, white children have developed a strong in-group preference
on the IAT, but black children have not.175 Black adults show vari-
ability in implicit racial preferences and overall, blacks show a prefer-
ence for whites over blacks.176 Specifically, about 65% of blacks exhibit
implicit bias in favor of whites.177
Third, Clinton’s campaign also set the stage for two aspects of the
McCain-Palin campaign. At the outset of their campaign, Senator
McCain, Governor Palin and members of their campaign were out-
raged by perceived sexism directed at Palin.178 The irony however,
171. Rory McVeigh & Juliana M. Sobolewski, Red Counties, Blue Counties, and
Occupational Segregation by Sex and Race, 113 AM. J. SOC. 446, 474-78 (2007).
172. Reed v. AirTran Airways, 531 F. Supp. 2d. 660, 668 n.11 (D. Md. 2008).
173. Parks & Roberson, supra note 1, at 20.
174. Kristin A. Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV;
What We Know (So Far) about the Method, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59, 66
(Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
175. Baron & Banaji, supra note 97, at 55.
176. Clarence Vincent Spicer, Effects of Self-Stereotyping and Stereotype Threat on
Intellectual Performance 64 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Kentucky) (on file with William T. Young Library, University of Kentucky).
177. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 97, at 957-58; John T. Jost et al., A Decade of
System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious
Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 895 (2004).
178. Ron Fournier, Analysis: McCain Camp Plays Sexism Card for Palin, USA TODAY
Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-09-03-2751994221_x.htm.
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is that political conservatism, vis-à-vis political liberalism, is more
closely aligned with sexism and possibly unconscious gender bias.179
Part of the concern stemmed from pundits and commentators ques-
tioning how Governor Palin would balance motherhood and the Vice
Presidency, which is consistent with social science research sug-
gesting that people discriminate against women based on parental
status180 and these biases may be unconscious.181 Courts have held
that discrimination against employees for having family obligations
is actionable,182 and legal scholars have made the connection be-
tween “family responsibility discrimination” and sex discrimination.183
Gender biases that result from political conservatism, however, were
evident in both Clinton’s and Palin’s campaigns. For example during
a campaign event in South Carolina a voter asked Senator McCain, in
reference to Clinton, “[h]ow do we beat the bitch?”184 Though Senator
McCain did not personally use that language, he failed to challenge
179. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (explaining that liberalism is more
closely aligned with sexism).
180. Research suggests that when women are viewed through the lens of motherhood
and housework, people view them as lacking in confidence and commitment. Studies dem-
onstrate that compared to businesswomen, housewives are rated as low in competence.
Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice,
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701, 712, 715 (2004); Thomas Ekes, Paternalistic and Envious
Gender Stereotypes: Testing Predictions from the Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEX
ROLES 99, 102 (2002); Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content:
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition,
82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 880, 882, 887, 892, 897 (2002); Peter Glick &
Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as Complementary
Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 111-13 (2001).
181. See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science
to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 402-04, 439-40 (2003) (finding that it is assumed that women
cannot adequately balance being a good mother and good employee).
182. See Gallina v. Mintz, 123 F. App’x 558, 560, 563 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
employer discriminated against an employee for being a mother); Knussman v. Maryland,
272 F.3d 625, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the employer discriminated against a
male employee where it denied the plaintiff leave to care for his daughter); Sheehan v.
Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1042-43, 1045 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an employer
discriminated against an employee for needing to spend time with her children).
183. Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Respon-
sibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1285-86,
1289-92, 1296 (2008) (citations omitted); Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1362, 1382 (2008); David L. Faigman et al.,
A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1391, 1396, 1398-99 (2008); see Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The
Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the
Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008) (discussing
employment discrimination based on family obligation).
184. Steve Chapman, To McCain, the Truth Is Expendable, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 2008,
at 7.
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it,185 and courts have found such language probative in analyzing
claims of sex discrimination in the workplace.186 In addition to such
sexist language associated with Senator McCain and his campaign, it
is important to examine his behavior toward Governor Palin. Critics
blasted his campaign for sequestering his running mate, and attributed
his paternalistic behavior as sexist.187 Courts have similarly found
that gender paternalism is inconsistent with anti-discrimination
laws.188
Finally, critics accused the McCain-Palin campaign of demon-
strating faux outrage at alleged slights toward Governor Palin.189 In
fact, some critics went so far as to charge the McCain campaign with
using “sexism” as a political talisman to ward off media analysis of
Governor Palin, and to blunt any critique lodged by the Obama cam-
paign that could loosely be tied to Governor Palin.190 If this critique
was accurate, the McCain campaign did a tremendous disservice to
women because, when “warnings are provided too often, their infor-
mation content becomes even lower and frequent false alarms render
them ineffective because of the ‘cry-wolf’ effect.”191 Under Title VII,
courts are critical of plaintiffs who have a “proven tendency to cry
‘wolf ’ . . . when no wolf is about . . . .”192 Generally, bias reduction
through interpersonal confrontation has the effect of inducing irri-
tation and anger toward the confronter.193 In essence, individuals may
be shamed, not only into guilt, but also into anger and aggression.194
185. Id.
186. See cases cited supra note 75 (stating that comments such as, “[h]ow do we beat
the bitch” are probative in sex discrimination cases in the employment context).
187. Katharine Q. Seelye, Seeking Sarah Palin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at 24.
188. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prod., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 342-43 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003) (“I reject
the notion that female workers are in need of ‘the protection of a preferential standard.’ ”)
(quoting DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995));
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1993) (“The belief that women are . . . in
need of a more protective standard . . . degrades women and is repugnant to the very ideals
of equality that [employment discrimination law] is intended to protect.”).
189. See Chapman, supra note 183 (contending that McCain’s campaign lied when it
claimed sexism “when [Senator] Obama scoffed at the idea that the GOP ticket offered real
change from President Bush, saying, ‘You can put lipstick on a pig—it’s still a pig’ ”).
190. Fournier, supra note 178.
191. Jason D. Papastavrou & Mark R. Lehto, Improving the Effectiveness of Warnings
by Increasing the Appropriateness of their Information Content: Some Hypotheses About
Human Compliance, 21 SAFETY SCI. 175, 175 (1996) (discussing how abusing the “race
card” causes a lack of believability in discrimination complaints).
192. McDowell v. Moore, 635 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (granting the
defendants attorney’s fees in a Title VII action due to frivolity of the plaintiff’s complaint).
193. Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias Through
Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784, 786-87, 791 (2006)
(explaining that bias reduction can induce irritation and anger towards the confronter).
194. June Price Tangney et al., Shamed into Anger?: The Relation of Shame and Guilt
to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669, 670
(1992).
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This is particularly so when racism is at issue and not so much with
regards to sexism.195 Nonetheless, the more the “gender card” is
played, whether in the domain of politics or employment, the more
insulting it will be to accused but guiltless individuals, and the less
effective legitimate cries of sexism will become.196
CONCLUSION
Overall, the 2008 presidential election represents an interest-
ing context in which to explore issues of sexism and gender bias, em-
ployment discrimination, and the intersection of gender and race in
employment outcomes. Further, at the center of it all stood Senator
Hillary Clinton, who navigated the peaks and pitfalls resulting from
the American public’s gender-related opinions, attitudes and voting be-
havior. While her 2008 bid for the U.S. presidency was not successful,
her candidacy provides an opportunity for interrogation about the
role of gender in American life and in the law. Further, it reveals
the palpability of such biases within political contexts.
195. See Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally):
Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 532, 536-37 (2003) (showing that more individuals are shamed by guilt, anger, and
aggression when dealing with racism than with sexism).
196. See Papastavrou & Lehto, supra note 191, at 175 (explaining the danger of the “cry
wolf” effect); see also McDowell, 635 F. Supp. at 283 (noting that the more the “gender
card” is used, the less effective and legitimate it becomes).
DECONSTRUCTING CEDAW’S ARTICLE 14: NAMING AND
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V. ARTICLE 14’S EXPRESSIVE SIGNIFICANCE
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) is the first human rights instrument to
recognize explicitly rural-urban difference.1 It does so by enumerat-
ing specific rights for rural women in Article 14 and also by mention-
ing their needs in relation to Article 10 on education. This article’s
goals are modest: to examine the Travaux Préparatoires to better
understand the forces and considerations that led to the inclusion of
Article 14; to assess Article 14’s particular mandates in light of both
its drafting history and CEDAW’s other provisions; and to consider
the assumptions implicit in this expression of rural exceptionalism.
I offer some thoughts on the expressive significance of both the
explicit acknowledgment of rural women—and, by extension, rural
populations—in this widely ratified human rights treaty and the
particular rights it accords to rural women. That is, I discuss what
CEDAW implies about the character of rurality and rural-urban dif-
ference. I also argue that CEDAW provides a framework for spatial
equality, in concert with the more obvious and comprehensive struc-
ture for gender equality. I thus seek to fill a void in the legal scholar-
ship on CEDAW, which often mentions Article 14 in inventories of
the Convention’s provisions, but which has largely ignored both its
meaning and significance.2
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law, King Hall;
lrpruitt@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to Justine Lescroart, Rebecca Lovell, Maytak Chin, Rachel
Ray, and Marta R. Vanegas for research assistance. I am grateful also for comments
from Darren Rosenblum, as well as from participants in a faculty workshop at Griffith
University, Australia, and the panel on Women in Development for Institutional
Empowerment at the Annual Meeting of the Rural Sociological Society, 2010.
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW], available at http://www.un.org
/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention/htm. Since CEDAW was drafted and adopted,
other human rights instruments have specifically enumerated rights for rural populations.
See infra notes 267-77 and accompanying text.
2. E.g.,  Noreen Burrows, The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 32 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 419, 446-48 (1985); Jo Lynn
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I. A SHORT PRIMER ON CEDAW
Drafting of CEDAW began in the 1970s, and the U.N. General
Assembly adopted the Convention in 1979.3 Upon ratification by
twenty member states, the Convention entered into force in 1981.4
Among the 192 United Nations members, 186 have ratified CEDAW.5
Notable among nations that have not ratified the Convention is the
United States.6
CEDAW is varyingly called “[T]he ‘[W]omen’s [C]onvention,’ ” 7 an
“international bill of rights for women,” 8 and even a “Magna Carta
Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 83-
85 (1996). But see, e.g., Aída González Martínez, Rights of Rural Women: Examples from
Latin America, in THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE UN
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 212, 213-22
(Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling & Cees Flinterman eds., 2007) [hereinafter Martínez,
Rights of Rural Women] (listing responses by Latin American nations to Article 14);
Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
509 passim (2010) (referring repeatedly to the salience of the rural-urban axis in relation
to the authority of customary law and traditional leaders and also noting the more
prominent role of elite urban women in drafting international human rights treaties
such as CEDAW and the African Protocol); Lisa R. Pruitt, Migration, Development and
the Promise of CEDAW for Rural Women, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 707, 728-49 (2009)
[hereinafter Pruitt, Migration, Development] (discussing how four countries have
responded to their Article 14 commitments); Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human Rights and
African Women: A Comparison of Protection Under Two Major Treaties, 15 HUM. RTS.
Q. 549, 556-64 (1993) (analyzing CEDAW’s effect on rural African women).
3. Short History of CEDAW Convention, UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2011). Note that at least one author has characterized CEDAW’s drafting as “under the
auspices of the male-dominated United Nations.” Southard, supra note 2, at 7.
4. Short History of CEDAW Convention, supra note 3.
5. Ratification, Accessions and Successions Status of Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
[hereinafter Ratification], http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
6. Id. This failure to ratify CEDAW is widely attributed to domestic political resistance
to CEDAW’s provisions regarding access to family planning services. See Lainie Rutkow
& Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 168-69
(2006) (discussing opposition to CEDAW by U.S. anti-abortion groups). But see Rebecca L.
Hillock, Establishing the Rights of Women Globally: Has the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Made a Difference?, 12
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 481, 511-13 (2004-05) (arguing that CEDAW reflects a radical
feminist agenda and that it is inconsistent with the United States’ democratic form of
government and processes).
7. See, e.g., Christine Min Wotipka & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and
Human Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND
DEMOCRACY 303, 305 (Beth A. Simmons et al. eds., 2008).
8. Hillock, supra note 6, at 500 (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should
Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 266 (2002));
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for women,” 9 all terms that refer to women’s notable absence from
pre-CEDAW international human rights instruments. The Conven-
tion’s mandate is extraordinarily broad,10 calling for member states
to eliminate direct or indirect discrimination in both the public and
private spheres of life,11 to improve women’s de facto position within
society,12 and “[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns . . . based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes.” 13
The Convention’s definition of discrimination against women is simi-
larly broad:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.14
The phrase “on a basis of equality of men and women” is repeated in
many Articles of the Convention.15 Article 5 even challenges member
states to take steps to end gender stereotyping.16
Elizabeth Evatt, Eliminating Discrimination Against Women: The Impact of the UN
Convention, 18 MELB. U. L. REV. 435, 435 (1991-92);  Overview of the Convention, UNITED
NATIONS DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
9. Leilani Farha, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Women Claiming Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—The CEDAW Potential, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
553, 554 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2009) (quoting STEPHEN LEWIS, RACE AGAINST TIME:
SEARCHING FOR HOPE IN AIDS-RAVAGED AFRICA 112-13 (2005) (lauding CEDAW’s great
potential influence and its aggressive assertion of equality throughout)).
10. The Convention is broad not only in its substantive provisions, but also in its
expectations of member states’ enforcement of rights. See Simone Cusack & Rebecca J.
Cook, Combating Discrimination Based on Sex and Gender, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 205, 206-07 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinen eds.,
2009) (providing background and overview of the Convention); Rebecca J. Cook, State
Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 228, 236-37, 246 (1994) (discussing member states’ obligations to end discrimination
by private actors as well as in domestic constitutions and laws).
11. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 2(d)-(e).
12. Id. art. 4 (sanctioning affirmative action as a means to achieve “de facto equality
between men and women”); see also id. art. 2(a) (referring to “practical realization of [the
equality] principle”).
13. Id. art. 5(a).
14. Id. art. 1.
15. Id. art. 1, 10, 11(1), 12(1), 13, 14(2), 16(1). Article 2(c) says “rights of women on an
equal basis with men.” Article 3 features the language, “on a basis of equality with men.”
Articles 7 and 8 use the phrase, “on equal terms with men.”
16. Id. art. 5.
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In addition to its general goal of equality between men and
women,17 CEDAW specifies a range of civil and political rights for
women, as well as some that would be best characterized as socio-
economic rights. These include the right to good quality education;18
the right to comprehensive health services, including family plan-
ning;19 the right to have equal access to jobs, benefits, and social
security;20 the right to be free from all forms of trafficking and pros-
titution;21 the right to vote, run for election and hold public office;22
the right to represent the country internationally;23 and the right to
participate in recreational activities such as sports.24 CEDAW thus
enumerates a series of “rights” that often have the ring of opportuni-
ties and public services that women may have a history of struggling
to get, or that may be denied (or historically have been denied) them
on the basis of their gender. That is, the items listed presumably stem
from identified common challenges that women, past and present,
face.25 It also serves as a list of that which is deemed important, from
a fundamental human rights perspective.26
Article 14 of CEDAW evinces a concern about gender as it in-
tersects with rurality.27 Recent human rights instruments permit “a
growing number of types of individual persons [to] press for their
human rights: women, children, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples,
17. Darren Rosenblum has analyzed extensively whether CEDAW’s goal is or should
be gender equality or women’s equality. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, 20.1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2011).
18. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 10.
19. Id. art. 12.
20. Id. art. 11.
21. Id. art. 6.
22. Id. art. 7.
23. Id. art. 8.
24. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 13(c).
25. See Afra Afsharipour, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women’s NGOs in the
Enforcement of the Women’s Convention, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 129, 130 n.4 (1999) (writing
that “women’s human rights arose out of the need for women to argue for the universality
of their rights as defined by them, highlighting those aspects of women’s experiences which
are universal or find their roots in universal patterns of discrimination against women”).
26. Indeed, the list is quite similar to the list of capabilities developed by Martha
Nussbaum. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-80 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT] (listing capabilities, including bodily health, education, autonomy); id.
at 106-07 (telling story of Vasanti, which illustrates women’s need for access to credit);
id. at 302 (listing the goals of a women’s collective in Andhra Pradesh, India).
27. See Marsha A. Freeman, Women, Development and Justice: Using the International
Convention on Women’s Rights, in OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN’S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
93, 98 (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993) (calling Article 14 “unique as a statement of human rights
because it emphasizes the rights of a particular sub-group to which special attention should
be paid”).
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gays and lesbians, the elderly, the disabled, and the imprisoned.” 28
CEDAW adds geography or place to the list of types or categories
recognized as a basis for disadvantage or discrimination.29
Some of the needs and rights enumerated in Article 14 appear to
be related to rurality itself, as well as to associated livelihoods such
as agriculture.30 Some appear to recognize the less developed and
perhaps more patriarchal character of rural places.31 Still others re-
peat and/or tailor for rural women rights articulated elsewhere in the
Convention for all women, such as education.32 Indeed, Article 14
sometimes appears to scale back or diminish for rural women the
robustness and detail of a right recognized elsewhere in CEDAW,
perhaps setting a lower or different standard for these same rights
in rural contexts.33
In part because of its explicit attention to rural women, CEDAW
has been labeled “visionary” in its approach to “addressing the sys-
temic inequities facing women.” 34 Another commentator has called
Article 14 “a more realistic approach to the whole question of women’s
rights at the international level,” and suggested that it evinces a “flex-
ible attitude” in defining “the scope of women’s rights.” 35 Further,
28. Wotipka & Ramirez, supra note 7, at 303. See also Aída González Martínez,
Human Rights of Women, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 157, 171 (2001) (referring to Article 14
as “a recognition that [rural women] constitute a group that faces specific problems and
that requires special attention”). This focus on group membership reflects the so-called
third generation of human rights. Hilary Charlesworth, What are “Women’s International
Human Rights”?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES 58, 58 (1994).
29. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14.
30. These include agricultural credit and extension services, for example. Id. art.
14(2)(g). “Extension services” refers to expert advice regarding farming techniques. These
services are often provided by the State, but may also be delivered by NGOs. See WORLD
BANK ET AL., GENDER IN AGRICULTURE SOURCEBOOK 257, 265 (2009) [hereinafter SOURCE-
BOOK] (describing extension services as providing information and training); see also
Extension, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/extension.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2011) (describing extension services provided by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to farmers in the United States).
Other than agriculture and associated activities, such as food processing and marketing,
“crafts” are mentioned in U.N. documents as a rural livelihood. U.N. Secretary-General,
United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: Women in Rural
Areas: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/32/269 (Oct. 18, 1977) [hereinafter
A/32/269]. The same document also refers to “the traditional and modern sectors of the
economy” in relation to rural women, but it does not elaborate on the meaning of these
terms. Id. ¶ 13.
31. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
32. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 10. See also infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text
(discussing whether rural women are entitled to the same standard of education as non-
rural women, or whether CEDAW establishes lower expectations for them).
33. See infra Part IV.
34. Southard, supra note 2, at 83.
35. Burrows, supra note 2, at 447.
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Article 14’s inclusion of rural women has been hailed as “a mile-
stone in the development of legal provisions which aim to improve
the situation of the bulk of the world female population.” 36
By naming rural women as a distinct population, CEDAW
might be thought of as an example of rural exceptionalism. It moves
beyond the implicit focus on urban populations that characterizes a
great deal of contemporary law making.37 In fact, the drafters’ deci-
sion to enumerate rights for rural women as a group may have been
an implicit recognition of our world’s increasing metrocentricity.
While the world’s population only became more rural than urban in
2008,38 the urban migration juggernaut has been in process, gaining
force, for decades. Indeed, a 1977 document that influenced the in-
clusion of rural women’s concerns within CEDAW articulated the
need to stem migration to urban areas as a principal reason for in-
tegrating women into rural development.39 Worldwide, almost 800
36. Id. Elsewhere Burrows writes: “For most women, what it is to be human is to work
long hours in agriculture or in the home, to receive little or no remuneration, and to be
faced with political and legal processes which ignore their contribution to society and
accord no recognition of their particular needs.” Noreen Burrows, International Law and
Human Rights: The Case of Women’s Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO
REALITY 80, 82 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986).
37. Certainly, this appears to be the case in U.S. law. See, e.g., Katherine Porter, Going
Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969, 982-85 (2005)
(discussing policymakers’ failure to consider rural U.S. populations); Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural
Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 236-40 (2006) (noting judicial failures to consider or under-
stand rural populations).
38. See Lisa Pruitt, Did the World Become More Urban Than Rural Yesterday?, LEGAL
RURALISM BLOG (Dec. 17, 2008, 7:38 PM), http://legalruralism.blogspot.com/2008/12/
yesterday-was-one-of-those-days.html (reporting Professor Ronald C. Wimberley’s post
to the Rural Studies listserv of the Rural Sociological Society). The United States became
more urban than rural almost a century ago, as marked by the 1920 census. See Roger A.
Lohmann & Nancy Lohmann, Introduction to RURAL SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE, at xi, xv, xvi
(2005) (tracking the conversion of the U.S. population from rural to urban as reflected in
each decennial census between 1900 and 2000).
39. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 19. The paragraph states in part:
Among the many measures recommended for the incorporation of women in
active economic, political, social and cultural life were the need to formulate
and execute integrated government planning policies that provide for effective
integration of women in rural development with a view to reducing their
migration to urban areas, which only worsens the problem of marginality; the
need to draw up government development plans that include training and
vocational education courses for women in rural and urban areas; to promote
the increased participation of women in agricultural co-operative activities
thus contributing to a more effective role of women in food production, higher
community earning, larger self-help programmes and improved standards of
living; to include in development plans provisions for programmes to train
women in the techniques of the production, processing and marketing of rural
products; to furnish women of rural and indigenous areas with meaningful
apprenticeship for meeting the priority needs of the community.
Id.
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million people have moved from rural areas to urban ones in the last
half century.40
Alternatively, CEDAW’s articulation of rural difference might be
viewed as a recognition of the developing world in its entirety because
the majority of the developing world’s population is rural.41 Nowhere
does CEDAW define “rural,” yet the term is in many ways synony-
mous with “undeveloped,” 42 and at least one nation, Chad, made this
link explicit during the Convention’s drafting.43 Ninety percent of
40. See Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 710 (citing Press Release, Food
and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Farm Investment Helps Slow Migration (June 2,
2006), http://www.FAO.org/newsroom/en/news/2006/1000313/index.html).
41. See id. at 711 (citing U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., URBAN
AND RURAL AREAS 2007, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/276, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XIII.13 (2008)).
“In 2007, 56.2% of those living in less developed regions lived in rural areas.” Id. “This
number is expected to fall to 44% by 2025.” Id. (citing U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS,
POPULATION DIV., WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2007 REVISION, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2007), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2007/2007WUP_Exec
Sum_web.pdf). In India, for example, only one-third of the population live in urban areas,
although that number is expected to increase. Lisa R. Pruitt, Human Rights and Develop-
ment for India’s Rural Remnant: A Capabilities-Based Assessment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant]; Pruitt, Migration, Develop-
ment, supra note 2, at 710-22 (providing additional data and discussing the phenomenon
of rural-to-urban migration in the developing world).
42. See Marc Mormont, Who is Rural? or, How to be Rural: Towards a Sociology of the
Rural, in RURAL RESTRUCTURING: GLOBAL PROCESSES AND THEIR RESPONSES 21, 28 (Terry
Marsden et al. eds., 1990) (writing that “[i]t was taken for granted” in rural sociology “that
its subject was the least developed regions and least integrated areas”). But see Lisa R.
Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 338, 344-
48 & nn.43-44 (2008) [hereinafter Pruitt, Gender, Geography] (discussing the contested
meaning of “rural” and rurality in relation to development) (citing Stephens v. Raleigh
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 257 S.E.2d 175, 180 (W. Va. 1979)); but see also A/32/269, supra note
30, ¶¶ 5, 13, 15 (linking rural women with poor urban women in terms of their needs);
Burrows, supra note 2, at 447-48 (noting Article 14’s relevance to countries at different
stages of development); Welch, supra note 2, at 555-56 (noting the de facto barriers to
women’s equality in rural places in Africa, as well as the serious problems women face
“due to traditional land tenure systems, inheritance practices, and lack of capital,” but
observing that “conditions are not significantly better” in urban areas in Africa). Indeed,
during the drafting of Article 14, Argentina proposed that it be more comprehensive to
cover “both women in rural areas and disadvantaged population groups in rural and urban
areas.” LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN 156 (1993) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Decade for Women:
Equality, Development and Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/32/218/Add.1
(Oct. 12, 1977)). Hungary, on the other hand, thought it should be limited to rural women.
Id. (citing U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Devel-
opment and Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum, ¶¶ 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/32/218/Add.2
(Oct. 28, 1977)).
43. See REHOF, supra note 42, at 156 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum, ¶¶ 15-16,
354 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:347
the world’s rural population lives in the developing world.44 Rural
development implicates human rights, particularly those of the socio-
economic variety.45 Setting apart women in the developing world—as
opposed to rural women—for the rights enumerated in Article 14
might not have been as politically palatable as singling out rural
women. This is because the former designates women in a certain
type of nation state, while the latter exist in virtually all nation
states. Nevertheless, some documents related to CEDAW’s drafting
suggest that one of Article 14’s goals was to narrow the gap between
the developed and developing world.46 The relationship between un-
developed/developing and rural implicates the expressive significance
of including an entire article about rural women in a major human
rights treaty, as well as what Article 14’s detailed provisions suggest
about the meaning or character of the rural. I take up these matters
more fully below.47
U.N. Doc. A/32/218/Add.2 (Oct. 28, 1977)) (stating “Chad said that this article was impor-
tant for developing countries”).
44. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., RURAL POPULATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2007, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/275, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.XIII.10 (2007) [hereinafter RURAL POPULATION 2007]. “The U.N. Population Division
defines the percentage of rural populations as the ‘[p]roportion of the midyear de facto
population living in areas not classified as urban according to the criteria used by each
country or area.’ ” Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 709 n.4 (quoting RURAL
POPULATION 2007, supra note 44, at n.7). “The United Nations calculates rural and urban
populations using national statistical sources based on the ‘urban’ criteria used by each
country or area.” Id. See also Martin Ravallion et al., New Evidence on the Urbanization
of Global Poverty 2-4 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4199, 2007),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/2795087-1191
427986785/RavallionMEtAl_UrbanizationOfGlobalPoverty.pdf (discussing the challenges
and inconsistencies with the differing definitions of rural and urban).
45. See Andrew C. Byrnes, The “Other” Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3
(1989) (observing that “[t]he most sustained interest in the Convention and the Committee
has been among those . . . interested in the human rights of women or the role of women
in development”) (citing Rebecca Cook, The International Right to Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Sex, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 161 (1989)); see also Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant,
supra note 41 (discussing universal human rights in relation to India’s rural development).
46. REHOF, supra note 42, at 153. Rehof states that “[w]omen’s involvement in devel-
opment (‘. . . narrowing the gap between developed and developing countries . . .’) was
discussed relative to the preamble and subsequent articles,” but he does not specify
whether he refers to CEDAW’s preamble or something else. Id. The language he quotes
is not included in the Preamble to CEDAW, which makes reference to development only
twice. In paragraph 7, it refers to the fact “that discrimination against women . . . is an
obstacle to . . . the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their
countries and of humanity.” CEDAW, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 7. In paragraph 12, the
Preamble states: “Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the
welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women
on equal terms with men in all fields[.]” Id. pmbl. ¶ 12.
47. See infra Part V.
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The following Part examines the drafting history to determine
how rural women came to be featured in CEDAW. It also assesses
the Travaux Préparatoires’ insights into the rights enumerated for
rural women and how those rights relate to the broader array of
rights featured in the Convention.
II. THE DRAFTING HISTORY
Rural women were first mentioned in CEDAW in Draft 4, in
1974, in what became Article 10, applying educational rights to
women “in rural as well as in urban areas.” 48 Additionally, an early
version of Draft 3 of the Convention, also in 1974, had alluded to
rural women by specifying that the provision applied to “women . . .
who are gainfully employed in . . . other organizations in agriculture
and on plantations.” 49 But the idea of an article dedicated to rural
women arose relatively late in the process of drafting CEDAW—
specifically, the idea arose in 1976 during the 26th Session of the
Commission on the Status of Women.50 An unnamed representative
of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) introduced the dis-
cussion of rural women and the challenges they face.51 She noted
other contemporary instances of United Nations’ attention to rural
women.52 The Mexico Conference had adopted a resolution on women
in agriculture,53 and the General Assembly had adopted two resolu-
tions at its thirtieth session, one regarding “women in rural areas” and
the other regarding “improvement of the economic status of women
for their effective and speedy participation in development.” 54 In
addition, a 1974 World Food Conference resolution had highlighted
the need for women’s involvement in rural development.55
48. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.12 (1974); see also REHOF, supra note 42, at 110, 153
(containing information regarding early drafts of Article 10).
49. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/574 (1974); see also REHOF, supra note 42, at 151, 153 (featuring
information regarding early drafts of Article 14).
50. REHOF, supra note 42, at 153 (discussed in Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra
note 2, at 729 n.149); see also Burrows, supra note 2, at 446-47 (relating the history of
specifically incorporating rural women into the Convention draft).
51. Burrows, supra note 2, at 446 (noting that the FAO official particularly hoped “to
improve the situation of agricultural workers”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (specifically referring to “[i]mprovement of the economic status of women for
their effective and speedy participation in development” of their countries, G.A. Res.
3522 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3522(XXX) (Dec. 15, 1975); and “Women in Rural Areas”,
G.A. Res. 3523 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3523(XXX) (Dec. 15, 1975)).
55. Burrows, supra note 2, at 446. The United Nations’ attention to rural women has
increased over the years since CEDAW was drafted. See, e.g., WomenWatch: International
Day of Rural Women, WOMENWATCH: INFO. & RES. ON GENDER EQUAL. & EMPOWERMENT
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Beyond the FAO representative’s role in getting rural difference
on the Commission’s agenda, a representative from India is widely
credited with rural women’s inclusion in CEDAW. She organized an
informal working party (hereinafter “working party” or “working
group”) of several states that produced a draft article.56 Ultimately,
seven nations sponsored the amendment proposing what became
Article 14: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, and
the United States.57 All except the United States were developing
nations.58 Indeed, one commentator saw Article 14 as “a manifesta-
tion of the impact of delegates of women from the Third World on the
Commission on the Status of Women.” 59 Professor Noreen Burrows
characterizes Article 14 as “perhaps an inevitable culmination of the
work of the United Nations linking questions of development with
those of women.” 60
The initial draft of what became Article 14, dated September 28,
1976, read:
Insert the following article in the text of the draft Convention
between Articles 10 and 11, or after Article 11.
States Parties shall take all measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in rural areas in order to
guarantee them equality as participants and as benefi-
ciaries of agricultural and rural development and par-
ticularly the right to:
(a) Participate fully in the formulation and imple-
mentation of development planning from the local to
the national levels;
OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/idrw/index.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2011) [hereinafter International Day of Rural Women] (noting that in December
2007, the United Nations designated October 15 International Day of Rural Women, and
this was first observed on October 15, 2008); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, DIV.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN ET AL., RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2008) [hereinafter RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING
WORLD], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/Women %202000%20-
%20Rural%20Women%20web%20English.pdf (promoting the goals of the Beijing
Declaration and the Platform for action); SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30.
56. Burrows, supra note 2, at 446.
57. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Status of Women, Inter-
national Instruments Relating to the Status of Women: Draft Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/L.687 (Sept. 28, 1976)
[hereinafter E/CN.6/L.687] (discussed in Burrows, supra note 2, at 446 & n.51).
58. Somewhat ironically, two of these sponsoring nations—Iran and the United
States—are among the handful of nation states that have yet to ratify CEDAW. See
Ratification, supra note 5 (not listing Iran as a party to CEDAW and showing the United
States has not ratified CEDAW).
59. Burrows, supra note 2, at 447.
60. Id.
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(b) Receive adequate medical and health facilities,
including family planning advice and services;
(c) Obtain all types of training, formal and non-
formal, as well as community and extension services;
(d) Participate equally in all community activities
including co-operatives;
(e) Obtain equal access to credit and loans; market-
ing facilities; and equal treatment in land and agrarian
reform as well as land resettlement schemes.61
Noteworthy is the fact that this initial draft was even more focused
on agriculture than the final version. The draft closely links “agricul-
ture with rural development,” but in a way that does not suggest they
are perfectly synonymous. The most significant aspect of Article 14
that did not appear in this draft is (2)(h), which calls for member
states to provide adequate infrastructure in rural areas, including
water, sanitation, electricity, transport, and housing.62 The right to
social security was also not included until a later version. It is inter-
esting that this initial draft does not use the term “education,” but
refers instead only to training and extension services, thus suggest-
ing something less formal for rural women.
“In presenting the draft article,” its sponsors noted “two thirds
of women in the World lived in rural areas,” and that for women in
the developing world, “this meant isolation from political, social, cul-
tural and economic activities.” 63 They also noted the importance of
community and extension services that would empower women to
help themselves.64 The proposal to include this article about rural
women found “immediate support from all delegates”; the Soviet
Union, for example, labeled it a “wonderful initiative.” 65
Delegates then debated how to acknowledge rural women in
the Convention. Representatives of France and Hungary “thought
it might be more logical, as well as more effective . . . to insert each
61. E/CN.6/L.687, supra note 57. New Zealand proposed what became the structure
for Paragraphs 1 (“problems faced by rural women”) and 2 (“participation in and benefits
from rural development”). REHOF, supra note 42, at 155 (citing Rep. of the Working Group
of the Whole on Drafting of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, 33rd Sess., ¶ 134, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1 (Dec. 1, 1978)).
62. See infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text.
63. Burrows, supra note 2, at 446; see also Bond, supra note 2, at 515 (noting that im-
plementation of a national inheritance law in Ghana has been “spotty, particularly in rural
areas”); id. at 515 n.194 (noting that knowledge of an international human rights treaty
is limited in rural parts of Africa); Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 750-52
(noting the absence of law and legal actors in rural places).
64. Burrows, supra note 2, at 446.
65. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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subparagraph of the proposed text in the appropriate chapter (train-
ing, medical services, credit facilities, etc.) in order to stress, in each
chapter, that a special effort should be made on behalf of rural
women.” 66 Ultimately, however, the working group decided that “the
situation of rural women was so disturbing that it should be the sub-
ject of a special article,” 67 and that an “article devoted to rural women
would carry greater weight.” 68 In the end, the Commission unani-
mously adopted the proposal of the Indian-led working group, with
minor amendments.69
Within the working group that drafted Article 14,70 a few repre-
sentatives noted that some paragraphs repeated prior articles, while
other representatives “stressed [the provisions’] importance within
the context of rural women.”71 The working group’s chairman acknowl-
edged the redundancies between Article 14 and the earlier articles,
but emphasized that Article 14’s “main purpose was to draw attention
to all aspects of the situation of women in rural areas.” 72
All of this suggests, of course, that Article 14 should be read in the
context of CEDAW as a whole. In cases in which Article 14’s specific
provisions are less expansive and detailed than other, similar CEDAW
provisions, interpretation is more difficult, as discussed below.
III. GENDER EQUALITY AND SPATIAL EQUALITY
While CEDAW’s principal focus is gender equality, its recognition
of rural women might also be seen as reflecting an aspiration to spa-
tial equality—or at least an acknowledgment of spatial inequalities.73
66. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Status of Women, Inter-
national Instruments Relating to the Status of Women: Draft Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/SR.658 (Oct. 11,
1976) [hereinafter E/CN.6/SR.658].
67. Id. ¶ 8.
68. Id. ¶ 9. Whether having a separate article has led to the provision’s substance
carrying greater weight is debatable. In any event, it seems noteworthy that subsequent
mentions of rural populations in relation to human rights have used a more pervasive
approach to inclusion of rural concerns. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
69. Burrows, supra note 2, at 447.
70. See Rep. of the Working Group of the Whole on Drafting of the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 33rd Sess., ¶ 134, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1 (Dec. 1, 1978) [hereinafter A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1] (reporting actions
of the working group).
71. Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Rep. of the
Working Group of the Whole on the Drafting of the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women, ¶ 131, U.N. Doc. A/34/60 (Mar. 2, 1979) [hereinafter A/34/60].
72. E/CN.6/SR.658, supra note 66, ¶ 34.
73. Spatial inequality is “place stratification or inequality within and between ter-
ritorial units.” Linda Lobao, Continuity and Change in Place Stratification: Spatial
Inequality and Middle-Range Territorial Units, 69 RURAL SOC. 1, 1 (2004); see also NEIL
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That is, CEDAW is concerned not only that women gain equality
with men, it seeks to some extent rural women’s equality (or perhaps
parity)74 with urban women. It implicitly recognizes variations in
access to services based on geography, suggesting that rural popula-
tions are often underserved in comparison to their urban counter-
parts.75 Thus CEDAW is at least implicitly concerned with all rural
populations, not only with women.
Indeed, CEDAW has been touted as manifesting a feminist
character because of its attention to socio-economic rights,76 and
nowhere is this more evident than in Article 14. In an extensive
and detailed list that one commentator has labeled “impressive,” 77
Article 14 calls for provision of infrastructure and basic needs,78 in-
cluding not only education and health care as stipulated elsewhere
in CEDAW, but also water, sanitation, electricity, transport, and
communications infrastructure.79 Indeed, Article 14 is one of the
lengthiest articles of the Convention, comparable in its detail only
SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: NATURE, CAPITAL AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 131-35
(1984) (discussing the possibility of spatial equilibrium). Spatial inequalities may be
assessed at various scales, including among nations and among sub-national units. See
Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding
of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 229 (2010) (illustrating spatial inequalities
among Arizona counties in their provision of indigent defense); Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial
Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and Place, 71 MONT.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Pruitt, Spatial Inequality] (considering how the Montana
Constitution could address spatial inequality in relation to provision of health and human
services); see also SPATIAL DISPARITIES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ASIA 1-6 (Ravi Kanbur et al. eds., 2006) (discussing spatial inequality in relation to inter-
national development); SPATIAL INEQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 3-11 (Ravi Kanbur &
Anthony J. Venables eds., 2005) (same).
74. See Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant, supra note 41, at Part III.B.
75. The same is true of the Disability Convention, discussed infra at notes 275-77.
76. See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15
HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 69 (1993) (asserting that international law has given primacy to civil
and political rights, which tend to protect men in their functioning in public life, while
“importance has not been generally accorded to economic and social rights which affect
life in the private sphere”); see also Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 60 (arguing that the
structure of human rights law has been based on the silence of women and that the rea-
son “[w]omen are in an inferior position [is] because they have no real power in either the
public or private worlds, and international human rights law . . . reinforces this power-
lessness”); Farha, supra note 9, at 553 (asserting the greater significance of socioeconomic
rights to women). Farha repeatedly asserts the significance of CEDAW to “economic, social
and cultural rights.” Id. passim.
77. Southard, supra note 2, at 85 (calling this “attention to detail” regarding rural
women “long overdue”).
78. Welch, supra note 2, at 556; see also A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 13 (referring to
the United Nations’ “new basic-needs approach to economic development and technology
choices” as manifest in a 1977 document by an ad hoc Working Group on Appropriate
Technology in relation to the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development).
79. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(h).
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to Article 10 on education, Article 11 on employment, and Article 16
on women’s rights in relation to marriage and the family. In the
Part that follows, I discuss further Article 14’s implicit attention to
spatial inequality and how compliance with its provisions would
ameliorate uneven development.
IV. THE LANGUAGE
In this part, I consider closely the language of Article 14 to
assess the meaning of each subsection in the context of CEDAW as a
whole.
Article 14(1): States Parties shall take into account the particular
problems faced by rural women and the significant roles which
rural women play in the economic survival of their families, includ-
ing their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application of
the provisions of the present Convention to women in rural areas.80
This provision calls attention to rural women broadly speaking,
and it indicates that they should enjoy all of the rights stipulated else-
where in the Convention.81 This part also makes certain assumptions
about rural women, for example, that they play economic roles—and
not only nurturing ones—in relation to their families. Indeed, it as-
sumes that rural women have families. Both assumptions are present
elsewhere in CEDAW with respect to all women.82
Second, Article 14’s reference to the “non-monetized sectors of
the economy” associates both women and rurality with the informal
economy (i.e., self-provisioning, bartering of goods and services).83
80. Id. art. 14(1).
81. This follows a form proposed by the Cuban representative who suggested “an intro-
ductory phrase be drafted guaranteeing rural women the rights recognized in all the pro-
visions of the Convention, and specifying in the subparagraphs those the Working Group
wanted to emphasize.” A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 132.
82. CEDAW’s Article 11 on work, for example, guarantees women “the right to work
as an inalienable right,” CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 11(1)(a), and prohibits “dismissal on
the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave,” id. art. 11(2)(a), and provides “special
protection . . . during pregnancy,” id. art. 11(2)(d). Article 12 on health stipulates the right
to “appropriate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal
period” and “adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.” Id. art. 12(2). Articles 5
and 9 also address aspects of women’s roles as parents. Id. art. 5(b), 9(2).
83. See Welch, supra note 2, at 552 (noting that rural women are a majority of the
female population of Rwanda, and that these women work in the non-monetized sector,
e.g., “cooking, gathering wood, grinding cereals, fetching water, maintenance work, edu-
cating children” (quoting Rwanda’s third report under the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/RWA/3)). Elsewhere
CEDAW similarly associates rural women with a lower degree of formality, e.g., “non-
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On the one hand, this association is beneficial for rural women be-
cause it acknowledges in a very positive way the significance of an
economic sector little attended to in national or international legal
systems.84 Rural women exist principally outside “official statistics
relating to GDP and employment, and have very often been ignored
in development planning.” 85 On the other hand, it might be seen as
negative to the extent it suggests that rural populations—including
women—do not suffer deprivation in the way that urban populations
do because the well-being of the former cannot be measured strictly
in monetary terms86 (i.e., the international poverty standard of one
dollar per day).87 That is, the informal economy may be seen as ame-
liorating poverty as measured in strictly monetary terms. While that
suggestion could lessen the perceived need to assist rural women,
formal” education. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(d).
Since CEDAW’s ratification, the CEDAW Committee has adopted two General Recom-
mendations about topics related to the informal economy. These are General Recommen-
dation 16 regarding “[u]npaid women workers in rural and urban family enterprises,”
and General Recommendation 17 on the “[m]easurement and quantification of the
unremunerated domestic activities of women and their recognition in the gross national
product.” Farha, supra note 9, at 556 (citing U.N. Doc. A/46/38 at 1-2 (1993)). These
General Recommendations assist States Parties with preparation of their periodic reports.
84. Indeed, this is an aspect of what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have com-
plained about in articulating their capabilities framework as an alternative to measuring
well-being based on, for example, GDP. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 164-68 (2006); NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 6, 60 (referring to “[d]efects in standard GNP-
and utility-based approaches” being well illustrated by looking at the situation of women
in the developing world and arguing for the need to look at the individual level of well-
being, not that of the nation as measured by GNP); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM 3 (1999) (writing that growth of GNP can be a very important “means to
expanding the freedoms enjoyed by” citizens, “freedoms depend also on other
determinants, such as social and economic arrangements . . . as well as political and civil
rights”); see also A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 11 (noting the lack of data on the “nature and
the socio-economic conditions” of rural women’s “work-participation” in “food production
both for export and subsistence,” even though it “is known to be very high”).
85. Burrows, supra note 2, at 447 (citing U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 94/8). See also RURAL
WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 7-10 (discussing the importance of agri-
culture in developing nations, as well as women’s significant participation in this sector).
86. See Pruitt, Gender, Geography, supra note 42, at 352, 362 (discussing the asso-
ciation of rural women with the informal economy in the context of the United States).
87. See, e.g., AXEL WOLZ, GLOBAL DONOR PLATFORM FOR RURAL DEV., THE ROLE OF
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOALS 1 (2005), available at http://www.donorplatform.org/component/option,com_doc
man/task,doc_details/gid,219/ (noting the one dollar per day poverty line); Gaurav Datt
& Martin Ravallion, Is India’s Economic Growth Leaving the Poor Behind? 2 (World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2846, 2002) (referencing the “international poverty
line of $1 per day”); see also THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008:
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 45-49 & Box A.1 (2007) [hereinafter AGRICULTURE FOR
DEVELOPMENT] (discussing and providing data based on poverty rates of $1.08 per day and
$2.15 per day).
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the remainder of Article 14 makes clear the particular needs of this
group, and it indicates how member states should respond to them.
The use of the word “appropriate” to modify member states’ com-
mitment under Article 14 might be read as giving member states
flexibility with respect to actually achieving CEDAW’s mandates
regarding to rural women. The Travaux Préparatoires, however, in-
dicate that the United Kingdom suggested the word “appropriate”
here in order that “nothing extreme, like violence, could be used to
eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas.” 88
Article 14(2): States parties shall take all appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they par-
ticipate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular,
shall ensure to such women the right[.]89
The first clause of this sentence tracks standard CEDAW lan-
guage (regarding member states taking measures to eliminate sex
discrimination), adding only “in rural areas” to modify women and
define the protected class. This part of Section 14(2), the prefatory
statement to more specific and substantive rights, notes the critical
importance of development to rural populations. The provision’s sec-
ond clause emphasizes the perceived need for and significance of devel-
opment to rural populations, a focus that is reinforced in part (2)(a).90
The concerns enumerated in the subsections that follow refer to a
variety of aspects of development, from investment in physical infra-
structure, including sewage systems and telecommunications lines;
to economic development, including access to credit and marketing
facilities; to enhancement of human capital, including education and
health care.91 These provisions regarding rural women are primarily
programmatic,92 setting forth aspirational “future policy for govern-
ments to follow in their development planning.” 93 Only one—land re-
form—clearly implicates law or legal change.94 I take up other aspects
of CEDAW’s focus on development in the next section.
88. REHOF, supra note 42, at 155 (citing U.N. Doc. A/C.3/33/WG.1/CRP.5/Add.9).
89. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
90. Id. art. 14(2)(a) (reading, “[t]o participate in the elaboration and implementation of
development planning at all levels”).
91. Id. art. 14(2).
92. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 735; see also Burrows, supra note
2, at 447 (stating that Article 14 “is intended to serve as a programme of action for the
developing countries”).
93. Burrows, supra note 2, at 447.
94. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(g).
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Article 14(2)(a): To participate in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of development planning at all levels[.]95
This provision’s emphasis on development seems somewhat
redundant of both the provision that precedes it and of some of the
substantive and detailed sub-sections that follow. The “at all levels”
language adds something new, however. It suggests that women
should have a say in development planning not only at the commu-
nity level (via self-help groups, co-operatives, community activities
and such, as suggested in other parts of 14(2)),96 but that they should
also be integrated and included at higher levels, such as those of the
region and even the nation state.97 This CEDAW provision seems to
contemplate decentralization, which international donors have iden-
tified as a positive force in rural development.98
A number of U.N. documents and reports appear to have influ-
enced the inclusion of Article 14(2)(a). Some of these documents are
listed in the Secretary-General’s 1977 Report on Women in Rural
Areas,99 and two other preliminary reports are also evidence of the
95. Id. art. 14(2)(a).
96. See infra notes 167-90 and accompanying text.
97. This is consistent with Articles 7 and 8 regarding women’s political participation
at all levels. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 7, 8. Again, this Article 14 language suggests that
participation in development is akin to political or other public sector participation in non-
rural areas. The initial draft of what became Article 14 specifies the local and national
scales. E/CN.6.L/687, supra note 57.
98. See WOLZ, supra note 87, at iv-v (noting importance of action at “global, national
and local” levels); see also A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 12 (discussing the goal of women’s in-
volvement “in decision-making concerning water and other local services’ management”).
99. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 2 n.1. These documents are:
(a) ECA annual report (1 March 1976-3 March 1977) (Official Records of the
Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 7
(E/5941), paras. 111-114);
(b) ECLA annual report (7 May 1976-6 May 1977) (Official Records of the
Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 11
(E/5945), paras. 29, 30 and 38);
(c) ESCAP annual report (3 April 1976-30 April 1977) (Official Records of
the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 8
(E/5909), paras. 195, 196, 200, 201 and 369);
(d) Report of the Executive Board of UNICEF (Official Records of the
Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 12
(E/6014), paras. 100, 125, 127 and 129-132);
(e) Report of FAO (E/5949 and Corr.1), paras. 29, 36, 170, 171, 179 and 180);
and “Summary programme of work and budget 1978-1979” submitted to
the FAO Council at its seventy-first session (CL 71/3, pp. 13 and A.7);
(f) “Report of the ILO on its activities of special interest to women”, sub-
mitted to the Commission on the Status of Women at its twenty-sixth
session (E/CN.6/603, paras. 3, 19-21 and 24-30);
(g) “Report of UNESCO on its activities of special interest to women”, sub-
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U.N.’s view of rural women in relation to development planning.
These were (1) the Secretary-General’s proposal to the General
Assembly, at its thirty-first session, of further research discussing
“the extent to which women participate in fields such as agriculture,
industry, trade and science and technology,”100 and (2) a question-
naire that the Secretariat (the staff of the Secretary-General) sent
to member states in order to evaluate progress related to the United
Nations’ International Development Strategy for its Second Develop-
ment Decade and for International Women’s Year.101 These reports
were preceded by General Assembly Resolution 3523 on “Women in
Rural Areas,”102 and Resolution 31/175 on the “Effective Mobilization
of Women in Development.”103 The questionnaires and resolutions
focused on facilitating women’s equal participation
with men in all development efforts and, in particular . . . equal
access to political parties, trade unions, training, especially in
agriculture, co-operatives, and credit and loan systems, as well
as equal opportunities to participate in policy-making in the eco-
nomic field, in commerce and trade and in the advanced efforts
of industry[.]104
Similar areas of concern are mentioned in CEDAW’s Article 14,
sections (2)(e) (self-help groups and co-operatives), (2)(f) (community
activities), and (2)(g) (agriculture and economics).105 Section (2)(a)
might thus be seen as an umbrella for the subsections that follow it,
as those subsections elaborate on different aspects of development.
This focus on development in Article 14 assumes that rural
places are in need of development, which might be read as suggest-
ing that they should become urban—or at least more urban-like. After
all, urban places are necessarily more developed than rural ones by
some measures. On this basis, Article 14 might be seen in its entirety
as reflecting an urban bias.106 Arturo Escobar’s critique of develop-
mitted to the Commission on the Status of Women at its twenty-sixth
session (E/CN.6/604, paras. 51-53, 58, 59, 63, 68 and 73).
Id.
100. U.N. Doc. A/31/205 (Dec. 22, 1976).
101. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 7.
102. G.A. Res. 3523 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3523(XXX) (Dec. 15, 1975).
103. G.A. Res. 31/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/175 (Dec. 21, 1976).
104. Id.
105. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(e)-(g).
106. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 725-27; see also IDRISS JAZAIRY
ET AL., THE STATE OF WORLD RURAL POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 69 (1992) (discussing urban bias generally and its perpetuation of rural
poverty); Michael Lipton, Urban Bias, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
724, 724-26 (Tim Forsyth ed., 2005) (defining urban bias in relation to international devel-
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ment would thus presumably see at least some aspects of CEDAW’s
Article 14 as problematic in that it risks articulating a false conscious-
ness for rural populations. Escobar challenges the assumption that
“peasants” desire development as manifest, for example, in production
for the market.107 He expresses offense that the development commu-
nity sees development as “about growth, about capital, about tech-
nology, about becoming modern,”108 which may be inconsistent with
the wishes of villagers themselves.109 Article 14, then, appears to
mandate what Escobar believes rural residents do not necessarily
seek because it effectively makes choices for rural populations by
suggesting what the good life entails, for example, increased produc-
tion and production for the market.
Nevertheless, Article 14(2)(a) may have some redeeming quali-
ties in relation to the otherwise hegemonic nature of development.
Specifically, Article 14(2)(a)’s call for the engagement of rural women
in development “at all levels”110 aspires for rural women to have a say
in the path of development, thereby endowing them with the power
to reject certain development courses, should they so choose. Indeed,
the CEDAW working group stressed “the need for the participation
of people at the grass-roots level, so as to ensure that actual conditions
in rural areas are taken into account in the planning process.”111
Interestingly, rural places are not the only objects of CEDAW’s
development agenda. Article 3, which broadly calls for member states
to take action, calls for the development of women themselves. It
states in relevant part:
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, in-
cluding legislation, to ensure the full development and advance-
ment of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a
basis of equality with men.112
opment); WOLZ, supra note 87, at 10, 41-45 (noting a bias in public spending on urban
needs, in spite of the significance of agricultural development at certain stages of a nation’s
development); see also infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text (discussing rural women
as “other” in the context of CEDAW).
107. ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 157-62 (1995).
108. Id. at 162.
109. Id. (discussing how development programming often does not view rural living as
a “viable . . . way of life”).
110. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(a); see also supra notes 95-105 and accompanying
text (echoing concerns about women’s integration into development that were expressed
in a 1977 U.N. document. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶¶ 5, 8, 12, 15, 19, 22).
111. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 22.
112. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 3.
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CEDAW thus assumes women are subjects to be acted upon—to be
developed—in the same way rural people and places are to be acted
upon and improved.
The parallel between women and rurality suggested by CEDAW’s
use of the term “development” regarding both reflects a pervasive
and long-standing association between the feminine and the rural.113
Both rurality and women have also long been associated with the
private sphere, with that which is beyond the law’s reach.114 CEDAW
challenges this latter association by bringing both to the law’s atten-
tion and within the purview of international law. In doing so, how-
ever, it fails to mainstream either. Instead, it reinforces the feminine/
private/rural association, and marginalizes both women and rural-
ity.115 On a more positive note, CEDAW sees women’s autonomy as
critical aspects of both types of development, and it attends to issues
such as education and health care as key to fostering that autonomy.
The concerns which led to (2)(a)’s stipulation that women be in-
cluded in development planning at all levels clearly persist. A 2008
United Nations Report, Rural Women in a Changing World, reveals
that rural women’s situation has changed too little.116 India, for
example, is among countries that have taken concrete steps to in-
crease women’s participation in local government.117 In some Indian
states, this has resulted in increased government spending on council-
women’s priorities, such as drinking water and health care.118 But
while some efforts to increase women’s participation in local govern-
ment have proved effective, significant barriers still impede women’s
involvement.119 These include women’s second shift, the fact that their
private sphere responsibilities (e.g., the household family and child
rearing)120 are typically greater than those of men. This leaves women
113. Pruitt, Gender, Geography, supra note 42, at 369-71.
114. Id. at 366-69; Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 750-51.
115. Rurality is often also a site for intersection with indigeneity. See Martínez, supra
note 2, at 216-17 (discussing allocating resources to indigenous rural populations). On a
more positive note, CEDAW sees women’s autonomy as a critical aspect of both types of
development, and it attends to issues such as education and health care as key to fostering
that autonomy.
116. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 35.
117. Id. (noting that a 1993 amendment to India’s constitution “included a measure
to reserve one third of seats in panchayats (local governing councils) for women”).
Many scholars have discussed the consequences of these quotas. See, e.g., Raghabendra
Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized
Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409 (2004).
118. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 36.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 35.
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with less time to participate in policy-making roles.121 Entrenched
attitudes regarding gender roles also continue to hinder women’s
opportunities for higher-level policy making positions.122
Article 14(2)(b): To have access to adequate health care facili-
ties, including information, counseling and services in family
planning[.]123
This “access to adequate health care facilities” clause came to be
included in Article 14 because U.N. research “showed that a great part
of the health expenditures intended for the most needy, especially
for rural women, did not reach them and remained at the middle
levels.”124 Article 14(2)(b) echoes Article 12, which is entirely about
health care.125 Article 12, however, is more comprehensive than
14(2)(b). Specifically, Article 12 grants women “access to health care
services, including those related to family planning . . . [and] appro-
priate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement and the
post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”126
That Article 12 is more comprehensive than section (2)(b) of
Article 14 might be seen as suggesting that less is due to rural women
than to their urban counterparts, despite Section 14(1)’s broad state-
ment applying “the provisions of the present Convention to women
in rural areas.”127 Other differences in language between the two
provisions support this construction. Whereas Article 12 talks of
achieving women’s equality with men in terms of access to health
care services, 14(2)(b) articulates the goal of “adequate health care
facilities.”128 The latter provision’s use of the term “adequate” does
not suggest rural-urban parity, but rather a sort of minimal stan-
dard.129 Thus, Article 12 is about equality between men and women,
121. Id.
122. See id. (noting that in Central and South American countries, “grassroots accep-
tance of women’s participation is difficult and slow,” so that women are rarely involved
in farmers’ organizations, and when they are, it is typically “only as members,” and rarely
in leadership roles).
123. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(b).
124. A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1, supra note 70, ¶ 149. This is consistent with the situation in
India, for example. See Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant, supra note 41, at Part II (discussing
the situation in India).
125. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 12.
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 14(1).
128. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
129. See Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant, supra note 41, at Part III.B (discussing the
adequacy versus equality debate in the context of the capabilities framework developed
by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, as well as in relation to spatial inequality across
the rural-urban axis); see also Pruitt, Spatial Inequality, supra note 73, at 88 & n.573
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while Article 14(2)(b) suggests mere adequacy—a minimal standard
of health care—for rural women. In addition, pursuant to Article 12,
rural women would enjoy equal access with men to the “adequate”
rural facilities and services.
Article 12’s “as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and
lactation” clause is an instance where attention to the needs of rural
women revealed a concern subsequently elevated out of Article 14 and
specified as a wider right for all women.130 The clause was originally
proposed for Article 14(2)(b), but the working group believed the
right “should not be limited to rural women.”131 This drafting history
reinforces the construction that Article 12 applies to all women, in-
cluding rural women. Article 14, then, highlights specific rights that
urban women have historically enjoyed to a greater degree than rural
women (e.g., access to health care facilities). Article 14(2)(b) thus
seeks to obtain for rural women some of what urban women already
tend to get. In essence, it draws attention to spatial inequality and
rural disadvantage with respect to health care services.132
(noting the adequacy/equality debate in education); Pruitt & Colgan, supra note 73, at 223
(noting the adequacy/equality conflict in indigent defense programming).
130. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Status of Women, Draft Rep.
of the Comm. of the Status of Women on its Twenty-Fifth Session, ¶ 112, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/L.660/Add.7 (Jan. 29, 1974) [hereinafter E/CN.6/L.660/Add.7].
Measures provided by the Convention should include the expansion of social
services in rural areas, which would make it possible for pregnant women
and nursing mothers to be relieved from the normal work on their farms in
order to fulfill their maternal duties without risks to their health or loss of
family earnings.
Id.
131. A/C.3/33/L.47 Add.1, supra note 70, ¶ 152.
132. Inclusion of the Article 14(2)(b) phrase regarding “information, counseling and
services in family planning” appears to have been about as controversial as the inclusion
of “family planning” language in Article 12. Specifically, regarding Article 14(2)(b), New
Zealand advocated gender neutrality, proposing an amendment that would specify “family
planning advice should be equally available to men.” REHOF, supra note 42, at 158 (citing
U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and
Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, ¶ 103, U.N. Doc. A/32/218 (Sept. 21, 1977)). Greece, on the other hand,
“expressed reservations” about even mentioning family planning, noting “it could give
rise to negative reactions.” Id. (citing U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Decade
for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc.
A/32/218/Add.1 (Oct. 22, 1977)). Also, Argentina and Hungary debated whether the text
of 14(2)(b) should be more comprehensive to cover “disadvantaged population groups, both
in rural areas and among the lowest income urban groups.” U.N. Secretary-General, United
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: Draft Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum,
¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/32/218/Add.1 (Oct. 22, 1977); U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: Draft Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women: Rep. of the Secretary-General: Addendum, ¶ 16, U.N.
2011] DECONSTRUCTING CEDAW’S ARTICLE 14 369
Limited access to health care remains an issue for rural women
today, a problem illustrated by the rate of pregnancy-related deaths.
In many developing countries, the rate of pregnancy-related deaths
is one in sixty-one, but it is higher still in sub-Saharan Africa, at one
in fifteen.133 The rate of child delivery with a skilled attendant is also
significantly lower in rural areas than in urban areas.134 In South
Asia, for example, fewer than thirty percent of rural women deliver
with the help of a skilled attendant.135
Article 14(2)(c): To benefit directly from social security
programmes[.]136
As in 14(2)(b), this provision suggests that social security is a
right that urban women may have historically enjoyed to a greater
extent than their rural counterparts. One reason for the difference
in access to social security is the distinction between the formal and
informal economies, with benefits such as social security associated
with the former. “Social security” is not defined in CEDAW, but
Article 11 on employment provides some insights into its intended
meaning. It states that women shall enjoy, on a basis of equality with
men, “[t]he right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement,
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity
to work, as well as the right to paid leave.”137
The FAO’s representative noted the importance of expanding to
rural women “social security coverage, in particular as regards
Doc. A/32/218/Add.2 (Oct. 28, 1977). The inclusion of the family planning provision in
Article 12 triggered less debate. With regard to Article 12, several delegates “objected to
the reference to ‘services’ in connexion with family planning since there are no family plan-
ning services in some countries.” Some delegates thought this might lead to some countries’
refusal to ratify the Convention. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/33/L.47, ¶ 115 (Nov. 26, 1978). Others
insisted that CEDAW be aspirational in this regard, “that the Convention should reflect
the state of affairs desired and should contain guidelines for the future.” Id.
133. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 23.
134. Id.
135. Id. One consequence of this is obstetric fistula, which can leave women shunned
by their partner and their community. Id. According to a United Nations report, “at least
2 million women in Africa, Asia and the Arab region are living with obstetric fistula as a
consequence of prolonged obstructed labour, with some 50,000 to 100,000 new cases de-
veloping each year.” Id. The report further notes that a number of factors lead to obstetric
fistula, including “early childbearing, the lack of skilled attendants at birth, inadequate
emergency obstetric services and the lack of transportation facilities to reach such ser-
vices.” Id. at 24; see also Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant, supra note 41, at Part II.C.2
(describing rural-urban difference in health care access in India).
136. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(c).
137. Id. art. 11(1)(e).
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sickness, disability and old-age pensions.”138 Other representatives
expressed concern that the link between social security and “the non-
monetized section of the economy” might preclude rural women’s
access to social security benefits because of their association with
the informal economy.139 Specifically, these representatives wanted
women to “have access to social security in their own right and not
as dependents.”140
The inclusion of the clause on social security was one of the most
hotly debated in Article 14, and it is one of the only provisions of
Article 14 to which a member state has made a reservation.141 Egypt’s
representative noted that “most developing countries were striving
to extend social security coverage gradually, to all workers” and that
“women in rural areas should have the right to social security on
equal terms with men.”142 Whether she meant all men or only men in
rural areas is not known. The U.S.S.R. representative agreed that it
was “difficult for developing countries which as yet had no social secu-
rity systems” to promise to extend social security to rural women.143
France proposed that rural women enjoy social security “when such
a system exists in rural areas, at least for wage earners,” and Japan
noted that unemployed urban women are not eligible for social secu-
rity.144 Several different phrasing proposals were rejected;145 some
would have granted women “personal rights to social security” 146 or
“social security in their own right.”147 While these rejected proposals
do not seem fundamentally different than the language ultimately
adopted, “[t]o benefit directly from social security programmes,”148
this drafting history does suggest that Article 14 was not intended to
138. E/CN.6/L.660/Add.7, supra note 130, ¶ 12 (noting the need for expansion of social
security, “in addition to social services”).
139. A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 144. Rural women’s association with the informal economy
also persists in the developed world. See Pruitt, Gender, Geography, supra note 42, at
349-51 (discussing the association of rural women with the informal economy in the
United States).
140. A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 144.
141. Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of reserva-
tions relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, CEDAW/SP/2006/2, June 23, 2006, at 12-13 (articulating France’s reservation
to Article 14(2)(c) as interpreting the provision as “guaranteeing that women who fulfill the
conditions relating to family or employment required by French legislation for personal
participation shall acquire their own rights within the framework of social security”).
142. E/CN.6/SR.658, supra note 66, ¶ 26.
143. Id. ¶ 25.
144. Id. ¶ 28; A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1, supra note 70, ¶ 174.
145. See A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1, supra note 70, ¶¶ 143-46 (recording proposed phrasing
and delegates’ responses).
146. Id. ¶ 143.
147. Id. ¶ 146.
148. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(c).
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require member states to extend social security to rural women per se.
The intention was, rather, that in member states with social security
programmes, rural women should benefit from them directly, and
not only as the spouses of those working in the monetized sector.
“Directly” thus appears to be a key word.
The 2002 United Nations study Women’s Rights in Agriculture149
describes obstacles women continue to face in obtaining social security
benefits. In South Africa, for example, more women than men are
eligible to receive social security due to the lower age requirement;
however, fewer women than men actually receive these benefits be-
cause the former lack required identity cards.150 In Tunisia, the gen-
eral social security regime was extended in 1970 to cover agricultural
laborers who are employed with the same employer for more than six
months.151 Women, however, do not easily benefit from this extension,
because many women work in seasonal and temporary positions that
do not meet the six-month requirement.152
Article 14(2)(d): To obtain all types of training and education,
formal and non-formal, including that relating to functional liter-
acy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and exten-
sion services, in order to increase their technical proficiency[.]153
Just as 14(2)(b) regarding health care for rural women echoes
Article 12, this subsection of Article 14 echoes another article—the
one regarding education.154 Indeed, Section 14(2)(d) germinated in
Article 10 (on education), where the working group recognized the im-
portance of access to education “in rural as well as in urban areas.”155
Article 10’s express applicability to rural women was made as early
as Draft 4 in 1974,156 and Article 10 still features the only use of the
word “rural” outside Article 14.
Thus, two articles address education. Article 10 does so in a very
comprehensive fashion, specifying, for example, many contexts and
features of education: exams, teachers, books, availability of scholar-
ships, continuing education, and even access to education regarding
149. Lorenzo Cotula, Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Gender and Law:
Women’s Rights in Agriculture, FAO Legislative Study 76 (2002), available at http://
www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/Y4311E/Y4311E00.HTM
[hereinafter Women’s Rights in Agriculture].
150. Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 96.
152. Id.
153. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(d).
154. Id. art. 10.
155. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.12 (1974).
156. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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family planning.157 Article 10 also includes the acknowledgment of
the rural context in Article 10(a), noting the need for “educational
establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas.”158
Article 14(2)(d), on the other hand, is much briefer and focused
entirely on the rural setting.159 The presence of these two provisions
raises the issue of how to read them in tandem and, specifically, what
rights regarding education CEDAW anticipates for rural women. As
with access to health care, an apparent conflict exists between
Article 14(1)’s language applying “the provisions of this Convention
to women in rural areas” and Article 14(2)(d)’s narrower mandate
regarding the education of rural women.
The Travaux Préparatoires suggest that representatives ulti-
mately agreed that educational parity across the rural-urban axis was
not feasible and not to be expected of member states. An early draft
of Article 10 provided, “Each State Party . . . [shall] ensure women . . .
[e]qual conditions of access to, and study in educational institutions
157. CEDAW Article 10 provides:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimina-
tion against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the
field of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men
and women:
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to
studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments
of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this equality shall be
ensured in pre-school, general, technical, professional and higher technical
education, as well as in all types of vocational training;
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with
qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of
the same quality;
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and
women at all levels and in all forms of education . . . [suggesting even]
revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of
teaching methods;
(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study
grants;
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing edu-
cation . . . particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible
time, any gap in education existing between men and women;
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of
programmes for girls and women who have left school prematurely;
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical
education;
(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health
and well-being of families, including information and advice on family
planning.
CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 10.
158. Id. art. 10(a).
159. Id. art. 14(2)(d). “Cuba proposed the inclusion of a reference to rural women’s
access to ‘education’ in [Article 14], even though this had already been inferred in
adopted Article 10.” REHOF, supra note 42, at 159 (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/608, ¶ 122).
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of all types, in rural as well as in urban areas, including universities,
vocational, technical and professional schools . . . .”160 Some members
of the working group expressed reservations about this language.
Finland, for example, thought that the phrase “in rural as well as
in urban areas” was “too ambitious” and “would imply . . . the estab-
lishment of universities all over the country, in rural as well as urban
areas.”161 Ultimately, the language in Article 10(a) was changed from
“equal conditions of access . . . in rural as well as urban areas” to
“the same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access
to studies and or the achievement of diplomas in educational estab-
lishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas . . . .”
The change from “equal” to “same” may have been viewed as critical
because the former carries particular meanings—and burdens—in
legal contexts. Because Article 14(2)(d) makes no promise of “access
to . . . universities,” its expectations thus appear narrower than those
of Article 10. This suggests two things. First, the drafters recognized
the expense associated with providing the most sophisticated and
high-level services to spatially dispersed populations, where eco-
nomics of scale are very difficult to achieve. Second, it suggests that,
Article 14(1) notwithstanding, rural women are not expected to enjoy
all of the benefits contemplated by CEDAW for women generally—
essentially urban women. These differences between Articles 10 and
14(2)(d), illuminated by the Travaux Préparatoires, suggest that
CEDAW’s goal is not, in fact, to provide parity of educational oppor-
tunity across the rural-urban continuum.
Further, 14(2)(d) implies that certain types of education are more
significant than others to rural women. These include “non-formal”
education, “functional literacy,” and “community and extension ser-
vices” related to “technical proficiency.”162 The inclusion of these terms
associates rurality with a lower degree of sophistication, which in turn
implicates a lower caliber of educational need or service. Functional
literacy suggests a need for adult education, while references to “com-
munity and extension services” and “technical proficiency” suggest
rurality’s association with agricultural production.
Rural Women in a Changing World reports that, despite women’s
gains in access to education, it remains out of reach for many.163 Girls
account for three-fifths of the reported 113 million children of primary
160. U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.12 (1974).
161. REHOF, supra note 42, at 154.
162. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(d); see also A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 8 (similarly
noting the need for rural women’s “vocational training, non-formal education and orien-
tation, etc., to enhance development capabilities of women as well as to prepare them for
family reunion” with a migrant spouse).
163. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 26.
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school age who are not in school, and 82% of children not in primary
school in developing countries are in rural areas.164 In regards to
non-formal education, a 2003 study in south-western Nigeria found
that only 55.8% of women are aware of extension services in their
area, and only one-third of those women see extension personnel
regularly.165 Moreover, extension personnel tend to target landown-
ers, leaving many women without advice and training to enhance
their farming activities.166
Article 14(2)(e): To organize self-help groups and co-operatives
in order to obtain equal access to economic opportunities through
employment or self-employment[.]167
Subsection 14(2)(e) appears to be the rural equivalent to or com-
plement of Article 11, which discusses women’s rights in the field of
employment,168 and Article 13, which addresses economic rights,
164. Id.
165. Id. at 33.
166. Id. at 32.
167. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(e).
168. Id. art. 11. It provides:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis
of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the appli-
cation of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to pro-
motion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right
to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships,
advanced vocational training and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treat-
ment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in
the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unem-
ployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work,
as well as the right to paid leave;
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions,
including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of mar-
riage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, State Parties
shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dis-
missals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services
to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities
and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the estab-
lishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;
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including the “right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of
financial credit.”169 The drafters clearly saw self-help groups, co-
operatives, and self-employment as key vehicles for rural women’s
economic and social empowerment.
The working group that drafted Article 14 discussed the similari-
ties and differences between self-help groups and co-operatives. The
chairman clarified that a self-help group is “an arrangement of a co-
operative kind which is not established as a formal co-operative.”170
Thus, the difference appears to be in the nature of legal status and
degree of formality.
Consistent with Article 14(2)(c)’s attention to co-operatives and
self-help groups, a 2005 assessment of the Global Donor Platform
Regarding the Roles of Rural and Agricultural Development in
Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Global Donor
Platform) found rural organizations critical to “the political and eco-
nomic empowerment of the rural poor.”171 One reason for this is the
nature of rural spatiality; unlike their urban counterparts, impover-
ished rural populations “are spread over large areas.”172 While they
may be networked with one another, they are not necessarily in a
position to organize in order to improve their lot.173 The Global Donor
Platform has thus called for governments “to provide the necessary
legal framework” to facilitate organization by the rural poor.174
CEDAW can be an important motivator for member states to adopt
such a framework.
Indeed, over the years, the U.N. had issued various publications
about self-help groups and cooperatives in general,175 as well as how
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of
work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be re-
viewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and
shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary.
Id.
169. Id. art. 13. It provides:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on
a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:
(a) The right to family benefits;
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit;
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects
of cultural life.
Id.
170. A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1, supra note 70, ¶ 161.
171. WOLZ, supra note 87, at iv-v.
172. Id. at 45.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., U.N. Reports and Resolutions on Cooperatives, available at http://www
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they affect rural women specifically.176 A number of these reports
appear to have influenced the inclusion of Article 14(2)(e) and its
detail. The 1978 United Nations Report on the National Experience
in Promoting the Cooperative Movement found familiar obstacles to
women’s participation in cooperatives, including “lack of education,
heavy work schedules in the home and in the fields and restrictive
cultural and traditional attitudes.”177 The Report noted women’s
acceptance as the “natural labour force” in the lower and local levels
of co-operative employment, but observed that they rarely hold posi-
tions in higher echelons of these organizations.178 The traditional
public-private divide, the Report observed, has left women lacking in
confidence “to break out of their traditional roles and take on activities
outside the home.”179 One result is that women often support male
candidates rather than female ones for offices within co-operatives.180
As in other contexts, women’s lack of land ownership may be a
formal barrier—and not only a de facto one—to women’s advancement
because it may preclude them from membership in an agricultural
co-operative.181 Women’s involvement in these organizations thus
“usually begins and ends with the preparation and delivery of produce
for marketing,” while the men “vote and . . . control the proceeds from
the sale.”182
Nevertheless, co-operatives have sometimes proved successful
vehicles for women’s empowerment. The 1978 Report observed that
co-operative-provided services “relieve women of difficult time-consum-
ing jobs in their home and farm work and assist them in carrying out
their responsibilities in a more modern and efficient way.”183 The
.copacgva.org/publications/unpublications.html (listing “reports, resolutions and other
information resources produced by the United Nations on cooperatives”).
176. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, National Experience in Promoting the
Cooperative Movement, ¶¶ 24-33, U.N. Doc. E/1978/15 (1978) [hereinafter E/1978/15].
177. Id. ¶ 27.
178. Id. (noting also that “consumer movements are content to have the vast majority
of their members be women”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. E/1978/15, supra note 176, ¶ 27.
In many countries the prevailing unwritten, customary laws concerning
ownership and inheritance of land and other family property state that land
belongs to the clan and is entrusted to the man as head of the family. This en-
ables the man who belongs to a co-operative—whether agricultural, handi-
crafts or producers’—to receive dividends or other benefits from it, although
the women usually do the work.
Id. In some cases, legislation that would enable women to be members of a co-operative
is not enforced. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Report continues: “Since co-operatives involve the whole rural family,
women have a special part to play in shaping the attitudes of their families, increasing food
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United Nations has recognized that co-ops can enable women’s social
emancipation, as well as their economic empowerment, by providing
opportunities to “participate in decision-making.”184 Having learned
the “power of association” through involvement in co-ops, women
may press for services such as education and health care.185
Perhaps because of this explicit U.N. recognition of co-operatives’
significance, a 1976 General Assembly Resolution about the National
Experience in Promoting the Co-operative Movement noted “the social
and economic benefits” that “all sections of society” reap from a range
of co-operatives.186 The Report also stressed the value of “multipur-
pose co-operative[s]” to the “agricultural and allied rural sectors” in
the developing world.187
The World Bank’s 2009 Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook sheds
light on obstacles rural women continue to face in forming self-help
groups and co-operatives.188 One is that the distribution of work be-
tween women and men has not changed; women’s multiple respon-
sibilities—including responsibilities for family and home—effectively
limit their participation.189 Additional obstacles include the cost of
participation in groups, as many women can invest their time in more
profitable ways, as well as conflicts of interest that can arise between
more educated women and poorer women regarding the distribution
of benefits.190
Article 14(2)(f): To participate in all community activities[.]191
production and improving nutritional standards. Improvements in the condition of women
are reflected in improved conditions for the family.” Id. ¶ 28. This echoes concerns articu-
lated in a 1977 U.N. Report of the Secretary-General on “Women in Rural Areas,” A/32/269,
supra note 30. The Report makes two references to the “drudgery of rural women’s work,”
calling for example, for “appropriate technology” to alleviate it. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20. Availability
of water is sometimes also mentioned in relation to drudgery and how technology can alle-
viate it. Id. ¶ 12 (referring to United Nations, Econ & Soc. Council, United Nations Water
Conference, Mar. 14-25, 1977, Water, Women and Development, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/A.10
(1977)); see also Martínez, Rights of Rural Women, supra note 2, at 213 (writing of
“women’s central work in sowing and harvesting, gathering firewood, and carrying water,”
which is “overshadowed by other responsibilities . . . including child-rearing, care of ill or
elderly family members, house-cleaning, food preparation, and other tasks”).
184. E/1978/15, supra note 176, ¶ 28.
185. Id. ¶ 29. The 1978 Report further notes that women are sometimes appointed to
“responsible management posts, such as membership in national executive committees,
and elected to high office.” Id. ¶ 28.
186. G.A. Res. 31/37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/37 (Nov. 30, 1976) (listing as types of co-
operatives “producers’, consumers’, credit, multipurpose and other kinds of co-operatives”).
187. Id.
188. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 67.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(f).
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This section originally articulated the right as one “to participate
in all community activities including co-operatives,”192 thus linking
community activities and co-operatives. After a lengthy discussion
of co-operatives in relation to what became section (2)(e), the working
group decided to omit the reference to co-operatives from (2)(f).193 The
inclusion of (2)(f) seems to have been uncontroversial, although the
type of community activities it envisages is not clear.
Because this right to participate in community activities is not
expressed in similar terms elsewhere in the Convention, this provision
might also be seen as suggesting that grass-roots or community level
organizing is particularly significant in rural places, where higher-
scale (e.g., municipal, state or national) public-sphere activity has
less impact.194 This focus on the scale of the community suggests its
importance in rural settings, where villages may be isolated from
other places and the additional public sphere opportunities they rep-
resent. Otherwise, the right to participate in community activities
would not seem necessary or worthy of particular mention in relation
to rural women.
As a related matter, the mention of community activities might
also reflect the drafters’ perception that patriarchy, and in particular
the divide between public and private spheres, is more entrenched in
rural places than in urban ones.195 Martha Freeman has asserted, for
example, that development assistance has typically targeted land
owners who are usually men because of patriarchal assumptions
about gender roles.196 Various U.N. reports seem to suggest a pre-
sumption of entrenched rural patriarchy. These sometimes imply that
ensuring women’s progress and empowerment is more critical in rural
than in urban areas—perhaps because rural areas have lagged in this
regard.197 A 2008 U.N. report, for example, observed the importance
192. A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.1, supra note 70, ¶ 158.
193. Id. ¶ 159.
194. See supra notes 63, 253-55 and accompanying text (discussing rural isolation and
the relative absence of law in rural places).
195. See Pruitt, Gender, Geography, supra note 42, at 354, 366, 372 (describing rural
patriarchy and gender roles); see also Welch, supra note 2, at 555-56 (discussing the de
facto inequality of rural women in Africa as the “reality of village life”).
196. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 98 (discussing development aid going to men in
their roles as head of the family); see also Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2,
at 722-28 (discussing the differing types of development assistance that have historically
flowed to men and women); Ann Whitehead & Helen Bloom, Agriculture, in GENDER AND
DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 41, 53 (Lise Østergaard ed., 1992) (describing the
effect of patriarchal assumptions on a Gambian development project).
197. The 1977 U.N. report on “Women in Rural Areas” noted that among projects
which had then recently been approved for implementation at the national level, four
related to rural women, and one of these was described as “[r]esearch in five countries
on the impact of modernization on rural women, and attitudes towards the roles of
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of “monitor[ing] the changes in the rural economy from a gender
equality perspective” because the “empowerment of women is ‘smart
economics’ ” in light of their “critical role” in rural places.198 As a con-
sequence, “addressing gender inequalities can increase the efficiency
of resource use and enhance rural development outcomes.”199
Further, various commentators have focused on poor rural
women, sometimes treating “rural” as virtually synonymous with
“poor.” These commentators have noted the particular struggles that
rural women—especially indigenous women—face. Aída González
Martínez, for example, has written that “[c]ustoms, attitudes, beliefs,
and traditions” in Latin America “discriminate against women in gen-
eral, but women in rural or farming areas are specifically vulnerable
regarding their limited access to health care, especially reproductive
health services, education, employment, land ownership, and com-
munity decision-making processes.” 200
In a somewhat similar vein, Martha Nussbaum’s work—while
focusing broadly on human rights and capabilities for all—has
asserted that within any population—even among greatly impov-
erished and otherwise disadvantaged groups—women experience
added disadvantage.
Women in much of the world lack support for fundamental func-
tions of a human life. They are less well nourished than men,
less healthy, more vulnerable to physical violence and sexual
abuse. They are much less likely than men to be literate, and still
less likely to have preprofessional or technical education. Should
they attempt to enter the workplace, they face greater obstacles . . .
frequently, without effective legal recourse.201
Nussbaum cites the United Nations 1997 Human Development Report
for the proposition that no country in the world “treats its women as
well as its men, according to a complex measure that includes life
expectancy, wealth, and education.” 202 She observes that the prob-
lem is particularly acute in developing countries, where “[g]ender
inequality is strongly correlated with poverty.” 203 The situation of
rural women in the developing world is particularly dire because
women and their integration in development.” A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 15.
198. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 3.
199. Id. The United Nations has long viewed women as an important site of intervention
in rural development activity. See A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 15.
200. Martínez, Rights of Rural Women, supra note 2, at 213.
201. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 1.
202. Id. at 2 (citing United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 1997, 39 (1997)).
203. Id. at 2-3.
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they live in the least developed places—the doubly undeveloped, if
you will—with the least basic needs infrastructure and the fewest
services and opportunities.
But Article 14(2)(f) is not the only place where CEDAW takes
on patriarchy and its manifestation in the public-private divide.
Article 13 stipulates that “[t]he right to participate in recreational
activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life” are among women’s
economic and social rights.204 Article 14(2)(f) also seems to complement
Article 7, which mandates that States Parties “eliminate discrimina-
tion against women in the political and public life of the country and,
in particular, shall ensure . . . the right [t]o vote in all elections . . .
and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies,” the right
to participate in formulating and implementing government policy, the
right “to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels
of government,” and the right to “participate in non-governmental
organizations and associations concerned with the public and political
life of the country.” 205 Article 11 seeks women’s inclusion in a range
of economic activities, including many outside the home and in the
market.206 CEDAW thus includes various provisions that aim to bring
women into the public sphere. Article 14(2)(f) appears to be princi-
pally a rural equivalent or compliment to this broader effort to bridge
the public-private divide.
Article 14(2)(g): To have access to agricultural credit and loans,
marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treat-
ment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettle-
ment schemes[.]207
This provision is one of several that links rural livelihoods to
agriculture and, by extension, the land. Like many other United
Nations organizations and documents, Article 14(2)(g) recognizes the
significance of women’s roles in food production.208 Indeed, women pro-
duce about half of the world’s food for direct consumption,209 with 428
million women worldwide working in the agricultural sector.210 In
204. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 13(c).
205. Id. art. 7.
206. Id. art. 11; see also id. art. 13(b) (regarding access to credit).
207. Id. art. 14(2)(g).
208. See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 317-19, 392 tbl. 9.6; A/32/269, supra note
30, ¶¶ 4-5; Women’s Rights in Agriculture, supra note 149, at 115, 117-19; International
Day of Rural Women, supra note 55.
209. ESCOBAR, supra note 107, at 173; see also Burrows, supra note 2, at 447 (“In the
developing countries the bulk of the population is employed in the agricultural sector and
much of the work done in these areas is performed by women.”).
210. International Day of Rural Women, supra note 55 (citing Int’l Labour Org. [ILO],
Global Employment Trends for Women (2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_091225.pdf). By compari-
2011] DECONSTRUCTING CEDAW’S ARTICLE 14 381
many regions it is the principal sector for women’s employment.211 In
the labor forces of less developed countries, two-thirds of women work
in agriculture.212 Yet in spite of their widespread significance to food
production, “women own less than two percent of the land worldwide,
and they receive less than ten percent of the available credit.” 213
Article 14(2)(g) responds to such deficits by mandating equal
access to agricultural credit and loans, as well as better access to
land title via “land and agrarian reform.” 214 Article 14(2)(g) appears
to have been influenced by various U.N. reports that preceded the
Commission’s work. General Assembly Resolution 1213 on Land
Reform (1967) drew on a report of the 1966 World Land Reform
Conference and emphasized “the importance of supporting institu-
tional measures in the fields of credit, marketing, rural extension,
co-operatives and peasant organizations and other related measures
necessary for the implementation of effective agrarian reform.” 215 A
World Conference on Agricultural Credit in 1975 resulted in the estab-
lishment of regional agricultural credit associations216 and may have
son, 608 million men work in this sector. Id.
211. Id. (reporting that sixty-eight percent and sixty-one percent of women who work in
Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia, respectively, are employed in agriculture). Taking
into account both self-employment and wage labor, women provide more labor in agri-
culture than men in a number of regions, including Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle
East, North Africa, and some Caribbean and Central American countries. SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 30, at 317.
212. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 9.
213. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 722 (citing INT’L LABOUR ORG.
[ILO], WORLD COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION, A FAIR
GLOBALIZATION: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL, at 48 (2004), available at http://www
.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf).
214. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(g); see also A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶¶ 5, 19
(discussing the need for land reform in order to empower rural women).
215. E.S.C. Res. 1213(XLII), U.N. Doc. E/RES/1213(XLII) (June 1, 1967).
216. Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Regional Agricultural Credit
Associations, RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND AGRO-INDUSTRIES DIVISION, http://www.fao
.org/ag/ags/subjects/en/ruralfinance/RACA.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). The Report
details the importance of credit to small farmers and makes recommendations for central
banks. It recommends that member governments
(a) take urgent steps to arrange for small farmers to have access to insti-
tutional credit, both so as to facilitate their development, and to reduce the
burden of chronic debt owed to non-institutional sources, and the financial
hardship caused by natural calamities, associated with this sector; (b) provide
adequate financial and other support to agricultural credit institutions to
enable them to meet all the legitimate credit needs of potentially viable as
well as viable small farmers[.]
Id. at 12, II (a) and (b).
The Conference also recommends “that governments ensure easy physical access to
agricultural credit, either by means of cooperatives or by networks of branch banks.” Id.
at 15, II(b).
Finally, “[i]t was agreed also that loans to small farmers should have enough flexibility
to apply to all crops in the total rotation.” Id. at 19.
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addressed issues specific to women. Women’s access to agricultural
credit and loans was highlighted as an area needing further research
in the preliminary report that the Secretary-General submitted to
the General Assembly at its thirty-first session in 1976,217 but the re-
search and report were not yet complete when CEDAW was adopted
in 1979.
While CEDAW Article 13 grants women a “right to bank loans,
mortgages and other forms of financial credit,” 218 the provisions of
(2)(g) are otherwise distinct from that Article (on economic and social
life) and Article 11 (about employment). Other parts of (2)(g) are
without apparent parallels outside the rural context; these relate to
economic rights and empowering women by providing marketing facil-
ities and appropriate technology.219 A 1979 U.N. Document provides
a definition of “appropriate technology” that links the term to develop-
ing countries: that “within the context of technology acquired for de-
velopment plans in many less developed countries, taking into account
human resources, currency available, impact on the labour market,
labour-intensive versus capital-intensive technology, and the social
consequences that the specific technology brings into a society.” 220
Section 14(2)(g) is one provision where recognizing the rights of
women was somewhat controversial, with delegates suggesting that
rural men, too, faced the sorts of challenges to which this provision
was intended to respond. According to the Travaux Préparatoires,
“[a] few representatives stated that they could not see why the
The report seems to assume that farmers are men because it uses the pronouns “him”
and “his.” Statement by the Vice President of the World Bank, at 7.
217. U.N. Doc A/31/205 at 5-8 (Dec. 22, 1976) (proposing “further research on the extent
to which women participate in agriculture, industry, trade, and science and technology”).
This Report specifically draws attention to issues facing women engaged in agriculture. It
calls for policy recommendations and actions that will upgrade women’s participation not
only in agriculture, but also in “industry, trade sciences and technology.” Id. Regarding
agriculture, it calls specifically for study of the “composition of the rural labor force by
sex,” “agricultural economy and structure,” social organization, trade and financing,
women’s wages, “credit and loans to women,” “transfer technology and women,” women’s
participation in training programs, and the science and technology needed for women to
enhance their skills. Id.
218. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
219. This language echoes some in a 1977 U.N. document, which calls for “the develop-
ment of programmes of assistance for women in agricultural production, processing and
marketing with special attention to food preparation, preservation and consumption.”
A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 5.
220. A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 165. Another document refers to technology in relation
to generating energy: “electric power and other types such as draft animal and mechani-
zation and other specific technological improvement to generate cheap energy and decrease
women’s overwork without pay.” A/31/205 (Dec. 22, 1976) subp. (4)(22)(c). Yet, another
refers to the use of “appropriate technology” to “alleviate the drudgery of rural women’s
work” and “to reduce the heavy workload of women and increase their productivity.”
A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶¶ 3, 5.
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content of this subparagraph should apply only to women.” 221 The
Ghanaian representative said she had queried this when the amend-
ment was being drafted, and other co-sponsors had explained “that
discrimination in these sectors existed in some countries.” 222 Once
again, this discussion suggests concern with spatial inequalities—
with what entire rural populations are more likely than their urban
counterparts to be lacking.
In spite of CEDAW coming into force some three decades ago, the
2008 data regarding women’s credit and land ownership are so appall-
ing as to suggest the complete inefficacy of the provision.223 Women’s
inability to obtain agricultural credit can lead to their reliance on the
informal sector to meet their needs, which can be exploitative of poor
producers.224 Moreover, “women own very little agricultural land,” 225
which in some countries hampers their ability to obtain credit.226
Article 14(2)(h): To enjoy adequate living conditions, particu-
larly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water
supply, transport and communications.227
As already noted, CEDAW has been touted as reflecting greater
concern regarding socioeconomic rights than prior human rights
treaties, and this is arguably most evident in Article 14(2)(h). Indeed,
neither housing nor the types of communal infrastructure specified
in subsection (2)(h) are mentioned elsewhere in CEDAW. The rea-
son may be that shared infrastructure that the State typically
finances and provides—sanitation, electricity, water, transport, and
221. A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 170.
222. Id. (adding that the Swedish representative gave some illustrations of this, but not
including these illustrations in the document). Whether the Ghanaian representative was
referring to gender discrimination or some other basis of discrimination is unclear.
223. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 2006-10 (2002) (analyzing the correlation between compliance requirements and
ratification of international human rights treaties).
224. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 31.
225. Id. at 27.
226. Women’s Rights in Agriculture, supra note 149, at 20-21 (listing the Dominican
Republic and Honduras as among these countries).
Requiring the authorization of the husband for women’s application for credit
and mortgage is a widespread practice adopted by financial institutions. In
Jamaica, only 5 percent of the loans of the Bank of Agricultural Credit goes
to women. . . . In a study from the Andean region, only 29 percent of inter-
viewed women had applied for a loan (compared to 43.2 percent of men); 91
percent of women applicants had been granted the loan (compared to 85
percent for men).
Id. at 114.
227. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(h).
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communication—is taken for granted in urban areas, where it is far
more likely to be in place.228
This sub-provision of Article 14(2), which was not in the initial
draft of what became Article 14, was proposed by Bangladesh, Ghana,
Guyana, India, Kenya, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United King-
dom.229 The inclusion of this language, like that of (2)(f), seems to
have been uncontroversial, although the drafting history indicates
that the Dutch representative called for a “similar provision [to be]
included for all women” in Article 13, which addresses other aspects
of economic and social life.230 The chairman proposed proceeding on
the understanding that if urban women were to enjoy these rights
in the way they were specified for rural women in 14(2)(h), “provisions
to this effect should be included among the general provisions of the
Convention.” 231 Such provisions were not ultimately included outside
14(2)(h), which suggests that the same socioeconomic rights are not
due to urban women, or to urban populations more generally.
In part because of these rights’ association with rural populations,
section (2)(h) is the part of Article 14—and, indeed, all of CEDAW—
that appears most concerned with spatial inequality. This is partly
because (2)(h) specifies certain socioeconomic rights, the fulfillment
of which would almost certainly benefit rural men as much as rural
women. For example, if member states live up to their obligations
under (2)(h)—to provide the sort of infrastructure necessary for rural
women to have sanitation, water, electricity, and communication—
they will necessarily be making these services available to rural
men.232 In fact, any member state that meets its obligations under
(2)(h) will be making a major contribution to ameliorating the conse-
quences of uneven development.
As such, compliance with section (2)(h) is potentially very costly
to member states, especially to those at early stages of development.
That is, (2)(h) imposes real fiscal burdens in ways that many other
provisions of CEDAW do not. Aída González Martínez, former Ambas-
sador for Mexico and Member and Chair of the CEDAW Committee,
has observed, for example, that small public coffers have limited
228. See Pruitt, India’s Rural Remnant, supra note 41 (detailing the availability of core
infrastructure such as advanced sanitation and water across the rural-urban axis); see
also SEN, supra note 84, at 3 (noting that “public facilities” are implicated in relation to
poverty and well-being, along with “systemic social deprivation” and “intolerance”).
229. REHOF, supra note 42, at 157 (citing U.N. Doc. A/C.3/33/WG.1/CRP.10, 1-2).
230. A/34/60, supra note 71, ¶ 172.
231. Id.
232. See DIANE ELSON, BUDGETING FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS: MONITORING GOVERNMENT
BUDGETS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH CEDAW, 58-59 (U.N. Dev. Fund 2006) (noting that public
services such as paved roads, sanitation systems, defense, and policing cannot be broken
down into individual units, but instead, are enjoyed by entire communities).
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several Latin American member states’ efforts to provide sanitary
services, road and irrigation infrastructure, and the electrical,
water, transport, and communication services called for in Article
14(h).233
In Budgeting for Women’s Rights, Diane Elson observes that “geo-
graphical distribution of infrastructural facilities” may reveal spending
patterns that are gendered.234 She notes, for example, that if women
and girls comprise a higher percentage of rural populations than do
males, low infrastructure spending in rural areas may reflect gender
bias.235 Spending priorities within a given geographical area may also
reflect gendered priorities (e.g., roads and sanitation systems).236
Therefore, Elson argues, all groups of women should be involved in
establishing spending priorities,237 an idea reflected in 14(2)(a)’s
inclusion of rural women in “all levels” of development planning.
Rural Women in a Changing World238 highlights continuing
inadequacies in rural living conditions. Citing a 2005 World Health
Organization study, the report states that, in developing countries,
a mere thirty-one percent of rural areas have adequate access to safe
water and basic sanitation, while seventy-three percent of those in
urban areas do.239 More recently, a 2010 study reports that many girls
and women travel more than an hour each day to gather water.240
Various countries have invested in efforts to improve access to safe
water and sanitation, but the majority of the world’s rural women
continue to endure unsanitary water supplies and otherwise inade-
quate living conditions.241
233. Martínez, Rights of Rural Women, supra note 2, at 213 (noting that limited state
resources have also impeded member states’ efforts to provide health care).
234. ELSON, supra note 232, at 59; see also Denise Meyerson, Equality Guarantees and
Distributive Inequity, 19 PUB. L. REV. 32, 32-51 (2008) (discussing distributive inequities
in government spending as violations of equality guarantees in national constitutions).
235. ELSON, supra note 232, at 59.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 58. This is consistent with what has happened in India with the mandatory
representation of women in local government; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
238. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55 at 2-3.
239. Id. at 29.
240. Gayatri Koolwal & Dominique van de Walle, Access to Water, Women’s Work and
Child Outcomes 5 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5302, 2010), available
at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382
&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20100510114112.
241. See RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 28-29 (discussing water
provision programs and continuing lack of adequate access to water). Morocco is among
the nations to report affirmative steps toward increasing rural populations’ access to clean
water through the enactment of The Water Supply Programme for Rural Populations
(PAGER). Id. PAGER has expanded safe water access to fifty percent of Morocco’s rural
areas in its first decade, resulting in improved public health and sanitation, as well as a
twenty percent increase in rural girl’s primary school attendance. Id.
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V. ARTICLE 14’S EXPRESSIVE SIGNIFICANCE
Three decades after CEDAW’s ratification, it is worth pondering
the material and expressive impact of Article 14’s attention to rural
women.242 The Rural Women in a Changing World report and the
Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook help us assess the former,243 as do
the numerous reports that member states have filed with the United
Nations to report their progress under the Convention.244 While signs
of progress are mixed, we can safely assume that the very inclusion
of rural women and rural concerns on the checklist of matters about
which member states must report has increased rural women’s visibil-
ity among domestic law and policy makers.245 Very rare is the mem-
ber state that indicates in its periodic report to the United Nations
that it has nothing to say about Article 14 and rural women.246 It is
nevertheless rarely possible to say with certainty whether nations
have altered their development programming in response to CEDAW’s
Article 14, or whether they are simply listing in their periodic re-
ports to the United Nations their laws and programs which happen
to be beneficial to rural women. In short, cause and effect are diffi-
cult to determine.
Like developing countries, member states from the Global
North also regularly mention rural women in their reporting under
CEDAW, though these entries are rarely as lengthy as those of devel-
oping nations.247 When developed countries do report progress and
242. See Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 117-20 (2002) (explaining the expressivist thread in legal scholarship
and law’s role in influencing society’s values).
243. RURAL WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 55, at 2-3.
244. See Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 733-36 (discussing CEDAW’s
reporting obligations on member states); see also id. at 735-47 (discussing the progress that
Ghana, India, China and South Africa have reported in relation to CEDAW’s Article 14).
Critiques of CEDAW and the apparent inefficacy of its enforcement and reporting proce-
dures provide a balanced perspective. See, e.g., Evatt, supra note 8, at 449 (discussing
CEDAW’s ability to effect change); Hillock, supra note 6, at 487, 512-13 (arguing that
CEDAW’s reporting procedures are overly complex and that its provisions create a
“perpetual state of bondage [that] has no place within a true democratic society”).
245. See Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 736-39 (discussing changes
to land tenure laws in Ghana, India, South Africa).
246. But see Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Third Periodic
Rep. of States Parties: Singapore, 49, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/3 (Nov. 22, 2004) (stating
that Singapore is a city state with no rural population).
247. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Sixth
Periodic Rep. of States Parties: Austria, 68-71, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUT/6 (Nov. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter Austria Report] (including four pages regarding Article 14, providing details
of training and educational opportunities for rural women); Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Rep. of States Parties: Netherlands, 77-79,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/4 (Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Netherlands Report] (including
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challenges under Article 14, they tend to focus on women’s roles in
agriculture,248 access to services such as health care, education,249
and job creation and training.250 They less often address issues such
as cooperatives and self-help groups or women’s involvement in devel-
opment planning.251 Still, Article 14 challenges the developed world’s
tendency to conflate “rural” with “developing.” It prompts law and
policy makers in the Global North to think about the relevance of the
rural-urban axis and the particular needs of rural women and their
three pages related to Article 14). But cf. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reps. of States Parties: Australia,
101-11, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUL/4-5 (Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Australia Report] (listing
numerous initiatives by both the federal and state governments).
248. See Austria Report, supra note 247, at 68-71 (noting that as much as forty-one
percent of agricultural holdings by natural persons were held by women); Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Reps. of States Parties: Ireland, 107, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRL/4-5 (June 10, 2003) (“The
Government in the ‘Action Programme for the Millennium’ made a commitment ‘to rec-
ognise the role of women in agriculture by setting up a special Advisory Committee to
advise on, and monitor progress, with policy initiatives to support women in agriculture.’ ”);
Netherlands Report, supra note 247, at 62 (stating that rural women are rarely employed
in agriculture, but rather are married to or living with farmers and noting that these
women are employed in sectors other than agriculture; id. at 79 (reporting results from
a study of the number of women and the role of women in agriculture and horticulture and
their roles in these enterprises).
249. Australia Report, supra note 247, at 83, 102 (detailing health care initiatives in
rural communities and reporting the Rural Transactions Centres Programme, which estab-
lishes multi-purpose centres in rural communities); Austria Report, supra note 247, at 69
(noting “a number of further education training and upskilling programmes were con-
ducted . . . [e]ducation is considered as the key to success”). Japan reports that the level of
women’s involvement in cooperatives is low, at 13.3 percent, while women’s representation
among agricultural committee members is lower still, at less than one percent. See Comm.
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Reps. of States
Parties: Japan, 41, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JPN/4 (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Japan Report].
250. See Austria Report, supra note 247, at 69 (noting “further education training and
upskilling programs”); Swedish Report, infra note 251, at 54 (reporting that Swedish rural
development programme promotes “women’s chances of finding employment and starting
businesses in rural areas”).
251. But see Australia Report, supra note 247, at 101-03 (reporting the establishment
of Regional Women’s Advisory Council in September 1999).
The Council’s role is to provide a conduit for the views and perspectives of
women in regional and rural Australia on social and economic development
issues. The Council, through the Minister, also provides input to govern-
ment decision-making to ensure that the views of women in regional areas
are taken into account in the development of policies and programmes for
regional Australia.
Id.; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Combined Sixth
and Seventh Periodic Reps. of States Parties: Sweden, 54, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SWE/7
(Sept. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Swedish Report] (noting that women have an equal say with
men in transport planning and priorities); Japan Report, supra note 249, at 42 (reporting
efforts to promote rural women’s involvement in community activities). France explicitly
mentions the significance of “the role of associations in rural development.” Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Rep. of States Parties:
France, 60, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/6 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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communities, many of which relate to infrastructure and the deliv-
ery of key services, such as health care and education.252 Like their
developing world counterparts, rural women in developed nations also
stand to benefit from Article 14’s attention to economic empower-
ment (e.g., credit, marketing, and extension services),253 and some
developed nations do address this, though rarely in relation to agri-
culture.254 Developed countries also tend to mention the provision of
252. E.g.  Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23
WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347, 362 (2008); Pruitt, Spatial Inequality, supra note 73, at 6;
Lisa R. Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 359, 359 (2009). Interestingly, a 1977 U.N. Document that is closely associated with
CEDAW expresses concern about deficits in social services in rural contexts. A/32/269,
supra note 30, ¶¶ 3, 5, 19, 20; see also E/CN.6/L.660/Add.7, supra note 130, ¶ 112 (suggest-
ing the importance of social services).
253. See Burrows, supra note 2, at 447-48 (noting the value to women of agricultural
credit on the same terms as men in “countries at different levels of development”). While
the United States is not a party to CEDAW, it recognizes this problem. See NAT’L AGRIC.
STATISTICS SERV., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, 54 tbl.50, 58 tbl.54 (2009), available
at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/usv1.pdf (reporting that
Commodity Credit Corporation Loans (CCC Loans) and Federal Farm Program Payments
rates differ between farms principally owned by women and men). The 2007 Census of
Agriculture reported that 0.48% of farms principally owned by women received CCC Loans,
while 2.29% of all farms received the same loan. Id. Farms principally owned by women
had a higher rate of Conservation Reserve, Wetlands Reserve, Farmable Wetlands, or
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Programs. Id. Other federal farm program
payments were given at a rate of 18.22% to women’s farms and at a rate of 31.18% for
all farms. Id.; see also Cesar L. Escalante, James E. Epperson & Uthra Raghunathan,
Gender Bias Claims in Farm Service Agency’s Lending Decisions, 34 J. AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. 332, 337 (2009) (discussing female farm owners in Montana who “sued
the USDA for gender discrimination in the administration of FSA farm loan programs”).
The women claimed they were denied the chance to apply and that they were not provided
with adequate loan service when they did apply. Id.; see also Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d
519 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1138 (2010) (affirming the dismissal of the
women’s APA claims as barred by an alternative form of relief under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
254. See Swedish Report, supra note 251, at 54 (reporting that the Swedish rural
development programme promotes “women’s chances of finding employment and starting
businesses in rural areas”); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reps. of States Parties: Canada, 40, 58, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/Can/7 (Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Canada Report] (reporting that Ontario
“delivers the Community Futures Program” to fund “women-targeted projects[,] . . . 529
women-led businesses received loans,” and that Prince Edward Island gives attention
to economic development in rural communities); Australia Report, supra note 247, at 101
(reporting “principles, strategies and best practice case studies to assist organisations to
better support the roles of women in agriculture and resource management” contained in
the Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management
publication A Vision for Change: National Plan for Women in Agriculture and Resource
Management); id. at 102 (reporting 14.5 million dollars in funding for the Foundation for
Rural and Regional Renewal). But see Austria Report, supra note 247, at 70 (recognizing
women farmers’ economic contributions); Japan Report, supra note 249, at 42-43 (reporting
“technological guidance and information on management and funds to rural women who
want to start farming,” and also reporting “home economics extension service” that is begin-
ning to focus more on “improvement of agricultural work, the coordination of farming and
living plans”).
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child care as a service to rural women, at least implicitly recognizing
how critical it is to their economic productivity.255
CEDAW’s rural exceptionalism—that is, its naming of rural
difference by including an entire Article addressing rural women’s
needs—thus seems at first blush a positive turn for rural popula-
tions, who are often rendered invisible to decision makers by virtue
of spatiality, as well as their lack of political and economic power.256
But CEDAW does not mainstream or truly integrate rural women
and their concerns because it cabins them in a single article. The
Convention effectively designates rural women as “other,” 257 sug-
gesting that the Convention as a whole is primarily about urban
women. “Women unmodified”—those outside Article 14, that is—are
thus actually urban women, the implicit norm. Not only are urban
women the norm, CEDAW’s language suggests that rural women are
often entitled to less than their urban counterparts in terms of key
rights, such as health care and education.
In a similar vein, Professor Darren Rosenblum has argued that
CEDAW’s gender “equality strategy presumes as normative the mas-
culine standard,” which “foster[s] a harmful binary that places women
in the inferior position.” 258 He argues that such “opposing visions of
255. See Canada Report, supra note 254, at 40 (“The Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP)
assists Canadian and permanent resident employers to recruit caregivers to live and work
in their homes to provide childcare, home support for seniors or the disabled.”); id. at 105
(“Flexible and affordable childcare in rural areas is a challenge in improving the economic
security of rural women.”); Austria Report, supra note 247, at 65, 69 (including rural
women in the child-care benefit programs); Netherlands Report, supra note 247, at 77
(reporting an expert meeting entitled “Diversity in combining work and care”).
256. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 751-52; Pruitt, Gender, Geography,
supra note 42, at 370, 371 & nn.204-205 (quoting NEIL WEBSDALE, RURAL WOMAN BATTER-
ING AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 49 (1998) who argues patriarchy in rural areas is shaped
around “women’s more limited opportunities for survival in the wage labor market”); see
also KNOWING YOUR PLACE: RURAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL HIERARCHY 2, 17 (Barbara
Ching & Gerald Creed eds., 1997) (noting that “the rural/urban distinction underlies
many . . . power relations” and that “the city remains the locus of political, economic and
cultural power”).
257. Rosenblum, supra note 17 (discussing the “otherness” of women in general
created by “women’s rights discourse”) (citing Dianne Otto, Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’:
Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 105, 106 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji
eds., 2005)).
258. Id.
As Dianne Otto argues, the emphasis on certain “female subjectivities” estab-
lishes the “otherness” of women in women’s rights discourse. Otto identifies
three “female subjectivities” reproduced by human rights discourse, each of
which is marginalized by a corresponding masculine subject. First, the wife
and mother requires protection and “is more an object than a subject of inter-
national law.” Men, as heads of households, form the masculine component
of this binary. The second subjectivity is the “formally equal” woman, whose
role in public life is measured by the extent to which it matches the implicit
“masculine standard of ‘equality’ against which her claims to equality are
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the masculine and feminine ‘organize[ ] sex/gender as a hierarchy,
with the masculine assuming the position of authority.’ ” 259 Rosenblum
thus endorses Dianne Otto’s call to “dismantle the hierarchical binary
of gender” by reconceiving it “as fluid and formulated as a hybrid.” 260
Similar concerns are raised by the rural-urban binary manifest in
CEDAW. Indeed, analogous to Rosenblum and Otto’s point regarding
the gender binary is rural sociologist Ann Tickamyer’s call for move-
ment past “binary spatial distinctions,” such as the rural/urban dichot-
omy, favoring instead “spatial continua.”261 Yet CEDAW embraces the
rural/urban dichotomy, segregating rural women in Article 14 and
leaving the remainder of the Convention—its rhetorical and substan-
tive bulk—to be primarily about urban women, who represent both
norm and superiority. CEDAW thereby reinforces politically and in
law the marginalization that rural women already experience by
virtue of the physical geography that separates them from centers
of power. An unintended downside to naming the category “rural
women” is thus the privileging of the urban and a corresponding
marginalization of the rural.
On the other hand, to name a group and endow them with rights
is a powerful symbol—and it may also have powerful material conse-
quences. As Hilary Charlesworth has pointed out, “rights discourse
offers a recognized vocabulary to frame political and social wrongs”
for those who have been historically disadvantaged.262 She notes
other prominent critical scholars’ defense of rights rhetoric, including
Patricia Williams’s statement that “ ‘[r]ights’ ” is “deliciously empow-
ering to say” and “a sign for and a gift of selfhood,” as well as Martha
assessed . . . .” This equality strategy presumes as normative the masculine
standard, thereby fostering a harmful binary that places women in the in-
ferior position. Third is the female victim “produced by colonial narratives
of gender” and the perceived “sexual vulnerability” of women. The male homo-
logue for this subjectivity is the masculine bearer of “ ‘civilization’ and savior
of ‘good’ women from ‘bad’ often ‘native,’ men.”
. . . .
In reproducing these hierarchical binaries, CEDAW’s potential for transform-
ing women’s lives is compromised. Most of the CEDAW provisions follow a
formal equality yardstick, measuring success as the extent to which men have
access to a particular social position. The imprecision of the term “women”
becomes clearer once we consider the different contexts in which “women”
exist—they are wives and mothers, persons equal to men, and victims. Each
of these subjectivities arouses a legal response within CEDAW. Most impor-
tant is the extent to which the Convention renders invisible the individuals
identified as women but do not fit into these three subjectivities.
Id. (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
260. Id. (citation omitted).
261. Ann R. Tickamyer, Space Matters! Spatial Inequality in Future Sociology, 29
CONTEMP. SOC. 805, 811 (2000).
262. Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 61.
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Minow’s reluctance to criticize rights language “just when [rights]
have become available to people who had previously lacked access
to them.” 263
Although the empowerment that may accompany “rights talk”
and “rights endowment” is appealing, most of the women who stand
to benefit from Article 14 are likely not aware of these rights. The vast
majority of the world’s rural women are in developing countries.264
The extent to which these women know about CEDAW generally, let
alone Article 14 in particular, is doubtful.265 Further, as I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, rural women presumably have fewer opportunities
than their urban counterparts to enforce their rights because of the
relative absence of law and legal actors in rural places.266
Yet another indicator of the impact of CEDAW’s explicit inclusion
of rural women is its influence on other human rights instruments.
Since CEDAW’s drafting and ratification, three such instruments
have followed CEDAW’s lead in that they have also discussed the
needs of rural populations. These instruments have done so, how-
ever, in ways that deviate from CEDAW’s cabining rural people in
a single article.
One of these, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Protocol),267 refers
to women in rural areas in several different provisions that mirror
the language of CEDAW’s Article 14. Article 14(2)(a) of the Protocol
263. Id. (quoting Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 431 (1987); Martha Minow,
Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1910 (1987)).
264. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (asserting that the majority of the devel-
oping world’s population lives in rural areas).
265. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 179 (2006) (discussing laypersons’ consciousness
regarding international human rights); see also Heather Dawn Alexander, Reversing the
Disenfranchisement of Rural Women: Using CEDAW as a Case Study for the Incorporation
of Anthropological Methodology into International Legal Research, (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Evatt, supra note 8, at 449 (stating that as of 1991-92,
women’s NGOs were not yet very familiar with CEDAW).
266. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 750-51.
267. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 [hereinafter Women’s Protocol
to the African Charter], available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/
Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf (adopted by the 2nd
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union Maputo); see also African Union, List of
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, (July 22, 2010) http://www
.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of
%20Women.pdf (indicating that as of July 22, 2010, forty-six of fifty-three countries in the
African Union have signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa and twenty-eight have ratified it). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the Maputo Protocol’s promise, including for rural women, see Bond, supra
note 2, passim (assessing the potential efficacy of the Protocol).
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mandates “adequate, affordable and accessible health services . . .
to women especially those in rural areas,” whereas Article 19 on the
“Right to Sustainable Development” includes the goal of “promot[ing]
women’s access to credit, training, skills development and extension
services at rural and urban levels in order to provide women with
a higher quality of life and reduce the level of poverty among
women.” 268 The latter provision pairs rural with urban, suggesting
that women in both types of places share similar needs in relation
to economic development.
The African Youth Charter (Charter) also makes a number of
references to rural youth, taking up some issues associated with rural-
ity that CEDAW does not.269 At other points, it merely acknowledges
geography, pairing rural and urban in a way similar to the Women’s
Protocol to the African Charter.270 Specifically, the Charter includes
a provision that calls for “revitalis[ing] vocational education and train-
ing” and “expand[ing] access by developing centres in rural and re-
mote areas.” 271 Two provisions of the Charter are attuned to the role
of amenities in rural areas as a means, apparently, of stemming rural-
to-urban migration. Article 14(2)(a) seeks the “[e]nhance[ment of] the
attractiveness of rural areas to young people by improving access to
services and facilities such as educational and cultural services,” 272
while Article 22 on Leisure, Recreation, Sportive and Cultural Activ-
ities calls for “[p]ut[ting] in place adequate infrastructure and services
in rural and urban areas for youth to participate in sport, physical
education, cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activities.” 273
This latter provision suggests the rural-urban binary and the equal
importance and needs of both types of places.
Finally, Article 16 on “Health” suggests that rural places are
similar to poor urban places in its call for “[m]ak[ing] available equit-
able and ready access to medical assistance and health care especially
in rural and poor urban areas with an emphasis on the development
of primary health care.” 274 Unlike CEDAW’s Article 14(2)(b), the
268. Women’s Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 267, at 15, 17-18.
269. African Youth Charter, July 2, 2006, 10 [hereinafter Youth Charter], available
at www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/African_Youth_Charter.pdf
(adopted by the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union Banjul) (containing
a provision aimed at attracting young people to rural areas). Of fifty-three states in the
African Union, thirty-eight have signed the African Youth Charter, and of those, twenty-
two have ratified it as of June 8, 2010. African Union, List of Countries Which Have
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Youth Charter (June 8, 2010), http://www.africa
-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/list/Youth%20Charter.pdf.
270. Youth Charter, supra note 269, art. 16(2)(a), 22(1)(b).
271. Id. art. 13(4)(e).
272. Id. art. 14(2)(a).
273. Id. art. 22(1)(b).
274. Id. art. 16(2)(a).
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Charter calls for equitable facilities and not merely adequate ones.
With its mention of rural concerns and challenges in several different
articles, the Charter reflects a more pervasive and mainstreaming
approach to rural concerns than either CEDAW or the Women’s
Protocol to the African Charter.
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(Disabilities Convention), the most recent Convention to mention
rural difference, also makes several references to the “rural.” 275
Article 9(1), for example, states in relevant part that member nations
must provide disabled persons access, “on an equal basis with others,
to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and
communications . . . and to other facilities and services open or
provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas.” 276 The
Disabilities Convention recognizes geography in a way more akin to
the Charter by acknowledging both rural and urban. Other provi-
sions evince recognition of spatial challenges associated with rural-
ity by mandating provision of health services and habilitation and
rehabilitation services “as close as possible to people’s own com-
munities, including in rural areas.” 277
All three of these post-CEDAW human rights instruments have
handled rural difference and concern for rural populations in a way
that could be seen as more pervasive and less marginalizing than
CEDAW’s Article 14. The breadth of expressed needs for rural popu-
lations is especially apparent in the Charter and the Disabilities
Convention. These instruments approach rural difference more in
terms of rural places and less in terms of rural people. They do so by
acknowledging the consequences of rurality, which includes the
275. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 9(1),
25(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Disability Convention], available
at http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml.
276. Id. art. 9(1); see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED
NATIONS ENABLE, http://un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional
Protocol was adopted on 13 December 2006 at the United Nations Head-
quarters in New York, and was opened for signature on 30 March 2007.
There were 82 signatories to the Convention, 44 signatories to the Optional
Protocol, and 1 ratification of the Convention. This is the highest number of
signatories in history to a UN Convention on its opening day. It is the first
comprehensive human rights treaty of the 21st century and is the first human
rights convention to be open for signature by regional integration organi-
zations. The Convention entered into force on 3May [sic] 2008.
Id.; Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS
ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?id=166 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011)
(showing that there are 147 signatories to the Convention, ninety signatories to the
Optional Protocol, ninety-four ratifications of the Convention, and fifty-four ratifications
of the Protocol).
277. Disability Convention, supra note 275, art. 25(c), 26(1)(b).
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spatial and resource-based challenges to rural service delivery. This
latter approach seems less marginalizing of rural populations. Still,
had CEDAW not led the way in naming rural concerns, these trea-
ties might not have acknowledged rural difference at all. If not for
CEDAW, when would rural difference—which so often equates to
rural disadvantage—have been seen by the international human
rights community?
Finally, it is worth contemplating the changing relevance of
Article 14 as the world becomes more urban by the day. While a
1977 document associated with CEDAW’s drafting saw rural-to-urban
migration as a tide to be stemmed,278 such thinking is now less evident
among the international and development communities.279 Indeed,
what I have elsewhere labeled the urban juggernaut280—a reference
to the speed with which the world is becoming more urban by the
day—may make rural places and rural development seem less rele-
vant or necessary than ever.281 But while cities’ populations burgeon
and their land areas sprawl worldwide, the rural populations of less
developed countries continue to grow, having doubled since 1950.282
Concerns for rural women are thus as great in the developing
world as they have ever been. Indeed, they are arguably greater as
the urban juggernaut aggravates uneven development,283 disserves
the rural, and diminishes the visibility and political significance of
rural populations. Whatever its shortcomings, taking Article 14
seriously can help ameliorate these inequities.
278. A/32/269, supra note 30, ¶ 19.
279. U.N. Population Fund, Urbanization and Sustainability in the 21st Century, in
STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION 2007: UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF URBAN GROWTH,
at “Cities: Burden or Blessing?,” available at http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/english/
chapter_5/print/chapter_5.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
280. Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 710; see also Pruitt, India’s Rural
Remnant, supra note 41.
281. AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 87, at 45. For example, in recent years
rural-urban income gaps have narrowed in most regions except Asia. Id. Where the gap re-
mains wide, as in Asia, it is a source of political tensions that are leading to “new efforts
to stimulate agricultural and rural development.” Id.
282. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., URBAN AND RURAL AREAS
2007, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/276, U.N. Sales No.E.08.XIII.13 (2008).
Between 1950 and 1975, the rural populations of less developed regions in-
creased by almost 2% annually; in more developed regions they decreased by
0.44% annually. Between 1975 and 2007, rural populations in less developed
regions increased by slightly more than 1% and in more developed regions
they decreased by 0.32%. During this period, urban populations increased
in both developed and less developed regions.
Pruitt, Migration, Development, supra note 2, at 713 n.27 (citation omitted).
283. See UN-HABITAT, THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2010: GOVERNANCE, INEQUALITIES
AND URBAN LAND MARKETS (2010), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/
SACR-ALL-10-FINAL.pdf (documenting the alarming rate of urbanization expected in
Africa over the next few decades).
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Since the United Nations (U.N.) was founded in 1945, the
organization has pledged to promote equality and non-discrimina-
tion throughout the world.1 The United Nations Charter is the most
significant and widely ratified international agreement making
reference to the rights of women. The Preamble reaffirms the faith
of the members of the United Nations in “fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women . . . .” 2 Article 1 sets forth the purposes of
the United Nations, and states that in addition to maintaining peace
and security, one of the purposes is to “promot[e] and encourag[e]
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to . . . sex . . . .” 3
Gender equality was indeed a revolutionary idea when the
United Nations was established. In 1945, less than one half of all
nations allowed women to vote. Specifically, discrimination against
women was permitted in the United States in virtually all aspects
of life including employment, jury service, access to credit and even
within the criminal justice system itself.4
* Professor of Law and former Dean of Seton Hall University School of Law. The
Author would like to thank her research assistant Caroline E. Oks, J.D. Candidate (2012),
Seton Hall University School of Law.
1. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
2. Id. pmbl.
3. Id. art. 1, paras. 1, 3.
4. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 882 & n.30 (1971); John D. Johnston, Jr. &
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From its inception, the United Nations has been in the forefront
of advancing women’s legal rights through the development of norms
relating to gender equality,5 General Assembly declarations, the
formulation of treaties, and its emphasis on the development of
international criminal jurisprudence and prosecution of gender based
crimes.6 It has also focused attention and resources on addressing
the pervasive problem of violence against women as a violation of
human rights and has now created a so-called super-agency headed
by an under-secretary general to address and advance issues con-
cerning women.7
However, it is indeed ironic that the United Nations, which has
been instrumental in setting norms in the area of gender equality,
now stands accused of egregious acts of sexual abuse and exploitation
committed by United Nations Peacekeepers.8 In addition, the U.N. has
been criticized for personnel policies within the organization itself
that negatively impact women and for its mishandling of allegations
of sexual harassment within the organization.9 Despite urging by
various bodies within the U.N. and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) to increase the number of women in decision making posi-
tions within the U.N., women continue to be underrepresented.10
This article will assess the effectiveness of efforts undertaken
by the U.N. to address the inequalities that continue to exist between
men and women in three key areas:
1. Development of norms and treaties relating to women;
2. Advancements in international criminal law and the
establishment of international criminal tribunals that
address gender based crimes; and
3. Initiatives to end worldwide violence against women.
Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 675, 678 nn.4, 14 & 15, 708, 739 (1971).
5. Global Issues: Women, UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/en/globalissues/women/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2011).
6. Id.
7. Id. (discussing the creation of “UN Women” on July 2, 2010).
8. Owen Bowcott, Report Reveals Shame of UN Peacekeepers, GUARDIAN, Mar. 25,
2005, http//www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations/print; see also Colum
Lynch, U.N. Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005,
http://washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30286-2005Mar12?language=printer (noting that
the U.N. is facing sexual misconduct allegations in Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, and Congo).
9. Steve Stecklow, Sexual-Harassment Cases Plague U.N., WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124233350385520879.html.
10. CAMILLE PAMPELL CONAWAY & JOLYNN SHOEMAKER, WOMEN IN INT’L SEC., WOMEN
IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: INCREASING THE LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES 5
(2008).
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Several areas in which U.N. policies or practices have not been
positive will also be addressed. They include:
1. Sexual abuse by U.N. Peacekeepers;
2. Personnel practices at the U.N.; and
3. Sexual harassment allegations within the U.N. system.
I. BUILDING BLOCKS AND EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS
A. Development of Norms and Treaties
At the time that the United Nations was founded, Eleanor
Roosevelt chaired the Commission on Human Rights.11 Under her
leadership, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was
drafted and adopted by the General Assembly without dissent.12 The
UDHR was the first human rights document that was open to all
states to adhere to. Although both the U.N. Charter and the UDHR
speak in terms of equal rights for men and women, a special commis-
sion was proposed to implement this guarantee.13 Roosevelt opposed
the creation of the Commission because, in her view, if rights were
equally protected for men and women, a special body to monitor rights
for women was unnecessary.14 Despite her objections, the Commission
on the Status of Women (CSW) was established by the U.N. and con-
tinues to be the principle global policy body dedicated exclusively to
gender equality and the advancement of women.15
The CSW has been instrumental in developing norms in areas
of concern to women and has focused world attention on issues that
particularly impact women. This has been accomplished in several
ways, including the sponsorship of conferences and programs that
have resulted in treaties, declarations, and programs of action.16
11. 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/udhr60.photos.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
13. Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
2 N.W. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 5,  ¶ 3 (2004), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/
jihr/v2/5.
14. See, e.g., Paula F. Pfeffer, Eleanor Roosevelt and the National and World Woman’s
Parties, 59 HISTORIAN 39, 53 (1996) (claiming that treating women as a group distinct from
men “impl[ies] ‘a silent recognition of the idea that women are to be regarded on a different
level and rights are to be given to them out of charity’ ” (citation omitted)).
15. See Commission on the Status of Women: Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://www
.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (noting that the CSW is “dedi-
cated exclusively to gender equality and advancement of women”).
16. Id.
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The U.N. has sponsored periodic world conferences that identify
issues and develop strategies to improve the status of women on a
world-wide basis. The decade 1976-1985 was designated as the
United Nations Decade for Women, and sex-disaggregated data was
generated and analyzed.17 The General Assembly declared 1975 as
International Women’s Year and organized the first World Conference
on Women, held in Mexico City.18 The conference defined a World Plan
of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International
Women’s Year, which offered a comprehensive set of guidelines for
the advancement of women.19 Subsequent conferences were convened
in Copenhagen in 1980, which urged governments to implement the
Programme of Action;20 and Nairobi in 1985, which was called the
World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the
U.N. Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, and in-
cluded a mandate to member states to establish concrete measures
to overcome the obstacles to achieving the Decade’s goals.21
The final conference dedicated to women was the 1995 Beijing
Conference. It was attended by almost 50,000 people from more than
180 countries and was the largest U.N. gathering ever held at that
time.22 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted unan-
imously by 189 countries, built on political agreements reached at the
three previous global conferences on women and consolidated five
decades of legal advances aimed at securing the equality of women
with men in law and in practice.23 It addressed key areas of concern
17. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 4 (2000) (analyzing the distinct forms of oppression
faced by women).
18. Milestones in United Nations History: A Selective Chronology, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/milestones.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
19. World Conference of the International Women’s Year, Mex. City, Mex., June 19-
July 2, 1975, Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contributions to
Development and Peace, 1975, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.66/34 (1976).
20. G.A. Res. 35/136, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/108 (Dec. 11, 1980).
21. G.A. Res. 40/108, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/108 (Dec. 13, 1985); Pamela Goldberg
& Nancy Kelly, Recent Developments: International Human Rights and Violence Against
Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 198-99 (1993) (citations omitted); Geraldine A. del
Prado, The United Nations and the Promotion and Protection of the Rights Of Women: How
Well Has the Organization Fulfilled Its Responsibility?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
51, 57 (1995).
22. 15 Years After Landmark Gathering, Women Still Lack Equal Rights, U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME (Mar. 1, 2010), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/march/15-years
-after-landmark-gathering-women-still-lack-equal-rights-and-opportunities.en.
23. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, ¶¶ 8-10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996)
[hereinafter Beijing Declaration]; Charlotte Bunch, Women and Gender, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 496, 499 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws, eds., 2007);
see also Benjamin D. Knaupp, Comment, Classifying International Agreements Under U.S.
Law: The Beijing Platform as a Case Study, 1998 BYU L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (measur-
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for women including: human rights, violence against women, health,
economic empowerment and special concerns of the girl child.24 Forced
abortions, forced sterilizations, female genital mutilation, dowry burn-
ing, and sexual harassment were condemned.25 Domestic violence was
identified as a worldwide problem.26
However, declarations, such as the Beijing Declaration, even if
followed by Resolutions of the General Assembly, are not binding,27
although they often contribute to the development of treaties that
translate such promises into binding legal obligations among states.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], adopted at the
first session of the General Assembly, provides: “Everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.” 28 The UDHR further stipulates: “All are equal before
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protec-
tion of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrim-
ination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to
such discrimination.” 29
Equality and non-discrimination are the overarching themes of
the international human rights system. As such, equal treatment
and non-discrimination on the basis of sex are accepted principles of
human rights law.30 General human rights treaties at both the uni-
versal and regional levels contain rights of non-discrimination on a
number of bases that include sex, and prohibit distinctions based on
sex with respect to the enjoyment of rights. For example, Article 3
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
states that “[t]he States Parties . . . undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political
rights set forth in the present Covenant.” 31 Article 26 provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
ing the Beijing Platform against the five classifications of international agreements).
24. Beijing Declaration, supra note 23, ¶¶ 23-34.
25. Id. ¶ 113.
26. Id. ¶ 112.
27. MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS., SUMMARY OF THE BEIJING DECLARATION
AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION 2 (1996).
28. UDHR, supra note 12, art. 2.
29. Id. art. 7.
30. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment 18: Non-
discrimination, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Vol. I) Supp. (Oct. 11, 1989).
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, polit-
ical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.32
Despite progress in the general human rights arena, it soon
became apparent that there was a need to supplement the general
human rights treaties with a treaty specifically applicable to women.33
One of the major accomplishments of the Commission on the Status
of Women was the development of treaties on matters such as the
minimum age to marry, the nationality of married women, and the
enfranchisement of women.34 In 1979, the General Assembly adopted
the comprehensive Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),35 often called the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights for Women.36 The Convention defines gender
discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nulli-
fying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.” 37 It requires states to embody the
principle of equality of men and women in their constitutions or
appropriate legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regula-
tions, customs and practices that discriminate against women, and
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women.38 To date, more than 185 nations, or more than 90% of the
world’s countries, have ratified this Convention, though the United
States has not.39
32. Id. art. 26
33. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Equity and Equality for Women—Ratification of Inter-
national Covenants as a First Step, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 399 (1993) (noting the
pervasive nature of gender discrimination required a treaty targeting the protection of
women’s human rights).
34. Draft Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages, G.A. Res. 1763 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1167th plen.
mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1763 (XVII) (Nov. 7, 1962); Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women, G.A. Res. 1040 (XI), U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 647th plen. mtg. at 18, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1040 (XI) (Jan. 29, 1957); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, G.A.
Res. 640 (VII), U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., 409th plen. mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/640 (VII)
(Dec. 20, 1952).
35. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
36.  Overview of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS,(2009), http://www.un.org/women
watch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
37. CEDAW, supra note 35, art. 1.
38. Id. art. 2.
39. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of all Dis-
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Unfortunately, reservations to human rights treaties and to
CEDAW in particular are an obstacle to their effectiveness. There
have been more than 100 reservations submitted by over 40 states to
CEDAW,40 more than to any other human rights treaty.41 “Reserving
states justify their reservations on grounds of religion, culture, tra-
dition, and economics.” 42 For example, some reservations provide that
in a conflict between the terms of the Convention and Shari’a law,
Shari’a law shall prevail.43 Other states, including Turkey, Thailand,
New Zealand, Brazil, and Tunisia, have entered reservations regard-
ing the equality between men and women in matrimonial property
and family law.44 Malawi entered a reservation stating that it did not
consider itself bound by provisions that require immediate eradication
of discriminatory practices due to the “ ‘deep-rooted nature of some
traditional customs and practices.’ ” 45
Despite the requirement that reservations are impermissible if
they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, the
reservations to CEDAW have been tolerated in order to gain maxi-
mum adherence to the Convention.46 The Committee charged with
crimination against Women, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-8&&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Status
of CEDAW].
40. Id.
41. See Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (listing reservations
by country) (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
42. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Women’s Human Rights: The Twenty-First Century, 18
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1748, 1751 (1995).
43. See Jennifer Riddle, Note, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s
Reservation Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 605, 627 (2002).
Libya made a general reservation citing that CEDAW cannot conflict with
Islamic laws having to do with “personal status derived from the Islamic
Shari’a.” Bangladesh reserved on Articles 2, 13(a), and 16(1)(c) and (f) be-
cause “they conflict with Shari’a law.” Egypt also reserved on Articles 2 and
16 in regard to marriage and family relations, though it stated that Shari’a
“restricts the wife’s rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge’s
ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of the husband.”
India reserved on Articles 5(a) and 16, citing a policy of “noninterference in
the personal affairs of any Community” and “[the country’s] variety of customs
[and] religions,” while Iraq reserved on Article 2 without offering any expla-
nation at all.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted); Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Note,
Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women: Are the Shari’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1949, 1951-52 (1995).
44. Status of CEDAW, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
311 (listing instances in which a State cannot formulate a reservation).
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oversight of CEDAW has taken the position that elimination of such
reservations would greatly strengthen the effective reach of the
Convention.47 Although this deficiency has long been recognized
these reservations continue and greatly weaken the effectiveness of
the treaty.
On December 22, 2000, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW entered
into force.48 The Protocol contains two procedures: (1) a communica-
tions procedure allowing individuals to submit claims of violations
of protected rights,49 and (2) an inquiry procedure enables the Com-
mittee to initiate inquiries into situations of “grave or systematic
violations” of women’s rights.50
The Convention has been criticized for its ineffective implemen-
tation, its weak language, its plethora of reservations, and the very
inefficient reporting system.51 Moreover, the resources allocated to
the Committee are insufficient, and indeed, until recently, the Com-
mittee met for only two weeks of each year.52
The overall rationale of the Convention is equality and nondis-
crimination, and it aims to achieve equality of treatment between
men and women in the public sphere. Some have challenged this
approach because it requires women to conform to a male-defined
world and ignores the underlying reason for the inequality.53
More recently, it has been suggested that the standard to be ap-
plied should be gender equity rather than equality.54 This approach
47. During the CEDAW Committee’s sixth meeting, it expressed concern about “the
significant number of reservations that appeared to be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention.” Chairperson of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women, Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, ¶ 579, U.N. Doc. A/42/38 (Apr. 10, 1987). It suggested that parties reconsider
these reservations, with a view to withdrawing them. The Committee also asked the
United Nations “to promote or undertake studies on the status of women under Islamic
laws and customs and in particular on the status and equality of women in the family . . .
taking into consideration the principle of El Ijtihad in Islam.” Id. ¶ 580. In 1993, the
Vienna Conference on Human Rights called for the withdrawal of such reservations in
its declaration. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter
Vienna Declaration].
48. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/protocol (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
49. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999) [herein-
after Optional Protocol].
50. Id. art. 8.
51. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 17, at 220.
52. Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 220.
54. See Glossary of Gender Terms and Concepts, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., 1 (2008),
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/pubs/Glossary_Handout.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (Equity can be defined as “the processes used to achieve gender
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has been rejected by the CEDAW Committee,55 which has repeatedly
called reporting countries’ attention to the distinction between equity
and equality as a standard, both in its dialogues with country dele-
gates and in its concluding comments or observations on the country
reports.56 It has noted that the terms “equity” and “equality” are not
synonymous or interchangeable, and that the Convention is directed
toward eliminating discrimination against women and ensuring de
jure (formal) and de facto (substantive) equality between women and
men.57 Indeed, the equity standard is sometimes advocated by gov-
ernments seeking to avoid the requirements of formal equality.58
It has also been suggested that women-specific conventions have
marginalized or disadvantaged women.59 The Human Rights Com-
mittee and mainstream institutions and NGOs have often subordi-
nated women’s concerns to what could be regarded as more ‘global’
issues. As a result, the establishment of separate conventions and
measures for women very often results in the creation in what has
come to be known as a “women’s ghetto,” which has a lower priority
than more mainstream human rights issues.60 Since 1977, an objective
equality. Equity involves fairness in representation, participation, and benefits afforded to
males and females. The goal is that both groups have a fair chance of having their needs
met and that they have equal access to opportunities for realizing their full potential as
human beings.” Alternatively, equality is when “males and females have equal rights, free-
doms, conditions, and opportunities for realizing their full potential . . . and benefit[ ] from
economic, social, cultural, and political development.” With the equality standard, “society
values males and females equally for their similarities and differences and the diverse
roles they play.”).
55. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Comments, 37th Sess., Jan. 25, 2007, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/COL/CO/6 (Feb. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter Concluding Comments of the 37th Sess.]; Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 36th Sess., 753d mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.753
(Aug. 18, 2006); see also Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women?
Understanding CEDAW’s Equality Principles, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1133, 1139, 1141 (2009)
(discussing concerns over the way equity and equality are discussed in CEDAW) (citations
omitted).
56. E.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Comments, 38th Sess., May 18, 2007, ¶¶ 14-15, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/VUT/CO/3 (June 11,
2007).
57. See id. ¶ 15 (noting that “equity” and “equality” are not interchangeable). Further,
the Committee prefers the concept designated by the term equality. “[T]he State party’s
goal often is to achieve equity for women rather than to accelerate the achievement of de
facto equality of women with men. It also notes that the concept of equity, rather than
equality, is often used in the design and implementation of policies and programmes for
women.” Concluding Comments of the 37th Sess., supra note 55, ¶ 16.
58. Cf. Facio & Morgan, supra note 55, at 1136 (noting that governments and NGOs
in Latin America preferred “equity” over “equality” policies).
59. Anne Gallagher, Ending the Marginalization: Strategies for Incorporating Women
into the United Nations Human Rights System, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 283, 285 (1997).
60. Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 267 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (citation omitted).
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of the United Nations has been to mainstream a gender perspective
in policies and programs.61
The United Nations has also been instrumental in formulating
treaties that are not gender specific but which address issues that
overwhelmingly affect women’s human rights. One example is the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children.62 The Protocol supplements the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.63
The U.S. State Department estimates that 2.4 million people are vic-
tims of trafficking at any given point in time.64 Approximately 80%
of those trafficked are women and 50% children, many of whom are
trafficked for sexual exploitation.65 Women and female children are
particularly vulnerable to this slavery-like practice, due largely to the
persistent inequalities they face in status and opportunity world-
wide and the lucrative nature of the business.
Early conventions, under the auspices of the United Nations,
addressed trafficking in women or trafficking in children for purposes
of sexual exploitation separately.66 Both the 1949 Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others and the 1979 CEDAW Convention prohibited
the exploitation of prostitution of women.67
61. 13 THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN vii
(Masha Fedorova & Willem-Jan van der Wolf eds., 2006):
The Agreed Conclusions at the 1997 Economic and Social Council Meeting
(ECOSOC) outlined the basic components of this process. Specifically, the
Secretary General called on the heads of all UN funds and agencies to: formu-
late specific strategies for ensuring that gender issues are brought into the
mainstream of organizational activities; systematically use gender analysis
of information disaggregated by sex and age; carry out sector-specific gender
surveys and gender-sensitive studies on particular issues in preparation of
reports and operational activities; [and] prepare medium-term plans and pro-
gramme budgets in such a manner that a gender perspective is apparent.
Id. at vii-viii.
62. G.A. Res. 55/25 (II), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
63. G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
64. Trafficking in Persons—An Affront to Human Dignity, 6 HUM. SEC. AT THE UNITED
NATIONS 1 (Winter 2009/2010) [hereinafter Trafficking in Persons].
65. OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 19 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter
Convention on Traffic and Exploitation]; Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour, art. 3, 38 I.L.M. 1207, June 17, 1999.
67. Convention on Traffic and Exploitation, supra note 66, art. 1; CEDAW, supra note
35, art. 6. Trafficking of children and child prostitution are explicitly prohibited by the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which also prohibits “the exploitative use of chil-
dren in pornographic performances and materials” and “other unlawful sexual practices.”
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With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, human trafficking has
become the fastest-growing criminal industry in the world, with the
total annual revenue for trafficking in persons estimated to be $32
billion.68 Collaboration between states, and oversight by international
bodies, is necessary to address this issue. Thus, the Protocol to the
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which
specifically addresses trafficking, is an important milestone.
For the first time, a definition of trafficking has been agreed
upon. The Protocol defines trafficking as follows:
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transpor-
tation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include,
at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal
of organs . . . .69
The definition is broad and not only reaches trafficking for pur-
poses of sexual exploitation, but also forced labor and most forms of
modern day slavery, including practices such as domestic servitude,
child soldier, and forced or bonded labor.70 The Protocol is unique in
that it focuses on the victims, who are overwhelmingly female, and
requires state parties not only to prevent and combat trafficking in
persons, but also to assist victims of trafficking.71
While enforcement of the Protocol is unfortunately weak, it shifts
the emphasis to helping victims, which had not been accomplished
by prior policies. This in turn forms the basis for subsequent legisla-
tion by state parties.
Taken together, these programs and treaties represent a step
forward in identifying and focusing world attention on issues that
impact women, and in advancing women’s legal rights.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 34, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Nov. 20, 1989.
68. Trafficking in Persons, supra note 64, at 1.
69. G.A. Res. 55/25 (II), supra note 62, art. 3.
70. In bonded labor, a victim is forced into work to pay off debts to the owners of the
operations. Examples of such operations are sweatshops, brothels, restaurants, and fields.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 65, at 15.
71. G.A. Res. 55/25 (II), supra note 62, pmbl.
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B. Developments in International Criminal Law
Another major advancement with respect to women’s human
rights, for which the United Nations is largely responsible, is the
emergence of international criminal law and the establishment of
International Criminal Courts,72 both ad hoc and permanent, which
address the most serious human rights violations that affect women.
At the close of World War II, the world community was shocked
by the horrendous disclosure that millions of people were extermi-
nated in concentration camps, tortured, or forced into slave labor.73
At the war’s end, the victorious Allies established military tribunals
to try those “most culpable for the atrocities.” 74 The International
Military Tribunals in Nuremberg (IMT) and Tokyo (IMTFE) were
established with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, and crimes against the peace.75 It was thought that the prosecu-
tion of crimes against the peace would be the outstanding legacy of
the post-World War II tribunals,76 but this charge proved to be the
most controversial aspect of the indictment. The Nuremberg principles
were affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950.77
They included the principle that an individual could be held respon-
sible for violating international law,78 thus affirming criminal respon-
sibility for individuals for violations of international law.
The indictments for the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to include
any charges of sexual violence, even though sexual violence, including
rape and sexual slavery, was extensively documented throughout
the war and occupation.79 In part because the focus of the trial was
72. About the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About
+the+Court/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
73. Kelly. D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under
International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
288, 300 (2003).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 300-01 (citations omitted).
76. Id. (citing John Murphy, Crimes Against Peace at the Nuremberg Trial, in THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (George Ginsburg & V.N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990)).
77. Formation of the Nürnberg Principles, G.A. Res. 488 (V), at 77, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
488(V) (Dec. 12, 1950). The principles establish liability for those who commit, or who are
complicit in, international law crimes, regardless of internal law, or that the individual was
acting within the scope of their official duty or under a government order. The principles
also establish the right to a fair trial. Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n, 191-93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
78. Id. at 191.
79. Askin, supra note 73, at 301.
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on those responsible for waging aggressive war, sexual violence was
largely ignored.80
The Tokyo Indictment included “allegations of gender-related
crimes: it characterized the rape of civilian women and medical
personnel as ‘inhumane treatment,’ ‘mistreatment,’ ‘ill-treatment,’
and a ‘failure to respect family honour and rights,’ and prosecuted
these crimes under the ‘Conventional War Crimes’ provision in the
Charter.” 81
The World War II tribunals were the foundation for the ad hoc
criminal tribunals that were established in the 1990s to deal with
massive human rights violations that were occurring in Europe and
Africa.82 These ad hoc courts were established in 1993 through Reso-
lutions of the United Nations Security Council and turned interna-
tional attention to gender based crimes.83
Following the war in Serbia and Bosnia, the U.N. appointed a
Commission of Experts to investigate the abuses that had occurred
during the conflict.84 After an extensive investigation, the systematic
detention and rape of women and girls, in addition to the mass killing
of men and boys, during the conflict was documented.85 After deem-
ing the Balkan conflict a threat to peace and security, the Security
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the
80. Charter of the International Military Tribunal—Annexed to the Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
pmbl. (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945; CHARLES I. BEVANS, 4 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1949 22, 28
(1979); see also John F. Murphy, Crimes Against Peace at the Nuremberg Trial, in
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 141 (George Ginsburg & V.N.
Kudriavtsev eds., 1990) (discussing the various counts and charges filed against the
wagers of war and conspirators).
81. Askin, supra note 73, at 302 (citation omitted).
82. David S. Bloch & Elon Weinstein, Velvet Glove and Iron Fist: A New Paradigm
for the Permanent War Crimes Court, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1998);
Laurie A. Cohen, Note, Application of the Realist and Liberal Perspectives to the Imple-
mentation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies Of Nuremberg And Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 113, 163 (1997); Karl Arthur Hochkammer, Note, The Yugoslav War
Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics, and International Law, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 119, 168 (1995).
83. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
84. G.A. Res. 48/88, ¶ 25, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 84th plen. Mtg. At 42, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/48/88 (Dec. 20, 1993); U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 9, 1993 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc.
S/25274 (Feb. 9, 1993); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Estab-
lished pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
395, 395 (Martinus Nijhoff 1999) (discussing the passage of Security Resolution 780 and
its effects).
85. U.N. Doc. S/25274, supra note 84, at 1.
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Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and specifically authorized the prosecu-
tion of rape as a crime against humanity.86
Less than a year after the ICTY was established, genocide
occurred in Rwanda in which more than 800,000 men, women and
children were murdered, and hundreds of thousands of others
were tortured, raped, and otherwise abused.87 In response, the
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) to deal with those most responsible for the mass
atrocities.88 Like the ICTY, the ICTR explicitly authorized the prose-
cution of rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime.89 Testi-
mony taken at the tribunals contained examples of forced pregnancy,
forced abortion, sexual slavery, forced marriage, sexual mutilation,
and sexual humiliation.90
In a landmark decision, the Akayesu judgment delivered by the
Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal in 1998, explicitly recognized
rape as an instrument of genocide and a crime against humanity.91
Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former bourgmestre (mayor) of the Taba com-
mune in Rwanda was convicted of, among other crimes, using rape
as an instrument of genocide and as a crime against humanity, and
was sentenced to life imprisonment.92 The tribunal defined rape as
“ ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive.’ ” 93 The definition of sexual vio-
lence is broader and includes, “ ‘any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sex-
ual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and
may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical
contact.’ ” 94 With respect to rape as an instrument of genocide, the
Court stated, “ ‘[l]ike torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimi-
dation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control
or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal
86. About the ICTY, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty
.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
87. Genocide in Rwanda, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhuman
rights.org/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
88. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
89. Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International
Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 16-17 (2004).
90. HUM. RTS. WATCH/AFR., SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH, 2 (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org reports/1996/
09/24/Shattered-lives.
91. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 685 (Sept. 2, 1998).
92. The indictment charged Akayesu with fifteen counts of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, rape, and genocide for extermination, murder, torture, and cruel treatment com-
mitted in his commune. He was convicted on nine counts. Id. ¶ 744.
93. Askin, supra note 73, at 319 (quoting Akayesu, ¶ 688).
94. Id. (quoting Akayesu, ¶ 688).
2011] THE UNITED NATIONS AND WOMEN—A CRITIQUE 409
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture’ when all of the elements
of torture are satisfied.” 95
Through the jurisprudence developed by the Rwanda Tribunal
and the Yugoslav Tribunal, it is now accepted that international
crimes include gender-based violence, and that individuals can be
held accountable in international tribunals.96
Although the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC)
was contemplated by the United Nations almost from its inception,97
the Court proved to be a casualty of the Cold War. In tandem with
the drafting of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide and the various Geneva Conventions, the
General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to
examine the possibility of creating a permanent international crimi-
nal court.98 By the early 1950s, the “Commission had produced two
draft statutes, but the project was shelved when it became apparent
that the political climate of the Cold War made such a court impracti-
cable.” 99 Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States were concerned that
the crime of aggression or crimes against the peace would politicize
the court.100 It was not until 1989, through the prodding of Trinidad
and Tobago who sought international assistance in dealing with the
drug trade plaguing both countries, that the issue was revisited.101
95. Id. at 319-20 (quoting Akayesu, ¶ 687) (alteration in original). Torture is defined as
an intentional act committed by or with consent of a public official that causes severe pain
or suffering for the purposes of obtaining information, punishment, or intimidation. G.A.
Res. 39/46, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
96. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Crimes of Sexual Violence: The Experience of the
International Criminal Tribunal, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 7 (2000); Martina
Vandenberg, Kosovo: Rape as a Weapon of “Ethnic Cleansing,” 12(3) HUM. RTS. WATCH
(2000); Betty Murungi, Prosecuting Gender Crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, COAL. FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS, http://www
.womensrightscoalition.org/site/publications/vol14No1/prosecutinggendercrimesictr
_en.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
97. Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case against the Proposed International




100. John R. Bolton, Courting Danger: What’s Wrong with the International Criminal
Court, NAT’L INT., (1998), available at www.aei.org/article/9791; Marlene Wind, Challenging
Sovereignty? The USA and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 2 ETHICS
& GLOBAL POL. 83, 87, 89 (2009).
101. The international community stalled on the concept of aggression as a crime be-
cause both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were concerned that the addition of the crime would
result in politicizing the Court. In 1998, the International Law Commission issued its
report on the establishment of an International Criminal Court. Analysis of Issues in the
Draft Statute, UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/icc/statute/htm#intro (last visited Jan. 31,
2011).
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In 1998, building upon the legacy and the momentum of the ad
hoc tribunals established earlier, a diplomatic conference was held in
Rome to consider the creation of a permanent International Criminal
Court.102 NGOs, particularly those focusing on women’s issues, were
strong partners with the U.N. and were instrumental in focusing the
attention of the Conference on issues of gender violence and in having
these issues included in the formal drafts of the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court.103 The Court became a reality in 2002,
after its 60th state ratification.104 Based in The Hague, the ICC is a
permanent court with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and aggression.105 The statute for the Court ex-
plicitly authorizes the prosecution of rape, sexual slavery, forced pros-
titution, forced sterilization, forced pregnancy, and “any other form
of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3” as
war crimes and crimes against humanity.106
The International Criminal Court will undoubtedly build on the
rich jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, with respect to prosecut-
ing gender-based violence. In addition, the statute for the Court re-
quires states in selecting judges to “take into account the need . . .
for . . . fair representation of female and male judges.”107 Legal expe-
rience, including exposure to violence against women, should also
be taken into account.108
The experience of both the ITCY and ICTR indicate that the
presence of women in such tribunals do make a difference. For ex-
ample, in the Akayesu case before the ICTR, questions by the sole
female judge prompted the prosecutor to amend the indictment to
include the charge of genocide.109 At the present time, eleven of the
nineteen judges on the ICC are women (most with expertise in gender
crimes).110 Thus, it seems certain that gender violence will be viewed
102. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1993, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
103. See Yvonne M. Dutton, Commitment to the International Criminal Court: Do States
View Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat?, 4 (One Earth Future Found.,
Working Paper), available at http://www.oneearthfuture.org/siteadmin/images/files/file
_43.pdf (listing the number of NGOs that attended the U.N. Conference in Rome).
104. Rome Statute, supra note 102, art. 126. However, China, Russia and the U.S. are
not parties to this Treaty. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL CT.,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
105. Rome Statute, supra note 102, arts. 3-5.
106. Id. art. 8.2(e)(vi).
107. Id. art. 36.8(a)(iii).
108. Id. art. 36.3(b)(i)-(ii).
109. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Amended Indictment, ¶ 23 (Sept. 2,
1998).
110. The Chambers, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
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as an international crime as well as a gross violation of human rights,
rather than as a mere casualty of war.
These remarkable developments in international criminal law
are attributable to the actions of the U.N. and its member states as
well as to the efforts of NGOs who have insisted that gender-based
crimes be addressed.
C. Violence Against Women and Other U.N. Programs
A third area in which the U.N. has been instrumental in address-
ing issues and human rights violations that impact women are those
efforts to eradicate violence against women.
According to World Bank data, “[w]omen aged 15-44 are more at
risk from rape and domestic violence than from cancer, car accidents,
war and malaria.”111 Additionally, up to seventy percent of women
worldwide are subject to violence throughout their lifetime.112 “Vio-
lence against women takes many forms—physical, sexual, psycho-
logical and economic. These forms of violence are interrelated and
affect women from before birth to old age.”113 They include acts such
as female infanticide, inadequate nutrition for girl babies, rape, and
female genital mutilation.114
Gender violence sometimes originates in the womb and might
persist throughout the early years of a girl child’s life. Nobel Prize
winning economist Amartya Sen estimates that more than 100 mil-
lion women are missing due to sex-selection and inadequate medical
care, food and social services provided to girl children as compared
to boy children.115 Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn call this
“gendercide,” and note that in the last fifty years, more girls have
been killed simply because they were girls, than all the men who were
Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/The+Judges/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
111. UNiTE to End Violence Against Women, Violence Against Women: The Situation,





115. Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women are Missing, 37 N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(1990), available at http://ucatlas.edu/gender/sen100m.html; see also NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
& SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN
WORLDWIDE xv, 61-67 (2009) (supporting the estimate and discussing forms of violence com-
mitted against women and girls in various countries); Martha Nussbaum, Seeing Women’s
Rights as a Key to Countries’ Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/8/books/08nussbaum.html (invoking the phrase “diffuse cruelty of indifference,”
which refers to the systematic undervaluation of women (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
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killed in battle during the twentieth century.116 Further, “[m]ore girls
are killed in this routine ‘gendercide’ in any one decade than people
were slaughtered in all the genocides of the twentieth century.”117
Violence against women is not confined to a specific culture,
region or country, or to particular groups of women within a society.
The most common form of violence experienced by women globally is
physical violence, inflicted by an intimate partner, where women
are “beaten, coerced into sex or otherwise abused.”118 It is estimated
that, “[w]orldwide . . . one in five women will be a victim of rape or
attempted rape in her lifetime.”119 Moreover, recent reports and
studies indicate that during times of financial and economic instabil-
ity, the incidence of domestic violence increases.120 The United Nations
Population Fund estimates as many as 5,000 women annually are
victims of so-called “honour killing.”121
While violence against women has persisted in all societies, it is
only in the last two decades that international attention has focused
on this scourge. The existing international human rights norms and
practices are the result of a male-centric approach to human rights
norms and international law in which the violation of the human
rights of women have been ignored. The Western liberal tradition
draws a distinction between public life encompassing work, politics,
and macro-economics and the private sphere including home, children,
and domestic concerns often gravely affecting the responsibilities of
women.122 Traditionally, the law had functioned in the public sphere
and avoided entanglement in the lives of those it governs.123 This
public/private distinction is magnified at the international level, which
purports to govern relations among states.124 Consequently, human
rights violations specific to women remained largely unregulated and
have, until recently, continued without international legal sanctions.125
116. KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 115, at xvii.
117. Id.
118. See U.N. POPULATION FUND, STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2005 65, available at
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/en_swp05.pdf (describing the average number of women
who experience physical violence in their lifetime).
119. Id. (citation omitted).
120. The Increased Importance of the Violence Against Women Act in Times of Economic
Crisis, Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3-4 (2010) (statement
of Susan B. Carbon, Director, Office on Violence Against Women).
121. U.N. POPULATION FUND, STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2000 29, available at http://
www.unfpa.org/swp/2000/pdf/english/chapter3.pdf.
122. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
50-52 (1987); Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 387, 390 (1999).
123. See MACKINNON, supra note 122 (describing this dichotomy thematically through-
out the text).
124. Chinkin, supra note 122, at 390.
125. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
2011] THE UNITED NATIONS AND WOMEN—A CRITIQUE 413
In 1993, the first U.N. Conference on Human Rights was held in
Vienna to assess the status of human rights throughout the world.126
Primarily through the efforts of women NGOs who participated in
the deliberations, the Platform of Action adopted at the Conference
recognized that the lives of women were not taken into account in the
contemporary human rights system and affirmed women’s rights as
human rights.127 The United Nations Conference could well be con-
sidered a watershed in the protection of human rights of women.128
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action promulgated at
the Conference expressly recognized that “[t]he human rights of
women . . . are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of uni-
versal human rights.”129 The Declaration identified numerous gender-
specific abuses, including those resulting from cultural prejudice,
such as violence, sexual harassment, and sexual exploitation, as
human rights violations that were incompatible with the dignity and
worth of the human person.130 Until that time, the General Assembly
had not issued any statement recognizing or condemning violence
against women.131 In response to the Vienna Programme of Action,
in December 1993, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women that recognized vio-
lence against women as an issue of international concern.132 Violence
against women is defined as “any act of gender-based violence that
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.”133 The Declaration rejects the concept of cultural rela-
tivism in addressing violence against women.134 Significantly, the
INT’L L. 613, 615 (1991) (noting that “[i]nternational law is a thoroughly gendered system”
in which women’s rights are often marginalized).
126. Vienna Declaration, supra note 47, pmbl.
127. Id.
128. Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family:
Redefining the Ties that Bind: A Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L.
113, 162 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 266 (1977); Ruth B. Philips, Too Close To Home?
International Criminal Law, War Crimes and Family Violence, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
229, 232 n.11 (2002).
129. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 47, art. 18 (describing the human rights of
women).
130. Id.
131. See id. (noting that the Vienna Declaration urges Member States to step-up their
promotion of human rights for women and girls).
132. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, pmbl.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994).
133. Id. art. 1.
134. See id. art. 4 (nothing that “[s]tates . . . should not invoke any custom, tradition or
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Declaration urges states to “[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, in-
vestigate and . . . punish acts of violence against women, whether
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons,”135 thus
easing the distinction between the public and the private sphere.
In April 1994, Radhika Coomaraswa was appointed as the first
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to focus on vio-
lence in the home (domestic violence), in the community (prostitution,
rape, pornography), and by the state (abuse in prisons and in armed
conflicts).136
Rape has long been used as a tactic of war, with violence against
women during or after armed conflicts reported in every international
or non-international war-zone.137 For example, between 250,000 and
500,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.138
On June 19, 2008, the United Nations Security Council took a mon-
umental step with respect to violence against women by passing
Resolution 1820 on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict.139 It reaffirmed
its “commitment to ending sexual violence as a weapon of war and as
a means to terrorize populations and destroy communities.”140 Sexual
violence is identified as “a tactic of war used to humiliate, dominate,
instill fear in, and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a commu-
nity or ethnic group.”141 “Further, the Council noted that violence can
significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede
the restoration of international peace and security”142 and decided
to remain apprised of the matter.143
In 2008, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched the global
campaign UNiTE to end violence against women.144 In doing so he
religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to” ending gender-based
violence).
135. Id. art. 4(c).
136. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Promotion and
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, H.R. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/6 (June 23, 2009).
137. See Katherine Jones, Rape as a Tool of Warfare, ASSOCIATE CONTENT (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/690379/ape_as_a_tool_of_warfare.html?cat=49
(describing how rape has been a part of the discourse of war since the Middle Ages).
138. ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 11 (2005)
(citation omitted).
139. Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 127, 133 (2009). To view the actual Resolution, see S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820
(June 19, 2008).
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stated, “there is one universal truth, applicable to all countries, cul-
tures and communities: violence against women is never acceptable,
never excusable, never tolerable.”145
The Secretary-General’s campaign will run through 2015.146
“UNiTE calls on governments, civil society, women’s organizations,
young people, the private sector, the media and the entire U.N. system
to join forces in addressing the global pandemic of violence against
women and girls. By 2015 UNiTE aims to achieve the following . . .
goals in all countries”:147
1. Amend existing legislation and “[a]dopt and enforce
national laws to address and punish all forms of vio-
lence against women and girls”;148
2. “Address sexual violence in conflict” and assure that
women are included in the Peacemaking Process;149 and
3. “Strengthen data collection on the prevalence of violence
against women and girls.”150
As the campaign is now in formation, significant resources have
been committed by the U.N.,151 the Security Council has been involved
and awareness has been raised.
II. OBSTACLES TO U.N. EFFORTS
Despite the very positive achievements of the United Nations
in addressing inequality, disparities and vulnerabilities of women
in virtually all sectors of society, its record and efforts in addressing
issues relating to its own personnel are disappointing.
The reputation of the United Nations has been tarnished by the
actions of some of its peacekeeping personnel charged with sexual
abuse, and there is widespread agreement that allegations of sexual
harassment claims brought by U.N. staff members within the U.N.
Never Acceptable, Never Excusable, Never Tolerable, as He Launches Global Campaign
on Issue, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/11437 (Feb. 25, 2008).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. UNiTE to End Violence Against Women, About UNiTE, UNITED NATIONS, http://
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have been mishandled.152 In addition, despite persistent requests from
within the U.N. system itself and from NGOs monitoring the status
of women at the United Nations, a glass ceiling continues to impede
the promotion of women.
A. Sexual Abuse by U.N. Peacekeepers153
Despite widespread reports and documentation of sexual abuse
by United Nations Peacekeepers dating back more than two de-
cades,154 there is not yet a sufficient mechanism in place to address
these very serious offenses. Although the U.N. has been successful in
setting norms and developing treaties in the area of gender equality,155
it has been unsuccessful in its efforts to address the egregious acts
of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by U.N. Peacekeepers.
“Sexual abuse and exploitation was first documented ‘in Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Kosovo in the early 1990s, [and] then later in
Mozambique, Cambodia, East Timor and Liberia.’ ” 156 Abuses in-
cluded pedophilia, pornography and sexual assaults, but it was not
until the widespread allegations of abuse emerged in the Democratic
Republic of Congo in mid-2004 that high-level U.N. officials responded
to the charges.157 Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged
the seriousness of the charges, stating:
This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say,
and I am absolutely outraged by it. . . . I have long made it clear
that my attitude to sexual exploitation and abuse is one of zero
tolerance, without exception, and I am determined to implement
this policy in the most transparent manner.158
152. Stecklow, supra note 9.
153. For a fuller discussion of the topic, see Elizabeth F. Defeis, U.N. Peacekeepers and
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 185,
187-95 (2008).
154. See id. at 187 (noting that the first documented complaints of sexual abuse arose
in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s).
155. Defeis, supra note 33, at 389-90 (citations omitted).
156. Defeis, supra note 153, at 187 (quoting U.N. Reforms Aim to End Sexual Abuse
by Peacekeepers, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, (2005), http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
peacekpg/reform/2005/0510conduct.htm) (alteration in original).
157. Ryan Balis, Support for United Nations Justifiably Weakened by Financial, Sex
and Human Rights Scandals, NAT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS (2006), http://www.nationalcenter
.org/NPA545UNScandals.html; Jonathan Clayton & James Bone, Sex Scandal in Congo
Threatens to Engulf UN’s Peacekeepers, TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.times
online.co.uk/tol/news/world/article405213.ece; UN Sexual Allegations Double, BBC NEWS,
May 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4521481.stm.
158. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General ‘Absolutely
Outraged’ by Gross Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of
Congo, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/9605 (Nov. 19, 2004).
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Recognizing that the procedures in place were inadequate and
that a fundamental change was necessary, the Secretary-General
appointed Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan to investi-
gate the alleged abusers.159 The report detailed pervasive abuse and
exploitation of women and girls, most of which involved trading sex
for money, food, or jobs.160 Even more disturbing, victims of rape were
often given gifts after being assaulted, in order to give the impression
of prostitution, rather than rape.161 So-called “ ‘peacekeeper babies’ ”
were left with the victims of abuse, who were often abandoned by
their families and had no means of support.162
However, more than a year after it was announced, the widely
publicized zero tolerance policy by Annan was ignored. Prince Zeid,
“in a confidential report obtained by The Times, said, ‘[t]he situation
appears to be one of ‘zero-compliance with zero-tolerance’ throughout
the mission.’ ”163
To mark the 60th anniversary of the U.N. in October 2005, The
New York Times published a critical editorial on the sexual abuse
by U.N. peacekeepers. It said:
Nothing discredits the United Nations more than the continuing
sexual abuse of women and girls by soldiers belonging to its inter-
national peacekeeping missions. And yet almost a year after shock-
ing disclosures about such crimes in Congo, far too little has been
done to end the culture of impunity, exploitation and sexual chau-
vinism that permits them to go on. . . . When United Nations
peacekeepers rape the people they were sent to protect and coerce
women and girls to trade sex for food, as they were found to have
done in Congo last winter, they defeat the purpose of their mission
and exploit some of the world’s most vulnerable people.164
In January 2007, sexual exploitation by U.N. peacekeeping forces
in southern Sudan was reported by the media, including the systematic
159. Id.
160. A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in letter dated Mar. 24, 2005 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/710, at 8 (Mar. 24, 2005).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 8, 9.
163. Clayton & Bone, supra note 157; see also SARAH MARTIN, REFUGEES INT’L, MUST
BOYS BE BOYS? ENDING SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & ABUSE IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
iv, 6 (2005), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/MustBoys
beBoys.pdf (discussing how the U.N.’s zero tolerance policy is meaningless rhetoric until
it takes real action to “eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse and the tolerance of these
activities throughout the United Nations”).
164. Editorial, The Worse U.N. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes
.com/2005/10/24/opinion/24mon3.html.
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abuse of children as young as twelve.165 According to the report, the
first allegations emerged shortly after the arrival of U.N. forces.166
In response to these new allegations, the newly appointed
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed the U.N.’s zero-tolerance
policy and stated: “The UN standard on this issue is clear—zero tol-
erance meaning zero complacency and zero impunity. . . . It is the
UN’s policy to treat credible allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse as serious offences to be investigated by the Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS).”167
Later that year, however, 100 Sri Lankan peacekeepers were re-
patriated from Haiti following allegations that some had sexually
exploited or abused children, according to a report in the Wall Street
Journal.168 “Soldiers allegedly had sex with at least nine minors,
ranging in age from 10 to 16, in and around a U.N. camp . . . .”169
They were paid with food or “as little as 75 cents.”170
In 2008, Save the Children, a U.K. based NGO, urgently called
for the appointment of an international watchdog to investigate cases
of child abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers.171 Its research estab-
lished that desperate and starving children were victims and were
coerced to sell sex for food, money, soap and even mobile phones.172
While acknowledging that the U.N. had commented on the matter,
the report stated that, in most cases, “statements of principle and
good intent have yet to be converted into really decisive and con-
certed international action.”173
In the first half of 2010, forty-five allegations of sexual exploita-
tion and abuse by U.N. personnel in peacekeeping and political
165. Kate Holt & Sarah Hughes, UN Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1538476/
UN-staff-accused-of-raping-children-in-Sudan.html.
166. Id.
167. Secretary-General Office of the Spokesperson, Statement Attributable to the
Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
by UN Personnel in Sudan (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2388.
168. Steve Stecklow & Joe Lauria, U.N. Peacekeepers Dodge Discipline, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 2010, at A1, A18.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. CORINNA CSÁKY, SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, NO ONE TO TURN TO: THE UNDER-
REPORTING OF CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY AID WORKERS AND PEACE-
KEEPERS 24 (2008), available at http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/docs/no_one_to_turn
_under_reporting_of_child_sea_by_aid_workers.pdf.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at v, 10 (“Few UN Agencies and NGOs collect detailed information on the
abuse of children by their own personnel, and even fewer make this information publicly
available.”).
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missions were received, eighteen of which involved minors; this rep-
resented an increase from the same period as the previous year.174
Despite the harrowing revelations and specific recommendations
for reform contained in many U.N. reports and reports of NGOs
monitoring the issue, sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. Peace-
keeping Operations persists. Peacekeeping missions are generally
deployed in societies where the social fabric has been ripped apart by
civil strife: the rule of law is absent, and family structures no longer
exist where the local population endures severe economic and psycho-
logical hardship.175 Under these conditions, power can be, and some-
times is, abused.
The masculine culture of Peacekeeping Operations often results
in a “wall of silence” from outside accusations.176 In traditionally male-
dominated environments such as police departments, militaries and
fraternities, this tradition is a bond that protects the members inside
from outside accusations. Instances of abuse and exploitation are
often unreported either to protect the reputation of the peacekeepers
or because the so-called “whistle-blower” would be stigmatized.177
Thus, instances of sexual abuse are often ignored.
The former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Bosnia said that officials “ ‘don’t want to know about [sexual mis-
conduct] . . . . There is this whole ‘boys will be boys’ attitude about
men visiting brothels. There’s a culture inside the UN where you
can’t criticise it. That goes all the way to the top.’ ”178 The United
Nations has taken some measures to address the problem in the form
of training and disciplinary measures for all civilian personnel, in-
cluding experts on missions and independent contractors.179 U.N.
staff regulations have been amended to clarify that sexual exploitation
and abuse constitute sexual misconduct and can result in disciplinary
action, including dismissal.180
174. Neil MacFarquhar, Abuse Allegations Reported in Peacekeeping Missions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05EFDC133EF
933A15754C0A9669D8B63.
175. Anna Shotton, A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United
Nations Peacekeeping Personnel, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 97, 103 (2006).
176. See Eric Schmitt, Wall of Silence Impedes Inquiry into a Rowdy Navy Convention,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at 1, 34 (describing lack of cooperation by aviators in sexual
assault investigation).
177. See Dominic Hipkins, Bosnia Sex Trade Shames UN, SCOTSMAN.COM, Feb. 9, 2003,
http://www.scotsman.com/world/Bosnia-sex-trade-shames-UN.2400797.jp (discussing a
U.N. police officer, Kathryn Bolkovac, who was fired for exposing the sexual abuse com-
mitted by her male colleagues).
178. Id. (quoting Madeleine Rees, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia).
179. Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission, in note
dated Sept. 11, 2007 from the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/62/329, at 3 (Sept. 11, 2007) [herein-
after Criminal Accountability].
180. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Staff Regulations, U.N.
420 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:395
In addition, conduct and discipline teams have been established
in peacekeeping missions to raise awareness of sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse, and to promote onsite training to the peacekeepers.181
There are currently fourteen Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs)
covering nineteen peacekeeping and special missions.182
However, the problem with respect to accountability of military
personnel has not been sufficiently addressed. Although each peace-
keeping mission is comprised of both civilian and military personnel,
the military component predominates.183 At the present time, there
are almost 124,000 personnel serving on 16 peace operations on 4 con-
tinents.184 The United Nations lacks a military force and must rely on
a relatively small number of countries, mainly developing countries,
to staff the military operations.185 Because “the U.N. pays about $1,000
per month per soldier,”186 peacekeeping is a source of income for such
countries. Under the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated between
the U.N. and the troop contributing country (TCC), all such troops are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the troop contributing state.187
This immunity cannot be waived by the Secretary-General since
jurisdiction is exclusive to the TCC.188 TCCs are united in their in-
sistence that military personnel should not be subject to disciplinary
action by the U.N. or by any other state, including the host state.189
Unfortunately, however, troop contributors have a poor record of
holding their personnel accountable for such violations. Often the
perpetrators are sent home with no further action taken by the home
country, and it is impossible for victims to determine what, if any,
disciplinary action has been taken.190 When information is requested
by the U.N. about disciplinary actions in investigations, most of the
Doc. ST/SGB/2006/4, at 13 (Jan. 1, 2006).
181. Conduct and Discipline Teams, U.N., http://cdu.unlb.org/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2011).
182. See id. (listing the countries in which peacekeeping and special missions are
located).
183. U.N. DEP’T PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, FACT SHEET 1 (2010), http://un.org/en/
peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
184. Id.
185. FACT SHEET, supra note 183, at 1.
186. Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A18.
187. Criminal Accountability, supra note 179, at 2. Indeed, no country has been willing
to subject its military contingents to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation.
188. U.N. Secretary-General, Model Status-of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping
Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 47(b), 48, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990).
189. See Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A18 (noting how TCCs oppose “external
oversight of their troops”).
190. Id. (citing a 2007 investigation in which Morocco did not tell the U.N. what action
it had taken against soldiers who allegedly sexually abused women during a U.N. mission).
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time the TCC does not respond.191 It is thus critical that this issue
be addressed.192
In 2007, the General Assembly decided that the model Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) with TCCs should include the U.N.
Standards of Conduct193 but posits responsibility for investigation with
the TCCs themselves. The U.N. investigates complaints only if the
TCC is unwilling or unable to investigate.194 It also affirms that TCCs
have exclusive jurisdiction over military contingents.195 However, the
U.N. investigation unit, the Office of Internal Oversight Service
(OIOS) has no authority to discipline soldiers and because of a lack
of staff it can only probe so-called “ ‘priority’ ” cases.196
In 2008, through Resolution of the General Assembly, the U.N.
adopted a Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to
Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff
and Related Personnel.197 The strategy provided that complainants,
victims and peacekeeper babies should receive basic assistance and
support in the form of medical care, legal services, psychological sup-
port and maternal assistance.198 However, it appears that in order
for a child to qualify for benefits as a child “born as a result of sexual
exploitation,” paternity must first be established by a “competent
national authority,” which, in most circumstances, appears to be ex-
tremely difficult to accomplish.199 Moreover, the Strategy provides that
such support only needs to be provided through existing services.200
While it is still too early assess the effectiveness of the Strategy, it
appears to be another example of too little, too late.
The extraordinary and dangerous services performed by U.N.
Peacekeepers were recognized in 1988 when they were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize for “represent[ing] the manifest will of the commu-
nity of nations” and “mak[ing] a decisive contribution” to the reso-
lution of conflict around the world.201 The allegations of sexual abuse
191. Id.
192. In 2006, a group of legal experts was appointed by the Secretary General to
examine the issue of holding U.N. staff accountable for criminal conduct with respect to
instances of sexual abuse. The report proposed a new international convention to deal with
the issue, but specially excluded military peacekeepers from its proposal coverage. Never-
theless, further action on the proposed convention has stalled. Criminal Accountability,
supra note 179, at 1, 2.
193. See id. at 2 (discussing how certain misconduct will be punished).
194. Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A18.
195. Criminal Accountability, supra note 179, at 2.
196. Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A18.
197. G.A. Res. 62/214, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/214 (Mar. 7, 2008).
198. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
199. Id. ¶ 5(e).
200. Id. ¶ 10.
201. Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 1988 (Sept. 29,
1988), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prize/peace/laureates/1988/press.html.
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have now tarnished the reputation of both the United Nations and
the difficult work of the U.N. peacekeepers. While the issue of sexual
abuse has been addressed in numerous Security Council resolutions,
U.N. reports, press reports and reports of NGOs, reports of sexual
abuse and official inaction continue to escalate. The rhetoric and good
intentions must be translated into action. Although the Zero Tolerance
Policy was announced in 2004, a U.N. official acknowledged, “ ‘[t]he
ambition, of course, is to be zero tolerant . . . . But you have to be
realistic.’ ” 202 The Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations
commented with respect to allegations of sexual abuse by Moroccan
troops: “ ‘It’s my biggest headache and heartache, this whole issue.’ ” 203
While very positive steps have been taken, much remains to be done
if indeed there is to be no impunity for perpetrators. The U.N. must
take more forceful action and discipline of troops and must become
a shared responsibility.
B. Personnel Policies of the U.N.
Another area of concern within the United Nations structure it-
self is both the number of women in decision-making capacity and the
treatment of all women on staff, particularly with respect to handling
the widespread allegations of sexual harassment within the U.N.204
At the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1946,
Eleanor Roosevelt read “an open letter to the women of the world,”
calling upon “[g]overnments of the world to encourage women every-
where to take a more active part in national and international
affairs” 205 and calling on women themselves “to come forward and
share in the work of peace and reconstruction as they did in war and
resistance.” 206 Noting “[w]e hope their participation in the work of
the United Nations Organization may grow and may increase in
insight and in skill.” 207
202. Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A18 (quoting Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Under-
Secretary for Internal Oversight Services).
203. Debbie Schlussel, Muslim UN Peacekeepers Committed Rape, Dodge Discipline,
DEBBIE SCHLUSSEL BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://www.debbieschlussel.com/19511/
muslim-un-peacekeepers-committed-rape-dodge-discipline/ (quoting Alain Le Roy, U.N.
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations).
204. FRANCINE J. D’AMICO, PROMISES TO KEEP: WOMEN WORKERS AT THE UNITED
NATIONS 1 (2008).
205. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Contributions of the
Comm. to Int’l Conferences: Rep. of the Comm. on Progress Achieved in the Implemen-
tation of the Convention, Nov. 14, 1994, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1995/7 (citing “Open
Letter to the Women of the World,” read by Eleanor Roosevelt at the first session of the
General Assembly on February 12, 1946).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Article 8 of the U.N. Charter provides that the U.N. “shall place
no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in
any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and sub-
sidiary organs.” 208 Although the under-representation of women in
professional levels posts at the United Nations was documented for
the Commission on the Status of Women in 1950, it was not until
twenty years later that the General Assembly adopted its first resolu-
tion on employment of women at the U.N.209 It requested the Secretary
General to include data on women in his annual report and urged that
appropriate measures be undertaken to ensure equal opportunity
for women.210 The under-representation of women in the Secretariat
has been continuously on the agenda of the General Assembly since
this time.211
In 1974, a goal was set to achieve an equitable balance of staff
members by 1980, and targets were established in an attempt to
achieve such balance; they were subsequently revised continuously,
as the target was not met.212
The representation of women in the U.N. was on the agenda of
each of the World Conferences on Women.213 The Nairobi Conference
of the U.N. Decade for women recommended that “the United Nations
system should take all necessary measures to achieve an equitable
balance between women and men staff members at managerial and
professional levels in all substantive areas, as well as in field posts.” 214
In 1992, a target for policy level positions to be as close to fifty
percent as possible by 1995 was adopted; however, this goal still has
not been met.215 In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action recognized the paucity of women in decision-making posts
and urged the U.N. Secretariat to appoint and promote women staff
members in accordance with the mandate of equality in the Charter
of the United Nations.216
208. U.N. Charter art. 8.
209. Dina Francesca Haynes, Ethics of International Civil Service: A Reflection on How
the Care of United Nations’ Staff Impacts the Ability to Fulfill Their Role in “Harmonizing”
the World, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 175, 190-91 (2008).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 190-92, 196.
212. U.N. Secretary-General, Equality of Men and Women in the Secretariat, ¶¶ 10, 15,
16, 176, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/154 (Mar. 8, 1977).
213. Historic Overview on the World Conferences on Women, U.N., http://www.un-ngls
.org/spip.php?page=article_s&id_article=1725 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
214. World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies
for the Advancement of Women, ¶ 356, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev (July 26, 1985).
215. G.A. Res. 48/106, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/106 (Feb. 23, 1994); SG Calls for Urgent
Action to Achieve Gender Parity at UN, UN NEWS CTR., 1 (Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.un
.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/Secretary%20General%27s%20message%20on%20Iseek.pdf.
216. Vienna Declaration, supra note 47, ¶ 43.
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In a report prepared in 1994 for the Ford Foundation entitled
Renewing the United Nations System, Erskin Childers and Brian
Urquhart, in commenting on the under representation of women at
the U.N., noted that, although the United Nations has been a leader
in standard-setting on gender issues, its Secretariat “is in standing
violation of the Charter in abjectly failing to meet these standards.”217
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has acknowledged that the pace
of progress towards achieving gender parity in the United Nations
system is slow and “called for redoubling of efforts to reverse the
‘regrettable trend.’ ” 218
As of December 2004, women constituted only 36.9% of “staff
in the Professional and higher categories with appointments of one
year or more in the United Nations system.” 219 “During the 11-year
period December 1997-December 2008 in the UN system, the overall
growth of women in appointments of one year or more was 7.8%, an
increase from 30.9% (5,716 out of 18,486) in 1997 to 38.7% (10,207
out of 26,316) in 2008.” 220 Gender parity within the U.N. system
has fallen substantially short, particularly with respect to decision
making positions.
Ban Ki-moon, in his statement to the General Assembly, stated
that the entire system must adopt “new policies where none exist and
more rigorously implement existing ones . . . . Efforts must be made
to overcome the United Nations system’s informal organizational
cultures which constrain the advancement of women staff.” 221
It has been reported by U.N. bodies that impediments to achiev-
ing parity fall into seven broad categories, namely: inadequate ac-
countability, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; the lack of
special measures to achieve gender balance; the absence of a focal
point system; limited flexible work arrangements; lack of outreach
in recruitment; low numbers of qualified women applicants; and lack
of adequate data on the causes of high attrition rates for women.222
In addition, women are not promoted proportionately to men be-
cause of U.N. Personnel Policies.223 A man, for example, might accept
long absences from his family as essential for his career, but the
217. ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
168 (1994).
218. SG Calls for Urgent Action to Achieve Gender Parity at UN, supra note 215.
219. U.N. Secretary-General, Improvement of the Status of Women in the United Nations
System: Rep. of the Secretary-General, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/63/364 (Sept. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. A/63/364].
220. Id. at 1.
221. Id. at 46.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Stecklow & Lauria, supra note 168, at A1.
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working mother would likely face criticism from many sources if she
chose to leave her family and ultimately qualify for a promotion.
Unless the member states and policy makers under the U.N.
are committed to achieving parity within the U.N., women will
continue to be underrepresented. Despite the attention paid to this
issue for so many years, lack of representation of women remains a
“regrettable trend.” 224
C. Sexual Harassment Within the U.N. System
An Op Ed piece in the New York Times notes:
In the middle of New York City, 7,000 employees work be-
yond the reach or protection of the law. They can be harassed,
discriminated against or fired, and they have nowhere to turn.
Their employer is not some sweatshop in Chinatown but the
Secretariat of the United Nations. A particular group of employees
has special cause for complaint: women.225
Almost from its inception, the United Nations has been the
subject of complaints of sexual harassment involving high level U.N.
personnel. The organization has been criticized for its handling of
such cases both because of the arbitrary nature of the process and the
length of time required to dispose of such claims.226 Cases of sexual
harassment within the U.N. can take years to adjudicate and com-
plainants have no access to investigative reports.227 In several cases,
the contract of the complainant was not renewed or her position re-
classified while the alleged harasser was allowed to retire or resign
with full benefits.228 This effectively put the harassers out of reach of
the U.N. justice system despite the fact that the harassment had been
substantiated by the internal investigation conducted by the internal
investigation unit of the U.N. (OIOS).229 One former U.N. attorney
224. U.N. Doc. A/63/364, supra note 219, at 45.
225. Ciceil L. Gross, Op-Ed., Catherine Claxton vs. the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994,
at A23.
226. In addition, there are no statistics concerning the number of such cases which have
been brought because each U.N. entity tracks cases separately and confidentially.
227. Stecklow, supra note 9.
228. Id.
229. In 2004, a French woman working as a legal officer in Gaza for the U.N. complained
that a director of operations, to whom she reported, sexually harassed her. Id. A probe by
the local U.N. agency in Gaza, which was led by the accused’s friend, cleared the
accused, but the complainant took her case to the U.N.’s main investigative unit, the
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). Id. The accused reached his mandatory
retirement age and left before the OIOS investigation was complete. Id. Meanwhile, the
complainant’s contract ran out and was not renewed. Id. By 2006, the OIOS had found
some evidence of sexual harassment and concluded that it would have “recommended
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commented, “ ‘[n]o matter which way the cases go, they mishandle
it . . . .’ ” 230
U.N. personnel must pursue employment claims of discrimina-
tion or harassment within the internal justice system of the U.N.
rather than through national systems because, under the U.N.
Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, the so-called “General Convention,” 231 the U.N.
and its officials enjoy immunity from prosecution in state courts.232
Thus, staff members must rely on the U.N. regulations rather than
national courts. While an informal resolution of disputes is encour-
aged, the system has been criticized as non-transparent, confusing
and inefficient.233
The mishandling of sexual harassment cases is illustrated by two
widely reported cases. The first was the ground-breaking case brought
by Catherine Claxon who claimed that she had been sexually harassed
by an Assistant Secretary General in 1988.234 A report issued by the
U.N. Discrimination and Grievance panel and another by an outside
Irish judge appointed by the Secretary General to hold a closed inquiry
concluded that harassment and retaliation had occurred.235 The
Secretary General refused to release the report of the outside judge
because it was not in “ ‘the best interests of the organization’ ” and
threatened Claxton with disciplinary action if she released the re-
port.236 The harasser received a generous retirement package and
payment of his legal fees.237 Claxton’s suit in New York state court
was dismissed because the U.N. intervened on behalf of its former
employee and claimed diplomatic immunity.238 The U.N. ultimately
counseling” if the accused was still with the organization; however, as he had already
retired, nothing could be done. Id. The complainant pressed on, though, taking her plea for
an equivalent job and compensatory pay to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who
rejected the appeal and sent it back for review to the local agency in Gaza that had
initially dismissed the case. Id.; see also Masum Momaya, Do Sexual Assailants in the
United Nations System Enjoy Impunity?, ASS’N FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN DEV. (July 8,
2009), http://www.awid.org/eng/ Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Do-sexual-assailants-in-
the-United-Nations-system-enjoy -impunity (describing the incident).
230. Stecklow, supra note 9 (quoting George G. Irving) Mr. Irving was “a former U.N.
attorney who now represents clients on both sides of such cases.” Id.
231. Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 22 (I) A , U.N. Doc.
A/RES/22 (Feb. 13, 1946).
232. Id. art. 4.
233. JULIA HUTTER, PRE-LITIGATION PROCEDURES TO SETTLE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 17-18
(2007).
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reached a settlement and agreed to pay more than $200,000.239 This
case is emblematic of numerous other cases where sexual harassment
was substantiated, but the individuals were not disciplined because,
during the course of the proceedings, they retired or resigned from
the U.N.240
In a more recent case, two female employees charged the former
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, who was also
the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, with sexual harass-
ment that allegedly occurred during a 2003 meeting in Geneva.241
The internal investigating unit of the U.N., OIOS, confirmed that
sexual harassment had occurred and that the Chief had “a pattern
of sexual harassment” 242 against female employees and had
“engage[d] in serious acts of misconduct . . . of a sexual nature,” 243
and recommended that he be disciplined.244 The then-Secretary
General Kofi Annan disregarded the findings on the ground they
“could not be substantiated.” 245 Lubbers resigned, but the complain-
ants faced retaliation, including threats of job loss.246 The women
then sued in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.247 The United
Nations claimed diplomatic immunity and was supported in its claim
of immunity by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.248 The suit was dismissed
on those grounds.249 The ruling was upheld by the Circuit Court of
Appeals,250 and the claimants were denied a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.251 In interesting dicta, the Circuit Court seems to
open the door for a tort action, based on a battery claim of sexual
harassment if the state system allowed such a claim.252 The state
239. UN History Made with $210,800 Settlement, 3 HUM. RTS. TRIB. 21 (1995); U.N. Will
Pay $94,000 to Settle Complex Sex Harassment Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1994, http://
articles.latimes.com/1994-12-24/news/mn-12562_1_sexual-harassment-cases.
240. Momaya, supra note 229; Shelley Walden, United Nations Sexual Assault/
Harassment Reports on Wikileaks, ALL THINGS WHISTLEBLOWER: A GAP BLOG (Feb. 25,
2009, 9:42 AM), http://whistleblower.typepad.com/all_things_whistleblower-/2009/02/
united-nations-sexual-assaultharrassment-reports-on-wikileaks.html.
241. Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 151 (2010).
242. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-2799), ¶ 2.
243. Id. ¶ 60.
244. Id. ¶ 64.
245. U.N. Employee’s Sexual Harassment Suit Tossed, MSNBC.COM, May 1, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24408051/wid/1/.
246. Id.
247. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 110.
248. Id.
249. Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
250. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114.
251. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 242, at 114.
252. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114.
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court would thus be required to adjudicate the defendant’s claim of
immunity.253
In 2005, the General Assembly, partly in response to the criti-
cism of cases of sexual harassment, urged the Secretary General
to convene a panel of experts to prepare “a model for a new system
for resolving staff grievances in the United Nations that is inde-
pendent, transparent, effective, efficient and adequately resourced
and that ensures managerial accountability.” 254 The experts con-
firmed that “[t]he system of administration of justice as it currently
stands is extremely slow, underresourced, inefficient and, thus, ulti-
mately ineffective.” 255
Further, the dispute proceedings themselves “generally lack[ ]
transparency and fail[ ] to satisfy minimum requirements of the rule
of law,” 256 such as guaranteeing “the right to a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal in the determination of a person’s rights,
the right to appeal and the right to legal representation.” 257 The re-
port further stated, “the standards of justice that are now generally
recognized internationally and that the Organization pursues in its
programmatic activities are not met within the Secretariat or the
funds and programmes themselves.” 258
In April 2007, the General Assembly formally adopted many of
the recommendations set forth in the report.259 Among the changes
is a mandatory course on sexual harassment for U.N. staff and a
redesign of the investigation procedures, which had been severely
criticized previously.260
During the first year of the new system, 200 judgments had
been rendered and the Appeals Tribunal reviewed more than 60
judgments.261 Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Legal
253. Id.
254. Administration of Justice at the United Nations, G.A. 59/283, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/283 (June 2, 2005).
255. Rep. of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administration of
Justice, 61st Sess., Feb. 1, 2006, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Redesign Panel].
256. Id. ¶ 73.
257. Id. ¶ 9. Both the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) are staffed by three full-time judges working in Geneva,
New York and Nairobi. These tribunals have, in effect, subpoena power, the power to com-
pel appearances and may issue temporary relief. Judgments are final and must be based
on a recent opinion, stating both the facts and the law on which the judgment is heard.
258. Id.
259. G.A. Res. 61/261, ¶¶ 1, 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/261 (April 30, 2007).
260. See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat, Prevention of Workplace Harassment, Sexual Harass-
ment and Abuse of Authority, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2005/20 (Nov. 28, 2005) (announcing
the introduction of a learning program to aid in the facilitation of the zero tolerance policy
regarding all types of harassment).
261. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls for Peaceful Settlement
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Affairs, characterized “[t]he new system as a milestone in strength-
ening the Organization’s commitment to the rule of law, justice and
accountability.” 262
Nevertheless the new system has been criticized. It fails to pro-
vide staff members with professional legal counsel, but instead relies
on volunteers. The thousands of staff who are non-permanent cannot
utilize the system and the jurisdiction of the tribunals is narrowly
drawn. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated, with reference
to sexual harassment, “ ‘[t]his scourge remains a high priority issue
for me.’ ” 263
It is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the new proce-
dures. The pending cases and prior record of non-action, impunity,
absence of disciplinary action for the harassers but punishment for
the complainant, are not promising. The U.N. routinely waives im-
munity in criminal matters, and it claimed immunity to quash civil
cases alleging sexual harassment despite the fact that action in a state
court might provide the only available redress.264 It should review its
policy of immunity with respect to sexual harassment.
Further, an evaluation of OIOS, conducted in 2007, recom-
mended that the U.N.’s procedures be revamped and made more pro-
fessional.265 It further advocated a more proactive approach to the
issue of sexual harassment and recommended the creation of a Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse Task Force to respond “to this highly visual
and urgent area of misconduct.” 266 U.N. Security General Ban Ki-
moon acknowledged that the system is defective and stated: “ ‘I fully
share your concerns regarding sexual harassment and sex discrimina-
tion.’ ” 267 Nevertheless, the U.N. continues to be the subject of inves-
tigative reports from the media.268 Meaningful reform is still lacking
and once again words remain to be translated into action.
CONCLUSION
On balance, how do we assess the achievements of the United
Nations with respect to women?
of Disputes, Pledging ‘Forceful’ Fight against Impunity, in Statement Capping Day-Long
Debate on Rule of Law, U.N. Press Release SC/9965 (June 29, 2010).
262. Id.
263. Stecklow, supra note 9.
264. Momaya, supra note 229.
265. MICHEL GIRODO, A CULTURE REVIEW OF THE INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION OF OIOS
36-37 (July 13, 2007).
266. Id. at 44.
267. Stecklow, supra note 9.
268. See id. (analyzing the sexual harassment reports and stating that sexual harass-
ment cases within the U.N. is a slow process and that many managers have diplomatic
immunity from both criminal and civil punishment).
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Progress has been made in the past decades in the recognition
that women’s rights “are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part
of universal human rights.” 269 The development of International
Criminal Law and the creation of International Criminal Tribunals
now address gender-based crimes so that there no longer is impunity.
The promulgation of treaties, both general human rights treaties, such
as the ICCPR, that provide for equality and nondiscrimination, and
women-specific conventions like CEDAW have had a major impact on
the development of rights around the world. However, the numbers
and scope of reservations to CEDAW greatly reduces its effectiveness
and those incompatible with the object and purpose of CEDAW
should not be allowed.270
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, adopted in 2000, addresses
trafficking in a comprehensive way.271 Trafficking is a growing menace
that overwhelmingly impacts women. U.N. Security Council recom-
mendations focus on violence against women, particularly in times
of conflict.272 General Assembly declarations on violence against
women, the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on violence against
women and the new initiatives such as UNiTE, focus attention on
grave human rights violations. Violence against women takes many
forms and affects up to seventy percent of women in their lifetime.273
Enforcement and implementation of such programs and initiatives
must be strengthened and resources allocated in the decade ahead.
Although gender specific violations of human rights, such as domestic
violence and dowry burning, had been ignored or marginalized by the
U.N. Human Rights Committees and the major human rights organi-
zations,274 more recent efforts to mainstream these issues are having
an effect.
Gender related abuses attributed to U.N. Personnel including
U.N. Peacekeepers have been the subject of many U.N. reports and re-
ports from international NGOs.275 Allegations of sexual abuse continue
269. Vienna Declaration, supra note 47, ¶ 18.
270. UN: CEDAW Weakened by Slew of Reservations, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM
LAWS, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.wluml.org/node/6063.
271. G.A. Res. 55/25 (II), at pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
272. Violence against Women: Work of the Security Council on Violence against Women,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/v-sc-work.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2011).
273. Violence Against Women: The Situation, supra note 111.
274. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 18-19 (1995).
275. Cf. Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse By U.N. and Related Personnel,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/tools.shtml (last visited Jan. 31,
2011) (citing related reports from both the U.N. and NGOs concerning gender related
sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers).
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and indeed have escalated. While the situations with respect to cer-
tain personnel and experts on mission have been dealt with, discipline
of military personnel is uneven and needs to be addressed.
Despite numerous General Assembly resolutions, reports and
statements of support from successive Secretary Generals, women
have yet to be adequately represented in professional posts within
the U.N. Certainly, the appointment and retention of women in high
level positions at the United Nations would be a positive development
and might well lead to a change in the culture at the U.N. This will
require a reexamination of accepted philosophy, policy, and political
will on the part of the U.N. Secretariat, and national governments.
On July 2, 2010, the General Assembly unanimously approved
the establishment of a single U.N. entity to promote equality for
women.276 The resolution adopted by consensus by the 192 member
states will put four existing U.N. bodies dealing with the advancement
of women under a single umbrella agency entitled, United Nations
Entity for Gender Equity and the Empowerment of Women277 or, as
christened by the U.N. Resolution, UN Women.278 The Resolution will
consolidate the Secretary-General’s Office of the Special Adviser on
Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, the U.N. Develop-
ment Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Division for the Advance-
ment of Women, and the U.N. International Research and Training
Institute for the Advancement of Women.279
“ ‘This is truly a watershed day,’ ” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
said. He continued:
By bringing together four parts of the UN system dedicated to
women’s issues, Member States have created a much stronger
voice for women and for gender equality at the global level . . . It
will now be much more difficult for the world to ignore the chal-
lenges facing women and girls—or to fail to take the necessary
action . . . .280
“The new organization . . . will be headed by an under-secretary-
general who will report directly to the Secretary-General.” 281 The
276. In Historic Move, UN Creates Single Entity to Promote Women’s Empowerment,
U.N. NEWS CTR. (July 2, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35224
&Cr=gender&Cr1.
277. Id.
278. G.A. Res. 64/L.56, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/64/L.56 (June 30, 2010).
279. Id. ¶ 84.
280. In Historic Move, UN Creates Single Entity to Promote Women’s Empowerment,
supra note 276.
281. United Nations: A Super Agency for Women Only?, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. INT’L REV. 56,
57 (2010); see also Neil MacFarquhar, A U.N. Agency for Women? Yes! But those Names . . .,
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position of under-secretary-general is the third highest rank in the
U.N. system, and outranks the positions held by the present chiefs
of the four existing women’s agencies.
For many years, the United Nations has been hampered in its
mission in promoting equality for women around the world because
of the lack of funding, the marginalization by U.N. bodies of issues
that impact women, the lack of political will on the part of member
states and policy makers within the U.N., and the absence of a high-
level advocate to advance equality. Creation of the so-called “super-
agency” culminates a four-year campaign to streamline the U.N.’s
activities promoting the status of women that was strongly supported
by women’s organizations and other non-governmental groups.282
Although the world’s governments agreed in 1995 to an ambitious
platform to achieve equality for women, in the Beijing Declaration
and Programme of Action, disparities continue in all aspects of soci-
ety.283 One U.N. spokesperson acknowledged that, “[w]omen in all
parts of the world suffer violence and discrimination, and are under-
represented in decision-making processes. High rates of maternal
mortality continue to be a cause for global shame.” 284
The platform to achieve women’s equality adopted at the 1995
U.N. women’s conference in Beijing will be the framework for the new
body’s work.285 The Declaration “called for governments to end dis-
crimination against women and close the gender gap in 12 critical
areas including health, education, employment, political participation
and human rights.” 286
The mission of the new agency is to address policy issues, pro-
vide assistance to U.N. member states that seek it, and promote and
monitor the U.N. system’s actions to promote the advancement of
women.287
With this new milestone achieved, perhaps the next is the
appointment of a woman to the highest post at the U.N. that of
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/03nations.html (“[T]he
French managed to get the official translation included in a footnote: ONU Femmes. Now
they are pushing for that name to be used over the English version.”).
282. MacFarquhar, supra note 281. However, some member states were less than en-
thusiastic that scarce U.N. resources would be allocated to the creation of a new agency,
or indeed to the idea that women needed their own U.N. organization. Id.
283. Press Release, UNIFEM, UN Creates New Structure for Empowerment of Women,
U.N. Press Release (July 2, 2010), available at http://www.unwomen.org/wpcontent/
uploads/2010/07/UNWomen_PressRelease_201007021.pdf.
284. Id.
285. Edith M. Lederer, UN Approves New Body to Promote Women’s Equality, USA
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Secretary General. While traditionally the post of Secretary-General
rotates so that each geographic region has a turn,288 gender is not con-
sidered in the rotation and there has never been a female Secretary-
General. Yet, there are many qualified women from all regions of the
world who might serve as Secretary-General. The time is ripe and the
efforts should start now. Certainly, a woman at the head of the U.N.
would send a powerful message and might contribute to a change in
the culture of that body. Although much has been achieved, much
remains to be done.
288. UN Secretary-General, UN ELECTIONS.ORG, http://www.unelections.org/?=node/71
(last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Gender inequality is a pandemic, both in the developing world
and in developed countries.1 In an attempt to address the situation,
1. E.g., Cindy A. Schipani et al., Women and the New Corporate Governance: Pathways
for Obtaining Positions of Corporate Leadership, 65 MD. L. REV. 504, 519 (2006) (“Gender
inequality . . . remains pervasive worldwide . . . .”) (citation omitted); Donna J. Sullivan,
Women’s Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT’L
L. 152, 157 (1994) (“[S]ystemic gender inequalit[y is] entrenched in the legal, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural structures of societies worldwide.”).
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the United Nations (U.N.) has called on its subsidiary agencies and
all Member States to mainstream a gender approach in all program-
ming.2 Although the mandate is vague concerning implementation,
the clear goal is gender equality as framed by international standards
found in human rights conventions.3 In post-conflict states, gender
equality often becomes disconnected from efforts to improve the rule
of law. This is due to a tendency to resist applying otherwise widely-
accepted human rights norms to gender issues.4 Many signatory states
ignore human rights standards when it comes to gender issues, basing
reservations on cultural or religious objections.5
This Note contends that the fissure concerning gender issues
implicates the main challenge facing rule of law initiatives in post-
conflict settings: fusing adherence to international norms with cul-
tural relevance to ensure lasting results.6 Domestic ownership of
and “buy-in” to rule of law reforms7 are determinative of whether
the reforms will fail as international involvement declines.8 Although
2. U.N. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON GENDER ISSUES & ADVANCEMENT OF
WOMEN, Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality (2001) [herein-
after Promoting Gender Equality], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/
factsheet1.pdf.
3. Specifically, gender equality calls for equal rights for men and women. The rele-
vant human rights instruments include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [here-
inafter ICCPR]; and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
4. Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 154, 155-56 (2003) (“Though most countries around the world allegedly espouse
equality between the sexes, and this notion is incorporated both in international and
national laws, simultaneously there is widespread acceptance of the notion that groups
have the right to maintain religious and cultural norms that discriminate against women.”)
(citation omitted).
5. William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 84-86 (1997). For example:
The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the provisions
of the Convention [on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women], except those which the Government may consider contradictory to
the principles of the Islamic Sharia upon which the laws and traditions of the
Maldives is founded.
Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
6. Scholars have criticized the international aid community in general for its tendency
to inadequately address culture when acting to bring about change. See, e.g., Madhavi
Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2003) (“[A] meaningful right to
equality requires equality not just in the public sphere, but also within the contexts of the
communities that are important to people.”).
7. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
18 (2009) [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.usip.org/resources/
guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction.
8. Id. at 65-66.
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the domestic impetus crucial for successful reform9 often exists in
post-conflict settings, it is still essential to understand the local
context in these volatile environments to ensure that such impetus
does not stall.10
This Note argues that mainstreaming a gender approach in rule
of law initiatives is crucial to long-term success. Gender roles are
foundational in most societies because of their tight links to family
structure, which in turn defines much of a society’s cultural, religious,
and political norms.11 Thus, proposed changes based on international
human rights law appear to challenge the basis of the society in ques-
tion.12 This provokes more resistance to gender equality than to other
human rights provisions.13
While the centrality of gender roles will make efforts to shift
cultural perceptions more difficult, this Note argues that the results
will be worth the effort. Culture is not a static entity.14 Thus, the goal
in a gender-mainstreamed rule of law initiative must be to under-
stand the cultural norms surrounding gender, decipher how those
norms are infused into the legal framework, and identify ways those
norms can be adapted to promote gender equality.
By mainstreaming a gender perspective in rule of law program-
ming, initiatives will be better able to identify culturally relevant
approaches to address different aspects of rule of law-based reform
initiatives. In addition, mainstreaming will provide an opportunity to
incorporate criticism from both feminist scholars and scholars crit-
ical of the development community’s failure to incorporate cultural
differences into gender equality initiatives.15 Attention to both gender
9. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96 (1998)
(“[O]utside aid is no substitute for the will to reform, which must come from within.”).
10. See GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 187 (“Consulting with the population
on the design and implementation of the programs is essential to ensure that the efforts
are locally driven.” (citation omitted)).
11. Stopler, supra note 4, at 172-73.
12. See Lisa Hajjar, Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies:
A Framework for Comparative Analysis, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 8 (2004) (“Eradicating
violence from women’s family lives requires changes in laws and social attitudes that
sustain or contribute to the problem of impunity” for such gender inequality.).
13. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1407-08.
14. Johanna Schalkwyk, Questions about Culture, Gender Equality and Development
Cooperation, CAN. INT’L DEV. AGENCY, 2 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
47/37/1850708.pdf; see also infra Part III.A (discussing how “culture is a human construct
in a constant state of evolution and adaptation”).
15. Input from both camps is crucial, as reform should “not necessarily resemble a
typical feminist approach to the topic. Feminist theory, particularly liberal feminism, has
elements that can actually conflict with or contradict indigenous philosophies.” Sarah Deer,
Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 134-35 (2004)
(internal citation omitted). Yet such reform efforts “will be successful only by incorporating
contemporary views and voices into the [local] judicial systems.” Id. at 135.
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issues and cultural context in rule of law initiatives is vital, though
difficult to manage.16
The Introduction of this Note will continue by providing defini-
tions of key terminology in the rule of law, gender, and development
fields. In Part I, this Note lays out the international legal and devel-
opment framework relevant to rule of law initiatives in post-conflict
contexts, with a focus on international instruments that address
gender. Part II provides an overview of key feminist critiques of the
rule of law movement’s dealings with gender issues, as well as some
criticism of feminist perspectives. Part III discusses the importance
of understanding the domestic cultural context of a rule of law initia-
tive for developing reforms that promote gender equality. Finally, in
Part IV, this Note combines the international and domestic factors for
addressing gender in areas of particular importance to rule of law-
based reforms.
A. Rule of Law and Gender Terminology
For the purposes of this Note, it is helpful to define certain instru-
mental terms to clarify their particular nuances in the context of rule
of law reform and gender mainstreaming.
“Rule of law” has become an oft-used term of art in the interna-
tional development community.17 It describes a desired outcome for
reform efforts in which the population “ha[s] equal access to just laws
and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable,
protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.”18
The rule of law consists of several key components. The first is a
“[j]ust [l]egal [f]ramework,” meaning the domestic legal framework
must conform to international standards.19 The legal framework
must be transparent and clear, predictable, equitable, and universal,20
in accordance with the “principle of legality.” 21 The rule of law places
emphasis on accountability within the government, meaning all per-
sons are equally subject to the laws, regardless of their positions of
power within the system.22 This requires that “horizontal and vertical
accountability mechanisms” be put in place to ensure individuals in
power are not held above the law.23
16. Indeed, success in implementing reform within these communities often “will not
originate from a simple blending of [local] law with feminist theory.” Id.
17. Carothers, supra note 9, at 95.
18. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 9.
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id.
21. Iulia Crisan, The Principles of Legality “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege”
and Their Role, 5 EFFECTIUS NEWSLETTER (2010).
22. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 64.
23. Id.
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With the rule of law comes a “[c]ulture of [l]awfulness,” which
refers to the situation in which society’s members follow the law and
refrain from illegal acts because such acts are against the law.24 The
rule of law also focuses on “[a]ccess to [j]ustice” within a society,
meaning that the general public reasonably understands how to find,
and is actually able to find, remedies through the legal system.25 The
rule of law is a concept that is applicable across the political and cul-
tural spectrum.26 Thus, part of the rule of law development process
involves understanding the domestic context and adapting rule of
law-based reforms to mesh with that context.27
The U.N. has defined culture as “the whole complex of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that character-
ize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters,
but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being,
value systems, traditions and beliefs . . . .” 28
In much of the developing world, the formal justice system is
often a legal construct created and left behind by colonial powers or
imported, in whole or in part, from Western sources.29 In many
societies throughout the world, people continue to use justice mech-
anisms that pre-existed Western influence.30 These mechanisms are
largely based on custom and tradition and do not generally conform
to the structures in the state’s formal legal system.31 Often, they are
composed of procedures that would be viewed as largely informal com-
pared to Western legal structures,32 including community meetings
with traditional leaders deciding legal issues based on customary
law.33 Although these justice mechanisms are referred to by a variety
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Carothers, supra note 9, at 99 (“[C]ommentators have seized on the rule of law as
an elixir for countries in transition. It promises to remove all the chief obstacles on the path
to democracy and market economics. Its universal quality adds to its appeal.”).
27. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 30 (describing how the rule of law “is a
spider web of interdependence that requires as much integration as possible”).
28. World Conference on Cultural Policies, Mex. City, Mex., July 26-Aug. 6, 1982,
Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, 41, U.N. Doc. CLT/MD/1, (Nov. 1982).
29. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 165 (2003).
30. Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the
Plurality of Justice Systems, 2 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQUITY AND
DEVELOPMENT, Background Paper 2 (July 2005), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-1118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy
_Reform.pdf (“[I]n communities where the state systems lack legitimacy and/or political
reach, informal and customary systems often act completely independently from the state
legal system, which may be rejected, ignored or not understood.”).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., James Ojera Latigo, Northern Uganda: Tradition-Based Practices in the
Alcholi Region, in  TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT:
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 85, 107 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008),
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of terms in the development literature, this Note will refer to this
category of institutions as “customary justice mechanisms.” 34
The term “gender” is often erroneously equated to “sex.” “Gen-
der” refers to social constructions defining men’s and women’s roles
and opportunities in a society, whereas “sex” refers to biologically-
determined differences between men and women.35 While sex traits
are largely unchangeable, gender roles are based entirely on context
and can alter over time.36 “Gender equality” refers to a situation
where individuals’ “responsibilities and opportunities [do] not de-
pend on whether they are born male or female.” 37 Although, in many
cases, eliminating gaps in rights means improving women’s situation,
gender equality should not be equated with women’s empowerment
over men.38
Gender-based violence (GBV) is violence perpetrated against an
individual because of his or her sex that results in physical, sexual, or
psychological harm.39 GBV arises predominantly in situations where
power relations between men and women are unequal.40 Because
women are generally the party with less power in the relationship,
they tend to be the primary victims.41
More than a decade ago, in response to pervasive gender in-
equality, the U.N. declared that all initiatives should “mainstream”
available at http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Transitional
_Justice_and_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf (“The principle of conflict reso-
lution among the Acholi is to create reconciliation which brings the two belligerent sides
together through the intercession of elders, leading to the acceptance of responsibility
and an indication of repentance.”).
34. Often, these justice mechanisms are called “traditional” or “informal.” Luc Huyse,
Introduction: Tradition-Based Approaches in Peacekeeping, Transitional Justice and
Reconciliation Policies, in id. at 1, 3. Because the law that these mechanisms employ is
largely referred to as “customary law,” this Note will employ the term “customary justice
mechanism.” See Chirayath et al., supra note 30, at 2 n.2 (“[A] vast array of practices, sys-
tems, traditions have been defined as informal, traditional or customary law, all existing
within vastly differing contexts.”).
35. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, GENDER MAINSTREAMING FACTSHEET, http://www.undp
.org/women/mainstream/whatis.shtml (follow “Download the ‘Gender Mainstream’ (PDF)
Fact Sheet” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
36. Gender Mainstreaming: Concepts and Definitions, U.N., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ADVISOR ON GENDER ISSUES & ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
37. Id.
38. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 4 (specifying that programs aimed at improving condi-
tions for women may be necessary in many contexts and are not a form of gender discrimi-
nation, as long as they are conditioned to end once gender equality is achieved).
39. Gender-Based Violence, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., (last updated Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/gbv/index.html.
40. Amy G. Lewis, Gender-Based Violence Among Refugee and Internally Displaced
Women in Africa, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 269, 272 (2006).
41. Id.
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a gender perspective.42 In theory, gender mainstreaming requires that
gender issues be taken into account at all stages and with respect to all
aspects of initiatives and programming.43 The goal is to promote and
establish gender equality.44 In practice, however, gender mainstream-
ing has proven easy to promise, but hard to carry out.45 Although
many programs have taken steps to begin gender mainstreaming,46
most lack personnel with the experience and knowledge required to
implement programs that effectively address gender issues.47
With this important terminology defined for the purposes of this
Note, the next step in the analysis of gender in the rule of law is de-
veloping an understanding of the international legal and development
context surrounding gender issues. The next section will develop the
basis for the “just legal framework” element within the rule of law
and discuss the international development community’s stance on
gender equality.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GENDER—LEG ONE OF RULE OF
LAW INITIATIVES
In post-conflict situations, the legal system is usually in need
of reform.48 The system often either does not or cannot address the
state’s reconstructive needs and has lost the population’s trust and re-
spect.49 Rule of law-based initiatives consider legal reforms immensely
important for post-conflict reconstruction.50 Reforms focus on estab-
lishing a legal framework that comports with accepted international
law, particularly international human rights law (IHRL).51
By their texts, existing human rights treaties should already
guarantee gender equality,52 but the current regime faces several
42. Promoting Gender Equality, supra note 2, at 1 (“Mainstreaming was clearly estab-
lished as the global strategy for promoting gender equality through the Platform for Action
at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Mieke Verloo, Gender Mainstreaming: Practice and Prospects, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
4 (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/equality/Eng/WordDocs/
Document%20list.htm (follow “EG(99)13” hyperlink).
46. Rekha Mehra & Geeta Rao Gupta, Gender Mainstreaming: Making It Happen,
INT’L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, 3-4 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.icrw.org/
publications/gender-mainstreaming-making-it-happen.
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. See GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 38 (“A country’s recovery from violent
conflict depends first and foremost on the establishment of security.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 68.
51. Id. at 64, 66.
52. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights both provide for equality and freedom from
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challenges that impede successful application to gender issues. Con-
sidering the level of gender inequality in the world today,53 these
treaties have clearly not been sufficient to bring about gender equal-
ity. Contrary to international law, many states party to these treaties
have entered reservations or understandings,54 invoking domestic
or religious laws to justify failure to adhere to international obliga-
tions.55 While these reservations could have been deemed illegal from
the outset, the desire for multilateral treaties to have as widespread
a membership as possible has allowed states to enter reservations56
that undermine the treaties’ fundamental purposes.57
Even when states do not enter reservations, enforcement mecha-
nisms in human rights treaties—as is common in international
law—lack the certainty needed to produce concrete effects.58 The
enforcement mechanism within human rights treaties is usually a
monitoring body with the authority to hear complaints from states
and, sometimes, from individual non-state actors.59 Yet many states
opt out of these often-optional enforcement protocols.60 As a result,
the main force behind IHRL is the diplomatic pressure that signatory
states exert to persuade non-conforming states to uphold interna-
tional standards.61 This pressure can arguably be put on states in the
context of rule of law initiatives.62
A. Gender in International Human Rights Law
Many of the long-standing sources of international law make only
cursory references to women, and earlier documents do not address
discrimination, including discrimination based on sex. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 2; ICCPR,
supra note 3, art. 2.
53. Schipani et al., supra note 1, at 519; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 157.
54. Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L
& COMP. L. 219, 226-27 (2006); Schabas, supra note 5, at 79. For an example of how treaties
define “reservations,” see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“ ‘Reservation’
means a unilateral statement . . . made by a State . . . whereby it purports to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”).
55. Schabas, supra note 5, at 84-86.
56. Engle, supra note 54, at 228. Even those treaties that explicitly acknowledge “that
reservations of a general scope have no place in a convention of this kind[,] . . .” it there re-
mains the “possib[ility] to allow certain limited reservations.” Reservations to Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15,
21 (May 28).
57. Schabas, supra note 5, at 80.
58. Engle, supra note 54, at 228.
59. Id. at 226.
60. Id. at 228.
61. Id. at 231.
62. Id. (“The state that supports human rights has a . . . weapon of human rights [that]
can be wielded in negotiations . . . .”).
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“gender” at all.63 Recently, interpretations of international treaties
and conventions have read broader protections for gender-related
issues into the original text.64
The foundation of IHRL is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). Instrumental among UDHR’s guarantees are the
“right to life, liberty and the security of person” 65 and the right not
to be subjected to torture.66 Although UDHR is a non-binding instru-
ment, many argue that its guarantees have reached the status of
binding customary international law.67 If these rights were protected
equally for men and women in adherence with the universal nature
of these rights, gender equality would already have been achieved.
A large majority of U.N. Member States are party to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).68 Building
on UDHR, ICCPR clarifies the rights to equality and equal protection
under the law, as well as the right to be free from all forms of discrim-
ination.69 If fully implemented, the rights guaranteed in ICCPR would
go a long way toward bringing about gender equality. Yet many of
the countries that signed ICCPR did so with reservations or “under-
standings,” which has limited the treaty’s effects on gender issues,
thereby reducing its strength.70
63. Francoise Krill, The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law,
249 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 337, 337 (1985); see also Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime
Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances,
Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 294-95 (2003) (discussing the limited and
often indirect references to women and gender-related issues in international humanitarian
law documents dealing with armed conflict).
64. See, e.g., Askin, supra note 63, at 310 (“The Geneva Conventions do not speci-
fically list any form of sexual violence as a grave breach, although case law confirms that
sex crimes are covered by the grave breaches provisions, particularly the prohibitions of
‘torture,’ ‘inhuman treatment,’ ‘willfully causing great suffering,’ and ‘serious injury to
body or health.’ ” (citation omitted)).
65. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 3.
66. Id. art. 5.
67. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1-3 (1995).
68. The treaty currently has 166 parties. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31,
2011) [hereinafter ICCPR Treaty Collection].
69. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26.
70. Id. For example, Bahrain entered an understanding providing that it would in-
terpret the ICCPR’s provision on equality between men and women as not infringing on
Bahrain’s interpretation of Islamic Shariah law. Id. Several states, including Estonia,
Ireland, and the Netherlands, filed statements expressing concern about the legality of
this reservation. U.N. Depositary Notification, Sept. 12, 2007, C.N.883.20007.TREATIES-
26 (objection by Estonia); U.N. Depositary Notification, Sept. 27, 2007, C.N.1020.2007.
TREATIES-41 (objection by Ireland); U.N. Depositary Notification, July 27, 2007,
C.N.8052007.TREATIES-11 (objection by the Netherlands).
444 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:435
The majority of U.N. Member States are also party to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).71 Yet there are more reservations to the ICESCR than to
the ICCPR,72 making it a less influential document. Consistent with
this trend, the United States (U.S.) Has signed the treaty but has not
ratified it;73 the U.S. views the ICESCR as encouraging desirable
social goals rather than guaranteeing fundamental human rights.74
Thus, although the ICESCR details guarantees that could be helpful
in promoting gender equality,75 it lacks sufficient teeth to be a signifi-
cant aid in mainstreaming gender in rule of law initiatives.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) is another important IHRL treaty, and it
has been “described as the international bill of rights for women.” 76
CEDAW represents the “apex standard for women’s rights,” and its
requirements should be implemented in domestic law by signatory
states.77 Under CEDAW, States Parties must incorporate gender
equality into all levels of domestic law from their constitutions down.78
If this requires reform, States Parties are to use “all appropriate
means . . . without delay” to bring their legal frameworks into com-
pliance.79 Where necessary, this will involve imposing sanctions for
gender discrimination,80 creating specialized public institutions,81
repealing or modifying contradictory laws,82 and suppressing human
trafficking and sexual exploitation.83
CEDAW’s Article 7 calls for political gender equality, requiring
that women be given the right to vote, be eligible for election, be able
71. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The treaty current has 160 parties. U.N. Treaty
Collection, Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=
4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter ICESCR Treaty Collection].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 377 (1990).
75. For example, Article 7 of the ICESCR mandates that there be “fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay
for equal work.” ICESCR, supra note 71, art. 7.
76. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 13.
77. Shelley Inglis et al., CEDAW and Security Council Resolution 1325: A Quick Guide,
U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, 5 (2006), available at http://www.unifem.org/resources/item
_detail.php?ProductID=104.
78. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 2(a).
79. Id. art. 2.
80. Id. art. 2(b).
81. Id. art. 2 (c).
82. Id. art. 2(f)-(g).
83. Id. art. 6.
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to participate in government policy-making, be allowed “[t]o hold
public office,” and be permitted “[t]o participate in non-governmental
organizations.” 84 Article 15 requires legal equality, mandating that
women and men be equal before the law, have the same “legal capac-
ity” (including contract and ownership rights), and have the same
right of movement.85 CEDAW also specifies that programs targeting
women’s inferior status with the goal of gender equality are not forms
of gender discrimination, so long as the programs end when gender
equality is achieved.86
Although 186 countries have signed or acceded to CEDAW,87
many have done so with reservations, limiting CEDAW’s effective-
ness in achieving gender equality.88 Reservations are largely based on
cultural and religious arguments.89 These are arguably contrary to
CEDAW’s language and purpose.90 Further, by the treaty’s text, such
reservations are invalid.91 Yet the U.N. and Member States, though
opposed to the reservations, lack legal mechanisms to adequately
address the conflict.92 Thus, when confronted with these reservations
based on cultural arguments,93 “the U.N. [has] tolerated a situation
where some countries would be treated as parties to a convention
whose substantive provisions they had professed their unwillingness
to abide by.” 94
B. U.N. Doctrine on Gender
The U.N. approach to gender issues has undergone several evolu-
tionary changes since the end of World War II. Until the early 1970s,
the U.N. approach limited women’s role in development to that of
84. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 7.
85. Id. art. 15.
86. Id. art. 4.
87. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter
CEDAW Treaty Collection].
88. Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s Reservation
Regime under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 605, 606 (2002) (“Of the United Nations’ human rights treaties, CEDAW has
attracted the greatest number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most,
if not all, of the terms of the treaty.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 627.
90. Id. at 628.
91. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 28(2).
92. Hilary Charlesworth, The Challenges of Human Rights Law for Religious
Traditions, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 401, 408-09 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn
Evans eds., 1999).
93. Id. at 408.
94. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 18 (citation omitted).
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“passive beneficiaries of aid,” while men were involved in the actual
program development and implementation.95 After International
Women’s Day in 1975, the U.N. adopted the women in development
movement, calling attention to social and political gender equality,
and incorporated women’s programs into development strategies.96
Despite the “women in development” movement’s successful drafting
of CEDAW, critics argued that separating women’s programs from
the rest of the U.N. development scheme marginalized gender issues.97
As a result, the U.N. adopted the gender in development approach,
which was built from a theory that a gender perspective should be
mainstreamed in development programming.98
1. Gender Mainstreaming
In 1993, the U.N. General Assembly issued the Vienna Declara-
tion and Programme of Action, stating that the goal of pursuing “[t]he
equal status of women and the human rights of women should be in-
tegrated into the mainstream of U.N. system-wide activity.” 99 Around
the same time, the U.N. drafted the Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women.100 According to the Declaration, states
should take concrete action to investigate and punish violence against
women, regardless of whether the violence occurs in the public or
private sphere.101 States also should develop comprehensive “pre-
ventive approaches,”102 including targeting social attitudes through
education initiatives.103
Following the emergence of these two strides in the U.N.’s
approach to gender issues there has been considerable uncertainty
about what “gender mainstreaming” means substantively. In 1997,
the Economic and Social Council issued agreed conclusions, explain-
ing that:
95. NADIA HIJAB & KRISTEN LEWIS, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, TRANSFORMING THE
MAINSTREAM: GENDER IN UNDP 4 (2003).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 5.
99. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
100. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (Feb. 23, 1994) [hereinafter DEVAW]. The Declaration’s definition of “violence
against women” is “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private
life.” Id. art. 1.
101. Id. art. 4(c).
102. Id. art. 4(f).
103. Id. art. 4(j).
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Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the
implications for women and men of any planned action, including
legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels . . .
in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and
men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.104
In other words, “gender mainstreaming” means addressing and con-
sidering gender roles at all stages of programming, with the aim of
achieving gender equality.105
After the U.N. issued the Vienna Declaration, most U.N. bodies
incorporated a gender mainstreaming goal into plans and mission
statements.106 Still, despite this widespread lip-service given to main-
streaming gender in programming, the discussion has been predomi-
nantly “without any mentioning of specific instruments, activities or
procedures.”107 Taking into account a gender perspective when exam-
ining issues in justice systems requires practitioners to collect gender
disaggregated data and undertake “sector-specific gender studies”
to find ways to close gaps between the rights of men and women.108 To
truly mainstream gender in international initiatives, international
bodies would have to employ gender experts and involve those ex-
perts in every aspect and level of programming.109 Yet U.N. bodies
and many national development agencies lack the gender expertise
necessary to effectively mainstream a gender approach in projects.110
Thus, mainstreaming gender is a difficult requirement to meet for
development agencies, both financially and practically.
Generally, the first step in mainstreaming gender is to assess
current gender roles and then discern the ways in which and the rea-
sons why women’s and men’s roles and needs are different.111 The
Council of Europe has outlined certain societal prerequisites for
104. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Jan. 23 & Feb. 4-7, 1997, Report of
the Economic and Social Council for 1997, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/52/3 (Sept. 18, 1997).
105. HIJAB & LEWIS, supra note 95, at 3.
106. United Nations Economic and Social Council, June 30-July 25, 1997, Coordination
of the Policies and Activities of the Specialized Agencies and Other Bodies of the United
Nations System: Mainstreaming the Gender Perspective into All Policies and Programmes
in the United Nations System, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/1997/66 (June 12, 1997).
107. Verloo, supra note 45, at 4.
108. Promoting Gender Equality, supra note 2, at 2.
109. See Vasuki Nesiah et al., Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies and
Procedures, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., 4, 10 (2006), available at http://www.ictj
.org/static/Gender/GendHandbook.eng.pdf (“Appointment and recruitment policy for com-
missioners and staff combine a search for professional expertise in a range of disciplines,
with long standing experience in the human rights community. In addition, some degree
of gender balance is usually a criterion.”).
110. Mehra & Gupta, supra note 46, at 5.
111. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, GENDER APPROACHES IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT
SITUATIONS 9 (2001) [hereinafter GENDER APPROACHES].
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achieving true gender mainstreaming.112 These include: political
will to start mainstreaming; increased resources; gender segregated
data; gender training for civil servants; introduction of a gender
mainstreaming infrastructure; increased representation of women
in government; and openness in gender policy-making.113
C. Gender in the Modern Post-Conflict Situation
Many argue that conditions for women in wartime situations
have worsened in the modern era, despite the prevalence of human
rights documents and advances in international criminal law.114 This
may be true: in blatant disregard of international humanitarian law,115
civilian populations are often primary targets in modern conflicts.116
In addition to suffering the same forms of violence as male civil-
ians,117 female civilians are also the primary target of GBV.118 Evi-
dence further suggests that women and female children are often
killed in sexualized ways,119 adding to the amount of gender-related
violence in conflicts. GBV is an increasingly visible and acknowledged
aspect of conflict. In many conflicts, it is used as a war tactic against
enemy civilian populations.120 This suggests that international law
should develop a stronger stance on gender inequality in the face of
abhorrent modern conflict realities.
In recent years, jurisprudence from the various international
criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court (ICC),
demonstrates that GBV is considered a “grave breach” under the
Fourth Geneva Convention.121 In the ICC’s statute, persecution based
on the discriminatory ground of gender is listed as a crime against
humanity.122 In the Akayesu Judgment,123 the International Criminal
112. Verloo, supra note 45, at 5.
113. Id.
114. E.g., Askin, supra note 63, at 297.
115. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (stating that “[p]ersons taking
no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”).
116. See Askin, supra note 63, at 297 (noting how civilian populations are “the greatest
casualties of” warfare).
117. Id. (starvation, torture, and murder).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 298.
120. Id. at 297-98 (discussing the Japanese’s use of over 200,000 “comfort women” (sex
slaves) during World War II).
121. Id. at 310.
122. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(h), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
123. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
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Tribunal for Rwanda found that rape and GBV may constitute geno-
cide124 when “used as instruments of genocide.”125 The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) placed emphasis
on gender issues in the Celebici case.126 In that case, the ICTY held
that sexual violence can be prosecuted as torture, finding that such
violence involves an element of gender discrimination because men
and women are often tortured differently based on their sex, as in the
case of rape.127 Thus, sexual violence often satisfies the “purpose”
element of torture.128 The ICTY has also held that rape involving a
single victim can constitute a serious violation of international law.129
Nevertheless, despite the strengthened international response to
gender-related crimes, “[a] disturbing tendency persists . . . to de-
mand something ‘extra’ before” gender-related crimes will become an
international concern.130
The number and magnitude of gender-based human rights vio-
lations during conflicts is overwhelming, and the majority of these
violations are not redressed in international criminal tribunals.131
Strong, long-lasting national responses to gender-related crimes are
necessary to promote gender equality and close the gap left by inter-
national mechanisms. International law regarding gender issues sets
clear standards that can protect women’s rights and promote gender
equality if states comply.132 Clear standards make non-conformity
easily recognizable, and thus increase pressure on states to reform
their legal frameworks.133 As a result, the international legal frame-
work that must be incorporated into rule of law-based reforms already
exists for gender issues. What remains is for rule of law initiatives
to mainstream gender issues by bringing these legal standards into
the central push of rule of law-based reform.
124. Id. ¶ 731.
125. Askin, supra note 63, at 318.
126. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 16, 1998).
127. Id. ¶ 941.
128. Id.
129. Askin, supra note 63, at 327, 332 (discussing The Furundzija Judgment, Prosecutor
v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia,
Dec. 10, 1998)).
130. Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of
Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 87, 102 (1999).
131. Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 520 (2003) (“Despite its insidious prevalence during armed conflict,
even the most notorious or egregious cases of sexual violence are typically committed with
absolute impunity.”).
132. See Hajjar, supra note 12, at 13-14 (“More than any previous initiative, the Beijing
platform articulates a clear set of factors that perpetuate domestic violence, all of which
governments are expected to remedy.”).
133. Id. at 14.
450 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:435
II. FEMINISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Feminist legal literature offers scathing criticism of the rule of
law principle and initiatives. The argument is that the rule of law’s
“jurisprudential preoccupation with the duty to obey law and the
authority of law overlook[s] law’s tendency to validate and facilitate
oppression and violence.”134 Feminist scholars contend that this lack
of concern with the actual substance of law makes rule of law-based
initiatives “compatible with gross violations of human rights.”135
This argument, however, may not fully acknowledge the rule of law
requirement that legal frameworks be compatible with international
human rights standards,136 necessarily including those that promote
gender equality.
Feminist scholars view the rule of law as counterproductive for
gender issues because rule of law initiatives emphasize a division of
public and private spheres.137 Furthermore, rule of law programs pro-
mote autonomy and formalism, “entrench[ing] the invisibility of the
private sphere,”138 which perpetuates impunity for gender-related
crimes and restricts women’s opportunities. One reason this happens
is because, during the reform process, domestic and international
development professionals often “hearken back to the security offered
by established cultural practices as a way of reinventing and secur-
ing the new order.”139 Feminist legal scholars argue that legal sys-
tems the world over are inherently patriarchal.140 Thus, drawing from
underlying legal traditions to encourage new beginnings in the public
legal sphere may effectively ensconce gender inequality in the un-
touchable private sphere.141 As such, rule of law reforms can have
the unintended consequence of cementing developing states in a
system that does not promote gender equality.
A. Criticism of Feminist Criticism
Although feminist literature offers helpful insights for main-
streaming a gender perspective, elements of feminist theory can be
134. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 383
(1991) (internal citation omitted).
135. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 221 (1979).
136. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 64.
137. Fionnuala D. Ni Aoláin & Michael Hamilton, Gender and the Rule of Law in
Transitional Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 380, 387-88 (2009). So, “rule of law-infused
transitions can arguably sustain, without contradiction, persistent discrimination against
women, systematic and normalized private violence, and immovable barriers to equality
in the public sphere.” Id. at 385.
138. Id. at 386.
139. Id. at 389.
140. Id. at 399-400.
141. Id. at 388.
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in opposition to incorporating the domestic culture into reforms.142
Feminist scholars tend to adhere to the principle of “New Sovereignty,”
which views culture and religion as unchangeable, subsequently creat-
ing an inherent incompatibility between women’s rights and cultural-
religious norms.143 Because cultural arguments are so often invoked
to oppose gender equality, the feminist perspective is particularly rele-
vant. Some female scholars, often those from non-Western cultures,
do not subscribe to the concepts of “New Sovereignty,” arguing in-
stead that culture is changeable and often is the subject of heated
debate within the community in question.144 The view that culture
and, particularly, religion cannot be shaped or even touched by re-
form movements gives legitimacy and power to patriarchal arguments,
effectively silencing progressive voices within the community.145 In
other words, the cultural status quo becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy:
because current dominant cultural views are accepted as is, and as
unchangeable, those views gain the power to become just that: static.
Traditional feminist legal literature tends not to incorporate cul-
tural differences and views. For example, while feminists strive to
empower women by freeing them from imposed identities, feminists
also paradoxically impose an atheist identity “by not accepting that
people have a right to be religious.”146 Feminists tend to look at the
women’s rights movement through a Western-values lens, lauding the
“affirmation of rights and universality” and characterizing cultural
deviations from Western views as compromises, or as “nostalgic, self-
defensive, and ‘disingenuous.’ ”147 The only sign of “success” for femi-
nist scholars is the wholesale importation of Western values to re-
place domestic values.148 This method of evaluating the success of
reform in non-Western societies based on the degree of “transplant”
has been criticized as unworkable in other aspects of development.149
One reason Western feminists may have difficulty accepting
approaches to gender equality in non-Western cultures is because
these schools of thought see “duties as primary, and . . . recognize
rights only as a consequence of duty fulfilled.”150 De-emphasizing
142. Deer, supra note 15, at 135.
143. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1409 (“New Sovereignty [is] the increasing use of law to
protect and preserve cultural stasis and hierarchy against the challenges to cultural and
religious authority emerging on the ground.”).
144. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1402-03.
145. Id. at 1403.
146. Id. at 1453 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
147. Id. at 1460 (citation omitted).
148. Id. (internal citations omitted). Sunder describes how societies in which different
values remain are considered “failed ‘legal transplants.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).
149. Berkowitz et al., supra note 29, at 164-65 (discussing how the results of such
transplants “have been mixed”).
150. Engle, supra note 54, at 238 (citation omitted).
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the individual woman’s rights and emphasizing men’s duty to ensure
women’s rights may seem incompatible with feminism because, under
this approach, women’s rights appear dependent on men’s benevo-
lence. In cultures where the fulfillment of duties is emphasized, how-
ever, the distinction may not be as significant. In fact, it may make the
call for women’s rights stronger. By framing the issue as one of duties,
the non-Western culture in question may also find gender equality less
threatening to integral cultural values that emphasize the importance
of “community.” The end result would be gender equality.
To overcome the problems posed by “New Sovereignty,” rule of
law practitioners must undertake thorough studies of domestic culture
and religion to discern “that part of religion that is a human or legal
construction and thus requires justification and accountability.”151
In the past, interpretations of culture and religion have changed,
and these areas continue to be challenged and altered today.152 True
gender “equality requires equality not just in the public sphere, but
also within the contexts of the communities that are important to
people.”153 It is thus especially pertinent for a rule of law program
to identify areas in religion and culture, in addition to in the public
sphere, where women in the society are demanding equality.154 This
approach slightly alters the feminist perspective on the private sphere
because it emphasizes the importance of working within the commu-
nity and adapting to the cultural norms found therein to create equal-
ity within the private sphere.
To do this, gender-mainstreamed rule of law initiatives in non-
Western cultures must not impose Western ideas of gender equality
wholesale, but must instead “giv[e] women the tool[s] to be able to
say that women’s rights are part of [their] own culture.”155 In essence,
people in all cultures should be allowed to disagree with current views
of religion and culture, while still belonging fully to their religious
and cultural communities.156
In many post-conflict and developing states, law reform initia-
tives pursuing gender equality, especially within family structures,
become fixated on the function and influence of customary and reli-
gious law.157 Compatibility with culture and religion is an important
151. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1404.
152. Id. at 1402-03.
153. Id. at 1409.
154. Id. at 1433.
155. Id. at 1438 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
156. Farida Shaheed, The Other Side of the Discourse: Women’s Experiences of Identity,
Religion and Activism in Pakistan, in SHAPING WOMEN’S LIVES: LAWS, PRACTICES AND
STRATEGIES IN PAKISTAN 415, 442 (Farida Shaheed et al. eds., 1998).
157. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 4.
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factor for ownership and social acceptance of reform programs.158 In
dealing with religious and cultural issues in law reform initiatives,
however, the religious status quo should not simply be accepted.
Instead, law reform initiatives must take into account the fact that
culture is dynamic and work within the community to counter self-
interested arguments made by those in power under the guise of
preserving “tradition.”159
III. NATIONAL AND LOCAL FACTORS—MAKING RULE OF LAW
INITIATIVES STICK
The rule of law is not tied to a specific political or legal tradition,
so it is perceived as a universal concept, applicable to varied con-
texts.160 This has been an important factor in the popularity of rule
of law-based reforms around the globe.161 One of the key factors in
creating a viable rule of law initiative is adapting rule of law re-
forms to fit the country’s specific legal and cultural traditions.162
Although most international organizations promote incorporating
cultural perspectives into their programming, they rarely define
means to achieve this goal.163 Without a clear strategy, rule of law
programs fail to apply reforms to the specific state’s unique historical
and legal background.164
Gender mainstreaming in rule of law programs requires much
attention during the planning phases because gender roles are so
deeply rooted in tradition and culture.165 Discussions about altering
gender roles within a culture are often interpreted as an attempt to
undermine a society’s core values.166 Proposed changes to promote gen-
der equality seem “more foreign and alien” than other reforms and
are more likely to “provoke or exacerbate anxieties about cultural
158. Id.
159. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1467.
160. Carothers, supra note 9, at 99.
161. Id.
162. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 66.
163. See Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and
Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659, 681-82 (2007) (summarizing study’s
finding that though culture and governance are complexly linked, reform strategies are
still not defined, nor are they easy to define).
164. See John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 429, 464 (2003) (“[M]ost [exports] appear to have failed in some significant sense
because the resultant law is contradictory, unclear, or ineffective, or because the foreign
model was simply rejected . . . .”).
165. Stopler, supra note 4, at 173.
166. See Hajjar, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that many developing countries criticize
IHRL’s “Western” views of individualism, arguing that it is not harmonious with
development nations’ collectivist societal viewpoints).
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imperialism.”167 In order to address these concerns, arguments and
reforms to promote gender mainstreaming goals must be phrased in
culturally relevant terms. This is no easy task. The relationship
between gender and culture is complex. Without a thorough under-
standing of domestic culture and a detailed strategy for reform,
gender-mainstreamed programs will not be able to address the height-
ened resistance that reforms may face. Thus, the first priority for gen-
der mainstreaming must be a thorough study of domestic culture.
A. Understanding Culture as a Development Resource
Culture is a complex entity168 that forms the foundation of soci-
eties.169 Many societies and individuals view culture as both unchang-
ing and unchangeable.170 History has demonstrated, however, that
culture is a human construct in a constant state of evolution and
adaptation.171 Cultural shifts generally occur over generations,172
spurred by “actual circumstances [and implicit cues] more than [by]
formal reform and indoctrination.”173 Understanding culture as a
changing human construct is necessary for gender mainstreaming
in rule of law programs. Instead of viewing cultural resistance to
gender-mainstreamed rule of law-based reforms as an insurmount-
able obstacle, programs must make culturally relevant arguments
to encourage development toward gender equality.
An illustrative example of a past cultural shift is the develop-
ment of global condemnation of slavery. Before 1807, pockets of civil
society condemned slavery,174 but slavery was still a widely accepted
institution.175 In 1807, Britain abolished the slave trade within its
Empire and began a “crusade” to bring about abolition globally.176
167. Id. at 15.
168. Schalkwyk, supra note 14, at 1.
169. See World Conference on Cultural Policies, General Report, ¶¶ 29-31, July 26-
Aug. 6, 1982, U.N. Doc. CLT/MD1 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter General Report] (detailing the
ways in which culture and cultural concepts are important in all aspects of society).
170. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1402-03.
171. General Report, supra note 169, ¶ 34 (positing that cultural identity is not stagnant;
rather, it reflects historical and social values of the past, present, and future); Schalkwyk,
supra note 14, at 1 (“Societies and cultures are not static. They are living entities that
are continually being renewed and reshaped.”).
172. General Report, supra note 169, ¶ 34.
173. Licht et al., supra note 163, at 682.
174. Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred
Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393, 398 (2007) (discussing how “[b]y the mid-1700s,
French courts were holding that slavery could not exist in France”).
175. Id. (“Slavery and the slave trade were international phenomena in the early to
mid-nineteenth century.”).
176. Suzanne Miers, Slavery and the Slave Trade as International Issues 1890-1939,
19 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 16, 16 (1998).
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Pushed by international and domestic interest groups, the anti-
slavery shift culminated in the Slavery Convention of 1926.177 Today,
the prohibition of slavery is considered a jus cogens, an international
norm binding on all states.178 Similarly, in the international system
today, discrimination against an ethnic group based on a cultural
argument is unacceptable.179
International instruments take a relatively hard line by curtail-
ing the effects cultural differences have on treaty obligations. For ex-
ample, states party to the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women are not permitted to “invoke any custom, tradition
or religious consideration to avoid their obligations.”180 Similarly,
domestic law cannot eliminate a state’s treaty obligations,181 such as
those under CEDAW. Yet even though rationales for avoiding other
human rights obligations are widely disparaged, “women’s human
rights are being consistently undermined by claims of religious free-
dom and cultural exceptionalism.”182
The reason behind this discrepancy is uncertain. Some scholars
argue that gender issues are more controversial than other human
rights issues because of their direct relation to family structure, which
falls in the private sphere.183 Because gender roles are so funda-
mental, gender mainstreaming reform initiatives can be perceived as
a direct attack on the society’s cultural beliefs.184 As a result, “the dis-
advantages that women experience as women can be justified and de-
fended—even glorified—as an aspect of that particular culture.”185 The
more foundational a particular gender role seems to the society, the
more frequently and more vehemently that role tends to be glorified.186
177. Slavery Convention of 1926, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 2, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (“The High
Contracting Parties undertake . . . [t]o prevent and suppress the slave trade [and t]o
bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in
all its forms.”).
178. Roza Pati, Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in International
and Comparative Legal Perspective, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 260 (2005) (“[F]reedom
from slavery and servitude constitute[s a] jus cogens norm[].”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) (“A state violates international law if,
as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . slavery or slave
trade . . . .”).
179. Schalkwyk, supra note 14, at 5.
180. DEVAW, supra note 100, art. 4.
181. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
182. Sunder, supra note 6, at 1408 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
183. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 8-9.
184. Id. at 15; Schalkwyk, supra note 14, at 1.
185. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 15.
186. See id. (“[W]hen the promotion of women’s rights demands the revision or revo-
cation of local laws and changes in local practices, it often provokes efforts to resist globali-
zation and foreign influence by defending that which is (deemed) authentic and particular
to a given culture or society.”).
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At times, political leaders harness the sensitivity surrounding
gender issues to justify policies, or to divert attention from political
failures.187 These politicians frame gender equality and its supporters
as threats to society.188 Thus, the politicians’ resistance to gender
equality becomes “resistance to globalization and foreign influence,”189
and these individuals argue that they are “prioritizing other values
such as social stability and adherence to religion.”190 Gender main-
streaming in rule of law initiatives must call attention to the political
motives behind such statements and strive to design programming not
perceived as a plot “to overturn the cultural identity of the nation.”191
Instead, programming must aim to examine and address elements
within societies that impede gender equality.192
Another common argument made against gender equality is
that IHRL has a Western bias that makes it incompatible with non-
Western cultures.193 According to this school of thought, the Western
world played such an overwhelming role in developing the modern doc-
trine on human rights that the field will always be subject to “accusa-
tions of cultural imperialism.”194 Human rights universalists oppose
this argument,195 citing the number of non-Western signatory states
party to human rights treaties,196 as well as to a number of resolu-
tions issued by the U.N. General Assembly.197 According to univer-
salists, human rights are not reserved for men or Westerners alone.198
Instead, they serve as “means to a universally desired end” based on
the “common capacities, needs, desires, and an interest in prospering”
187. Id. at 31.
188. Id.
189. Andra Nahal Behrouz, Women’s Rebellion: Towards a New Understanding of
Domestic Violence in Islamic Law, 5 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 153, 164 (2007).
190. Id. (citation omitted).
191. Schalkwyk, supra note 14, at 2.
192. Id.
193. E.g., Engle, supra note 54, at 247.
194. Id. at 252.
195. Id. at 247-252.
196. For example, the Slavery Convention has ninety-nine states parties, including coun-
tries as diverse as Afghanistan, Egypt, and Niger. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the
Slavery Convention, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
_no=XVIII-2&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). The ICCPR has 166 states
parties. ICCPR Treaty Collection, supra note 68. CEDAW has 186 States Parties. CEDAW
Treaty Collection, supra note 87.
197. See Engle, supra note 54, at 229 (“Even the undemocratic are attracted to univer-
salist human rights ideals. Thus, in practice, international human rights norms, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are identified in hortatory declarations by the
U.N.” (internal citation omitted)).
198. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 5-6 (1980).
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of all humans.199 Viewing human rights as universal, intrinsic, and
basic, it is hard to formulate a logical argument for excluding women.
B. Encouraging Culture Shifts
The first step to implementing a cultural shift toward gender
equality is to understand current conditions and incorporate them into
each stage of programming.200 Cultural gender perspectives should
be comprised of both past views of gender roles and “contemporary
realities” within the community.201
Reform of Native American tribal rape law can serve as an illus-
trative analogous example of how legal reforms can bring traditional
gender views into conformity with IHRL. The Native American tribal
laws on GBV and rape were first written based on corresponding
Anglo-American laws.202 Unlike rape laws in individual state juris-
dictions, however, tribal laws did not undergo the reforms brought
about by American women’s rights movements.203 A parallel situation
is arguably seen across many developing countries.204 Current laws
are often reflections of laws instituted by colonial powers,205 and
these laws did not undergo the reforms prompted by women’s move-
ments in the developed world.206 This means that in both the Native
American and developing nation contexts, the modern legal frame-
work satisfies neither the local cultural camp nor the international
human rights camp.
Scholars involved in the reform of Native American tribal laws
argue that, to be successful in the long run, a contemporary cultural
perspective on gender issues should be based on both progressive
contemporary voices and the traditional, historic belief system.207
199. Engle, supra note 54, at 237.
200. See James Lang, Gender is Everyone’s Business: Programming with Men to Achieve
Gender Equality, OXFAM, 13 (2002) (listing understanding gender roles—and, particularly,
the roles of boys and men—as the first step in gender programming).
201. Deer, supra note 15, at 122.
202. Id. at 128.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Hans Joerg Albrecht et al., Building the Rule of Law in Haiti: New Laws
for a New Era, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 2 (2009) (noting that, despite being one of the world’s
poorest developing nations, Haiti’s laws are still based on the Napoleonic codes).
205. Id.; see Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 539 (1999)
(discussing colonial powers’ role in shaping the constitutions and institutions of nations
that had recently acquired independence from those same powers).
206. Cf. Gordon, supra note 205, at 575, 580 (discussing how, though the modernization
of the then-eight-year-old Republic of Somalian (which was once British Somalia) was the
goal, many traditional forms of social organization were still accepted, signaling “a lesser
commitment to confront gender inequality”) (citation omitted).
207. Cf. Deer, supra note 15, at 135 (recommending a similar approach for reforming
Native American tribal rape law).
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Where societies have jurisprudence based on a legal transplant, like
the Native American tribal nations and those in many post-conflict
countries, it is important to study cultural roots in order to deter-
mine the societies’ core views on gender roles and gender equality.
This requires in-depth studies of all resources available concerning
how gender roles were culturally understood prior to colonization.208
Building on an understanding of the traditional views of gender, re-
form initiatives can frame the contemporary issue and develop legal
means to address modern situations in ways that satisfy both cultural
and human rights demands.
C. Cultural Entry Points
The next step in incorporating cultural norms into IHRL is to
identify cultural entry points through which views on gender equal-
ity can be re-framed.209 In previous culture-shifting initiatives, such
as that involving slavery,210 “[c]hange . . . resul[ted] from deliberate
efforts to influence values through changes in the law or government
policy, often due to pressure from civil society.” 211
1. Community Leaders and Men
One significant entry point for culture shifting is through tra-
ditional community leaders.212 Community leaders have a special
capacity to pass on information and perspectives to the rest of the
community due to the trust and respect they command.213 Because
many societies are patriarchal, the traditional community leaders will
most likely be male.214 Gender mainstreamed rule of law-based initia-
tives should develop gender training sessions for community leaders
and invest more resources in engaging influential individuals. In post-
conflict or transitional settings, traditional leaders have often lost
legitimacy, particularly with younger generations.215 The turmoil of
208. See id. at 139 (stating that these studies should include “a rigorous examination
of [local] oral histories, anthropological and linguistic studies, and interviews with
[community] elders”).
209. Lang, supra note 200, at 14.
210. Miers, supra note 176, at 16.
211. Schalkwyk, supra note 14, at 2.
212. Lang, supra note 200, at 12.
213. Id. at 40; CLAUDIA GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL.,WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MULTI-
COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN’S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
SUMMARY REPORT OF INITIAL RESULTS ON PREVALENCE, HEALTH OUTCOMES, AND
WOMEN’S RESPONSES, 23, 26 (2005).
214. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 23.
215. Latigo, supra note 33, at 186.
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conflict can disrupt fundamental aspects of society, such as family and
community structure.216 For that reason, it is important that rule of
law-based initiatives take into account the position traditional leaders
occupied before the unrest, as well as those they occupy in the current
context, so as to create a program incorporating the complete picture.
Some claim that investing more resources in programs for men,
such as those aimed at aiding community leaders, is counter-produc-
tive to gender equality initiatives.217 This camp argues that such
programs for men perpetuate the superiority of male community
members and the segregation of men and women.218 Involving men,
however, is essential to gender mainstreaming219 because the central
goal of mainstreaming is to increase awareness of gender perspectives
in every aspect of development. In instituting programs involving
males in society, familiarity with the particular culture is an essen-
tial first step for formulating arguments in favor of gender equality
and for answering questions from the community.220
2. Education
Many development specialists promote education—both education
for the general public and formal education for children and adoles-
cents, especially for girls and women—as an entry point for gender
issues.221 Schooling for children and young adults comes at a time in
human development when the mind is open to learning new infor-
mation and ways of living.222 Thus, formal education is an important
platform for reframing male and female understandings of gender
roles and encouraging scrutiny of gender inequality.223 In fact, re-
search across societies has shown that women with higher levels of
education are less likely to be victims of GBV.224 Additionally, studies
have shown that societies with relatively higher levels of education
216. Id. (noting the effects that conflicts involving mass genocide, child abductions, or
other oppressive acts, such as high incidences of sexual violence, have on social norms,
particularly in small communities).
217. Lang, supra note 200, at 11.
218. Id. at 11, 28.
219. Id. at 11, 27-28.
220. Id. at 13-14.
221. Sarah Douglas, Gender Equality and Justice Programming: Equitable Access to
Justice for Women, 2 PRIMERS IN GENDER & DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 25 (Lance W.
Garner ed., 2007); GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 9, 22, 25.
222. See, e.g., Arathi Sriprakash, Child-Centred Education and the Promise of
Democratic Learning: Pedagogic Messages in Rural Indian Primary Schools, 30 INT’L J.
EDUC. DEV., 297, 302-03 (2010) (using examples to demonstrate that if children and young
adults are taught in the right way, they will retain the information).
223. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 22, 25.
224. Id. at 9.
460 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:435
tend to have fewer overall occurrences of GBV.225 Mainstreaming gen-
der in formal education need not necessarily involve a curriculum on
gender equality, although that strategy may prove effective with some
age groups.226 It can also involve basic education policy reform, such
as prohibiting the use of corporal punishment and imposing policies
that discipline students who engage in gender-discriminatory behav-
ior.227 Policies that address underlying gender inequality in the edu-
cation system can help foster an environment where boys and girls
feel equally safe.228 This, in turn, spreads awareness of these gender-
equality policies, which may then encourage change toward gender
equality in unrelated sectors.
The most common method of coordinating a public education cam-
paign is to create a committee, commission, or ministry dedicated to
the issue.229 Civil society groups can also be influential in formulat-
ing gender-mainstreamed curriculums and increasing awareness and
acceptance among community members.230 In public education cam-
paigns, the media can be very useful in altering cultural perceptions
of gender issues.231 Thus, civil society groups and the government
should utilize the media for advertising campaigns and other pro-
grams.232 The main focus of public awareness campaigns should be to
challenge the stigma attached to gender discussions.233 This, in turn,
will open channels to create “informal support networks” for those
suffering from gender inequality, such as battered women.234 Raising
awareness of different male perspectives is particularly useful because
it can break the stereotype that all men support gender inequality.235
Additionally, increasing exposure to alternate male perspectives on
gender can provide inroads to shifting male gender stereotypes so
that future generations do not reinforce gender inequality.236
225. See, e.g., id. (discussing the importance of education in curbing gender-based
violence).
226. “To be effective, programmes should begin early, involve both girls and boys
(although probably with different information and key messages, and with a balance of
single-sex and mixed-sex discussions) . . . .” Id. at 25.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination: Comparing
American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 355, 391-92 (2006).
230. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 27.
231. Id. at 23.
232. Id. at 23-24, 26; INT’L CTR. FOR CRIM. L. REFORM & CRIM. JUST. POL’Y, MODEL
STRATEGIES AND PRACTICAL MEASURES ON THE ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
IN THE FIELD OF CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL
STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL].
233. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 24.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 23-24.
236. Lang, supra note 200, at 30-31.
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3. Mass Media
Mass media itself—and the individuals who work within the
media—can also be highly influential in altering the dialogue on
gender issues.237 The media play a vastly influential role in “[t]he
perpetuation of negative or stereotyped images of women and men”
within a society.238 Imposing strict regulations on mass media to erad-
icate harmful gender stereotypes may, therefore, seem appealing,
but such censorship would not comport with “the right to freedom
of expression.” 239 This does not mean that media must be allowed to
function without any regulations or guidance. Governments and civil
society groups can encourage media editors to take steps toward gen-
der equality, such as banning sexist language and promoting gender
sensitivity in journalism, especially with regards to GBV.240 Addi-
tionally, groups can create “media watchdogs” and campaigns to call
attention to gender stereotypes in private media.241 As the infrastruc-
ture for mass media will have been damaged in many post-conflict
situations, it may be necessary to incorporate development strategies
that target to groups previously without access to media outlets.
D. Customary Justice Mechanisms
A controversial entry point for cultural shifts that holds a unique
place in legal culture is a society’s customary justice mechanism.242
In recent years, there has been a significant push in the development
community to incorporate customary justice mechanisms into legal
reforms as a way to make reforms more culturally relevant and “home
grown.” 243 It is widely accepted that a strong justice system needs
national ownership based on the population’s ability “to recapture
and develop [its] own approach[ ] to justice.” 244 Use of customary
237. Id. at 20 (describing how “work with men in the media . . . bring[s] men into the
public debate and show[s] men that it is acceptable to speak out on gender equality
issues”); Astrida Neimanis, Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: A Handbook, UNITED
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 153-54, available at http://www.undp.org/women/docs/RBEC
_GM_manual.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (“[T]he ethics of journalists themselves can
affect the perpetuation of negative gender stereotypes.”).
238. Neimanis, supra note 237, at 153.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 154; MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 95.
241. Neimanis, supra note 237, at 154.
242. Douglas, supra note 221, at 14.
243. Paul Blustein, The Right Aid Formula This Time Around?; Agencies’ New
‘Selectivity’ Policy Could Leave Neediest Nations out in the Cold, WASH. POST, Mar. 24,
2002, at A27 (noting the argument that forcing reforms, such as by introducing formal
court systems, does not adequately address developing nations’ corruption and gover-
nance issues).
244. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 51.
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justice mechanisms is seen as a remedy for the one-size-fits-all
approach to legal reform because it offers more culturally-legitimate
methods.245 The overall success of such initiatives, however, is un-
certain and contested, especially with regards to gender equality.246
One positive aspect of customary justice mechanisms is that
they can provide women with access to justice when formal justice
systems are off-limits due to cultural constraints.247 Additionally, vul-
nerable groups like women sometimes place more trust in customary
justice mechanisms because such mechanisms are more culturally
relevant and easier to understand.248
On the other hand, there are significant deficiencies in the ways
customary justice systems address gender issues, victim issues, and
the root causes of gender-based offenses.249 For example, it is widely
acknowledged that many customary justice mechanisms are domi-
nated by men.250 In addition, in many post-conflict and transitional
societies, a combination of formal and informal legal mechanisms is
adopted in an attempt to meet the society’s needs.251 Unfortunately,
this kind of pluralistic legal system can weaken gender equality ini-
tiatives because the resulting confusion “ ‘allows male-dominated
societies to resist women’s claims by vacillating between the two
systems and putting off, or neutralizing, any reforms.’ ” 252
Moreover, customary justice systems were not designed to deal
with large numbers of cases and may not, therefore, be capable of
addressing, and providing redress for, the widespread human rights
violations often seen in post-conflict societies.253 Still, customary
justice systems have, in some situations, proven to be vital tools. For
example, they can be used to address often-overlooked gender-related
aspects of post-conflict justice, such as refugee property disputes and
domestic violence claims.254
245. See Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca
Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 765 (2007) (“Hybridity
is an increasingly common theme in the study and practice of transitional justice and post-
conflict reconstruction. . . . The primary purpose of such hybridity is to facilitate holism. . . .
Holistic approaches cater to the various physical, psychological, and psychosocial needs of
individuals and groups during, as well as after conflict.”).
246. Douglas, supra note 221, at 14-15.
247. Id. at 15. For example, “customary justice mechanisms also provide women a space
for dispute resolution that is acceptable to men and therefore easier for women to access
than formal justice systems.” Id.
248. Id. at 14.
249. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 51.
250. Latigo, supra note 33, at 183.
251. Huyse, supra note 34, at 6.
252. Douglas, supra note 221, at 15 (citation omitted).
253. Nesiah et al., supra note 109, at 40.
254. Id. at 190.
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E. Accountability in a Post-Conflict Setting
In post-conflict situations, there is often discussion concerning
what form of accountability best serves the conflict victims, specifi-
cally those victims of gender-based crime.255 Gender inequality in the
law and in cultural views can severely limit women’s access to legal
remedies.256 While it is important to address gender-related crime
through official mechanisms, there are often practical difficulties in
addressing the level of gender-related crime in post-conflict societies.257
Truth commissions sometimes handle redress for GBV in post-
conflict states258 in order to fill the formal legal system’s capacity
gap.259 In these situations, steps must be taken to ensure that the
society does not dismiss GBV as a lesser form of crime because it is
addressed by an informal mechanism.260 In some post-conflict contexts,
the number of GBV cases has tempted leaders to lump similar cases
together.261 This diminishes the positive effects individual hearings
can have, such as challenging perceptions of GBV as a private matter
and “publicly affirm[ing] the value of each individual life.”262 Addition-
ally, “allowing women to testify in a privileged, officially sanctioned
space carries symbolic significance in marking state responsibility
for women’s experience of abuse.” 263 Thus, even when it is impos-
sible for the formal justice system to handle gender-related cases, it
is important that each case is officially addressed.
The international development community is coming to appreci-
ate the importance of understanding local historic, cultural, and legal
contexts.264 The process and best practices for accomplishing this
255. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 82.
256. Nesiah et al., supra note 109, at 35 (discussing the effect of gender discrimination
on women’s access to reparations).
257. Id. at 22-23 (describing the numerous evidentiary issues that arise when investi-
gating certain crimes, such as rape).
258. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 82.
259. Nesiah et al., supra note 109, at 40.
260. Id. at 8-9 (“Defining human rights victims in terms of harsh bodily injuries . . . may
not address the principal dimensions of women’s experiences of human rights abuses. In
fact . . . a focus on gross violations and harsh bodily injuries may even distort the stories
that commissions tell.”).
261. See id. at 26 (naming this joint presentation of cases “thematic hearings”).
262. Id. at 30.
263. Id.
264. See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457,
481 (1977).
The mainstream law and development movement, dominated by the American
legal style, was bound to fail and has failed. . . . Until we have tested, reliable
theory (i.e. tested and reliable vis-à-vis the target society), we will be more 
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important task, however, are not well understood. By studying the
interplay between culture and gender, and by mainstreaming gen-
der issues into rule of law-based reform initiatives, programs may
be able to make strides in the struggle to encourage national owner-
ship and development through adapting rule of law concepts to the
national context.
IV. GENDER AND THE RULE OF LAW: PUTTING THE
PIECES TOGETHER
Only when rule of law-based reforms fully take into account
cultural context can they take root. Many initiatives, however, are
instead based on the reform leaders’ view of an ideal outcome, which
inevitably reflects the system in place in these leaders’ countries of
origin.265 This is problematic because it leads to faulty assumptions
based on the belief that a certain ideal of the justice system existed
in the developing country when it may never have.266
Faulty assumptions based on this ideal’s underlying presence
can be disastrous for gender equality because such assumptions fos-
ter a tendency to overlook the legal system’s foundation as a barrier
to gender equality.267 In fact, the legal system can have deep-seated
“[s]tructures of inequality” that enable pervasive gender inequality.268
If these structures are not addressed in the initial stages of reform,
this can lead to a cycle of repression and inequality that becomes
very hard to alter.269 A significant entry point for breaking this cycle
is through reform of the criminal justice system.270 Reforms in this
area, if done with a mainstreamed gender approach, can have a
responsible and productive if we limit ourselves to third world law and devel-
opment inquiry. In this way we can begin to build theory of the sort that may
eventually provide a more satisfactory basis for third world action.).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
265. See id. at 479, 480 n.60 (discussing “[t]he tendency for proposed reforms to resemble
familiar U.S. models”).
266. Id. at 479; Klaus Decker et al., Law or Justice: Building Equitable Legal Institu-
tions, 7 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 33653, 2005).
267. Decker et al., supra note 266, at 3.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id. at 11-12.
270. Id. at 11. This is necessary because, for example:
Until recently, Morocco’s Penal Code provided that ‘murder, injury and
beating are excusable if they are committed by a husband on his wife’ when
caught in adultery. While a recent amendment succeeds in eliminating ex-
plicit discrimination against women by making the provision gender neutral,
it provides for such discrimination to be continued de facto, having in mind
that virtually all such killings are effectuated by men.
Id.
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widespread effect on gender equality as a whole. As such, fully main-
streaming a gender approach to rule of law reform in the justice sector
is instrumental in promoting gender equality.
A. Justice Sector Challenges
Rule of law initiatives in post-conflict settings often make criminal
justice reform a priority because of the need to establish and maintain
order in a tumultuous time.271 In the wake of a conflict, reformers of
the criminal justice system face the daunting task of dealing with
offenses committed during the conflict, in addition to those offenses
unrelated to the conflict.272 Gender issues arise in both categories
because women are particularly vulnerable to both conflict-related
violence and post-conflict abuse.273 One of the most significant gender-
related issues for the justice system is the treatment of GBV. Rule of
law programs can make significant progress towards gender equality
by focusing on GBV in justice sector reforms.
1. Gender-Based Violence
Gender-related crime, particularly GBV, is often overlooked or
ignored in post-conflict rule of law and justice reform.274 Yet research
has documented the pervasiveness and seriousness of GBV and its
effects on women in society.275 A World Health Organization (WHO)
study found that, in the ten countries studied, between fifteen and
seventy-one percent of women experience violence at the hands of an
intimate male partner.276
To attempt to combat this pandemic of violence, the international
community has framed GBV, especially violence against women, as
a human rights issue.277 Framing GBV as a human rights violation
is important because it emphasizes that GBV “reflects and rein-
forces women’s subordination, denying them the right to equality
271. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 38, 74. “Without public order, people will
never build confidence in the public security system and will seek security from other
entities like militias and warlords.” Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
272. Id. at 74, 82.
273. Askin, supra note 63, at 297.
274. Askin, supra note 131, at 512-13.
275. Nadia Hijab, Quick Entry Points to Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality
in Democratic Governance Clusters, 1 PRIMERS IN GENDER & DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
9 (Jessica Hughes ed., 2007); Valorie K. Vojdik, Conceptualizing Intimate Violence and
Gender Equality: A Comparative Approach, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 487 (2008).
276. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 1, 5. Even more alarming is the fact
that, at most of the sites studied, this range was 29 to 62 percent. Id. at 5.
277. Vojdik, supra note 275, at 491.
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and enjoyment of fundamental freedoms.” 278 When framed as a
human rights issue, GBV’s contribution to gender inequality in the
public and private spheres is thus brought to the forefront.279
Despite the international community’s strong stance on the
issue, criminal justice systems in many developing countries portray
a “reluctance to criminalize . . . and/or indifference to the issue of
[gender-based] violence.” 280 This is compounded by a general percep-
tion that intervention in a case of GBV violates “the sanctity of the
home” and interferes with “a private matter.” 281
Even in situations where GBV is criminalized and prosecuted,
less obvious issues can still perpetuate gender inequality. One issue
is the availability of legal defenses for defendants in homicide cases,
particularly the honor and provocation defenses. By invoking the
honor defense,282 the male defendant seeks to “equate[ ] a wife’s adul-
tery, or alleged adultery, with a physical act of aggression,” so as to
justify retaliation.283 
The honor defense is, by and large, not available to female de-
fendants to invoke against male victims.284 Similarly, the defense of
provocation is not applied equally to men and women.285 Generally,
a male’s provoking act must be more threatening and immediate for
a female homicide defendant’s act to be justified.286 As applied, the
provocation and honor defenses thus reinforce gender inequality be-
cause men successfully invoke them more frequently than women,
especially when they have killed their partners for acts that are non-
violent and physically non-threatening.287
278. Id. at 487.
279. Id. at 497.
280. GENDER APPROACHES, supra note 111, at 12.
281. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 27 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, “women who suffer rights abuses tend to do so in their own homes,
at the hands of family members.” Douglas, supra note 221, at 12.
282. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 33.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Brenda M. Baker, Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill, 11 CAN.
J.L. & JURIS. 193, 193 (1998); Cate Hemingway, Boxing Women: Regulation, Women and
Mental Health, 2 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 109, 125 (1995). Generally, the extreme emotional
distress brought about by legally-recognized provocation can reduce the severity of a
murder charge or constitute a defense. The more time that has passed between the act of
provocation and the homicide, the less likely the defense will be accepted, although “the
passage of time is not alone dispositive.” 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 106 (2008) (citing People v.
White, 590 N.E. 2d 236 (N.Y. 1992)).
286. Baker, supra note 285, at 194, 199 (juxtaposing domestic abuse suffered by females
with “the traditional favourites . . . held to extenuate male homicide, such as learning of a
wife’s infidelity or being exasperated by a screaming child”).
287. Id. at 194.
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Women who kill their partners more commonly invoke the doc-
trine of self-defense because circumstances rarely lend themselves
to a successful provocation defense.288 Even so, a woman’s claim of
self-defense is often less successful than the provocation defense in-
voked by male defendants.289 This is because self-defense generally
does not allow for a cool-down period, instead requiring that the indi-
vidual act in the presence of immediate danger.290 Yet research shows
that domestic violence often builds up over time.291 This means that
a female defendant may honestly have feared for her life at the hands
of her systematic aggressor at the time she acted, even if the precipi-
tating incident, considered alone, would not have caused a reasonable
person to fear for his or her life.292 Thus, although the availability of
these defenses may be equal on the law’s face, in practice, there is
disparate implementation based on the defendant’s sex.
Definitions of violence and abuse are subtle legal issues that
can have an important effect on the prevention of violence against
women.293 Gender specialists in the justice sector condemn defining
gender-based crimes as immoral acts linked to sexuality, as opposed
to violent physical crimes.294 Such a definition perpetuates the view
that rape and sexual violence are private, moral issues295 that the
justice system should not address. This definition may also lend it-
self to a stereotype of victims as “spoiled goods,” potentially deterring
victims from seeking remedies through the justice system.
288. Id. at 210-11. Self-defense is invoked by a defendant who felt it was necessary to
use force in order to protect himself or herself from imminent death or bodily harm,
State v. Robbins, 388 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ohio 1979), rather than to justify conduct that
resulted from extreme emotional distress. The definition of “imminent” tends to be re-
stricted to the moments before the crime was committed. E.g., Howard v. State, 1945 So.
857, 858 (Ala. 1940).
289. See Baker, supra note 285, at 195 (“[B]ecause self defence operates as a justification
but not as an excuse, and provocation historically has served as a partial excuse or miti-
gation for murder . . . provocation would make it possible for some such homicides to be
excused even if they were not considered to be justified.”).
290. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962). Alternatively, the Model Penal Code’s
definition of voluntary manslaughter, which is similar to the provocation defense, does not
require that the defendant have acted before having time to cool off after the “extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.” Id. § 210.3(1)(b). But see Baker, supra note 285, at 198
(discussing how “the historical development of the plea of provocation . . . emphasized the
need for the provoked action to be done . . . before the blood cools”).
291. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 33.
292. Cf. Baker, supra note 285, at 198 (explaining how, instead of reacting violently
after the first instance of domestic violence, some women wait to react because they have
been taught to suppress feelings of anger or because they are “socialized to be disinclined
to fight”).
293. See MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 8, 12 (discussing how
the way laws are written is a crucial aspect of providing women protection from violence).
294. Id. at 18-19; Stephens, supra note 130, at 93.
295. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 18.
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Additionally the way terms are defined affects the level of vio-
lence women experience: when states do not define sexual abuse as
a form of violence, they have an excuse not to prohibit and punish
such behavior.296 Importantly for the rule of law, when GBV is de-
fined as a violent crime, the numerous provisions in international law
concerning such crimes are applicable, providing further protection
for GBV victims.297
In addressing GBV in a rule of law initiative, it is important to
have a community-based, and “culturally-relevant,” perspective in
order to pinpoint problem areas and entry points.298 The WHO has
identified several factors that increase the risk of GBV, providing a
good starting point for developing a rule of law initiative.299 Among
these factors, the fact that girls and boys who experience or witness
violence in their homes are more likely to tolerate or commit GBV as
adults stands out.300 This observation reinforces the idea that culture
is a product of the environment and can be altered over time.301 By
reducing the number of children exposed to GBV in their youth, the
overall level of GBV in society can likely be reduced over time.
A GBV reduction plan should involve a campaign to disrupt soci-
etal tolerance of GBV. The campaign should make GBV more visi-
ble, emphasize its violent nature, and formulate “culturally relevant
arguments . . . to challenge laws, jurisprudence and ideologies that
construe [GBV] as vital to the greater good of society.” 302 To do this,
countries should be encouraged to adopt “zero-tolerance policies.” 303
To combat impunity, law enforcement and legal personnel should be
trained in handling gender crimes with sensitivity and efficiency.304
Other potential measures include creating harsher criminal penalties
for perpetrators of GBV, authorizing victim protective orders, and
criminalizing stalking and sexual harassment.305
B. Systemic Challenges
When organizations undertake rule of law-based justice sector
reforms, the focus is often on achieving a particular structure, rather
296. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 5.
297. Stephens, supra note 130, at 100, 108.
298. Deer, supra note 15, at 122.
299. GARCÍA-MORENO ET AL., supra note 213, at 7-8.
300. Id. at 8.
301. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the claim that culture is static is a mis-
conception).
302. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 15.
303. Douglas, supra note 221, at 27.
304. Hijab, supra note 275, at 22-24.
305. Goldscheid, supra note 229, at 388-89.
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than on how the legal system will interact with the cultural and polit-
ical structures within the domestic context.306 Although structure
plays a very important role in how the legal system serves its pur-
pose, it is only one of the factors determining success of reforms.307
Training is essential for addressing systemic challenges to gen-
der inequality in the criminal justice system. Lawyers and judges
should be educated in international standards on gender equality.308
Additionally, the judiciary should be trained on how international
standards should be incorporated when interpreting domestic law.309
Training programs for justice system professionals should be con-
ducted on all levels. For all, this training should include an historical
overview of gender and abuse patterns.310 For those working directly
with individuals facing gender-related justice issues, the training
should also include sensitivity training for dealing with abuse victims
and witnesses, processes for collecting data on gender-related crimes,
and procedures for writing reports with a gender perspective.311
1. Change Agents and Spoilers312
It is unrealistic to expect a uniform societal view on gender issues
and gender equality initiatives. There will always be factions within
every society supporting moves toward gender equality, as well as
factions opposing such progress.
A major group of spoilers of change will be those men and women
who believe gender equality is unrealistic because the two sexes are
inherently unequal.313 Another likely large group of spoilers will be
made up of men who feel “personally threatened by” a change in the
“status quo” of the gender-based power balance that had long worked
to their benefit.314 Government officials, law enforcement officers, and
306. Decker et al., supra note 266, at 2.
307. See id. at 1 (“[A] belief in the need for ‘the rule of law’ tells us little about what the
rule of law actually means . . . .”).
308. CAN. INT’L DEV. AGENCY, GENDER EQUALITY & LEGAL/JUSTICE INITIATIVES: IN
BRIEF 3 [hereinafter LEGAL/JUSTICE INITIATIVES], available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/
INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/Policy/$file/Ceelegal.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
309. Id.
310. Nesiah et al., supra note 109, at 12.
311. Id.
312. Change agents are those individuals and groups within the community with the
will and power to encourage successful reforms. See Fran Quigley, Growing Political Will
from the Grassroots: How Social Movement Principles Can Reverse the Dismal Legacy
of Rule of Law Interventions, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 58 (2009) (describing “agents
of change” as those “who have a driving will to reform” (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Spoilers are those within the community who perceive reform to be against their
interests and work to undermine the process. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 43.
313. HIJAB & LEWIS, supra note 95, at 5.
314. Id.
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other justice system workers may become another, more subtle, group
of spoilers if they condone gender inequality. This may be done un-
intentionally if, for example, officers assume women are at fault in
instances of GBV or that GBV is a private matter to be handled at
home rather than a crime to be addressed in the legal system.315
Several groups within society work against these opponents of
change. For example, human rights organizations and “watchdogs”
exist in most countries.316 These organizations are instrumental in
increasing awareness of international protections for human rights,
which in turn increases public awareness of violations and public
critique of governments.317 Those men within communities who sup-
port gender equality are effective proponents of change due to the
various positions they hold in societies.318
Local women’s rights groups have also made significant progress
in increasing gender equality discourse.319 This is especially impor-
tant in cultures where Western women’s rights organizations may
be unable to bridge the cultural divide. For example, Islamic feminist
scholars versed in the culture governing their societies, are in the
best position to provide insights about Islam and gender equality.320
Because they are able to make religiously relevant arguments to
promote their cause, these scholars can influence opinions in their
communities more than an outside organization would be able to.321
2. Constitutions and Legislation
Within a national legal framework, there are often “systemic
barriers” in place that prevent gender equality in the political struc-
ture.322 These barriers can thwart progress and require methodical,
direct attention to be mitigated.323 Commonly, the problem is ad-
dressed through constitutional and legislative study and reform.324
Because legislation plays such an important role in framing
gender issues nationwide, gender-mainstreamed rule of law-based
programs should “[r]eview . . . all legislation from a gender perspec-
tive” in the early stages of planning.325 This should involve a national
315. LEGAL/JUSTICE INITIATIVES, supra note 308, at 2.
316. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 3; Hijab, supra note 275, at 27.
317. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 6.
318. Lang, supra note 200, at 12.
319. Hijab, supra note 275, at 27.
320. Behrouz, supra note 189, at 165.
321. Id.
322. Neimanis, supra note 237, at 53.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 18.
325. Id. at 134.
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action plan including “a multifaceted review of” all levels of legislation
to determine which areas of the law “create special vulnerabilities
for women.” 326
Where legislation fails to promote gender equality, initiatives
should encourage domestic leaders to reform laws to conform to
international standards.327 Programs should also provide domestic
leaders with resources detailing legislative options to further em-
phasize the government’s dedication to gender equality, such as
“general anti-discrimination law[s],” “constitutional provision[s],”
“specific sex discrimination bills,” an “equal opportunities act,” and
“women’s rights laws.” 328
Many initiatives have promoted gender-neutral or gender-
blind legislation in an effort to promote equality under the law.329
Experience has shown, however, that a gender-neutral approach is
too unspecific to work against ingrained discrimination.330 Instead,
gender-conscious legislation specifically mandating equal treatment,
ensures that the legal system fully addresses gender issues and that
measures promoting gender equality are implemented as intended.331
Gender-conscious legislation can be instrumental in addressing in-
equalities in areas of law prone to gender discrimination, such as
property and family law, by addressing laws that are applied discrim-
inatorily.332 Properly implemented, gender-conscious language pro-
motes gender equality by making the discriminatory application of
laws a blatant violation.333
3. Access to Justice
Many factors within a legal framework can act as barriers to jus-
tice for women, perpetuating gender inequality. To address barriers
to justice, rule of law initiatives should ensure that areas in which
gender issues most often arise are addressed by the reform strategy.
Training should be a high priority because legal measures pro-
tecting against gender equality fail to have significant effect if legal
professionals lack knowledge about them.334 A significant number
326. MODEL STRATEGIES RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 232, at 11.
327. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 6.




332. Douglas, supra note 221, at 12.
333. Neimanis, supra note 237, at 132.
334. Douglas, supra note 221, at 24. Further, “[s]trengthening capacity of key partners
who draft, review and pass legislation is critical to ensure that gender equality is ade-
quately addressed.” Neimanis, supra note 237, at 134.
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of qualified female staff within justice institutions can also counter-
act barriers by making it less intimidating for women to bring com-
plaints.335 Because many gender-equality issues arise in family and
civil courts, rule of law initiatives should strive to fund adequately
those courts and train professionals.336
On an individual level, high illiteracy rates, especially among
women, can stifle the spread of information and perpetuate barriers
to justice.337 Further, when women lack the resources or time to par-
ticipate in justice processes, they are effectively denied access.338 In
a post-conflict context, the security risk for women is particularly
high, and fear of repercussions for participating in legal processes in-
hibits women, more often than men, from making use of the justice
system.339 Thus, programs must factor security needs into the design
of the justice system.340
4. Culture of Lawfulness
In many post-conflict countries, gender mainstreaming efforts in
the justice system clashes with impunity for gender-related crimes.341
Laws prohibiting GBV and other gender-related crimes may be ig-
nored because of “social and legal constructions of the family as pri-
vate and popular perceptions of male power . . . as normative.” 342
Thus, even in cases where there are laws prohibiting GBV, offenders
have “social impunity” because the laws are not enforced.343 In some
countries, applicable penal codes not only allow for impunity for GBV,
they also encourage it by creating categories of “honour crimes.” 344
Official criminalization, although important for combating impu-
nity, is only the first step.345 To promote a culture of lawfulness, the
law must be enforced. This is an area in which training and raising
awareness play a significant role. If leading social groups place
emphasis on the seriousness of gender-related offenses and dictate
responses, impunity can likely be overcome.346





340. Id. at 16.
341. Douglas, supra note 221, at 15-16.
342. Hajjar, supra note 12, at 4.
343. Id. at 3.
344. Hijab, supra note 275, at 22.
345. See Hajjar, supra note 12, at 9 n.9 (“[E]ven in countries where a criminal justice
approach has been adopted . . . if the state lacks legitimacy . . . victims are unlikely to
see the state as a source of relief and protection . . . .”).
346. See id. at 5 (discussing how “[t]he role of the state is particularly important to any
discussion of domestic violence because states are vested with the responsibility to prohibit
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Encouraging a state to enforce laws promoting gender equality
is a difficult task. Policies and practices regarding gender relations
are built on the state’s unique history, including any colonial roots,
conflicts, social integration, and economic development.347 Throughout
history, gender inequality may have played a role as a political tool.
Politically motivated positions on gender should be closely evaluated
and discouraged because they encourage impunity for gender-related
offenses. The laws drafted by post-conflict states should be tailored
to the context they will govern and should note the society’s actual
need for bringing about gender equality.
CONCLUSION
The international legal framework governing gender equality
is clear: states must provide citizens with equal rights and pro-
tections regardless of their sex. In practice, however, many states
fail to fulfill their international obligations.348 The U.N.’s gender-
mainstreaming approach is the international community’s response
to widespread gender inequality. The hope is that focusing on gender
issues in all stages of development initiatives will lead to solutions
for gender inequality.
Gender mainstreaming in rule of law-based reform initiatives
must overcome challenges on two fronts: the domestic cultural context
and practical implementation. First, rule of law reforms must be tai-
lored to the local context, meaning they must reflect the culture and
history. It is imperative that rule of law programs thoroughly take
into account gender roles within the local context and are able to craft
culturally relevant arguments to foster gender equality. When im-
plementing rule of law-based reforms, programs must mainstream
a gender perspective. Viewing the reform process through a gender
lens will ensure that reforms do not overlook structural elements that
prevent gender equality. By facing these issues head-on, rule of law-
based initiatives can develop programs that better address gender
issues and promote gender equality.
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In January 1998 the circumstances of a young man’s death in
Kumbungu, Ghana, were seen as unnatural,1 and an act of “bewitch-
ment was invoked to explain [his] death.” 2 “Three days later, about
eight masked vigilantes ‘avenged’ his death by bludgeoning and
stoning to death two women, aged 55 and 60 years old, on suspicion
that the pair were witches and had caused the man’s death by super-
natural means.” 3 
1. Mensah Adinkrah, Witchcraft Accusations and Female Homicide Victimization in
Contemporary Ghana, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 325, 343 (2004) (“In Ghana, as in
many modernizing societies, there is a common perception that death is unnatural unless
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Unfortunately, this same witchcraft belief system runs across
most of sub-Saharan Africa, such that “ ‘every evil and misfortune that
is incapable of rational explanation is attributed to witchcraft.’ ” 4
Most individuals branded and victimized as witches are women, 5
especially older women and widows.6 Furthermore, while believers
in witchcraft within sub-Saharan Africa do accept the fact that a
person has died of a certain illness, be it malaria or heart disease,
“which explains how the misfortune happened[,]—these cultures
[still] seek a metaphysical answer for why it occurred.” 7
This Note seeks to provide insight into the concept of witchcraft
and its legal implications for women, particularly older women, in
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Part I explores the foundation
for the belief in witchcraft and witchcraft’s place in and effect on the
social ordering within communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Part II
examines the clash of customary/traditional laws against state legal
systems, mostly common and civil law traditions. Witchcraft histori-
cally fell under the jurisdiction of customary/traditional legal systems,8
and, today, accused witches in sub-Saharan Africa have no specific
legal or human rights protections under most state constitutions.9 And
because there is not one universal law within sub-Saharan Africa
against witch hunts,10 this Note will evaluate whether any specific
4. Mohammed A. Diwan, Note, Conflict between State Legal Norms and Norms
Underlying Popular Beliefs: Witchcraft in Africa as a Case Study, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 351, 355 (2004) (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT
IN EAST AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA xvii (1977)).
5. Robert A. LeVine, Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community, in WITCHCRAFT
AND SORCERY IN EAST AFRICA 221, 225 (John Middleton & E.H. Winter eds., 1963).
6. Johann Hari, Witch Hunt: Africa’s Hidden War on Women, THE INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 12, 2009, http://independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/witch-hunt-africas-hidden-war
-on-women-1642907.html.
7. Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of Witchcraft Says
for the Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62, 74 (2003) (citing ISAK
ARNOLD NIEHAUS, WITCHCRAFT, POWER AND POLITICS: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LOWVELD 17 (1997) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with the University
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg library)).
8. See id. at 83 (describing how traditional courts punished witchcraft, mediated
conflicts involving accusations of witchcraft, and even provided remedies, including
compensation for individuals falsely accused of witchcraft).
9. Although the constitutions of some sub-Saharan countries such as Ghana and
South Africa offer general human rights protections, there are no specific provisions that
address witchcraft. E.g., GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 26(2) (1992) (prohibiting dehumanizing
or injurious customary practices but failing to mention witchcraft); S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
South Africa does, however, have domestic legislation to prevent false accusations of witch-
craft, which will be discussed infra, in Part II.D.
10. Although there is already legislation in countries like Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, and Gabon that prohibit the practice of witchcraft, such universal
legislation would be difficult because “[s]orcery in Africa is not a uniform belief[;] . . . it
cannot always be put into one box.” Rights: Child Witchcraft Allegations on the Rise,
IRIN NEWS (July 16, 2010), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=89858.
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State action is enough to protect these women, or whether specific
rights are being violated under state laws. Part III follows with an
analysis of various international treaties, principles, and norms and
explores international law and human rights standards that could
or should arguably protect this victimized class of women in contem-
porary sub-Saharan Africa.
In Part IV, the Note concludes by brainstorming suggestions
and potential methods to handle situations involving witchcraft accu-
sations. This is crucial, as the notion of witchcraft, as a basis of
discussion, is one of many traditional belief systems, yet is one that
adversely affect women within contemporary sub-Saharan Africa,
and which lacks clear legal remedies.11 These methods include utiliz-
ing the perspective of traditional laws, national legal systems, or a
combination of both. Additionally, Part IV will focus on the different
roles the international community can play in assisting these mar-
ginalized women. This Note concludes by analyzing whether an inter-
national solution, rather than a domestic grassroots approach, is the
more efficient method of protecting women without simultaneously
destroying the current integrated, customary/traditional, and state
legal systems of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
I. BACKGROUND: WITCHCRAFT AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A. Definition of “Witch” and “Witchcraft”
Certain ideas, such as evil spirits, sorcery, spell casting, magic,
and harmful curses, are all synonymous with the idea of witches or
witchcraft.12 A witch can be described as “a person with an incorrigi-
ble, conscious tendency to kill or disable others by magical means,”13
or as someone “who secretly uses supernatural power for nefarious
purposes.”14
Because of the varying beliefs and practices among the different
communities within sub-Saharan Africa, the definition of a witch or
witchcraft is not singular.15 Instead, because “[w]itchcraft is a vague
11. See HELPAGE INT’L, Discrimination against Older Women in Burkina Faso, 6
(2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/JointNGO
Report_BurkinaFaso47.pdf (“Customary laws perpetuating inequality and human rights
violations and the absence of clear legal and policy frameworks lead to the State’s inability
to enforce legislation such as the family and penal codes.”).
12. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 76.
13. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225.
14. Nelson Tebbe, Witchcraft and Statecraft: Liberal Democracy in Africa, 96 GEO.
L.J. 183, 190 (2007).
15. Id.
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and loose term defying exact definition,”16 “[e]ven within a single
community, beliefs [about witchcraft] are not typically organized
into a coherent system.”17 In spite of this wide range of viewpoints,
the concept of witchcraft typically does universally encompass “ ‘the
power to inflict injury and benefit . . . through unobservable, super-
natural means.’ ”18
One of the fundamental beliefs that many ethnic groups and
populations within sub-Saharan Africa share is the belief that “witch-
craft is not a faith that people openly profess”19 to practice; rather,
the issue only arises through others’ “accusation or suspicion.” 20
Secondly, witchcraft is viewed as a human, not divine, action,21 one
that results from supernatural happenings such as a pact with the
devil,22 or through other motivations, such as jealousy, hatred, or
revenge.23 In addition, witches are often accused of attacking neigh-
bors and intimates in order to further their own selfish interests or
“out of an inherent craving for causing harm.” 24
B. Witchcraft Accusations
Under common understandings of witchcraft in sub-Saharan
Africa, accused witches may be of any age or either sex, but women
are certainly the most common targets of witchcraft accusations.25
For example, among the Gusii people of south-eastern Kenya, “[a]
witch can be of either sex, but is much more likely to be a woman.”26
This imbalance reflects the belief that witchcraft “is an acquired
art . . . handed down from parent to child.” 27 Even though sons can
learn witchcraft,28 daughters are believed to inherit their mothers’
witch powers.29 According to the Lovendu people of South Africa,
16. Jemma Neville, No Country For Old Women: In Medieval Europe They Drowned
Suspected Witches. In South-East Africa Today, the Killers Use Machetes, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 22, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/journalismcompetition/old-women.
17. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 190.
18. Diwan, supra note 4, at 355 (quoting JENNIFER WINDER, BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAW 380 (2000)).
19. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 190.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 191.
22. Diwan, supra note 4, at 355.
23. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 191.
24. Id. at 191-92.
25. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
26. LeVine, supra note 5, at 225.
27. Id. at 228.
28. Id. Sons are less likely to accept their mothers’ witch training and can “avoid
becoming [a witch] by having as little contact as possible with [their] mother[s].” Id.
29. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
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these powers are inherited when “children drink in witchcraft with
their mother’s milk.” 30 As for the mother,
she will try to train her children in witchcraft, at first by sending
them to procure the exuviae of prospective victims. The daughters
of a witch are considered more likely to accept this training be-
cause girls are more obedient than boys and also because they
spend more tmie [sic] with their mothers.31
Also, among the Akans in Ghana, the belief that most witches
are female can be attributed to the fact that women “are considered
the weaker sex and [so are] more susceptible to be[ing] ‘carriers of
witchcraft.’ ” 32 Furthermore, persons who “learn witchcraft in adult-
hood from someone other than their parents are typically married
women,” who are educated by their mothers-in-law.33 Interestingly,
these same “women are more likely to be targets of accusations be-
cause of what is considered the typically poor and often jealous rela-
tionship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law,” who may
spitefully accuse each other of witchcraft as part of competition for
the son/husband figure.34
Often, those typically thought to be witches are middle-aged or
elderly individuals, particularly those who are in poor health.35 Of
these, elderly women are said to be more susceptible to accusations
because of their particular physical features, such as drooping breasts,
eyes that are yellow or red, wrinkled skin, missing teeth, and a
hunched stance.36 People who exhibit anti-social, difficult, or other-
wise odd behavior are also likely targets of witchcraft accusations.37
Additionally, as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, many women have outlived their children.38 With the loss
of the “so-called ghost generation of HIV/Aids,”39 these older women
are left to care for their orphaned grandchildren.40 Yet these grand-
mothers are increasingly viewed with suspicion by the community,41
30. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
31. LeVine, supra note 5, at 228.
32. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 335.
33. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
34. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 80.
35. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 336.
36. Id.
37. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 81. Living alone is deemed a form of anti-social behavior,
which may explain why older women are the primary targets of witchcraft accusations. Id.
38. Neville, supra note 16.
39. Id.
40. Id. (“Unicef estimates that 14% of all children in Tanzania are orphans, of whom
64% are cared for by grandparents.”).
41. Id.
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which makes them even more “vulnerable targets with which to
attribute blame for unforeseen problems.”42
C. How an Accusation of Witchcraft Operates
In sub-Saharan Africa, some of the common notions about
witchcraft are “that witches are nocturnal, traveling secretly, as
balls of fire, at night to remote locations where they cavort with
other witches and feast on unsuspecting relatives, causing physical
and psychological harm.” 43 In addition to being thought to operate
in groups, witches are also believed to carry out all of their evil deeds
while in spirit form, during which time their physical bodies are
still sleeping.44
Witches are described as deriving their powers either through
inheritance or by learning them from others.45 They are also believed
to use these powers to “cast spells, curse individuals, or use charms
or medicines, all of which ultimately cause harm.” 46 Through super-
natural powers, a witch, can, for example, manipulate evil spirits,
enter someone’s body, and force the individual to suffer symptoms of
a certain disease. According to traditional African beliefs, “[w]itches
can [also] use animals and lightning bolts to create accidents and in-
juries.”47 Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, ailments such as infertility
in women, the destruction of crops and property, accidents, sickness,
and even death can be attributed to acts of witchcraft.48
No one ever admits to being a witch; witchcraft accusations “are
based on mere suspicion, rumor, or gossip” that circulates within
the community.49 For example, in South Africa, when misfortunes
are experienced, traditional healers and diviners are often sought
to determine and explain whether the source of the misfortune was
witchcraft.50 The belief is that diviners can smell out a witch because
“witches carry a terrible smell that diviners can detect.” 51
Along this same line, in Ghana, when individuals believe they
may have been bewitched, they “may consult an oracle or witch
42. Id.
43. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 335.
44. Id.
45. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 76 (citations omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 76-77 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 76.
49. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 337.
50. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 78. Some fear they may have upset their ancestors, while
others believe their misfortunes have resulted from witchcraft. Id.
51. Id. at 79 (citing FREDERICK KAIGH, WITHCHCRAFT AND MAGIC OF AFRICA 40 (1947)).
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doctor, who, through divination, may establish, confirm or reveal the
identity of the offending witch.” 52 In many communities within sub-
Saharan Africa, “after a witchcraft accusation is leveled, the suspected
witch is threatened, drugged, beaten, forced to submit to humiliating
ordeals, or is coerced into confessing” to her supposed evil powers.53
In extreme cases, accused witches are even butchered to death be-
cause of an allegation of witchcraft.54
D. Statistics of Witchcraft Accusations in Sub-Saharan Africa
The ordeal of Sato Magdalena Ndela, a shrunken, elderly woman
from Kenya, is particularly poignant.55 Sato cannot remember when
she was called a witch for the first time, but she vividly recalls an
attack in 1995 that has forever left her scarred.56 As told to a reporter,
It happened in the night. I heard people opening the door without
knocking . . . . They shone a light in my face. I thought—what is
happening? What can I do? That was when I felt the first cut
into my body. I looked down and saw my hand was cut right off.
Then they cut into the right one and it was hanging. Then I felt
a blow against my head and I lost consciousness.57
Sato’s story is just one of many.58 The statistics regarding witch-
craft accusations leveled against women in sub-Saharan Africa are
grave. HelpAge International estimates that around 1,000 witchcraft-
related killings occur in Tanzania each year, and the victims are
mostly older women.59 In March 2009, Amnesty International reported
that as many as 300 people in Sintet village in The Gambia were
kidnaped from their homes by “witch doctors” and placed in deten-
tion centers, where they were “forced to drink hallucinogenic concoc-
tions” as part of a witch-hunting campaign.60 The report also indicates
52. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 337.
53. Id.
54. Hari, supra note 6.
55. Id.
56. Id. Sato’s “head is one long scar, and her ear is a twisted lump. Ever since the
attack in 1995, her right eye has been weeping salt tears and pus. . . . Now [she] can’t
do anything.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
58. Neville, supra note 16 (“Villages along the shores of Lake Victoria have en-
countered escalating numbers of murders: mostly older women, who have been accused
of witchcraft.”).
59. Id.
60. The Gambia: Hundreds Accused of “Witchcraft” and Poisoned in Government
Campaign, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press
-releases/gambia-hundreds-accused-%E2%80%9Cwitchcraft%E2%80%9D-and-poisoned
-government-campaign-20.
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that at least two people forced to drink the concoction died from
kidney failure.61
Another report has revealed that in Northern Ghana, 5,000 to
8,000 accused witches have been banished from their homes and
forced to live in shelters, where they endure “physically dehumaniz-
ing conditions.” 62 Many fear returning to their families for fear of
community reprisal.63 Across sub-Saharan Africa, similar situations
involving witchcraft accusations have been reported in countries such
as Cameroon, Botswana, Nigeria, and Mozambique, to name a few.64
E. Witchcraft and Its Effects on the Social Ordering Of
Communities Within Sub-Saharan Africa
The belief in witchcraft throughout sub-Saharan Africa cuts
across all social lines.65 It is a belief held by traditional and religious
groups66 as well as by urban and rural populations.67 For example,
even though many educated individuals within sub-Saharan Africa
may “not believe that witches have all the powers traditionally
ascribed to them,” they nevertheless believe in the notion of witch-
craft and that witches do exist.68
Some may argue that allegations of witchcraft and the subse-
quent punishment of suspected witches serve a social purpose.69 The
reasons cited include the notion that “witchcraft accusations bring
tensions within the community into the open . . . often allowing for
a traditional leader to mediate conflicts.” 70 It is also argued that the
threat of witchcraft accusations “curb antisocial behavior” and pro-
vide an incentive for people “to treat each other well.” 71 Even though
these may be legitimate arguments, witchcraft accusations not only
61. Id.
62. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 328.
63. Id.
64. Aleksandra Cimpric, Children Accused of Witchcraft: An Anthropological Study
of Contemporary Practices in Africa, U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, 12 (2010), available at
http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/wcaro_children-accused-of-witchcraft-in-Africa.pdf.
65. See id. at 9 (“Contrary to a number of hypotheses . . . that were quick to predict
the decline or disappearance of . . . superstitious beliefs as a result of the rise of economic
development, urbanization, [and] education . . . witchcraft belief has not disappeared. It
is apparent as an unquestionable component of private and public life.”).
66. See id. at 37 (noting that in these communities, individuals look to both traditional
healers and religious pastors to heal “ ‘witchcraft-related’ illnesses”).
67. Id. at 9 (“[W]itchcraft is no longer a village affair.”).
68. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
69. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 82.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. Id.
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discriminate against women in sub-Saharan Africa, they also have
the effect of disenfranchising women within their communities. Not
only are accused women victimized by communal notions of witch-
craft, they are also treated as second-class citizens and face a myriad
of social problems within their communities as a result.72
Among those subjected to witchcraft accusations, most are elderly
and, almost always, widowed women with no personal income, and
so are dependent on others for their well being.73 Therefore, “[i]n
addition to facing physical abandonment and physical abuse, women
accused of being witches are often materially and financially neglected
by kin. The consequences of financial neglect are grave.”74 In addition,
not only will an accused lose honor and respect within her commu-
nity, this stigmatization may also lead to major emotional distress
and mental anguish.75
Witchcraft accusations levied against old women may also have
severe social and economic impacts on the crucial role of grandmothers
within the community. Socially, older women in African communi-
ties are viewed as a strong “learning institution” for the younger
generation.76 Thus, if these women are marginalized within their
communities, there may be no one to inspire the younger generations.
Another issue that arises with respect to the importance of grand-
mothers is based on an economic concern: who, besides grandmothers,
will look after the orphaned children of sub-Saharan Africa now that
the continent is losing a generation of parents to HIV/AIDS?77
II. THE “MULTI-FACETED” LEGAL STRUCTURE IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Though today “ ‘[l]aw’ in Africa is a multi-faceted concept,” this
was not always the case.78 Before its colonization, the foundation of
sub-Saharan Africa’s legal structure embodied a well-developed cus-
tomary law that governed the indigenous tribal and ethnic populations
72. See Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338 (noting that women accused of witchcraft lose




76. Judi Aubel, Grandmothers: A Learning Institution, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
1 (2005), available at http://www.beps.net/publications/GrandmothersFINALTAG.pdf.
77. AMY S. PATTERSON, THE AFRICAN STATE AND THE AIDS CRISIS 5 (2005) (“11
million African children under 15 years old . . . have lost at least one parent to AIDS.”);
Neville, supra note 16.
78. FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 13
(2005).
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“for whom custom was law.” 79 Though colonialism was somewhat
short-lived in many African countries, “[t]he significance of this brief
colonial history is that one of the results of the new political dispen-
sation was the imposition of a new legal system on the colonized coun-
try,” one that superseded the customary law.80
Still, “[t]here were of course regional variations [based on] differ-
ences in the approaches of the different colonisers.” 81 For example,
in most former British sub-Saharan colonies, the legal system reflects
the English common law system, whereas most former French colonies
follow the civil law system.82 Some countries in Southern Africa even
adopted, and continue to follow, the Roman-Dutch legal structure.83
Colonial independence in Africa brought about its own challenges,
especially with regard to choice of law.84 Whereas certain aspects of
customary law assimilated with the imposed European legal struc-
tures,85 a “romanticised notion of restoring [true] ‘customary law’ and
‘African culture’ to” independent Africa also created a legal enigma
with respect to the role customary beliefs should play in law.86 One
such customary belief is the notion of witchcraft,87 coupled with the
traditional perceptions and legal implications of one being an accused
witch. So, “punishing individuals who kill alleged witches creates a
conflict between state legal norms and norms underlying popular be-
liefs” because, culturally, the act of killing a witch is often praised.88
Due to this conflict, most African states have “stop[ped] short of
criminalizing popular beliefs in witchcraft,” despite the fact that
they “generally do not see witchcraft as legitimate.” 89
A. History of Legal Systems Within Sub-Saharan Africa
“In traditional African societies, custom [was] the principal, if
not the only, source of law.” 90 “Customary” or “traditional” law can
79. Julie A. Davies & Dominic N. Dagbanja, The Role and Future of Customary Tort
Law in Ghana: A Cross-cultural Perspective, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 303, 305
(2009).




84. Id. at 13, 19.
85. See Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 305-06 (describing the integration of the
received common law with the customary law in Anglophonic African countries).
86. BANDA, supra note 78, at 19.
87. Hence, “[i]n Africa, norms underlying beliefs in witchcraft pose a significant chal-
lenge to state legal norms underlying the new postcolonial normative orientation towards
modernization.” Diwan, supra note 4, at 358.
88. Id. at 354.
89. Id. at 352.
90. Justice Mobido Ocran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous
Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 467 (2006).
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be described as “a set of established norms, practices, and usages
derived from the lives of people,” 91 and it has thrived in sub-Saharan
Africa since the region was first populated.92 “The source of [customary
law’s] legal validity is the cultural expression of the particular soci-
ety where it is practiced.” 93 Customary law incorporates the “influ-
ential morals and religious beliefs of the people” 94 and “govern[s]
topics such as family law and social relations.” 95
Because customary law is comprised of the rules of customs and
beliefs of a particular group or community, it “is non-specialized [in]
that it does not distinguish between varying areas of law.” 96 For
example, customary law is known to “blur[ ] the lines between civil
and criminal law.” 97 Perhaps because it is often unwritten,98 custom-
ary law is thought of as “living” entity that is “dynamic, adaptable,
flexible and practical.” 99 Yet, although “devoid of rigidity,”100 cus-
tomary law is also used to impose and maintain social order and
harmony in the community.101 This may be explained, in part, by the
fact that customary law raises the collective interests of the com-
munity above individuals’ personal rights.102
Traditional leaders have long played an instrumental role in
customary law. For instance, in some pre-colonial African societies,
the procedure for determining whether someone was a witch started
with an alleged victim approaching a traditional leader with a com-
plaint of having suffered some harm as a result of witchcraft.103 The
traditional leader then looked into the allegation to determine whether
it was legitimate or whether it instead involved another underlying
issue.104 If the accused was believed to have used witchcraft, the indi-
vidual was handed over to a “diviner” for subsequent identification as
a “witch,”105 and, if found to be a witch after a trial was conducted, the
community leader would punish the individual.106 On the other hand,
91. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ocran, supra note 90, at 467.
95. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303.
96. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 70 (citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. Ocran, supra note 90, at 467.
99. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 72 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
100. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
101. Id. at 66, 70 (noting how the focus of customary law is on helping parties reconcile
their differences, rather than on having one party win and the other lose).
102. Id. at 70.
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id.
105. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 84.
106. Id. at 85-86.
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if the leader determined that the dispute was not related to witch-
craft, he mediated the parties’ dispute to find a solution.107 There-
fore, even though this system had flaws, it also had within it certain
ascribed procedural mechanisms designed to protect against abuse.108
After colonization, although indigenous Africans were some-
times allowed to retain their personal customary laws in the private
sphere,109  “the foreign law became the general law.”110 Still, customary
law was only accepted to a certain extent:111 the particular “aspects
of African customs that European culture found most appalling, ridic-
ulous, or simply unhelpful” were declared repugnant pursuant to
“repugnancy clauses,”112 which were then incorporated into the cus-
tomary law definition.113 As such, not all customs were tolerated by
the colonial legal system, and the customary rules and traditions
not consistent with written laws were deemed invalid.114
The belief in and notion of witchcraft was one such aspect of
customary law found to be repugnant to European culture.115 In par-
ticular, “the question of proof ” of witchcraft under the customary
system was problematic for the colonial jurists.116 Apart from the
question of proving how one was a witch, another problem presented
by witchcraft accusations was how to determine the legal options
available to the victim or the victim’s family.117 For example: “[w]as
it appropriate, or legally excusable, to kill someone believed to be a
witch? More particularly, was it legally excusable to kill a witch in an
anticipatory strike, in the manner of self defense?”118 Certainly
there were no clear answers, so the colonizers sought instead to elim-
inate the notion of witchcraft within the customary-law prong of sub-
Saharan Africa’s newly developed dualist legal system through the
creation of repugnancy clauses.119 Yet because the belief in witchcraft
107. Id. at 84
108. Id.
109. BANDA, supra note 78, at 16.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Ocran, supra note 90, at 470.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 475. “The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs per-
ceived to be against Christian values and morality or cruel and unusual by the standards
of the colonizers.” Id. (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 470 (“Two things particularly baffled the British. One was the crime of
suicide, and the other was witchcraft.”).
116. Ocran, supra note 90, at 472.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 474-75 (“In the face of this clash of cultures and of legal thought, what were
the British to do in Africa? . . . The legal strategy was to introduce ‘repugnancy clauses’ into
the definition of customary law.”).
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was still prevalent within the community,120 these clauses ironically
had the effect of eliminating the procedural protections for accused
witches that were in place under customary law.
B. Sources of Law Within Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa
“The coming of independence to African countries, from Ghana
in 1957 to South Africa in 1994, brought about its own dilemmas,”
igniting a very romanticized idea of bringing traditional law and
culture back to Africa.121 In certain aspects, a conflict-of-laws had
been created because, as with the dualist court systems of the past,122
independent sub-Saharan Africa emerged with a system that inte-
grated customary law with the State legal systems implemented
during colonization.123
Notably, “[t]he customary law invoked in post-independent
states was not the flexible, dynamic custom of pre-colonial years,
but rather the court/state/man manufactured hand-me-down of the
colonial era,”124 just with modifications of colonial repugnancy clauses
in some countries.125 In countries like Botswana, Ghana, and Sierra
Leone, for example, “[i]ncompatibility with legislative enactments or
of decisions of the highest court of the land became the main criteria
for” determining whether customary law was viewed as unacceptable
or permissible within these new legal systems.126 Consequently, “[a]
hierarchy of norms had been created” whereby the rules of customary
law that conflicted with state court decisions were struck down.127
This jurisprudential hierarchy is present in Ghana’s constitu-
tion,128 which states its sources of law as the following: “The laws of
Ghana shall comprise—(a) this Constitution; (b) enactments made
by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this
Constitution; (c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any
120. See Diwan, supra note 4, at 357 (discussing how beliefs in the existence of
witchcraft remain prominent in Africa today).
121. BANDA, supra note 78, at 19.
122. See Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 305-06 (describing the dual court
system established by the British, whereby courts applying “general law” existed sepa-
rately from local courts, which administered customary law).
123. See id. at 306 (noting that the constitutions of many post-independence
“Anglophonic African countries” have integrated statutes with common law decisions
and customary law).
124. BANDA, supra note 78, at 22,
125. Ocran, supra note 90, at 477. “[T]he African intellectual elite . . . felt insulted by
the notion that their own African laws were somehow repugnant. . . . They wished to
emphasize the fact that these laws represented their own ethos.” Id.
126. Id. at 477.
127. Id. at 478.
128. Id.
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person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution;
(d) the existing law; and (e) the common law.”129 Chapter Four of
Ghana’s Constitution further clarifies that the common law shall be
comprised of not only the rules of law “generally known as the com-
mon law,” but also of the rules of customary law “applicable to partic-
ular communities in Ghana.”130 In this way, the newly integrated
legal system in Ghana assimilates customary law into its common
law definition. Still, mandate that all parliamentary and judicial
decisions be held as the supreme law of the land, pursuant to their
State constitutions.131
The definition of “traditional leaders” under Chapter 12 of the
South African Constitution similarly recognizes customary law as
a source of South Africa’s domestic law.132 Section 211(3) of this
chapter states that “[t]he courts must apply customary law when that
law is applicable,” though such law is “subject to the Constitution and
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.”133 As
such, when dealing with the issue of witchcraft in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa, the question becomes whether the notion of
witchcraft falls under the ‘modern’ legal standard of customary law
as defined by the particular state constitution.134
C. Witchcraft: A Legal Enigma in Sub-Saharan Africa
Like most of the world, sub-Saharan Africa is absorbed in urban-
ization and globalization.135 Therefore, much of its law deals with
“modern legal issues.”136 Still, some concepts used in resolving these
legal issues have roots in the common law. For example, the concept
of “reasonableness,” which is significant in both civil and criminal
matters, has different meanings under common and civil law.137
129. GHANA CONST. ch. 4, arts. 11(1)(a)-(e) (1992); Ocran, supra note 90, at 479.
130. GHANA CONST. ch. 4, arts. 11(2)-(3) (1992).
131. Id. ch. 1, art. 1(2) (1992) This appears to mimic the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution and its role in establishing the hierarchy of law in the American legal
system. The text of the Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
132. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 12, § 211; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 68.
133. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 12, § 211.
134. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 92.
135. Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 303-04.
136. Id. at 304.
137. Diwan, supra note 4, at 377.
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Whereas under the common law, the issue of reasonableness asks
whether a defendant has acted in a way that was “[f]air, proper, or
moderate, or proper under the circumstances,”138 in civil law systems,
the question of reasonableness centers upon whether a defendant has
acted with “reasonable care” by exercising “the degree of care that a
prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business
or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”139
Therefore, in theory, because witchcraft is generally a common-
law offense, a trier-of-fact in a dispute involving the accusation of
witchcraft within sub-Saharan Africa should apply the customary
law’s understanding of reasonableness when deciding the case.140 The
question of what is considered ‘reasonable,’ however, may be an issue
in itself: should the standard of reasonableness be based on modern
beliefs about the legitimacy of witchcraft, on strong traditional com-
munity beliefs, or on a combination of both?141 A related issue is
whether it is reasonable for a court to convict an individual for witch-
craft when there is no observed link between the alleged witchcraft
and the harm suffered.142
Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to enforce and
criminalize accusations of witchcraft or the practice of witchcraft
through reference to legislative acts in place during colonial era.143
For instance, the Witchcraft Suppression Acts in South Africa and
Zimbabwe criminalize accusing another of being a witch.144 On the
other hand, Tanzania’s Witchcraft Ordinance criminalizes all aspects
of witchcraft, including “possess[ing] witchcraft materials.”145
In South Africa and Zimbabwe, accusations of witchcraft often
come to the courts “in the form of ‘imputations’ of witchcraft.”146
Though not referred to as such, the law essentially equates disputes
involving witchcraft accusations against innocent individuals as
138. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
139. Id. at 377-78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
140. See id. at 378 (“[I]n South Africa and Zimbabwe such imputations [of witchcraft]
are criminal and judges generally seem to apply a reasonableness standard in assessing
injury.”).
141. In South Africa, civil suits involving accusations of witchcraft are adjudicated
within the context of “the customary treatment of witchcraft,” whereas, in criminal cases,
witchcraft beliefs are treated “as wholly unreasonable.” Ludsin, supra note 7, at 91.
142. Id. at 89.
143. Diwan, supra note 4, at 352.
144. Id. at 352-53 (citing Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957, § 1(a) (amended
in 1997) (South Africa); Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890, § 3 (amended in 2001)
(Zimbabwe)).
145. Id. at 353 (citing Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928, § 4 (Tanzania) (amended in 1956)).
146. Id. at 356. Imputations are “something more than mere naming.” Id. (citation
omitted).
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defamation suits.147 Under the standard for proving wrongful impu-
tation of witchcraft, it must be “clear to the unbiased beholder that
the intention to attribute a certain [witch] characteristic exists in the
mind of the imputor which finds expression in some act or attitude”
of the accused.148 As such, the modern “judicial practice of punishing
individuals who [defame] alleged witches creates a conflict between”
the state legal system and strongly held traditional beliefs.149 Pun-
ishing these acts leads “many people [to] believe ‘that the law is in
collusion with the witches.’ ” 150 Arguably, “ ‘[a] law that fails to take
into account the social ethos of the community . . . remain[s] a dead
letter, incapable of inducing change.’ ”151 Witchcraft law that better
accounts for the beliefs of the general population, then, can perhaps
reconcile the conflict that exists between popular beliefs and state
legal norms.152
In contrast to those laws that criminalize imputing witchcraft
to another, Section 251 of the Cameroon Penal Code criminalizes
actual “witchcraft”:
Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination
liable to disturb public order or tranquility, or to harm another
in his person, property or substance, whether by taking a reward
or otherwise, shall be punished with imprisonment for from
two to ten years, and with a fine of five thousand to one hundred
thousand francs.153
Under the Cameroonian system, the question of proof in identi-
fying who is indeed a witch may lie almost conclusively with the
courts.154 By readily accepting at face value evidence from the commu-
nity regarding suspicions and accusations of witchcraft,155 the legal
systems in countries like Cameroon “have chosen to subordinate state
legal norms to norms underlying popular beliefs in local cultures.”156
147. Id. at 356-57 (“Imputations of witchcraft are essentially a type of defamation, and
they are criminalized in many African societies through legislation prohibiting acts of
witchcraft.”).
148. Id. at 356 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
149. Id. at 354.
150. Id. (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT IN EAST
AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 59 (1977)).
151. Id. at 353-54 (quoting ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT
IN EAST AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 104 (1977)).
152. Id. at 354.
153. Diwan, supra note 4, at 353 (citation omitted).
154. “When [a judge] is satisfied that a good case has been established, he will not
hesitate to convict the defendant . . . .” Id. at 368 (internal quotation mark and citation
omitted).
155. Id. (discussing a case in Cameroon where the judge relied on the sole testimony
of a witch doctor to determine the validity of a witchcraft accusation).
156. Id.
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Because African countries handle allegations of witchcraft differ-
ently, it is very difficult for witchcraft trials to always be compatible
with both the rule of law and customary law in the new ‘civilized’
African societies.157 For example, in adjudicating crimes that involve
witch-killing, the common law courts have adopted “the doctrines of
diminished capacity—including insanity, provocation, involuntary
reaction or emotion-induced diminished capacity”158 to deal with
“cultural beliefs they do not share.”159 Additionally, accusations of
witchcraft are often redressed civilly, through defamation lawsuits
or by seeking divorce.160 This disconnect between the newly adopted
“culture” and the customary law renders the system less effective.161
Thus, the current legal systems within sub-Saharan Africa do
not resolve the issues that the belief in witchcraft presents, but rather
create a new host of problems related to witchcraft accusations.162
It is therefore not surprising that, “[w]ithout the support and struc-
ture for handling witchcraft accusations . . . community members
[have] resorted to informal trials”163 and witch-killings,164 a phenom-
enon that has gravely and disproportionately affected women, as
women are those who most often become the victims when witchcraft
is suspected.165
Paradoxically, “the Witchcraft Suppression Act[s have] failed to
meet [their] primary goal of suppressing witchcraft . . . [yet also]
erased what may have been a potentially adequate mechanism for
controlling the manifestations of witchcraft belief .”166 African state
governments have thus failed at both curbing the notion of witch-
craft beliefs and providing sufficient relief for those accused of witch-
craft.167 As victims, women, especially older women, in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa, have fallen through the cracks of states’ legal
157. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 89.
158. Id. at 91.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Diwan, supra note 4, at 354.
162. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 87-88. For example, many scholars argue that witchcraft
legislation in South Africa undermined the legitimacy of the customary law and the
authoritative role of chiefs within the community, “block[ing] community members’ access
to justice.” Id. at 88. Furthermore, the belief that the laws were “ineffective” caused “people
[to] beg[i]n taking justice against witchcraft into their own hands. Id. at 87.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Hari, supra note 6.
165. Id.
166. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 109.
167. Ironically, “th[is] attempt[ ] by one legal system to suppress another in a legal
dualist society erased what may have been a potentially adequate mechanism for con-
trolling the manifestations of witchcraft belief and replaced it with a less fair, more
dangerous mechanism.” Id.
492 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:475
systems.168 Thus, the devastating realities that the belief in witchcraft
creates can be reframed as a human rights problem: the discrimina-
tion and marginalization of women within sub-Saharan Africa be-
cause of conflict between customary and state legal systems.169
III. WITCHCRAFT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Human Rights Question and Sub-Saharan Africa
Inasmuch as “[t]he universality of human rights norms is a cen-
tral tenet in human rights discourse,”170 it is argued “that there can be
no fully universal concept of human rights for it is necessary to take
into account the diverse cultures and political systems of the world.”171
Indeed, each of the more-than fifty countries in Africa is defined by
its own history, unique social, religious and cultural perspective, and
“distinct political econom[y].”172 Therefore, when the discussion turns
to articulating ‘universal’ human rights standards, it is important
to remember that “drawing sweeping conclusions for a continent as
diverse and complex as Africa may be an exercise in futility.”173
In evaluating human rights in the context of sub-Saharan Africa,
the concern of the individual and the protection of her liberty and fun-
damental rights against unwarranted state interferences presents
a different social question.174 Whereas, the “traditional conceptions
of human rights in the African context subsume the interests of the
individual to those of the community,”175 the broader human rights
perspective focuses more on the rights of the individual.176 Under an
African analysis of human rights, “the realization of such rights ex-
tend beyond individual concern and must be expanded to encom-
pass . . . family and community” obligations.177 Therefore, inasmuch
as the rights of the individual are important, the role the individual
168. Hari, supra note 6.
169. See HELPAGE INT’L, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that the underlying causes of
witchcraft accusations “are deeply rooted in cultural beliefs and gender and age based dis-
crimination”). Notably, customary laws and the lack of a clear legal framework perpetuate
human rights violations. Id. at 6.
170. Fareda Banda, Global Standards: Local Values, 17 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1, 3
(2003).
171. Id. at 4.(quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HOW WE USE IT 96-97 (1994)).
172. J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary
Africa: A New Dawn, or Retreating Horizons?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 40-41 (2000).
173. Id. at 41.
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plays in her community’s well-being is equally important.178 Thus,
“[t]o say to a[n African] woman that she has entitlements which may
bring her into conflict with the rights of others is to present her with
a seemingly intractable problem.”179
For example, one of the rights of women in many sub-Saharan
African countries, as recognized by many human rights instruments,
is that of equality, which “is based on a notion of sameness with
men—[that] women are to be made or put in the same position as
men.”180 Alongside this notion, however, exists the very unequal
status of African women within the African social structure.181 As
such, it is important to acknowledge that, even with the legal instru-
ments affording protection to women within sub-Saharan Africa,182
“the social, economic and cultural disadvantages suffered by African
women” have resulted in women maintaining a lower social status,
as compared to that of their male African counterparts.183 A woman
in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore viewed under traditional societal
norms as having a status inferior to that of men.184
In spite of the generally-accepted inferior role of women within
sub-Saharan Africa, many have written about the law’s usefulness to
women, and about the human rights protections that exist for women
within the law.185 For instance, under the bill of rights included in
various African state constitutions, there are well-established human
rights standards, which include various rights and protections—often
some specifically ascribed to women—that have been recognized as
human rights throughout the world.186
178. Banda, supra note 170, at 15 (“From an African woman’s perspective, one of the
problems of the whole human rights enterprise is the individualized nature of human
rights. Women in many parts see themselves and are identified as being part of a col-
lective.” (internal citation omitted)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
181. Id. Fareda Banda talks about the inferior status of women and “the socio-structural
inequalities of women,” as well as the cultural and economic disadvantages women face.
Id. (citation omitted).
182. See TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 127-28
(1999) (listing the various human rights protected by instruments that have been adopted
by African States such as Malawi and South Africa, including a right of non-discrimination
and to equal spousal rights).
183. Banda, supra note 170, at 8.
184. See Sylvia Tamale, Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Women’s Links to
Resources, 48 J. AFR. L. 50, 55 (2004) (arguing that social structures in Africa function to
“normalize gender inequality” such that “[m]ale domination as the status quo is constantly
defended and protected”).
185. See BANDA, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing the evolution of norms relating to the
human rights of women).
186. MALUWA, supra note 182, at 121, 128.
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Even within this sphere, however, the challenges faced by
African state governments come from various attempts to institute
a democratic rule of law into their political systems and to build “a
political culture founded on a conception of human rights.”187 Thus,
the main puzzle lies in connecting modern-day universal human
rights and democracy issues, with the dynamic and distinct cultural
systems in place sub-Saharan Africa.188 The principle challenge to
solving this puzzle is that the concept of “human rights and democ-
racy in Africa differ because its culture differs.”189 Thus, it is difficult
to apply general, universal human rights principles across the con-
tinent. As a result, in evaluating the human rights question within
sub-Saharan Africa, the answer may lie in tailoring human rights
concepts to fit the realities of sub-Saharan Africa by finding a balance
between the African “collective” and Western “individual” human
rights perspectives.190
B. The Human Rights Answer to the Witchcraft Challenge
In the past, a state’s treatment of its citizens was considered a
domestic affair, not a matter of international law.191 That is not the
case today.192 The field of international human rights has developed
such that states have increasingly come to believe that it is their obli-
gation, and that of the entire international community, to protect the
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all people.193
Consequently, the norms found in international human rights
law can be employed to protect women in sub-Saharan Africa against
human rights violations, like being accused of witchcraft. This may
be achieved by transforming the rationale behind local community
laws and reconciling local laws with regional and international per-
spectives on human rights.194 This is important because, “while human
187. Id. at 122.
188. See id. at 123 (posing the question: “[w]hat is culture, and how does it fit into the
African conception of human rights?”).
189. Id.
190. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 70.
191. MALUWA, supra note 182, at 124-25.
192. Id. at 125.
193. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55, 56 (recognizing the international obligations of states
to protect certain universal rights); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res 217 (III) A, publ., U.N. Doc A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1945) (“Member States have
pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”).
Together, these instruments set out same standards of customary international law and
general principles of international human rights law.
194. See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman’s Individuality:
The Struggle Between Women’s Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture,
2011] WITCHCRAFT: A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFLICT 495
rights are universal in nature . . . the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious
backgrounds”195 must be accounted for and utilized in order to pro-
tect marginalized women, particularly those victims of witchcraft
accusations, in sub-Saharan Africa. In analyzing this approach, cer-
tain regional and international human rights instruments are crucial,
and will be discussed in later sections.
C. The Local/Regional Perspective on Women’s Rights in Africa
On the domestic level, the rights of women within sub-Saharan
Africa can be protected, first and foremost, through the use of local
laws.196 In some countries, for example, international human rights
norms have been integrated into domestic laws by way of incorpo-
ration into national constitutions.197 For instance, Article 26 of the
Constitution of Ghana, which addresses fundamental human rights
and freedoms, makes clear that “[a]ll customary practices which de-
humanize or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of
a person are prohibited.”198 Witchcraft accusations and their devas-
tating effect on women, especially older women, would certainly seem
to fall under such domestic protection.199 Another example is the
Republic of Gambia, under whose constitution the general protec-
tion of the rights of women is implemented through a broad scheme
of fundamental rights and freedoms.200 Chapter 28 of the Gambian
Constitution, states that “[w]omen shall be accorded full and equal
dignity of the person with men.” 201 But, as with Ghana, this provision
may be described as only “being on the books”: even with the general
protections supposedly available under the law, women in present-
day Gambian society accused of witchcraft still experience marginali-
zation and discrimination from their communities.202
Hence, despite these supposed constitutional protections, and
even though African countries like Sierra Leone may recognize the
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1351, 1353-54 (1995) (arguing that efforts to address human rights
abuses against women should begin on the local level). “International human rights
norms . . . must be linked to local laws and regional human rights instruments to make
people realize that these norms are not part of an alien culture which is to be imposed on
them.” Id. at 1354.
195. Banda, supra note 170, at 3.
196. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1353-54.
197. Id. at 1370.
198. GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 26(2) (1992).
199. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338; Hari, supra note 6.
200. GAMBIA CONST. ch. 4, art. 28(1) (1997).
201. Id.
202. Witchcraft, An Idiom of Power, GAMBIA J. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.thegambia
journal.com/Top-News-and-Analyses/298.html.
496 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:475
importance of additional human rights protections within their local
and state laws, there are still considerable violations against women,
particularly within the arena of witchcraft accusations.203 One could
argue that the lack of domestic resources within poor state govern-
ment systems leads to weak domestic enforcement mechanisms that
fail to implement the law.204
Apart from the economic factors that may affect state govern-
ments’ ability to enforce sanctions for violations of human rights,
generally-accepted cultural practices again play an important part in
the perception and role of women within individual African coun-
tries.205 For example, “[i]n 2002, the Vice-President of Uganda made
public the fact that she had, over a number of years, been subjected
to physical violence by her husband,” a revelation that resulted in a
public outcry against her.206 Even though some viewed the abuse as
wrong (mainly women’s support groups), “[t]he majority of people,
men as well as women” viewed this as a private, “home” incident,
which should have been kept as such.207
This example illustrates how, often, “the ‘privacy’ argument
trump[s] the woman’s right to protection from violence.” 208 Even the
woman’s status as Vice-President did not exempt her from having to
adhere to the generally-accepted gender roles in Uganda, which value
only those wives who are submissive and obedient.209
With “a general cultural expectation that women demonstrate
respect, passivity, obedience, submissiveness, and acquiesce toward
men,” 210 it is therefore not surprising that the general responsiveness
to witchcraft accusations has been underwhelming within patriarchal
African states.211 Even though there are constitutional provisions and
203. Id.; see AMNESTY INT’L, Sierra Leone: Women Face Human Rights Abuses in the
Informal Legal Sector, 7, 19 (2006) [hereinafter Sierra Leone], available at http://www
.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/002/2006 (follow “Download: PDF” hyperlink) (asserting
that the Government of Sierra Leone has failed to protect women from human rights
abuses by not enacting legislation to prevent discrimination and, furthermore, by failing
to stop local chiefs from imposing “arbitrary charges against women, such as ‘witchcraft’ ”).
204. Sierra Leone is the world’s poorest country. Thráinn Eggertsson, Response:
Mapping Social Technologies in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 711, 725
n.55 (2010).
205. See BANDA, supra note 78, at 159 (discussing the African “universal wife” concept,
which dictates that “a good wife is one who is obedient and who does not challenge accepted
gender roles”).
206. Id. (citing Tamale, supra note 184, at 55).
207. Id.; see also Tamale, supra note 184, at 55 (noting that many Ugandans believe that
these home “issues do not belong in the public arena”).
208. BANDA, supra note 78, at 159.
209. Id.
210. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 331.
211. E.g., Sierra Leone, supra note 203, at 7 & n.14 (“It is unlawful for Chiefs to adju-
dicate on cases of witchcraft. There is no crime of ‘witchcraft’ in Sierra Leonean law, and
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laws for the protection of women, they clearly are not being utilized.212
Yet aggressive efforts at the domestic level through enforcement mech-
anisms by state governments and civic groups may still be the best
answer for protecting women against accusations of witchcraft.213
In addition, the use of regional efforts to achieve the common goal
of the protection of all African women from the ramifications of a cus-
tomary belief in witchcraft may be another crucial tool.214 Especially
“[w]here local laws do not permit the pursuits of women’s rights . . .
regional human rights instrument[s]” can be effective in bridging the
gap between local laws and international human rights norms.215
The African Charter216 encompasses this regional approach by rec-
ognizing the culture of Africa within—and incorporating this culture
into—its conception of human rights.217 The Charter also contains the
recently enacted 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (the
Protocol),218 designed specifically to protect African women from “all
forms of discrimination,” 219 including those “particular to Africa.” 220
Article 2 of the Protocol, for example, requires that “State Parties . . .
combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate
legislative, institutional and other measures,” 221 including through an
“integrat[ion of] a gender perspective in[to] their policy decisions, legis-
lation, development plans, programmes and activities.” 222 Article 17
of the Protocol also states that “[w]omen shall have the right to live
thus any such charge is arbitrary and violates international human rights standards.”).
Neither has the rest of the world taken note of the human rights violations perpetrated
against women accused of being witches: “[a]cross Africa, a war is being waged on women—
but we are refusing to hear the screams. . . . For decades, we have not wanted to know,
because it sounded too much like the old colonialist claims of African ‘primitivism . . . .’ ”
Hari, supra note 6.
212. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (juxtaposing the protections in the
Gambian Constitution with the witch hunt instituted by the country’s own President).
213. See Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1353, 1372 (describing how concentrating efforts
locally will better achieve human rights protections for women).
214. See id. at 1369 (suggesting that African NGOs join together to “devise a plan of
action,” because “[w]idespread education on human rights is . . . essential to alter peoples’
way of thinking.”).
215. Id. at 1373.
216. African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217.
217. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1374.
218. Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6(2003) [hereinafter
The Protocol].
219. Id. art. 2(1).
220. Kristin Davis, Note, The Emperor is Still Naked: Why the Protocol on the Rights
of Women in Africa Leaves Women Exposed to More Discrimination, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 949, 952 (2009) (citation omitted).
221. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 2(1).
222. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
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in a positive cultural” environment,223 and requires “States Parties
[to] take all appropriate measures to enhance the participation of
women in the formulation of cultural policies at all levels.” 224
The Protocol also requires States to implement legislation to curb
“harmful practices” that jeopardize women’s health and safety.225 De-
fined under Article 1 of the Protocol, “ ‘[h]armful [p]ractices’ means
all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the
fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life,
health, dignity, education and physical integrity.” 226 One may natu-
rally conclude from this language that the accusation of witchcraft
constitutes a “harmful practice” against women, and thus is very
much renounced by the Protocol.
Furthermore, because the Protocol incorporates “both civil and
political[,] and socio-economic and cultural rights”227 it is more com-
prehensive than any pre-existing instrument dealing with the rights
of African women, and so is regarded as the best.228 Indeed, “the
Protocol is the first international human rights instrument to affirm
a woman’s right to seek an abortion.” 229 Thus, such a right theoreti-
cally exists in contemporary African society. Notably, the Protocol
also addresses issues such as the impact of armed conflicts on the
lives of African women.230 This and other provisions are designed to
specifically address and provide protection against the particular
abuses suffered by African women. Hence, because accusations of
witchcraft mostly victimize elderly widows in sub-Saharan Africa,231
protections against these accusations should be recognized and guar-
anteed under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
Yet the extent to which the African Charter and its Protocol can
protect women within sub-Saharan Africa against allegations of witch-
craft is debatable. One of the criticisms levied against the Protocol is
223. Id. art. 17(1).
224. Id. art. 17(2).
225. Id. art. 2(1).
226. Id. art 1.
227. BANDA, supra note 78, at 79.
228. Davis, supra note 220, at 952 (noting that the Protocol is lauded as being “the most
progressive tool for protecting women’s rights to date” (citing Anne Gathumbi, Making
Reproductive Health Rights a Reality, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, Jan 20, 2005, http://www
.pambazuka.prg/en/category/features/26455)).
229. Id. at 962. Article 14 of the Protocol on health and reproductive rights affirms
women’s “right to control their fertility.” The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 14(1).
230. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 11. The Protocol also grants “Widows’ Rights,” id.
art. 20, and recognizes the need for “Special Protection of Elderly Women.” Id. art. 22. Both
of these provisions may aid in the protection of women from accusations of witchcraft in
sub-Saharan Africa.
231. Hari, supra note 6.
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that its provisions are unobtainable, despite being “legally binding”
on all African countries.232 For instance, although “Article 26 of the
Protocol calls upon States Parties to ensure the implementation of ”
its provisions into domestic law,233 this requirement is arguably be-
yond the reach of the Protocol because it fails to take into account the
differences within each country’s legal system,234 be they political,
or socio-economic. Further, the Protocol’s not allowing state parties
to deviate from its conventions has resulted in a reality where state
parties with different political and socio-economic standards refuse
to be bound by the same human rights rules.235
Another excuse invoked by states not following the Protocol is
“that the people who ratify human rights instruments tend to be the
political élite in a country and may not necessarily be representing
the position of all in that country.” 236 These problems undermine the
Protocol’s effectiveness because, over time, permitting states to ig-
nore obligations “create[s] evidence of an acceptable customary in-
ternational norm or state practice that ultimately makes such illegal
behavior legally acceptable.” 237 As a result, within a society like
Cameroon, where witchcraft is punishable as a crime,238 the Protocol
may be deemed entirely ineffective. In other countries, such as South
Africa and Kenya, where the belief in witchcraft is rampant even
among the educated,239 it is not surprising that community vigilante
justice is still utilized to eradicate alleged witches or witchcraft, de-
spite the existing forms of human rights protections, be they domestic,
or regional, like the Protocol.240
The Protocol is further criticized for its heavy reliance on various
United Nations treaties like the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence against Women.241 This reliance
has led commentators to describe the Protocol as “uncompromisingly
232. Davis, supra note 220, at 952.
233. Id. at 966 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
234. Id. at 966-67 (noting how the Protocol contains much “overarching vagueness,” and
arguing that more guidance is needed in light of “the fact that States Parties [sic] legal
systems are as diverse as the continent itself”).
235. See id. at 965 (observing how some “African countries have wholly ignored” pro-
visions of the Protocol that “interfere with customary practices,” such as common-law
marriage (citation omitted)).
236. Banda, supra note 170, at 5 (citation omitted).
237. Davis, supra note 220, at 953.
238. Diwan, supra note 4, at 353.
239. LeVine, supra note 5, at 229.
240. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 88-89.
241. Banda, supra note 170, at 18. CEDAW will be discussed in greater detail in the
following section.
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pro-woman and anti-defence of discriminatory cultural practices,” 242
and as “mak[ing] far-reaching demands” that are impractical and in-
applicable as applied to certain customary African traditions.243 For
example, under Article 6, which governs marriage, “monogamy is en-
couraged as the preferred form of marriage.” 244 Yet “[m]ost legal sys-
tems on the continent recognize polygamy, either as a customary or
religious ‘right.’ ” 245 The Protocol thus creates a system of law that
alienates the actual culture within African society. This consequently
undermines the positive effects such a provision can have for women
by triggering non-enforcement from individual state actors.246
Dealing with witchcraft allegations may therefore be described
as a situation in which States parties know of their human rights
obligations, but, because of unique domestic/cultural circumstances,
their “excuses” for not following these obligations are readily accepted
without the states having to suffer any consequences. Therefore, even
though the Protocol is praised as having adopted practical protections
for women within sub-Saharan Africa,247 it actually may not be an
effective tool for protecting of women from charges of witchcraft be-
cause of problems relating to the implementation and enforcement
of its provisions.248
D. The International Perspective on Women’s Rights
For the reasons just discussed, international norms and other
mechanisms, such as treaties, may be the tool necessary to protect
women from the stigma—and danger—of being labeled a witch in
sub-Saharan Africa. One of these treaties is CEDAW.249 Adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, CEDAW protects
women against all forms of prejudice by guaranteeing the equality
of women within all sectors. These protections extend to all “political,
economic, social, cultural [and] civil” rights.250 Often referred to as
242. Id.
243. See id. (listing several provisions that fail to take into account customary African
beliefs and practices).
244. The Protocol, supra note 218, art. 6.
245. Banda, supra note 170, at 18.
246. See id. at 18-19 (arguing that these culturally-insensitive provisions undermine
support for the instrument, and that without support from “ordinary people,” the Protocol
is “likely to be yet another paper tiger”).
247. Davis, supra note 220, at 951-52.
248. See id. at 974 (describing how some countries’ constitutions elevate customary
views of gender and discrimination over contemporary views, such as those found in the
Protocol).
249. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
250. Id. art. 1.
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a “bill of rights for women,” 251 CEDAW defines “discrimination” as
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recog-
nition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 252
Under this definition of discrimination, CEDAW makes irrelevant the
issues of whether an act was committed “by a state actor or a private
individual or private organisation” and whether the discrimination
was direct or indirect.253
With a goal of promoting equality and preventing the margin-
alization of women, CEDAW’s preamble and sixteen “substantive
articles” make it a comprehensive legal instrument.254 State govern-
ments, “that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally
bound to put its provisions into practice.” 255
CEDAW in not the only option. Because sub-Saharan women
accused of witchcraft face being subjected to violent acts and other
forms of victimization,256 the protections of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)257 can also be invoked because it protects against
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.258 Under
Article 2, CAT calls for each state party to “take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture
in any territory under its jurisdiction,” 259 and may implement com-
parable domestic laws and regional mechanisms to comply with fun-
damental human rights under CAT.260 The role of state parties in
sub-Saharan Africa is thus to use their domestic legislation to prevent
and provide redress for such violations of CAT, including violence
committed against women accused of witchcraft.
251. Press Release, Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee Holds 27th Session in
New York, 3-21 June: Will Review Reports of Eight State Parties, U.N. Doc. WOM/1337
(May 30, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release], available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2002/WOM1337.doc.htm.
252. CEDAW, supra note 249, art. 1.
253. BANDA, supra note 78, at 59.
254. U.N. Press Release, supra note 251.
255. Id.
256. See Hari, supra note 6 (stating that witch beatings and killings happen almost
daily in parts of Africa such as Sukumuland, Tanzania).
257. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
258. See id. pmbl.
259. Id., art. 2(1).
260. See Ronald L. Nelson, Torture in the Law of the Fifty American States: Searching
for Definition, 4 WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE & CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1, 8 (2010) (noting
that the United States, which is a signatory to CAT, has federal legislation implementing
CAT’s terms into the domestic law, which CAT requires signatory States to do).
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Because CEDAW and CAT are binding legal instruments, “States
are responsible for bringing their domestic law and practice into con-
formity with their obligations under international law to protect and
promote human rights.” 261 Yet the reality is that states often elevate
their own interests over this obligation.262 This is essentially one of
the main criticisms of international mechanisms like CEDAW and
CAT. For example, even when a state has ratified a treaty, imple-
menting legislation may be necessary for the treaty obligations to
take legal effect, “[y]et many states that ratify human rights treaties
do not enact all of the necessary implementing legislation.” 263 As a
result, treaties like CEDAW, “which specifically aimed to protect
women from discrimination [have] failed to meet the needs of women
in the African context.” 264
Another criticism of international mechanisms is that, unlike the
Protocol, the general approach to addressing fundamental issues af-
fecting women’s rights worldwide, an approach reflected by CEDAW,
often does not take into account the issues raised by specific customs,
practices, and traditions. This means that culturally unique and sensi-
tive issues, like the allegations of witchcraft common in sub-Saharan
Africa, are addressed only generally.265 In addition, “it is not uncom-
mon for states to formally commit to human rights agreements, but
fail to change their practices to conform to the treaty requirements.”266
Furthermore, “[a]chieving domestic enforcement requires that
state parties have the legal and structural capacity to create and en-
force legal rights and obligations,” 267 which may not be the case in
sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, because only the elite play an important
role in implementing international agreements within African soci-
eties,268 the inhabitants of these states, who comprise mostly rural
populations and informally educated communities,269 may not accept
261. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1370 (citation omitted).
262. See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1113 (1982) (discussing how it might not be in the “collection of
interests” for a “hypothetical new nation . . . to accept any of the[ ] [rules of international
law] as obligatory upon itself”).
263. Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 781, 790 (2009) (citation omitted).
264. Davis, supra note 220, at 958 (citation omitted).
265. E.g., CEDAW, supra note 249, art. 2. CEDAW simply requires States “[t]o take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.” Id.
266. Banks, supra note 263, at 785 (citation omitted).
267. Id. at 791.
268. Banda, supra note 170, at 5 (citation omitted).
269. Davis, supra note 220, at 988 (noting that “rural and informally educated commu-
nities” have been excluded from the dialogue of human rights law).
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or understand the “legitimacy of the international legal obligations
and norms” because they have not been socially internalized.270
Accordingly, the lack of enforcement mechanisms, practical
domestic laws, and ratification standards in sub-Saharan commu-
nities means that the harm resulting from allegations of witchcraft
made against women in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa cannot
easily be alleviated by local, regional or international human rights
mechanisms. Furthermore, the dilemma presented by choice of law
and conflicts within the law, namely the “conflict between state legal
norms and norms underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft,” reduces
any effectiveness that laws meant to punish individuals who kill
accused witches may have.271 As a result, women in sub-Saharan
Africa have fallen through the cracks present in human rights and
domestic legal instruments.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The notion of witchcraft and its effect on women’s human rights
is a problem unique to contemporary Africa, and, as such, it will need
a contemporary “African” solution. Even with the modern domestic,
regional, and international legal protections available to women in
sub-Saharan Africa who are victims of human rights abuses, such as
those suffered as a result of being accused of witchcraft, the systems
for providing protection and redress are still riddled with conflict.272
The principle conflict is that which lies between existing beliefs in
witchcraft and modern practical standards punishing those who act
violently when witchcraft is suspected. Fortunately, several possible
solutions do exist.273
According to Professor K.O. Adinkrah,274 a professor of law at the
University of Ghana, the general protections within sub-Saharan
Africa against witchcraft accusations can be described as “legally
protected on paper, but unprotected in reality.” 275 This may be the
number one problem facing the eradication of the belief in witchcraft
within sub-Saharan Africa. For example, under the Ghana Constitu-
tion, as with other constitutions in Africa, there are legal protections
270. Banks, supra note 263, at 799.
271. Diwan, supra note 4, at 354.
272. Id.
273. Id. (“If the law is more responsive to popular needs to regulate witchcraft, and if
it provides a comprehensive way of addressing these needs in a manner accessible to the
general population, perhaps the conflict between popular and state legal norms would
be reconciled.”).
274. Dr. K.O. Adinkrah, LLB (Hons), LLM (Ghana) & JSD (Berkeley), is a renowned
legal scholar specializing in family law at the Ghana School of Law. He is also a practicing
Barrister and Solicitor.
275. Interview with Dr. K.O. Adinkrah, Professor of Law, Ghana School of Law, Accra,
Ghana (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Adinkrah Interview].
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against acts that constitute “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” 276 Victims of witchcraft accusations may bring claims
under criminal law that they have suffered a form of degrading treat-
ment or cruel punishment, and/or perhaps invoke defamation and
slander suits as a means to protect against witchcraft accusations.277
The issue, however, is whether such suits actually get to court.278
Unless an individual accused of being a witch is already being tried
criminally, it is less likely that she will seek relief through the court
system, if indeed such relief is available.279 Hence, even though there
may exist the necessary means of relief within African court systems
for individuals prosecuted for outdated crimes like witchcraft, such
injustices are rarely redressed through the court systems.280
To find a solution for this dilemma, African governments must
first recognize that a problem exists within their legal systems. They
must then address the need for more integration between custom-
ary and state legal systems, specifically in the context of witchcraft
accusations and violence against suspected witches.281 For example,
instead of adopting Witchcraft Suppression Acts, states could adopt
legislation that attempts to control witchcraft. By accepting that the
belief in witchcraft in fact exists, but acknowledging that the “law
can control it,” 282 the State thus harmonizes the customary and state
legal systems.
As accusations of witchcraft certainly can have serious conse-
quences,283 the law and the courts of sub-Saharan Africa should also
discourage “false” claims.284 One way to accomplish this may be to
modify the objective standard of “reasonable” within the court sys-
tems to include a traditional community norm standard of reasonable-
ness for evaluating cases.285 In addition, states could create special
witchcraft courts to handle all aspects of witchcraft accusations, in-
cluding punishments and fines for false and self-serving accusations.286
In this way, sub-Saharan African states can recognize the interests
276. GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 15(1)(a) (1992); see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2(12)(1)(e)
(“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right . . .
not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.”).




281. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 102.
282. Id. at 103. This is especially true because “the witchcraft belief is not the problem,
but the actions taken on those beliefs.” Id. at 102.
283. See Diwan, supra note 4, at 381 (noting that imputations of witchcraft can risk
harm to those accused and often cause problems in the community).
284. Id.
285. Id. In some communities, laws that guard against “imputation[s] of witchcraft are
contrary to some traditional community norms of what is seen as reasonable conduct.” Id.
286. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 104.
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of the people in preserving customary traditions, yet still curb the
risks associated with witchcraft accusations.
On the other hand, some may say that there are enough legisla-
tive and criminal protections against the harms associated with the
notion of witchcraft, and that governments should instead focus more
on the efficacy of domestic enforcement mechanisms within the con-
tinent.287 Whether the focus is on prevention or enforcement, the
criminal justice systems within sub-Saharan countries must take
more proactive steps to stop such abuses, particularly in light of the
fact that witchcraft accusations can result in serious injuries, and
even death, to the innocent woman accused.288
In the prevention of such crimes, direct and serious actions must
be taken against those who kill individuals accused of witchcraft, as
well as enforced. For example, the imposition of minimum sentenc-
ing standards will be introduced throughout the continent through
public service announcements and campaigns. The witchcraft issue
would thus be thrust to the forefront, and all would know that acts
taken against accused witches are crimes for which there are serious
repercussions in all African communities.289
Additionally, in part because of the social circumstances within
sub-Saharan African society and the lack of education for women and
girls,290 women in Africa are generally not very assertive, and they are
less likely to invoke the legal protections of customary law or state
legal systems, even if doing so could legally protect them from victimi-
zation.291 Yet because the belief in witchcraft functions to margin-
alize women,292 education of girls and women must be encouraged.
Indeed, “[e]ducation is one of the most important means of empower-
ing women with the knowledge, skills, and self confidence necessary
to participate fully in a development process” 293 in sub-Saharan
Africa, and thus should be a particularly important focus.
African governments and local leaders should also educate their
communities with respect to the fallacy of witchcraft accusations and
287. Banks, supra note 263, at 782 (arguing that domestic enforcement mechanisms
are “one of the most effective means of enforcing” human rights obligations). “Recognizing
the value of domestic enforcement,” the CEDAW Committee urges states to “strengthen
domestic enforcement mechanisms” in order to fully realize human rights protections.
Id. at 782-83 (citation omitted).
288. Ludsin, supra note 7, at 63 (noting that thousands of innocent individuals have
been killed as a result of witchcraft accusations).
289. But cf. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 217-18 (discussing how Africans who believe witch-
craft is real feel wronged by the State punishing those who accuse others of witchcraft).
290. Sharon LaFraniere, Another School Barrier for African Girls: No Toilet, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2005, at A1 (emphasizing that “poverty, tradition, and ignorance” have deprived
24 million African girls of an education).
291. Adinkrah Interview, supra note 275.
292. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 338.
293. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1378.
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the harmful effects such accusations have on women.294 Aggressive
television and newspaper public service campaigns broadcast and
written in every local language should be encouraged.295 Governments,
community grassroots efforts, and nonprofit organizations should set
aside public service and educational resources to find ways to en-
courage women to “step out of their prescribed social roles” 296 and
feel confident enough to assert their rights.297
Professor Adinkrah also suggests that competing interests
and demands in contemporary African societies may be blamed for
today’s problem of the victimization of women suspected of witch-
craft.298 He has suggested that perhaps society should simply allow
such practices to go on until the attitudes of the people change, espe-
cially as the continent lacks the necessary resources to promote effec-
tive change.299 This view is reflective of the “cultural purist approach,”
which “favour[s] . . . the retention of the status quo.” 300 Following
this approach, issues like the victimization of women accused of witch-
craft would remain subject to customary law systems, rather than
state legal systems, thereby maintaining the status quo.301
But one must wonder whether, and at what time, society will
change, as women suspected of witchcraft have long been victimized
despite the various legal protections that have become available in
domestic, regional, and international systems. Hence “[to] argue for
things to remain as they are is both unrealistic and unhelpful” 302 in
saving this class of victimized women. Accusations of witchcraft and
their implications certainly remain a contemporary problem faced
by women in sub-Saharan Africa. This problem needs immediate,
domestic solutions.
CONCLUSION
Like the unfortunate old women in Kumbungu, Ghana who were
bludgeoned and stoned to death for “bewitchment” of a young man,303
the notion of witchcraft and the consequent vigilante justice it inspires
against women still exists in modern-day sub-Saharan Africa.304 In
294. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 349.
295. Id. at 349.
296. Davis, supra note 220, at 992 (citation omitted).
297. Adjetey, supra note 194, at 1378. The author talks about the frustration she has felt
in trying to convince illiterate women in Ghana to understand and believe they have rights.
298. Adinkrah Interview, supra note 275.
299. Id.
300. Banda, supra note 170, at 14.
301. Id. This approach was utilized by South African chiefs to resist the application of
anti-discrimination principles to customary law. Id.
302. Id.
303. Adinkrah, supra note 1, at 343.
304. Hari, supra note 6; Ludsin, supra note 7, at 88.
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spite of the various protections available in domestic, regional, and
international human rights instruments, women in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa still face considerable discrimination pursuant
to the notion of witchcraft and fall between the cracks present in
these legal instruments.
Part of the problem may be based on the existence of fairly com-
plex “integrated” legal systems within contemporary sub-Saharan
Africa.305 Where common law and civil law traditions are infused
with modern customary/traditional interpretations, the result is a
conflict of laws between state protections against allegations of witch-
craft and customary laws that preserve the belief in witchcraft.306 In
addition, even though the states purport to denounce the belief in
witchcraft that still holds fast in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa,
there generally are few civil or criminal actions, and few enforce-
ment mechanisms for such actions, to protect women,307 despite the
fact that vigilante justice is often employed to “take care” of witch-
craft’s presumed harm. This has lead to grave human rights violations
against women, particularly older women, in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa.
It is therefore suggested that a local/domestic solution is the best
method for solving the unique problems associated with the belief in
witchcraft. Through individualized, state-specific protective standards
that seek to harmonize state legal systems and customary/traditional
laws in African communities, the victimization and marginalization
of women within sub-Saharan African societies can be stopped. With
the right implementation standards, the law can finally protect women
in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa from the harms suffered follow-
ing an allegation of witchcraft.
MAAKOR QUARMYNE*
305. See Davies & Dagbanja, supra note 79, at 305-06 (noting that in post-independence
countries like Ghana, the legal system is an integration of both state or “general law” and
customary/traditional law).
306. See Diwan, supra note 4, at 354.
307. HELPAGE INT’L, supra note 11, at 6 (“Accused women have no support[ ] [or] access
to legal advice or redress . . . .”). Further, “the absence of clear legal and policy frameworks
lead to the State’s inability to enforce legislation” that may already be in place to protect
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* J.D. Candidate 2011, William & Mary School of Law; B.B.A. International Business,
James Madison University. The author will like to thank her family for their continued
love and support through her educational and professional pursuits—most especially,
Mummy Val for the great incite for this note on the witchcraft situation affecting women
in Northern Ghana. Finally, Alice Walker said it best, “the most common way people
give up their power is by thinking they don't have any” and thus the goal is to give back
the power to all marginalized people, especially that of women across the globe.
WILLIAM & MARY
JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
VOLUME 17 SPRING 2011 NUMBER 3
ARTICLES
GENDERING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
Dina Francesca Haynes, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Naomi Cahn ........... 509
OPEN SERVICE AND OUR ALLIES: A REPORT ON THE INCLUSION OF OPENLY
GAY AND LESBIAN SERVICEMEMBERS IN U.S. ALLIES’ ARMED FORCES
Suzanne B. Goldberg ............................................................................... 547
BOOK REVIEW
ON RACE, GENDER, AND RADICAL TORT REFORM: A REVIEW OF MARTHA
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW
Vincent R. Johnson ................................................................................. 591
NOTES
PROTECTING WOMEN: PRESERVING AUTONOMY IN THE COMMODIFICATION
OF MOTHERHOOD
M. Elliott Neal ......................................................................................... 611
ONE STEP FORWARD, BUT TWO STEPS BACK: WHY GACACA IN RWANDA IS
JEOPARDIZING THE GOOD EFFECT OF AKAYESU ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Brittany A. Olwine .................................................................................. 639
SECURING GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION CLAIMS: A PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO ASYLUM LAW
Lucy Akinyi Orinda ................................................................................. 665
GENDERING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES, FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN 
& NAOMI CAHN*†
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CONCLUSION
Over the past quarter-century, many countries have experienced
deeply divisive and highly destructive armed conflicts, ranging from
Afghanistan to The Democratic Republic of Congo to Rwanda, East
Timor, Northern Ireland, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
Each of these countries is at a different point on the spectrum of
emerging from and addressing the causes of conflicts. Moreover, with
varying degrees of intervention and assistance from the international
community, each is responding in highly differentiated ways to the
challenges of emerging from conflict, as well as rebuilding or creating
new institutions to allow movement forward.
Countries in the process of transitioning from conflict to peace (or
at least to something less than conflict) provide multiple opportunities
for transformation on many different levels including: writing or re-
writing local and national laws, reintegrating soldiers, providing re-
habilitation and redress for victims, establishing or re-establishing
the rule of law, building or rebuilding human rights institutions and
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governance structures, changing cultural attitudes, and improving
socioeconomic conditions. These opportunities are rare in stable and
non-transitional societies and explain, in part, why societies in hostile
conflict garner such significant international and institutional atten-
tion. The opportunities for massive transformation are, in theory,
open-ended and, in particular, hold significant potential for trans-
forming the lives of women.
Legal change is deeply implicated in most transitional and post-
conflict processes. The rule of law, in general, and reform of legal
institutions, in particular, are viewed as necessary tools to facilitate
broader political, economic and social change. The transformative
potential of legal and constitutional change for women’s lives in-
volves surveying the context in which most women live their lives
and accounting for that context in implementing change. For exam-
ple, “[m]ore than one female in every three lives in a low-income
country”1 and while “[f]emales generally live longer than males . . . [i]n
a few countries, women’s life expectancy is equal to or shorter than
men’s as a result of the social disadvantages that women face.” 2
Even if women do live longer, their extra years of life may be spent
precariously, as the social context of women’s lives may place excep-
tional burdens on their quality of life. This trend is especially rele-
vant in countries that have experienced long term, cyclical, or pro-
tracted conflict.3 In many conflicted countries, women and girls are
treated as socially or even legally inferior. These unequal power rela-
tions, promulgated by social, behavioral and sometimes legal norms,
translate into differential access to things important to women, such
as health resources, education, income, and political voice, and are
correlated with reduced well-being.4 The Millennium Development
Goals Report affirms that while women’s political participation is ex-
panding in many countries,5 men still wield political and, by exten-
sion, social and economic control in most societies.6 Such power and
participation differentials have the capacity to carve a marked effect
on the methods and means of the warfare pursued, to shape the way
1. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND HEALTH: TODAY’S EVIDENCE TOMORROW’S
AGENDA 4 (2009) [hereinafter WOMEN AND HEALTH].
2. Id. at 5-6.
3. See id. (noting that such conflicts result both from natural disasters and from the
actions of human beings themselves).
4. Id. at 9-10.
5. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 23
(2009) (discussing how as of January 2009, women in thirty-one parliaments held the
highest position, that of presiding officer).
6. See, e.g., id. (describing that women, on average, hold eighteen percent of parlia-
mentary seats and one quarter of countries have less than ten percent of women members).
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in which a conflict is ended, and to negotiate whose political voices
are heard at a conflict’s end.
New constitutions and laws are increasingly part of the standard
legal revision package that accompanies the end of violence.7 Whether
this confluence is a positive development for women is a focus of this
article. The introduction or recalibration of ‘hard’ law that often com-
prises part of the peace negotiation and post-conflict phases can be
very important to women. In this article, we are concerned not only
with what constitutions do for women, but also what they do to
women, understanding that even where constitutions may appear
neutral, they often have different and disparate impact with respect
to gender.8
This article commences with a discussion of transitional consti-
tutional design and the ways in which the branches of government
relate to one another, focusing on the consequences of these structures
for women. We are convinced that an analysis of the rights-bearing
portions of a constitution alone is insufficient to fully capture the way
in which power is structured and experienced. Consistent with other
scholars, we start from the view that “constitutions are derived from
a social contract between the constituents who will be governed and
the political actors who will govern; they explain how the society
and government will operate and under what parameters.” 9 This arti-
cle offers preliminary proposals on how to make gender central to
constitutional drafting, providing positive examples. We follow with
an assessment of constitutional drafting rhetoric and initiatives in
multiple post-conflict societies. We will explore their value and limi-
tations for women and offer, in both cases, a set of pragmatic reflec-
tions on ways to undertake constitutional drafting in such a way as
to dismantle masculinities currently in effect during constitutional
negotiations, as well as to give women a voice through constitutional
mandates and implementation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN THE POST-CONFLICT SETTING
Constitutions are valuable because they frame the prospect of a
fresh start for a community.10 For places that have been deeply and
7. Angela M. Banks, Participatory Constitution Making in Post-Conflict Societies,
101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 138, 138 (2007).
8. See HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1 (2008) (“[C]onstitutions frame women’s member-
ship of, or absence from, the constitutional community; . . . constitutional provisions can
promote, or alternatively, present obstacles to gender equity and agency.”).
9. Hallie Ludsin, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Palestinian Constitutional
Drafting Process, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 443, 472 (2005).
10. IRVING, supra note 8, at 1 (“[M]odern constitutions, ‘practically without excep-
tion, . . . were drawn up and adopted because people wished to make a fresh start, so far
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intrinsically violent, constitutions have tremendous symbolic im-
portance.11 Equally, they may provide the mechanical instruments to
harness political impulses, transmuting violent action into dispute
settlement of a more constructive kind.12
Legal reform, including constitutional design, is not the only tool
available for cultivating conditions conducive to advancing sustainable
peace. Nonetheless, legal reform is deeply important in post-conflict
societies. Not only does it provide a means for addressing previous
deficiencies in the rule of law, some of which may have given rise to
the conflict or allowed for it to take place, but legal reform also has
the benefit of placing the mantle of legitimacy on the nascent post-
conflict government.13 It offers routes to the recognition of needs and
status through constructive means and provides a space of alternative,
non-violent contestation for the political forces previously engaged
in violence.14
A significant concern with regard to legal reform, generally, and
constitutional drafting, specifically, is the extent to which women
are present, and how women fare, in negotiation processes. Recent
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1889, 1888, 1820 and
1325 have encouraged efforts to centralize women in the negotiation
process as part of the larger analysis of gender and constitution-
alism.15 Measuring the success of these efforts is fraught with diffi-
culty, given that there are few consistently applied measurements
across all post-conflict societies (that have constitutions) to assess the
quality and depth of change. Nevertheless, a gender audit of post-
conflict constitutions and rule-making might reveal the priority and
attention given to women’s full membership in the constitutional and
legal community. In undertaking such a review, we are concerned
not only with equality—both formal and substantive—for women,
but also with equity and agency, the latter including access to, and
effective participation in, decision-making.16
When we address the theory and practice of constitutional de-
sign in conflicted and transitional societies with gender and women’s
as their system of government was concerned.’ ”) (quoting KENNETH C. WHEARE, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONS 8-9 (Oxford Univ. Press 1951))).
11. Id. at 24-25.
12. CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX
PACIFICATORIA 60 (2008).
13. See id. at 7 (warning against the more simplistic “quick-fix approaches”).
14. See id. at 105-06 (“Peace agreements attempt to end violent conflict by designing
frameworks that aim to accommodate the competing demands of the conflict’s contenders.”).
15. S.C. Res. 1889 (2009), pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889(2009) (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res.
1888, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1820, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 1325, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
16. IRVING, supra note 8, at 2-3 (drawing an important correlation between these
concepts as necessary to understand the full gendered impact of constitutions).
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concerns in mind, the structure and substance of such documents
and processes do not always appear in quite the same way as they do
in ‘traditional’ constitutional settings. Rather, a key feature of many
post-conflict negotiations has been agreement on constitutional prin-
ciples, as well as the inclusion of ‘constitution-like’ arrangements,
within the peace agreements themselves.17 The increasing centrality
of constitutional agreements to the conflict negotiation phase is in-
dicative of the broader centrality of legal mechanisms to the man-
agement and cessation of conflict.18 While constitutional agreements
rarely ever constitute utilitarian mechanisms to end the violence be-
tween political adversaries, they do typically include a range of mea-
sures that impact legal and political structures within the state or
states in conflict, the goal being that these structural changes will
have transformative effects on the causality of violence. The impor-
tance of substantive and structural legal reform is understood as so
central to the short- and long-term cessation of hostilities that, while
the agreements to end conflict are often described as “peace treaties,”
they regularly also constitute core constitutional agreements, con-
tain elements of such agreements, or even fully incorporate regional
human rights instruments as the basis for the post-conflict constitu-
tion.19 Here, the dividing line between traditional constitutional docu-
ments, whether constitutions per se or bills of rights, and peace
agreements containing the ‘constitution-like’ provisions typical in
peace settlements may be elided by the reality that the two may be
collapsed in the practical setting of ending violent contestation be-
tween various political actors.
It is important to understand that there is often no clear blue
water between the constitutional ‘piece’ and the wider set of agree-
ments to end violence; in fact, there may be significant overlap be-
tween the two. Nor is there a clear sense as to how the constitutional
elements will be practically and effectively implemented where post-
conflict institutions with authority to implement often have yet to be
established. This clearly makes the implementation of constitutional
settlements in post-conflict societies a highly fraught enterprise.
17. An important aspect of the post-conflict negotiations in Dayton, which commenced
to end hostilities in Bosnia, was the inclusion of a draft constitution. Dayton Agreement on
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995, Bosn. &
Herz.-Croat., 35 I.L.M. 172, 172-73 (1996).
18. See Banks, supra note 7, at 138-39 (“[Participatory constitution-making] is seen
as a mechanism for adopting constitutions that lead to the creation of a governance system
that . . . is effective, domestically legitimate, and has significant public support.”).
19. For example, Annex 6 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (BiH) recog-
nizes the rights and liberties protected by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-
Croat., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 89, 130 (1996).
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What should also be understood is that most new constitutions fail,
as do most initial democratic processes.20 As a result, it becomes par-
ticularly important to play close attention to how constitutions are
crafted in post-conflict settings, particularly when such documents
may be one of the bridges to ending violence and advancing peaceful
co-existence over the short-, medium- and long-term. The process by
which documents are agreed upon and implemented also impacts
how women are incorporated into, or excluded from, constitutional
processes and agreements.21
In charting the overlap between peace agreements and consti-
tutional agreements, and their implications for women, we focus on
three aspects of the constitutional component. First, the negotiation
process that leads to the inclusion of constitutional norms in peace-
making deals. Second, the substantive constitutional conversations
and content that accompanies the dealmaking, with particular em-
phasis on equality and autonomy provisions, as well as the agency
of women in institutional design. Finally, the enforcement of consti-
tutional content, as it affects and implicates women’s interests and
needs, with particular attention paid to women’s exclusion from the
process and substance of norm creation and enforcement.
Much of the problem in addressing gender deficits in constitution-
making lies in the continuing belief in and adherence to the concept
“of the ‘gender-neutral’ citizen during moments of transition.” 22 The
pretense of acting on behalf of the gender-neutral citizen allows
those drafting the constitution and negotiating its content to mask
the extent to which women are not actually the beneficiaries of
constitutional change or incur only marginal advancement on the
issues that affect them most.23 A representative sample of the gender
blind-spots in transitional constitutions is found in the 2009 report
by the Constitutional Design Group that surveyed the contents of
20. Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw & Barry R. Weingast, Democratization and
Countermajoritarian Institutions: The Role of Power and Constitutional Design in Self-
Enforcing Democracy 1 (Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ., Working Paper 2010); see also
Timothy William Waters, Assuming Bosnia: Taking Polities Seriously in Ethnically
Divided States, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION 53, 75 (Dina Francesca Haynes
ed., 2008) (arguing that the constitution created by the international community for post-
conflict Bosnia will fail, along with the state itself).
21. See IRVING, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing women’s ability to “belong” to the consti-
tutional community, and the impact that this “belonging” has on the process of creating a
constitution and on its content).
22. Colleen Duggan, Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey & Julie Guillerot, Reparations for Sexual
and Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru,
2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 192, 197 (2008), available at http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/
content/2/2/192.full.pdf.
23. See id. (describing how rights such as non-discrimination and equity are often
ignored in this process, negatively impacting women’s rights).
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key transitional constitutions.24 Based on a sample of “599 of the
roughly 800 constitutions put in force since 1789,” the report notes
that “[r]elatively few constitutions specifically address transitional
justice. . . . [O]nly 1.3 percent of the cases in the current sample men-
tion a commission for truth and reconciliation, and about 2.2 percent
of cases contain provisions regarding crimes committed by the pre-
vious regime.” 25 The survey identifies neither gender provisions nor
socio-economic redress as part of the methodological capture of con-
stitutional change for a transitional society, and so we cannot speak
to the existence of gender provisions.26 The fact that the Report does
not mention gender provisions reflects a broader structural bias as
to what actually constitutes transition-generated change in a post-
conflict or post-repression society.
Such sampling, of course, only provides one lens of analysis;
there remains much quantitative and qualitative work to be under-
taken in assessing the impact, if any, of constitutional change on
women’s status and experiences in post-conflict societies. Any assess-
ment requires attention to the symbolic, communicative, and regula-
tory functions of law in such settings and a measurement along one
of these axes only suffers from a deficit of capture.
II. PROCESS: PEACE AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
The tripartite classification of peace treaty forms and processes
designed by Christine Bell27 is usefully deployed and adapted here to
understand the variety of relevant contexts in which women are vis-
ible and included, or invisible and excluded, in post-conflict constitu-
tion making. Understanding that cessation of hostilities encompasses
multiple phases allows us to view the processes that accompany the
end of conflict holistically and to understand more comprehensively
the constitutional elements involved in the cessation of hostilities
and their sequencing.28
24. The Group is composed of scholars dedicated to distributing data and analysis
useful to those engaged in constitutional design. The primary intent of the reports is to
provide current and historical information about design options in written constitutions
as well as representative and illustrative text for important constitutional provisions.
CONSTITUTION DESIGN GRP., CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE I (1996),
available at http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/transitional_justice.pdf [hereinafter
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]; see also Naomi Cahn, Women’s Security/State Security, in
SECURITY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY NORMATIVE APPROACH 261, 261 (Cecilia M. Bailliet ed.,
2009) (discussing the absence of gender considerations from evaluation of state security).
25. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 1.
26. See id. passim (noting that the word “gender” is absent from the report’s language).
27. BELL, supra note 12, at 56.
28. See id. (“This classification therefore revolves around what can be considered three
phases of peace process negotiations: pre-negotiation agreements, framework/substantive
agreements, and implementation/renegotiation agreements.”).
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A. Gendered Constitutional Implications of the Pre-Negotiation
Phase
The pre-negotiation phase typically precedes any formal political
agreement between protagonists.29 It usually involves bringing to-
gether key military actors as well as other protagonists, and it is domi-
nated by the short-term imperative of ending violence rather than
establishing the structure for rebuilding.30 Women generally have
limited presence in the pre-negotiation phase.31 As a recent UNIFEM
study notes, no woman has ever been appointed Chief or Lead Peace
Mediator in UN-sponsored peace talks, though some women have
been included by the African Union in teams of conflict mediators.32
While social, legal, and political reasons may be useful in explaining
women’s absence, they do not justify this absence. Pre-negotiations are
dominated by military actors, the result of a single-minded focus on
ending armed contestation and the brutal loss of life and injuries that
accompany it.33 Since military leaders are overwhelmingly male, as are
the armed groups themselves, men are the most obvious participants.
Despite a primary focus on military and security results, this
phase influences the peace process and has constitutional impact.
Many of these agreements produce statements of principles and terms
of reference for proceeding with the peace negotiations.34 Key and
lasting constitutional arrangements will follow from the principles set
in this preliminary phase, so these pre-negotiation agreements pro-
foundly affect women’s lives.35 While lacking binding legal status,
these agreements essentially establish the legal and political frame-
work as well as the legal principles governing the conflict’s end and
the new political dispensation.36 In South Africa, prior to the election
29. Id. at 56-57.
30. See id. at 58 (noting that pre-negotiation issues often deal with determining who
will participate in the negotiations, safeguarding against imprisonment, and limiting the
way in which the war will be waged).
31. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN (UNIFEM), WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION
IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE 1 (2009)
[hereinafter UNIFEM] (noting, however, that the study does not make a distinction between
pre-negotiation and formal negotiations in the data presented).
32. Id.
33. BELL, supra note 12, at 57.
34. Id. at 58.
35. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Eilish Rooney, Underenforcement and Intersectionality:
Gendered Aspects of Transition for Women, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 338, 345 (2007).
36. BELL, supra note 12, at 58. Important constitutional principles first advanced by
these agreements include the notion of “parity of esteem” between the two communities in
Northern Ireland. See id. at 59 (discussing the Downing Street Declaration between the
British and Irish governments); TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND’S ORDEAL, 1966-
1996, AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 461 (Palgrave 2002) (1996) (noting that the Downing
Street Declaration adopted many of these “guiding principles,” including parity of esteem).
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of the National Assembly, thirty-four principles were set down by a
multi-party negotiation process in 1993, which formed the drafting
committee for South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution.37 The prin-
ciples were incorporated into an interim constitution and drawn on for
guidance in the drafting of a final constitution.38 In East Timor, while
women made significant efforts to be involved in the formal constitu-
tional drafting process, some observers have suggested that the final
constitution was largely based on a 1998 draft document that had
been prepared in advance by Fretilin, the dominant political party in
the country.39
In some post-conflict constitution-making, women have sought to
eschew the closed nature of these early pre-agreement deals by setting
their own agenda in advance of such processes and seeking to foreclose
the exclusion they would otherwise experience.40 Colombian femi-
nists, for example, were deeply involved in preempting the Colombian
Constitution in 1991 and organized early and with sufficient voice to
impact the formal and informal processes.41 Success here remains diffi-
cult to measure, but presence within the process was clearly achieved.
In Rwanda, in advance of the constitution drafting and paralleling
the closed processes involving only elite political actors, a seminar
organized by the Rwandan National Assembly convened to consider
ways in which the constitution could be more gender-friendly.42 More
recently, in Iraq, where the gender provisions of the constitution were
keenly watched and scrutinized nationally and internationally, an
international NGO, Women for Women International, met in Jordan
37. Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-
Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 69 (1999).
38. Id.
39. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Constitution of East Timor, May 20, 2002, 1 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 325, 328 (2003) (indicating that the process in which East Timorese women
were able to participate had little impact on the final constitution).
40. See Martha I. Morgan & Mónica María Alzate Buitrago, Constitution-Making in a
Time of Cholera: Women and the 1991 Colombian Constitution, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
353, 355-56 (1991) (“Colombian women outside the Assembly sought to take advantage of
the opening provided by the constitutional process, trying to influence the drafting of the
new Constitution and to set the stage for future legislative struggles over gender justice
in this still classically machista society.”).
41. See, e.g., id. at 375 (describing how Colombian women and feminist organizations
created and sent as many as 1,500 reform proposals to the Constitutional Assembly). Addi-
tionally, once the new constitution was adopted, Women for Democracy promised to field
candidates for the next election, saying: “ ‘Our goal is that half the Congress be women and
that in the next few years we have a presidenta (women president) of the Republic.’ ” Id.
at 398 (quoting Surge movimiento por los derechos politics de la mujer, EL PAIS, July 18,
1991, reprinted in MUJER/FEMPRESS, Sept. 1991, at 21).
42. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (IPU), THE PROCESS OF ENGENDERING A NEW
CONSTITUTION FOR RWANDA 2 (2001), available at http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/
kigali_bi.pdf.
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to produce the report “Our Constitution, Our Future”: Enshrining
Women’s Rights in the Iraqi Constitution, which concluded with a list
of recommendations for constitutional provisions.43 Anticipatory and
early action by women’s organizations on the constitutional dimen-
sions of peace agreements is therefore critical to advancing women’s
interests from the inception of negotiations, both formal and informal.
B. Gendered Implications of Constitutional Design in the Peace
Agreement Phase and the Effect of United Nations Resolutions
Attempting to Mainstream Gender
The pre-negotiation phase generally leads to what Professor Bell
labels “Substantive/Framework agreements.” 44 These agreements
seek to establish a commitment by all the parties to a non-violent
process for resolving differences and to address some, if not all, of the
causes of the conflict.45 Framework agreements are, in some sense,
the classic peace agreements.46 Examples include: “The Burundi Peace
Agreement, the Belfast Agreement, Sierra Leone’s Lomé Accord, and
the South African Interim Constitution . . . .” 47 Framework agree-
ments tackle multiple issues simultaneously and are often framed as
“historic compromises” between enemies.48 They address a range of
issues including demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration
of combatants (DDR), amnesty, and security sector reform. While
their scope includes issues that arise directly from the nature and
form of the hostilities experienced, they also frequently address struc-
tural matters including legal, social, economic, and political reform.49
They set out, as constitutions typically do, preferences concerning
what are essentially political economy matters—how and between
whom power is to be divided and the oversight mechanisms for the
43. See WOMEN FOR WOMEN INT’L, “OUR CONSTITUTION, OUR FUTURE”: ENSHRINING
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION 13-15 (2005), available at http://www
.womenforwomen.org/news-women-for-women/files/conrepweb.pdf (recommending that
forty percent of seats in the legislature be reserved for women).
44. BELL, supra note 12, at 60.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. See, e.g., Natasha Mozgovaya & Barak Ravid, Netanyahu Tells Abbas: I Came to
Washington to Reach Historic Compromise with Palestinians, HAARETZ.COM, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-tells-abbas-i-came-to-washington
-to-reach-historic-compromise-with-palestinians-1.311613.
49. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Gendered Under-Enforcement in the Transitional Justice
11 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-33, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457767 (listing reparations, self-determination,
minority rights, human rights protection, and the reconstruction process itself as struc-
tural matters).
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division of power.50 They sometimes include specific constitutional
manifestos within the agreement, setting forth the procedural basis
upon which such constitutional matters are to be agreed and within
what timetable.51
The framework agreement phase is generally more procedur-
ally inclusive than other negotiation phases, drawing not only on the
groups actively engaged in hostilities but sometimes creating space for
a broader variety of national and international actors and interlopers.
As a result, framework agreements typically include more women,
though the degree of inclusion remains relatively small. UNIFEM
data from a 2009 study of 21 major sample peace processes since
1992 indicates that women’s participation in negotiation delegations
averages at 5.9% of the cases for which data was available.52 Addition-
ally, only 2.4% of signatories to framework peace agreements were
women.53 Moreover, only 16% of peace agreements since 1990 even
contained an explicit reference to women or gender.54 While frame-
work agreements are the high profile and public phase of negotiations
and local parties are sometimes under substantial pressure to include
women as a means to help legitimize the negotiations and interna-
tional involvement, the effect of such pressure appears limited. On the
other hand, external pressure can yield results, such as in East Timor
following the UN Security Council’s establishment of the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).55
Women’s groups in East Timor played a decisive role in pressing
gender issues forward.56 To foster women’s participation in the tran-
sitional processes, the women’s civil society network (REDE) spon-
sored the First Women’s Congress in June 2000.57
50. BELL, supra note 12, at 60-61.
51. An example is Rwanda, where the transitional Government of National Unity
(GNU) created the Legal and Constitutional Commission (LCC) to prepare a draft consti-
tution in consultation with public opinion. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL COMM’N, REPUBLIC
OF RWANDA, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTION FOR RWANDA: ACTION PLAN 2002-2003, at 10 (2002),
available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Rwanda.pdf.
52. UNIFEM, supra note 31, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The
Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and their Agreements, 59 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 941, 954 (2010) (showing that while still low, references to women have
increased from 11% to 27% since Resolution 1325 was passed).
55. See S.C. Res. 1272 (1999), pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272(1999) (Oct. 25, 1999)
(stating that the East Timorese people made their desire to transition toward indepen-
dence known to the United Nations community); see also Ní Aoláin, supra note 49, at 11
(noting that once in place, UNTAET was fully committed to women’s participation in the
constitutional drafting process).
56. See Hilary Charlesworth & Mary Wood, Women and Human Rights in the
Rebuilding of East Timor, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 325, 332 (2002) (identifying the catalyst
to organize a rally in Dili as the widespread violence against women).
57. Id.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on
October 31, 2000, provides critical language reinforcing the signifi-
cance of gender throughout the peace process.58 It mandates that
Member States “ensure increased representation of women at all
decision-making levels . . . for the prevention, management, and
resolution of conflict.” 59 It acknowledges that women have an impor-
tant role “in the prevention and resolution of conflict and in peace-
building” and that women and children constitute “the vast majority
of those adversely affected by armed conflict . . . .” 60 Accordingly, por-
tions of the resolution signify an important step away from stereo-
typing women as victims of conflict, and toward affirming the agency
and capacity that women may exercise in conflict and post-conflict
contexts.61 The resolution is broad ranging, advocating an array of in-
stitutional, structural and inclusive measures to substantively include
women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.62
Including women in the peace negotiation process was a key element,
but data show that this goal remains elusive.63 Substantively, there
has been some change, with the most comprehensive database analy-
sis available confirming that there has been an increase from 11% to
27% in peace agreement references to women since the adoption of
Resolution 1325.64 References alone are not sufficient, however, as
there is some evidence that the mere mentioning of women in some
peace agreements limits, rather than extends, women’s participation
and rights, and there is little evidence in the data that any systematic
approach to addressing women’s rights and needs is occurring across
peace processes and agreements.65 Thus, it is clear that ongoing re-
search indicates that the implementation of Resolution 1325 does
not in fact necessarily deliver better outcomes for women, and that
comparison across peace negotiations and agreements empirically
raises warning flags about the efficacy of 1325 in practice.
Resolution 1325 specifically outlines a set of requirements to
include women in the substantive negotiations involving cessation
58. S.C. Res. 1325 (2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325(2000) (Oct. 31, 2010).
59. Id. ¶ 1. For a critical discussion on the impact of this resolution, see Dianne Otto,
A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 1325, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 139-56 (2006).
60. S.C. Res. 1325 (2000), supra note 58, pmbl.
61. See Otto, supra note 59, at 139 (“The Resolution opened a new space for the pursuit
of women’s participation in the conflict-related decision-making and, through this space,
for the promotion of feminist goals aimed at achieving permanent peace.”).
62. Id. at 140.
63. Id. at 142 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Women, Peace, and Security: Study
Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325
(2000), at 186, U.N. Doc. E.03.IV.I (2002)).
64. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 54, at 956.
65. Id. at 975.
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and resolution of conflict, thereby creating a “soft law” international
obligation to gender equality at the negotiation tables.66 This articu-
lation of legal obligation can provide an access point when dovetailed
with local initiatives that exploit the language of equality often used
by both state and non-state actors. Here, Rwanda again provides an
interesting example in which women were able to utilize the political
rhetoric of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)’s commitment to
gender issues and translate it into actual presence at the constitution-
drafting table.67 Three of the twelve appointed constitutional com-
missioners were women.68 The mere presence of women was not, how-
ever, sufficient in itself to ensure a substantive role in constitutional
negotiations. The combined presence of women with the external pres-
sure generated by women’s organizations and informal political net-
working was necessary to enable a greater set of gains than might
otherwise have been possible.69 The capability of these grassroots
organizations, too, was significantly augmented through domestic and
international support, such that they were able to cast themselves
as central rather than peripheral stakeholders in the transitional
process.70 Rwandan women framed gender as a strategy for national
development and security in the context of an ethnically torn soci-
ety, which was key to their success.71 Another key element was the
speed and strength at which women’s associations grew in the post-
conflict period in Rwanda, supported financially and otherwise by
66. See Otto, supra note 59, at 140-41 (stating that Resolution 1325 is silent on
women’s participation in the Council). It is important to note that the “soft” legal status
of Resolution 1325 is a crucial limitation to its enforcement capacity, compounded by the
lack of implementation requirements and benchmarking on progress within the substance
of the resolution. See Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues
in International Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 11, 22 (2009) (discussing
the structural limitations of Resolution 1325).
67. See Jeanne Izabiliza, The Role of Women in Reconstruction: Experience of
Rwanda 3-4 Presentation Delivered at Empowering Women in the Great Lakes Region:
Violence, Peace, and Women’s Leadership Conference (June 2005), available at http://
unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Role-Women-Rwanda.pdf (noting
that Rwandan women filled positions “in the executive, legislative and judiciary arms of
the government” and were able to use their status as parliamentarians “to advocate for
women’s rights and gender equality”); see also Elizabeth Powley, Rwanda: Women Hold
Up Half the Parliament, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 154, 155 (Julie
Ballington & Azza Karem eds., 2005), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/wip2/
upload/Rwanda.pdf (stating that these new opportunities for women’s involvement is
correlated with the changing gender roles of post-conflict Rwanda).
68. Powley, supra note 67, at 155.
69. Id.
70. See id. (discussing the mobilization efforts of Rwandan women); see also Banks,
supra note 7, at 140 (highlighting the importance of support from “domestically and inter-
nationally influential actors” in “[g]ender-equity advocates . . . becom[ing] core participants
in Rwanda’s constitution-making process”).
71. Banks, supra note 7, at 140.
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UNIFEM and domestically by the Ministry of Gender and Promotion
of Women’s Development.72 This pattern of growth is, we note, gen-
erally at odds with what happens for many women’s organizations in
post-conflict societies, when civil society often collapses from a lack
of more long-term external economic support and from the drain of
key actors to the public sector.73
By way of another example, in East Timor, the First Women’s
Congress in 2000 produced a Platform for Action of the Advancement
of East Timorese Women, which emphasized the need for increased
women’s participation in the transitional administration and the
constitution-drafting process.74 The Platform particularly stressed
that thirty percent of elected decision-making positions should be re-
served for women and recommended a “consultative process for consti-
tution building.” 75 At the same time, a working group on Women and
the Constitution received support from the UNTAET Gender Affairs
Unit (GAU) and organized meetings and consultations with women
nationwide.76 These consultations resulted in a Women’s Charter of
Rights, which received thousands of signatures from East Timorese
women.77 That result, in part, validates the impact that women’s in-
clusion has on the outcomes of peace agreements. The Constituent
Assembly adopted constitutional provisions that specifically addressed
women’s rights.78 While these examples do not definitively prove bet-
ter outcomes for women, they do underscore the necessity of women’s
early involvement with constitution-drafting processes, thereby im-
proving the possibilities for better outcomes. These examples show
that women’s inclusion is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to
deliver gender positive outcomes for women in peace process settings.
The evidence demonstrates that even when women are included
along the lines envisaged by Resolution 1325, as they were in the
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., id. at 141 (suggesting that Rwanda’s unique success may be attributable,
in part, to the modes of citizen participation utilized).
74. Sherrill Whittington, Gender and Peacekeeping: The United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, 28 SIGNS 1283, 1285 (2003).
75. Id.
76. Susanne Alldén, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Women’s Security—Analyzing
Political Outputs in East Timor 14 (Umeå Univ., Umeå Peace and Conflict Studies,
Working Paper No. 1, 2007), available at http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf
?searchID=1&pid=diva2:140444.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 10. For example, Section 6 makes it a State objective to secure “effective
equality of opportunities between women and men.” CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE § 6(j). Section 16 guarantees equality before the law and free-
dom from discrimination based on gender. Id. § 16. Section 17 states that “[w]omen and
men shall have the same rights and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social
and cultural life.” Id. § 17.
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cases of post-conflict Rwanda and East Timor, women remain margin-
alized in ways that confirm and extend pre-existing gender hierarchies
and exclusions. Furthermore, most often there are gaps between the
rhetoric of the peace agreement as constitution and the subsequent
enforcement of gender provisions. In particular, close attention needs
to be paid to gendered forms of enforcement, including which parts of
a peace treaty translate into binding domestic legal norms and which
do not—remaining as lofty under-enforced goals.79
Again, by way of example, while the language of the East Timor-
ese constitution is strong, rhetorical strides were not accompanied
by strong enforcement provisions.80 Thus, although the constitution
establishes an ombudsman to investigate human rights complaints
against public bodies, the office only has the power to recommend that
“ ‘competent organs’ ” take action within the relevant sector of gov-
ernment.81 In the absence of specific constitutional provisions that
address discrimination in employment, education, family law, and
criminal justice, women must rely on the enactment and enforcement
of domestic legislation.82 Moreover, the backdrop to any advancement
for women in East Timor is a significant socio-economic disadvantage
compared to their male counterparts.83 Women suffer higher rates
of malnourishment than men, experience high fertility and mater-
nal death rates, maintain primary responsibility for childcare and
domestic work, and sixty-five percent of East Timorese women are
illiterate.84 This background of socio-economic insecurity, which
hardly surfaces in the constitution itself, is the primary impediment
to women’s full inclusion and political and economic participation.85
Managing the post-conflict transition is a complex enterprise and
often involves deciding which groups and individuals enable, facili-
tate and support a political process of moving beyond violence. For
mediators and facilitators, the management exercise involves decid-
ing whom to include or exclude in peace negotiations. Such determi-
nations are usually made by local and international elites, and the
79. Ní Aoláin, supra note 49, at 30.
80. Charlesworth, supra note 39, at 332.
81. Id. at 333.
82. Susan Harris Rimmer, Surfacing Gender and the Constitution of Timor Leste, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF TIMOR LESTE 3-4 (William Binchy ed., 6th ed. 2009 (citations
omitted)), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042 &context=
susan_harris_rimmer.
83. See id. at 4 (“Women in Timor generally lack political power and representation
in comparison to men, and possess the worst socio-economic indicators of the Timorese
population.” (citations omitted)).
84. Id. at 9.
85. Hilary Charlesworth & Mary Wood, “Mainstreaming Gender” in International Peace
and Security: The Case of East Timor, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (2001).
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ultimate decision on who is invited to the table is linked to and consti-
tutive of the substantive issues included in the peace negotiations.
There is a highly gendered dimension to this process of inclusion and
exclusion. Women are generally not privileged as central to “making
or breaking” elements of a peace agreement, and as a group their
interests are not viewed in any peace process as necessary to framing
the compromises and inducements necessary to kick-start, continue,
or conclude negotiations. Resolution 1325 has had little effect on
this core dynamic.
If and when women operate in a politically strategic way in
advance of a peace agenda, they often frame their initiatives more
generally, rather than in terms of advancing women’s interest per se.
For example, during the course of the Northern Ireland peace negotia-
tions, the Women’s Coalition worked strategically to advance broadly
applicable provisions on social and economic rights protections.86
These measures were not couched in terms of addressing women’s
evident needs, but rather as a means to avoid or utilize sectarian
splintering between opposing Nationalist and Unionist political
parties.87 This is not to suggest that such issues might not benefit
from more generalized application, but instead to acknowledge their
lack of connection to the gendered realities of how poverty and social
needs make women’s social and economic lives virtually invisible. It
is also worth noting that while Resolution 1325 prescribes the in-
clusion of women, it does not mandate gender auditing of the peace
treaty or constitution as a whole to assess if women’s interests are
best served by the final agreed document.88
Having women present and engaging meaningfully with the
issues that directly concern women throughout constitutional deal-
making is critical in both the conflict and post-conflict setting. Con-
stitutional documents matter profoundly in systems where the rule
of law has been denigrated, manipulated, or rendered irrelevant by
the unbridled exercise of power. In multiple states, women experience
social, economic, and political disadvantages, and such detriments are
generally exacerbated by violent communal conflicts.89 The exclusion
86. See KATE FEARON, WOMEN’S WORK: THE STORY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND
WOMEN’S COALITION 87 (1999) (“In a divided society like Northern Ireland, the NIWC
argued, there was a need for effective recognition of a range of communal rights and the
development of the concept of equality of treatment and respect for groups.”).
87. Id. at 86-87.
88. See S.C. Res. 1325 (2000), supra note 58, passim (listing the extensive specific
recommendations regarding the treatment and inclusion of women, but including no
specific mandate for broader consideration of women’s issues).
89. See Naomi Cahn, Dina Haynes & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Returning Home: Women
in Post-Conflict Societies, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 339, 343-44 (2010) (“In many countries, the
2011] GENDERING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 525
of women from constitution- and rule-making settings perpetuates
these disadvantages and offers little active opportunity for advancing
goals with distinctly gendered dimensions. Constitutional documents
are symbolically important in providing a message to both national
and international constituencies about the creation of a new legal
order, complete with rectifying prior deficiencies of the law. Consti-
tutions embody the state’s values, historical experiences, its memories,
and its sense of the forward-looking element of state rebuilding.90 As
a result, marginalizing women in the constitutional negotiation space
during transition has powerful and practical resonance.
The continuation of customary systems as the focal point of
legal remedy for women, especially in relation to family law, prop-
erty, and inheritance rights, indisputably undercuts any social and
political advancements that may have been incidentally reaped by
the social upheaval of conflict and the intervention and oversight of
international actors. Customary law settings often do not generally
protect women’s rights nor promote their equality. What makes consti-
tutional negotiations and peace agreements so important for women
is that they provide a meaningful political and legal tool to address
these deficits and entrench new social and legal understandings af-
firming the equality, autonomy, and agency. This point was cogently
recognized by the Kenyan Constitutional Review Commission’s re-
port, which required that “[c]ustomary rules must conform to con-
stitutional principles.” 91 The Commission’s report was significantly
shaped by a 2002 report entitled Gender and Constitution Making
in Kenya.92 While constitutions cannot be an instant panacea for
women’s long-standing and deeply gendered cultural and social
low level of women’s education, their lack of power, and cultural obstacles to women’s
equality hamper improvements in women’s status and health even as the country as a
whole seeks to recover.” (citation omitted)).
90. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 530 (1999)
(“Constitutions can flourish and succeed only if they are firmly planted in the cultural soil
from which they gain legitimacy.”).
91. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA REVIEW COMM’N, THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE 16 (2002)
[hereinafter THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE], available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/
d0000008/index.php. This 2002 Report was commissioned and published by the Heinrich
Böll Foundation. The new Kenyan Constitution was defeated by a referendum in 2005 and
its future remains uncertain. Kenya Referendum 2010, WORDPRESS (Aug. 8, 2010, 3:35
PM), http://welections.wordpress.com/2010/08/06/kenya-referendum-2010.
92. See, e.g., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE, supra note 91, at 15-16 (explaining the Commis-
sion’s commitment to gender equality and equity, and further outlining specific rights
the draft constitution promises to women); see also HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG, GENDER
POLITICS MAKES A DIFFERENCE: EXPERIENCES OF THE HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION
ACROSS THE WORLD 11-12 (2009), available at http://boellnigeria.org/downloads/Gender
_Politics_Web.pdf (noting that the Heinrich Böll Foundation continues to be active in the
political process by ensuring Kenyan women’s political participation).
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exclusions, they do provide an opportunity to begin the process of
meaningful social change.93
Constitutional compacts must address substantive as well as
formal equality for women, no matter what the legal formula for
advancement may be.94 We recognize that this is a complex and long-
term task, one that is not merely reliant on law to achieve its desired
ends. Substantive equality encompasses positive programs to ame-
liorate disadvantage, and it involves upending a set of agreed under-
standings across cultures and contexts about how women and men
relate to one another and gain benefits, status, and protection in
society.95 Its import would not only transform women’s lives but would
profoundly recalibrate men’s lives. The negotiation of such compacts
is invariably complex. An obvious point to be made is that in societies
that have significant social stability and trust, there may be greater
capacity for movement in gender roles than in societies which present
with distrust, limited social mobility, and restricted role adjustment.
Substantive equality entails both positive and negative rights, and
this lens has significant resource implications for states and interna-
tional institutions (in part an ongoing explanation for the hesitancy
in compliance).96 When women’s agency and equality are addressed,
women’s inclusion in, access to, and effective participation in decision-
making, both in the political-legal sense and with respect to one’s
person, can also be tackled.97
C. Gendered Dimensions of Constitutional Drafting in
Implementation Agreements
Once the substantive framework for peace has been negotiated,
the final phase involves implementing the peace through agreements
which provide further details on how the transition process will actu-
ally work.98 Such agreements are treaty documents that typically
93. See IRVING, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing how constitutions can be a means for
affecting social change and eradicating perceived injustices); Ní Aoláin, supra note 49,
at 9 (discussing the inclusion of women and women’s issues in the peacemaking process
as a “panacea”).
94. See IRVING, supra note 8, at 2 (“Formal equality offers the same rights, conditions,
and opportunities to women and men. It treats women and men as alike, as deserving of
equal and similar treatment. . . . The concept of substantive equality, in contrast, recog-
nizes that formal equality can produce unequal results; where similar treatment is offered
to persons who are not similarly situated, further disadvantage for the disadvantaged may
be the outcome.”).
95. Id. at 2-3.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. See BELL, supra note 12, at 62 (noting that at this stage in the process details begin
to be fleshed out and the actual framework is finalized).
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establish broad parameters for moving forward, rather than itemizing
the particular steps necessary to reform the political, social, economic,
and security sectors.99 To do so with the requisite specificity would
often be beyond the scope of the peace negotiators’ capacity to achieve
compromises across the enormous array of contested issues with
numerous parties. Negotiators understand that peace processes in-
volving combatant groups and states formerly engaged in violence are
risky for the participants.100 Peace negotiations pose acute dilemmas
for these groups whose base constituencies may have divergent needs,
and the participants constantly risk being out-flanked by political and
insurgent groupings outside the negotiations process, undermining
their capacity to make and deliver the “deal” for their particular com-
munity.101 These balancing and risk dimensions explain the construc-
tive ambiguity that often typifies peace agreements. Consequently,
it is during the implementation stage, as specific details are worked
out, that the actual political compromises become solidified. There are
very practical, and not always positive, consequences for women when
substantial aspects of necessary political, social, and accountability
compromises are left to subsequent and ongoing negotiations.102 A
good example of the this kind of implementation staging includes the
creation of the Patten Commission in Northern Ireland to address the
contentious issues of policing and the establishment of the Criminal
Justice Review to address reforms in the criminal justice system.103
Both processes (and their terms of reference) rolled out long past when
the Good Friday Peace Agreement had been signed.104 By the time
such important (and relevant) bodies were established, the input by
women to framing their terms of reference was negligible, and the
representation of women on the expert bodies designed to review,
agree upon, and implement change was minimal.105
99. Id. at 63.
100. Id. at 62-63.
101. Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, The Sharp End, Armed Opposition Groups in
Transition (2010) (paper on file with authors).
102. See Ní Aoláin, supra note 49, at 13-14 (“[M]uch of the difficult work of real compro-
mise can be left to the implementation phase, where both genuine opportunity and pitfalls
centred on enforcement (or not) exist for women.” (citation omitted)).
103. Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Local Meets Global: Transitional Justice
in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 871, 890 (2003); Kieran McEvoy & John
Morison, Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition, and Peacemaking in
Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 961, 981-82 (2003).
104. Campbell & Ní Aoláin, supra note 103, at 890; McEvoy & Morison, supra note
103, at 981-82.
105. See Campbell & Ní Aoláin, supra note 103, at 890 (discussing the implementation
of criminal justice reforms); McEvoy & Morison, supra note 103, at 981-82 (discussing the
time frame of the establishment of the Patten Commission).
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While implementation agreements may appear to have a limited
purpose in that they merely provide detail and specificity to principles
already agreed upon during peace negotiations, the reality is different.
Implementation becomes an ongoing, contested, and highly variable
arena engaging multiple actors—not only those whose views framed
the peace negotiations.106 In many post-conflict settings there is re-
trenchment on the political compromises previously made, as ele-
ments of the peace deal prove unpopular with certain political entities
and thus renegotiation or spoiler opportunities are sought. Some
political parties view the micro sites of implementation as a way to
revisit and regain losses (perceived or actual) in other parts of the
negotiation process. Other visible strategies in this phase include
determined stagnation where political parties deliberately prevent
advancement to avoid enforcement-specific aspects of the peace agree-
ment. In this way, the content of the peace agreement becomes vir-
tually meaningless in practice because there is no actual political will
to see the agreements through; these are agreements without any
intention to perform.
In affirming the importance of the implementation phase, we see
a pressing need for both national and international constituencies
to provide better financial and political support as well as for a focus
within the society on the relationship between implementation and ad-
vancing women’s rights.107 A cogent example of protracted implemen-
tation is the twelve-year negotiation of a Bill of Rights in Northern
Ireland derived from a general commitment in the Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement to entrenching rights protections.108 The Bill of Rights pro-
cess has facilitated a lengthy period of public consultation and engage-
ment with multiple communities and diverse groups.109 Such enforced
and ongoing consultation has numerous advantages when long-term
and consistent engagement with the causes of conflict is sought. The
engagement creates an ongoing space of public and civic contestation
that has the capacity to engage women and their concerns in ways
that may be much more constrained in time-bounded short-term
106. BELL, supra note 12, at 62.
107. A separate constitutional convention might be called to advance the specific work
of agreement on legal principles and values. The success of such approaches for advancing
women’s interests and needs remains open. Nonetheless, results and success for women
have been mixed, as we discuss in Section IV.
108. See Anne Smith, The Drafting Process of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, U.
ULSTER PUB. L. 526, 526-27 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1504569 (providing an in-depth look at the difficulties in the Bill of Rights
negotiation process).
109. See id. at 531 (describing how various individuals—including children, trade
unions, church groups, and political parties—were all part of the consultation process).
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negotiation processes.110 Negatively, long, drawn out processes can
be used as a delaying tactic to avoid compromise and negotiation
and further alienate those constituencies that seek transformative
outcomes in the short-term as proof of commitment to the peace
process itself.111
We see both the pitfalls and the potential benefits to implemen-
tation agreements for women. Critical to the success of a gendered
post-conflict agreement is ensuring that women remain aware of the
necessity of engagement in this phase and are actively supported in
doing so. Where international interveners are involved, their appreci-
ation that this is an arena where women can lose out substantively
means that their attention to the modalities of meaningful consulta-
tion and participation is vital.
The tightrope that women walk here is that the political space
they occupy can be essentialized by holding women out as being
predisposed to forgiveness and reconciliation or to certain kinds of
political and social arrangements over others. The Northern Ireland
negotiations, for example, illustrate both the capacity of women to
cast gender as central to the agreements (by using the momentum
towards finalized political agreements to create a women’s political
party which was included into the core of the negotiation process)
and the extent to which, in order to ‘keep’ negotiations on track, the
Women’s Coalition became the de facto facilitator between the war-
ring ethno-religious political factions largely dominated by men.112
Women face significant barriers to involvement in the implemen-
tation phase. The first is a barrier of time. Specifically, women often
do not have the ability or support to divert their attention from the
burden of care-giving and other responsibilities of the home to be
free to engage in the politics of the moment. Second is the barrier of
capacity. Women are often not provided with the support necessary
to become political actors. Both elements are organically linked. After
all, the end of violent public conflict does not usually mean an end
to violence for women, and thus the post-conflict environment is not
inevitably a secure space for women.113 This lack of security has a
110. See, e.g., id. at 531 (discussing the role of public participation in the drafting of the
Bill of Rights).
111. See, e.g., id. at 534 (asking whether the Northern Ireland Rights Commission’s task
was an “unwelcome distraction . . . as it detracted time, resources and effort from its other
statutory duties”).
112. For a more detailed discussion of the extensive role played by the NIWC in the
Northern Ireland peace negotiations, see FEARON, supra note 86, at 69-121.
113. See Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay & Meredeth Turshen, There is No Aftermath for
Women, in THE AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 3, 8-9 (Sheila
Meintjes et al. eds., 2001) (noting that “the return to peace is invariably conceptualised as
a return to the gender status quo”).
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profound practical effect on women’s capacity to engage in ongoing
political negotiations when hostilities have formally ended; they
may not have the physical security necessary to participate, nor the
political security to be included.
With respect to timing, international actors often still operate in
emergency mode throughout the peace negotiation phase and some-
times well into the implementation phase.114 Typically this means that
tasks that ought to be engaged in with a long-term view are managed
through a short-term “putting out fires” responsive approach.115 In
emergency mode, women’s issues tend to fare poorly, as security
issues and political rights—without gender-central consciousness—
are prioritized.116 The implementation of economic and social rights,
which impact women heavily, tends to be set aside while “urgent
matters” are undertaken. This view of what is urgent and what is not
is extremely short-sighted.117 Understanding the mechanics of how
and in what stages the end to conflict is negotiated, as well as how
substantive principles and legal frameworks are agreed to and at
which junctures they are implemented, is crucial to assessing how
to reframe the negotiation process to ensure that women are repre-
sented and that fairness and equality of outcomes for women result
from such processes.
Furthermore, even as the end of public violence creates signifi-
cant economic and social pressures for women, financial and economic
stresses significantly limit the capacity of many women to remain
engaged in post-conflict implementation negotiations.118 While tran-
sitional constitutions have almost invariably—and regrettably—been
framed as documents regulating the political and social relationships
between individuals and the state, they are under-utilized and under-
tasked as bearers of social and economic rights.119 This comports with
a narrow view of what substantive equality entails in many consti-
tutional contexts. As implementation agreements are rarely “one stop
114. See Dina Francesca Haynes, The Deus ex Machina Descends: The Laws, Priorities
and Players Central to the International Administration of Post-Conflict Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION 3, 22-27 (Dina Francesca Haynes
ed., 2008) (discussing the Bosnian process of moving out of “emergency mode”).
115. Id. at 25-27.
116. See id. at 22-23 (explaining that the areas focused on in this transitional period are
“democratization, human rights, safety and security, and rule of law”).
117. See id. at 25-26 (noting that in reacting to more pressing immediate concerns,
choices are not always made with long-term needs in mind).
118. See Meintjes et al., supra note 113, at 8-10 (discussing women’s failure to remain
engaged after the cessation of violence).
119. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of addressing social and economic
rights). Notably, the South African Interim Constitution contained numerous articles deal-
ing with economic, cultural and social rights, and was hugely criticized in the West for such
inclusions. Infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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shopping” and are instead spread out over a number of highly frag-
mented areas, the capacity of key civic sectors to remain engaged is
limited. In the Northern Ireland context, this point is illustrated by
the creation of a separate and wide-ranging review of policing (the
Patten Commission),120 a disconnected review and reform process for
the criminal justice system,121 a fractured set of initiatives to address
the needs of victims implemented between 1998 and 2010,122 and the
devolution of the Bill of Rights writing process.123 All of these micro-
processes were highly politically-charged and extraordinarily time
consuming.124 Engagement in any one process required a significant
amount of legal and policy capacity and the ability to direct it at that
one issue with concentrated focus; that kind of broader political capa-
bility was simply not possible in the women’s sector. Thus, the prac-
tical inability of an under-funded women’s civil society initiative to
stay involved in all of these conversations illustrates how the imple-
mentation phase can be the most challenging to women’s interests
and needs.
Civil society organizations, of which women’s organizations form
a key component, experience significant setbacks and challenges in
the post-conflict context that specifically impact implementation.125
These include the withdrawal of funding by international and local
donors on the basis that, as the “war is over,” the funding can be
better spent elsewhere.126 For example, in East Timor, funding to
civil society, including women’s organizations, was dwarfed by the
over-emphasis on acute peacekeeping concerns at the expense of
developing long-term civil society capacity.127 The underfunding was
compounded by UNTAET’s decision to phase out the humanitarian
120. McEvoy & Morison, supra note 103, at 981-82.
121. Campbell & Ní Aoláin, supra note 103, at 890.
122. See id. (describing the creation of institutions to address victims’ needs).
123. See Smith, supra note 108, at 531-32 (noting the delay in the finalization of the
Bill of Rights).
124. See Campbell & Ní Aoláin, supra note 103, at 887 (explaining that political
interests will inevitably be involved in the post-conflict agreement process).
125. See Christine Bell & Johanna Keenan, Human Rights Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Problems of Transition, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 330 passim (2004)
(describing that changes accompanying peace agreements—in both the issues that are
considered important and the “players” with whom NGOs must interact—cause new
difficulties to arise).
126. Id. at 354-55 (citing INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, LOCAL PERSPECTIVES:
FOREIGN AID TO THE JUSTICE SECTOR (2000)).
127. Vijaya Joshi, Creating and Limiting Opportunities: Women’s Organizing and the
UN in East Timor, Address Before the Challenges and Possibilities Public Forum (Sept. 10,
2005), in CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WOMEN
IN TIMOR-LESTE, A WEEKEND OF REFLECTION, DIALOGUE AND COLLABORATION, 22
(Damian Grenfell & Anna Trembath eds., 2007), available at http://mams.rmit.edu.au/
gcklk6oc7pk4.pdf.
532 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:509
and rehabilitation pillar that supported civil society in 2000.128 This
lack of material support alongside ongoing public violence and broken
governmental institutions meant that women’s hopes of security,
social empowerment, and political participation languished.129 Fur-
thermore, a “brain drain” was created within women’s organization
as specialized personnel within civil society moved into new post-
conflict institutions.130
What this means in practice is that while the implementation
stage continues to press ahead with enormous political and legal
changes, many with a constitutional hue, women’s organizations are
often the least well-prepared to address and impact the process, and
are the most likely to be excluded. If we abandon the notion that the
key constitutional challenges or changes are neatly held within the
scope of one document or one singular process, we gain a more
nuanced understanding of how women’s needs and issues are likely
to be left out of constitutional conversations in post-conflict societies.
III. SUBSTANCE: THE MISSING PIECES FOR WOMEN
In addition to ensuring gender centrality in the process for
developing the constitutional elements of a political settlement, it
is critical to assess whether the substance specifically addresses the
particularity and totality of women’s membership in the political,
economic, and social communities of the state. These elements need
to be assessed across all three dimensions we have outlined in the
previous section, namely during the principle-setting stage, in formal
agreements, and as part of implementation arrangements. Making
gender central in all these settings requires more than mainstream-
ing approaches; it also requires starting from the women’s point of
view and making a vision of gender equality a central benchmark of
successful outcomes.
In general, there has been a tendency to scrutinize such docu-
ments—where they are scrutinized at all—only with reference to
128. Id.
129. See id. at 19 (explaining how the focus on funding the peacekeeping initiatives
at the expense of other spending impacted women). “[W]omen’s activism that did not
directly threaten the power of the police or military . . . were encouraged by UNTAET.
Other kinds of activism . . . were largely ignored by UNTAET.” Id.
130. See, e.g., Manuela Leong Pereira, Hand-in-Hand Towards Progress, Address
Before the Challenges and Possibilities Public Forum (Sept. 9, 2005), in CHALLENGES
AND POSSIBILITIES: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WOMEN IN TIMOR-LESTE, A
WEEKEND OF REFLECTION, DIALOGUE AND COLLABORATION, 17 (Damian Grenfell & Anna
Trembath eds., 2007), available at http://mams.rmit.edu.au/gcklk6oc7pk4.pdf (noting that
“[c]onstant changes of personnel . . . risk[ed the] project’s continuity”).
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provisions that deal specifically or generally with sex equality or the
prohibition of sex discrimination.131 Other options in this equality-
oriented approach include deciding between “limiting classifications
based on sex or protecting the class of women,” “reaching only state
discrimination or reaching private discrimination as well,” “guaran-
teeing affirmative rights to the material preconditions for equality,”
and “setting forth only judicially enforceable or also broadly aspira-
tional equality norms.”132 These are all useful and pragmatic guide-
lines. Nonetheless, without eschewing the value of including such
provisions across all post-conflict negotiation phases and documents,
we want to suggest some limitations to this approach.
The first is that such a focus tends to assume that rights-confer-
ring provisions are the only means through which a constitution’s
impact on gender can be viewed. Rights are important and need be in-
cluded, but feminists and policy makers need to pay close attention to
other matters as well.133 The other matters we would endorse include
the definition of citizen, the impact on women of major architectural
choices such as the models of government (federalist, parliamentary
or presidential; theocratic or secular),134 the form of representation
(including in particular the use of quotas),135 and gendering the insti-
tutions that adjudicate on the constitution (notably its constitutional
court). Across all these substantive arenas, gender input and gender
audit is vital. Section 187 of the South African Constitution is the only
example of a constitutionally mandated entity created by a transi-
tional negotiation process that oversees and enforces such broad com-
pliance across all segments of the negotiation and implementation
phases.136 It provides for a Commission for Gender Equality, whose
131. See, e.g., IRVING, supra note 8, at 28-29 (describing that rights are only one con-
sideration of constitution-making); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing
Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 747 (2002) (posing the hypothetical question:
“[w]hat choices would a hypothetical set of feminist drafters face if they were to consti-
tutionalize women’s equality from scratch?” and then offering a typology largely based
on equality provisions).
132. Sullivan, supra note 131, at 747.
133. IRVING, supra note 8, at 29 (stressing the dangers of focusing on a “rights-centered
paradigm [that] overlooks structurally prior questions surrounding constitutional design
of the institutions in which the judges who interpret and enforce the rights are appointed
and work”).
134. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J.
2643, 2644 (2006) (suggesting that the singular executive with plenary power based on
a model of masculine authority is “the model least likely to result in women’s ascending
to executive office”).
135. See, e.g., Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J.
DEMOCRACY 96, 96-97 (2004) (suggesting that among the wide array of constitutional
models available to newly independent countries, consociational models may offer a better
model for deeply fractured societies).
136. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 187.
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functions include “promot[ing] respect for gender equality and the
protection, development and attainment of gender equality.”137 The
Commission has specifically designated powers under the consti-
tution “to monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise and
report on issues concerning gender equality.”138 While its impact has
been limited139 and a full exploration of its operation is beyond the
scope of this analysis, it is unusual precisely because of its constitu-
tional identity, portending how innovative constitutional design can
anchor gender in ways that are helpful to centralizing the discourse
about women into the mainstream of political and social life.
Overall, there is tendency for post-conflict interventions and re-
sponses to be myopic in terms of their foci and the definition of prob-
lems to be resolved.140 Such narrowing fails to capture the variety and
complexity of women’s experiences and is ultimately detrimental to
the protection of women’s broadly construed rights and interests. A
particular deficiency following a pattern of modeling on western con-
stitutional instruments, dominated by an emphasis on the protection
of the civil and political dimensions of the presumed gender-neutral
citizen and frequently couched as negative rights, has been the limited
engagement with a broader set of substantive protections, namely
social, economic, and cultural rights.141 As a result, formalized equal-
ity may be satisfied by including provisions on non-discrimination but
may fail to advance women substantively.142
As the end of hostilities is negotiated, we are increasingly seeing
the emergence of violent street protests and riots in countries that are
technically post-conflict.143 Significantly, post-conflict tensions and
“violence often arise[ ] out of the same types of socioeconomic griev-
ances that caused earlier periods of political violence and human
rights violations.”144 This is cogent validation of the need to address
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, ‘No Nation Can Be Free When One Half of
it is Enslaved’: Constitutional Equality for Women in South Africa, in THE GENDER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 230, 237 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds.,
2005).
140. See Haynes, supra note 114, at 25-27 (discussing the short-sighted priorities in
many post-conflict settings).
141. Duggan et al., supra note 22, at 197.
142. See, e.g., Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 139, at 241 (“[W]hile the equality case
law of the Constitutional Court contains the potential for progressive and tranformative
gender equality jurisprudence, there has been limited success in achieving gender equality
through litigation.”).
143. Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework,
2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 331, 331 (2008).
144. Id.
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broader social and economic disparities and inequities and to confront
“structural violence,” referring to the entrenched socioeconomic con-
ditions that cause poverty, exclusion, and inequality.145 As one scholar
has noted, “social and economic grievances can be ‘powder kegs’ that,
if left unaddressed, threaten to blow up peace initiatives.”146 The con-
stitutional process, and more generally the transitional processes,
must be cognizant of the causality of prior socio-economic inequalities
to conflict and conceptualize reform accordingly.147 This requires cen-
tralizing the conversations about inequities and redistribution at the
core of the constitutional compacts that are advanced in post-conflict
societies. This, in turn, means promoting and strengthening the par-
ticipatory mechanisms for constitutional negotiations that address
conditions of historical exclusion contributing to political marginali-
zation.148 Ultimately, however, participation without the capacity to
affect and influence political and economic agendas is futile and may
be counterproductive, creating expectations that are not met and
failing to address the lived realities of social and economic disen-
franchisement on the ground.149
Specific substantive rights important to women’s daily lives
might be addressed in constitutional design as well, for example,
women’s reproductive rights. We know that women who experience
early, frequent, and repeated pregnancies are most at risk for serious
and long-term health outcomes.150 Childbirth remains a risky medical
experience for many women, and maternal deaths are still a signifi-
cant feature of world mortality demographics.151 All of these risks are
heightened in violent and conflicted societies, where pregnancy and
violent sexual assault overlap and where access to any form of medical
intervention for the trauma of rape, pregnancy, childbirth, and post-
childbirth complications, including fistulas and FGM complications,
145. PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW
WAR ON THE POOR 8 (2d ed. 2005).
146. Ismael Muvingi, Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional
Societies, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 163, 163 (2009).
147. Id. at 178.
148. This kind of thinking is also clearly evident in the development sector. For example,
the World Bank’s Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook now calls for “the
expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, in-
fluence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives.” EMPOWERMENT
AND POVERTY REDUCTION: A SOURCEBOOK 14 (Deepa Narayan ed., 2002).
149. See id. at 16, 18 (explaining that participation alone is not enough to create change).
150. IRVING, supra note 8, at 200-01.
151. See CARLA ABOUZAHR & TESSA WARDLAW, MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2000:
ESTIMATES DEVELOPED BY WHO, UNICEF, AND UNFPA 2 (2004), available at http://www
.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/who-saf-22oct.pdf (providing detailed statistics and
research regarding maternal health and mortality).
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will be exceptionally limited.152 In addition to the broader rationale
for the inclusion of reproductive rights in new constitutional dispen-
sations, such pressing prior histories point to the relationship be-
tween constitutional settlements and the broader restitution which
takes place in violent communities. Addressing reproductive rights
then serves multiple purposes, not only increasing quality of life for
women, but also acknowledging and addressing the unique perspec-
tive of women with regard to what constitutes adequate restitution
for violations of their personal and bodily integrity.153
A final piece of this substantive overview is terminology. Gen-
dered words matter, and constitutions are rife with them.154 As one
scholar noted, “[n]otwithstanding the assumed reversibility of the
masculine rule, it is unlikely that the use of the feminine pronoun
is ever intended to embrace the masculine”155 and, as other feminists
have long noted, it is not by mere accident that “he” has been em-
ployed to cover all individuals, both in legal instruments and general
written and spoken discourse.156 In some transitional contexts, the use
of language has starkly reversed assumptions.157 For example, in the
drafting of the South African Constitution, an executive decision was
made by Cyril Ramphosa to employ “women and men” throughout
the document, even, for example, in the provisions addressing the
appointment of the national commissioner for police service.158 The
point is not merely cosmetic but subtly acknowledges that constitu-
tional language itself functions to reorder and reconfigure society.159
152. See WOMEN AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 11 (citation omitted) (discussing the
increased health risks and decreased healthcare access of women in conflict situations).
153. See IRVING, supra note 8, at 206-07 (describing the risks of not specifically
addressing reproductive rights in constitutions).
154. See, e.g., id. at 40-42 (“[A]ttempts at gender-inclusive language are not merely a
matter of legal precision and formal inclusion. They involve recognition of language as a
form of representation . . . .”).
155. Id. at 42.
156. See, e.g., Sandra Petersson, Locating Inequality—The Evolving Discourse on Sexist
Language, 32 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56-68 (1998) (discussing feminist theories on the
sexism of legal language and the so-called “masculine rule”).
157. See, e.g., Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa’s
Final Constitution, 23 U. ARK. L. REV. 809, 827-29 (2001) (discussing the gender-friendly
language in the South African Constitution).
158. Id. at 829.
159. A case that came before the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Bhe v. Magistrate,
is an example emphasizing how words matter in constitutional language. Bhe v. Magistrate
2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). Bhe concerned a 1993 constitutional challenge to the cus-
tomary rule of male primogeniture in inheritance, as codified in the South African Black
Administration Act. The presiding judge found that the removal of gender discrimination
in inheritance was consistent with the preamble of the South African Constitution. Id.
paras. 49-50.
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Again, this point is important to remember when looking across all
three sites of constitutional agreement and enforcement.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS—FORWARD OR BACKWARD?
Conflicted societies hold the political imagination of many watch-
ing states, in part because their moment of transition allows for the
possibility of transformation. For the watching international com-
munity, as well as for groups within the state who articulate the need
for powerful and incisive social change as a means to address the
causes of conflict, the constitutional moment is real and powerful. It
is invested with both symbolic and practical meaning.160
For women, the constitutional question is, in part, whether the
constitutional moment (however constructed) actually promises a
gender-neutral capacity for transformation on equal terms. In many
societies transitioning from violence, there is a significant interplay
between the need for political transformation on the basis of equality
and non-discrimination and the need to address the causes of conflict.
In some societies, the explicit recognition of minority and group rights
through the process of conflict resolution plays an important role in
defining the terms of the constitutional conversation. In these broader
political conversations, women are of course implicitly present, as
members of minorities and of other groups. They are in view, but the
complexity of their position as both women and minorities is rarely
fully textured into the conversation.161 The essential premise of many
negotiation processes is the reform or revision of political processes
to enable the inclusion of non-state entities (which have a high over-
lap with minority or outsider groupings) into the mainstream polit-
ical processes. The essential goal is to move the arena of political
dispute from violent contestation into the democratic context, where
difference is negotiated through a structured political process.162
Even in this highly clipped version of the priorities of the politi-
cal reform process, women are not in view and are not central to the
160. See András Sajó, Constitution Without the Constitutional Moment: A View from
New Member States, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 243, 251 (2005) (noting the special nature of
constitutional moments).
161. “As . . . the director of the Gaza Center for Women noted, ‘The women are like army
reservists. When they are essential they are used, and when they are no longer needed,
they are sent back to their place.’ ” Andrea Bopp, Book Note, The Palestine-Israeli Peace
Negotiations and their Impact on Women, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 339, 353 (1996)
(reviewing HANAN ASHRAWI, THIS SIDE OF PEACE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT (1995) (citing
Nora Boutsamy, Gaza Women Fear Peace Has a Price, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1994, at A01)).
162. Bell & Keenan, supra note 125, at 338.
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political sphere. Although women do come into view now, as man-
dated by UN Security Council Resolution 1325, their representation
is often aligned with the group to whom they are related by ethnicity,
tribe or religion, rather than as women per se. This problem mani-
fests the ongoing reality of essentialization for women in conflict and
post-conflict settings.
As noted above, negotiation processes privilege elites, including
both state and non-state actors. The question of how the transfor-
mation of political institutions and structures is conducted and who
participates in this process is of fundamental importance to the re-
structuring of relationships within any new dispensation. Constitu-
tional standards and principles frequently frame how that change is
constructed and understood. Institutional transformation enables the
redistribution of state or regime power and benefit within a future
rights and equality framework.163 The substance and form of institu-
tional reform is a complex issue in transitioning societies and ulti-
mately involves striking a balance of compromise between elite men
already in power and their willingness to share such power and benefit
with men seeking it.164 An under-appreciated aspect of peace agree-
ment enforcement is the way in which gaps between the framework
agreement and its enforcement in the implementation phase serve to
undercut the overall reform process and can, in fact, undo elemental
aspects of the “deal” itself.165 When this dynamic emerges in highly
fragile transitional contexts, the gap or enforcement problem can func-
tion to create the conditions that bring about a return to violence by
combatant groups.166
Constitutional reform is frequently framed broadly in peace agree-
ments, but for pragmatic reasons of space, expertise, and specificity,
the details of constitutional revision are rarely found in framework
agreements. As such, women, if poorly or marginally represented at
the negotiation process, may have limited ability to frame legal reform
in terms of a women’s agenda. Importantly, there is also a clear mar-
ginalization of equality and economic reforms in the constitutional con-
versations that have generally dominated conflicted and post-conflict
163. In this case, the law is seen as a complex set of practices with material and political
effects. See, e.g., Joanne Conaghan, Law, Harm, and Redress: A Feminist Perspective, 22
LEGAL STUD. 319, 323 (2002) (explaining the law’s impact on daily life).
164. See BELL, supra note 12, at 56-57 (“For parties to a long-term conflict, any move to
the negotiating table is a trial and error process linked to whether they perceive themselves
as getting more at the table than on the battle field.”).
165. See id. at 62-63 (describing how implementation agreements often involve renego-
tiation).
166. See, e.g., id. at 65 (giving examples of splinter groups emerging based on dissatis-
faction with peace agreements).
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societies.167 The marginalization of substance and representation
constitutes a double-blow to advancing women’s interests and needs
in constitutional decision-making.
A further complication is that the point of transition may not
necessarily mean transformation for women, but rather may have
retrograde elements that negatively impact gains that women have
made in their status and personal lives through the course of a con-
flict.168 In the transition phase, “the nationalist project circumscribes
the impulse to women’s social transformation and autonomy; this
project constructs women as purveyors of the community’s accepted
and acceptable cultural identity.”169 The point is most cogently illus-
trated by studying the complex role that women have played in the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ongoing struggle
for Palestinian statehood. In 1965, the PLO established the General
Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) with the stated aim of creating
more robust opportunities for women in social, political and economic
life.170 This was supplemented and extended by the establishment of
women’s committees by Fatah and other nationalist and socialist
parties in the 1970s.171 In addition, a wider and generally secular
women’s network emerged through the creation of civil society NGOs
and research centers throughout Gaza and the West Bank.172 Yet, in
the face of long-term occupation, related violence, economic insecurity,
and political infighting, instead of seeing a robust role for women in
the public sphere, in recent years Palestinian society has witnessed
a reactionary retrenchment of traditional gender roles.173
There can be a Janus-faced dimension to constitutional devel-
opments for women. An examination of the Basic Law of Palestine,
for example, an evolutionary document intended to become a final
167. See Muvingi, supra note 146, at 167. The author lists three factors that contribute
to this marginalization:
(1) a preoccupation with the cessation of violence and the transfer of power;
(2) the subservience of social and economic rights in the dominant human
rights discourse and practice; and (3) the dominance of the neoliberal free
market global paradigm, which is perceived as the only viable path to devel-
opment and human well-being.
Id.
168. See Rita Manchanda, Ambivalent Gains in South Asian Conflicts, in THE
AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 99, 100 (Sheila Meintjes et al.
eds., 2001) (noting that scholars are “sceptical [sic] of the possibility of protracted conflict
effecting desirable structural transformations . . .”).
169. Id.
170. Fadwa Allabadi, Controversy: Secular and Islamist Women in Palestinian Society,
15 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 181, 182 (2008).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 185.
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constitution once the state of Palestine is formed, illustrates a set
of highly fragmented and contradictory developments for women.174
Positively, both the Basic Law and the Draft Constitution set out gen-
eral human rights clauses applicable to both genders.175 They also
contain some gender specific provisions. For example, Article 9 of the
Basic Law, the Equality Clause, states that “[a]ll Palestinians are
equal under the law and judiciary, without discrimination because
of race, sex, color, religion, political views or disability.”176 These lofty
provisions, however, are tempered by the parallel confirmation in the
Draft Constitution that “Shari’a will be a ‘major source’ for legisla-
tion.”177 Additionally, “the Draft Constitution also places all personal
status matters, including women’s rights, under the control of one
of the religious institutions in Palestine.”178
Compounding these contradictions, in the wake of the tran-
sitional government’s failure to secure peace, adopt a constitution,
or establish a unified government, cultural backlash and political
divisions have brought the gender equality agenda to a near stand-
still.179 This is potently illustrated by the fact that the 2006 Fatah
legislation to establish a constitutional court with nine judges was in-
validated after Hamas’ decisive 2006 electoral victory.180 These kinds
of institutional schisms represent significant obstacles to the estab-
lishment and enforcement of a strong gender-equalizing constitution.
As the national identity struggles continue, the thorny situation of
women continues, hemmed in between an ongoing conflict with Israel
(including border closures, unemployment, chronic poverty, and vio-
lent incursions) and the strong assertion of patriarchal norms within
Palestinian society, partly a product of what some have termed a
“crisis of masculinity.”181 This crisis refers to the existential challenges
174. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Hisham Kassim, Hamas, Constitutionalism, and
Palestinian Women, 50 HOW. L.J. 479, 489-91 (2006) (discussing how different elements
of the Basic Law and the Draft Constitution either empower or restrict women).
175. Id. at 490.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 491. Complexity is compounded by the religious platform advanced by Hamas
which has made the very notion of “women’s rights” a point of controversy. In its election
platform, Hamas has stated that “Shari’a law should be the principal source of legislation
in Palestine,” which conflicts with the Draft Constitution’s language. Id. at 506.
178. Id. at 491.
179. See, e.g., NADERA SHALHOUB-KEVORKIAN, MILITARIZATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN CONFLICT ZONES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A PALESTINIAN CASE-STUDY 101-02
(2009) (describing the conditions in Palestine that make it difficult for women to bring forth
change).
180. Tim Youngs, The Palestinian Parliamentary Elections and the Rise of Hamas 11
(U.K. House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 06/17, 2006).
181. See SHALHOUB-KEVORKIAN, supra note 179, at 100-05 (explaining how the condi-
tions in Palestine result in the women’s agenda being difficult to advocate).
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that have been created for Palestinian male identity by emasculating
the male subject through detention, arbitrary arrest, constant and sus-
tained harassment, and lack of economic opportunity and by making
public enterprise and action highly constrained for the Palestinian
male.182 In response, domestic pressures have escalated and reli-
gious mores increasingly play a central role in defining women within
the Palestinian nationalist discourse.183 In this framework, religious
leaders have ample scope to argue that “religious law is the only
authentic statement of pre-occupation and pre-colonial law.”184 Thus,
personal status regimes, which require women’s obedience rather
than guaranteeing their equality, become part of “the hard irreducible
core of what it means to be a Muslim.”185 This is part of the landscape
of retreat in which success and failure of constitutional protections
have to be judged for women.
In many contexts, including Palestine, the revival or affirma-
tion of Shari’a or other religious frameworks as part of the constitu-
tional text of the renewal or creation of the state itself poses complex
issues for women and for enabling and defending women’s rights.186
In general, the complexity of a parallel universe, with lofty generalized
norms coexisting side by side with customary and traditional norms,
is left unsolved by formal constitutional negotiation processes. Con-
structive ambiguity here can work to the disadvantage of women,
where the failure to resolve matters of priority or the evident clash
between equality norms and religious premise means that, in practice,
the pull to custom and tradition may work against the enforcement
of the constitutional norms that defend women’s rights in theory.
Equally, as we have outlined above, secular constitutional documents
also posit the promise of a capacity to create contested legal space in
182. See id. at 94 (describing how patriarchal values based on religion have affected
women).
183. Id.
184. Ludsin, supra note 9, at 494.
185. Id. at 452 (quoting LYNN WELCHMAN, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: TEXT AND PRACTICE
IN PALESTINE 273 (1999)). Women in Palestinian society continue to experience discrimi-
nation in almost every facet of public and private life. Id. at 488. Many women’s primary
access to justice is through the customary and religious systems that do not recognize equal
justice between women and men. Id. at 452-53. The customary tradition, known as urf,
handles matters related to family law, education, honor killings, and domestic violence. Id.
at 453-56. Discriminatory practices under customary law include women being encouraged
to marry at a very young age and not allowing women to live independently; it also toler-
ates the practice of honor killings. Id. at 455. Women are generally excluded from acting
as mediators or negotiators in the customary system, offering them little opportunity to
change the practice. Id. at 456. Civil and criminal law codes are based on the Ottoman,
Jordanian, and Egyptian systems, some of which have not been revised since the 19th
century. Id. at 450.
186. See id. at 452-53, 462-64 (describing the harsh rules for women under Shari’a).
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societies where varying legal standards apply to public and private
life or where religious dictate may be given primacy over ordinary law.
Here, the privilege of a constitution as embodiment of legal values
may allow for a parallel legal universe of recognition and agitation
to exist for women. In this way, the constitutional document is not
itself the transformative legal tool, but such transformation may be
revealed in the ways in which it interacts with the ordinary and cus-
tomary law and provides a locus of challenge.
The commitments to gender equality and social inclusion that
exist in at least some peace treaties or formal constitutional docu-
ments are massively stymied through subsequent underenforcement.
Those commitments can be, as outlined above, the product of inter-
national interface and pressure on the post-conflict society, premis-
ing support on the adoption of a set of presumed universal values; a
rhetorical commitment to women’s rights comes as part of the pack-
age. Sometimes the inclusions come organically but, for the reasons
we set out in our analysis of the implementation phase, fail to be
followed through, in part because of backlash and in part because
women’s organizations have the least capacity to force compliance.187
When legal reform becomes the site of opportunistic bargaining or
clear retrenchment, the effects on nascent confidence-building in the
rule of law can be highly destructive. In parallel, as numerous post-
conflict transitional sites have revealed, there is an ongoing tension
that exists between a need to maintain law’s stability while simul-
taneously acknowledging its failings during the previous regime that
has resulted in a corresponding timidity in tackling fundamental
issues of social transformation.
A core proposition ought to be that social and economic transfor-
mation remains in the interest of all in post-conflict societies. Recall
that many of these societies are the poorest on the planet and have
weak social and economic infrastructure, limited industrial develop-
ment, poor indices of health and education, as well as meager capacity
for labor and social mobility.188 These are common interests that cross
gender lines and whose resolution or inclusion are intrinsic to creat-
ing the sustainability of ceasefires, ending protracted communal vio-
lence, and preventing a cyclical return to violence. A range of social,
political, and economic transformations in conflicted societies have
potential for positive effect regardless of gender situatedness. While
it is evident that many conflicts, particularly ethno-national conflicts,
give rise to particular exclusions, vulnerabilities and discriminations
187. See infra Part II.C (discussing the problems of implementation).
188. Certainly the majority of the examples used here come from countries that would
fit this description (East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and others).
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on the basis of ethnic or religious grounds, women within such groups
face double victimization from both external and internal sources,
compounding their specific exclusions and discriminations.189
It remains true that women are those most persistently excluded
across jurisdictions from core social goods or who must access such
goods differently. For example, in East Timor, while increased polit-
ical representation was a goal among women’s groups during the tran-
sitional period, it was to some extent viewed as a means to address
women’s exposure to gender-based violence, illiteracy, social and eco-
nomic discrimination, and poverty.190 The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme reports that “women receive less food than men and
one third between the ages of 14-49 are malnourished; fertility rates
are high, as are the rates of death in childbirth.”191 As the Commis-
sion on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) reports, East
Timorese women “continuously stressed the need for justice to en-
compass their ongoing [struggle for] economic and social rights.”192
There is a close relationship between intersectional social iden-
tities and the lack of real traction for women’s issues in post-conflict
constitutional conversations. The reality of economic status combined
with gendered disabilities hits women hardest here, and the failure to
translate economic and social rights into the hard law of constitutional
frameworks operates as a double disadvantage. Yet constitutional
frameworks do provide the opportunity to address these intersections.
For example, in Northern Ireland, all signatories to the peace treaty
confirmed “the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic
activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity,”193
reflecting the most comprehensive and enduring measurement of
women’s social inclusion: that of economic standing. The inclusion of
this provision represents significant work across party lines by the
women’s political party participating in the negotiation process. Its
inclusion infers an understanding by the political parties that there
189. Luc Huyse, Victims, in RECONCILIATIONS AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK
54, 54-56 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003) (describing the multiple ways in which a
woman can be victimized).
190. See Rimmer, supra note 82, at 6 (describing the East Timorese women’s agenda
and its social focus).
191. Id. at 9.
192. Susan Harris Rimmer, Wearing his Jacket: A Feminist Analysis of the Serious
Crimes Process in Timor-Leste, 16 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 81, 83 (2009) (citing COMM’N ON
RECEPTION, TRUTH, & RECONCILIATION, WOMEN AND THE CONFLICT: NATIONAL PUBLIC
HEARING 28-29 APRIL 2003 (2005), available at http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/phbFiles/
02_women_eng_WEB.pdf).
193. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Ir.-U.K., § 3, Apr. 10. 1998,
37 I.L.M. 751 (1998), available at http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Anglo-Irish/
agreement.pdf.
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are multiple and varied forms of structural discrimination and that
these intersect and interplay with one another.194
CONCLUSION
Contemporary constitution-making in post-conflict settings in-
volves a number of dimensions and has some unique aspects com-
pared to the historical precedents for constitution-making in several
ways. First, post-conflict constitutionalism engages a broader set of
documents across pre-agreement, formal agreements and implemen-
tation involving various degrees of formality, negotiation, and civic
participation. Second, it often occurs in the context of ongoing violence
and thus necessarily prioritizes acute short-term security concerns
over the kind of chronic economic and social issues that disproportion-
ately affect women. Third, it frequently emphasizes the rights and role
of minority groups in ways that tend to sideline gender and divide
women across geographic, ethnic and social class lines. Finally, it gen-
erally must strike compromises to balance competing pressures to
the international community’s advocacy of provisions guaranteeing
women’s rights and equality and local constituencies’ advocacy of pro-
visions protecting customary and religious laws (particularly against
the broad backdrop of colonialism) that codify inequality for women.
The negotiation and creation of constitutional documents in con-
flicted and post-conflict societies is not neatly contained in one phase
of the negotiation. Rather, depending on the conflict and the site at
play, it may fall across multiple stages of the negotiation process and
may appear to variable degrees in all three.195 Increased recognition
of the multitude of arenas in which the constitutional conversations
take place illustrates both opportunity and challenge for women.
Despite the lofty goals outlined for the transition from conflict
to peace, institutional change through constitutional principle and
agreement remains elusive.196 It remains even more deeply contested
territory for women. The public/private distinction sustains and con-
firms women’s oppression on a global level,197 and it is also a part of
the legal export between states and from international and interested
194. The Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c.47, § 75 (Eng.) (requiring public authorities to
assess public policy as it affects people who experience these intersecting dimensions of
inequality by considering the need “to promote equality of opportunity—between persons
of different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual
orientation; between men and women generally; between persons with a disability and
persons without; and between persons with dependents and persons without”).
195. See BELL, supra note 12, at 56 (noting that the classification of constitutional
documents into the pre-negotiation, framework, and implementation stages is flexible).
196. Ní Aoláin & Rooney, supra note 35, at 348.
197. See id. at 349 (noting that constitutional changes can concurrently promulgate
patriarchal values and revamp the public sphere).
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states to elites in transitioning states.198 Gendered biases are implic-
itly carried into the constitutional drafting. To render the constitu-
tional drafting phase of post-conflict reconstruction meaningful to
women requires a “sophisticated conversation that enables . . . a
deeper understanding of how institutional resistance encompasses
gendered, social class, and other ‘identity securing’ systems of privi-
lege.”199 As a starting point, paying due attention to the outcomes
when we fail to account for gender would force uncomfortable ques-
tions about how and why the transitional endeavor prevents the re-
currence of conflict and why progress on a peace agreement seems
elusive. With close scrutiny, it might be clear that gender is implicated
in who does and does not benefit from peace agreements, and how.200
With this improved understanding, we see the importance of
ensuring that gender is central to the entire process that results in
constitution-drafting, the substantive provisions, and the resulting
legislation that implements constitutional guarantees. Gender con-
sideration should also be central in thinking through what the rule of
law priorities are for states and in what order they will be addressed
and supported. In both contexts, auditing and benchmarking for gen-
der from the inception of the process is essential to securing genuinely
transformative outcomes for women. In this guise, a gender-centered
constitutional process might go some ways towards transformative
change for women in conflicted and post-conflict societies.
Making gender central, going beyond the acknowledgement that
women have particular needs, requires transformative action in those
spheres—social and economic—that have consistently been most re-
sistant to legal regulation. It also, in our view, requires inclusion at
all levels, starting at the constitutional norm apex and working its
way down through legislative and policy routes. Addressing equality,
discrimination and social status through the process of institutional
revisions and constitutional enforcement, thereby encompassing
both procedural and substantive equality, means that constitutional
enforcement looks and feels radically different in terms of its impact
for women in transitioning societies.
198. See, e.g., id. at 352 (demonstrating how outsiders’ support of the elite in Afghan-
istan has led to the “underenforcement or non-enforcement of women’s rights”).
199. See id. at 348 (offering a deeper analysis of the fundamental relationship between
intersectionality, inequality and under-enforcement).
Recognizing these relationships is the start of probing the benefits of inter-
sectional analysis as a tool for analyzing the problems of underenforcement,
particularly as they negatively affect those women and children who consti-
tute the group most seriously affected by armed conflict and repression. In
this view, underenforcement and equality are structurally linked.
Id. at 348.
200. See id. at 341-42 (suggesting that looking at intersectionality will make obvious
the fact that the experience of women is largely disregarded in negotiations).

OPEN SERVICE AND OUR ALLIES: A REPORT ON THE
INCLUSION OF OPENLY GAY AND LESBIAN
SERVICEMEMBERS IN U.S. ALLIES’ ARMED FORCES
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG*†
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the wake of the Obama Administration’s pledge to repeal
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the United States, the Columbia Law
School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic undertook a review of how
allies of the United States moved from a policy of banning gay and
lesbian servicemembers from serving in the armed forces to a policy
of allowing these servicemembers to serve openly (“open service”).
In documenting this review, this report aims to provide information
about the decision to implement open service and the mechanics of
the transition to open service in Australia, Canada, Israel, and the
United Kingdom. In addition to addressing concerns about the effect
of open service on unit cohesion and morale, this report also includes
information about how the militaries of Australia, Canada, Israel, and
the United Kingdom have implemented their open service policies
on the ground. The report examines, as well, the ways in which U.S.
soldiers have worked as part of multinational forces with members
of other militaries that have open service policies.
Open Service and Our Allies shows that no significant problems
have arisen as a result of a transition to open service. Notably, not
one country studied in this report has made any changes to its hous-
ing or bathrooms. Moreover, although all of the countries studied in
this report have reported scattered incidents of harassment, this
report also shows that there has been no pervasive discrimination
against or harassment of gay and lesbian servicemembers. Whereas
some countries achieved a successful transition through educational
and sensitivity training, others have not addressed harassment of gay
and lesbian servicemembers in their trainings. The common thread,
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instead, has been an emphasis on strong leadership and a clear state-
ment of the behavior that is expected of servicemembers. This report
also shows that none of the countries studied have experienced a de-
cline in unit cohesion or morale. To the contrary, many of the coun-
tries studied have seen an increase in morale due to servicemembers’
increased ability to focus on work, rather than on hiding their sexual
orientation, and a decrease in paranoia and suspicion as a result of
the new open environment.
Overall, this report shows that the transition to open service in
Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom was smooth,
although not always flawless, and provides some insight into what
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The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law,1 in place since 1993, prohibits
openly gay and lesbian individuals2 from serving in any of the United
States military forces. Congress enacted this policy in a move away
from the previous military policy declaring that “homosexuality is
incompatible with military service.” 3 In January 2010, President
Obama and several high-ranking military officials called for the re-
peal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 4 Congressional hearings were held,5
and a Pentagon report was issued on November 30, 2010 examining
how implementation of a new, open policy would take place.6 Before
1. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
2. This report refers to gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals and servicemembers
as “gay and lesbian” collectively.
3. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14(1)(H)(1)(a), ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE
SEPARATIONS (Jan. 28, 1982), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation
41.html.
4. Elisabeth Bumiller, Top Defense Officials Seek to End “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/politics/03military.html;
Obama Calls for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Repeal, CNN.COM, Jan. 27, 2010, http://articles
.cnn.com/2010-01-27/politics/obama.gays.military_1_repeal-policy-that-bars-gays
-servicemembers-legal-defense-network?_s=PM:POLITICS.
5. Luis Martinez, Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Hearing—Mullen Strong on Repeal—
UPDATED, ABCNEWS.COM POLITICAL PUNCH BLOG, Feb. 2, 2010, http://blogs.abcnews
.com/politicalpunch/2010/02/don’t-ask-don’t-tell-hearing----mullen-strong-on-repeal.html.
6. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” (2010), available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/don’t-ask-don’t-tell/DADTReport_FINAL/pdf;
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the end of 2010, Congress had passed a bill to repeal “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” and President Obama signed the repeal into law on
December 22, 2010.7 The law provides that the repeal will be imple-
mented only after a certification process has been completed and an
additional sixty-day waiting period has passed.
B. Purpose
This report is intended to illustrate to Congress and other inter-
ested parties how the United States military might go about imple-
menting the repeal of the current “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” ban by ex-
amining the experiences of four U.S. allies. These allies, Australia,
Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all had similar bans in effect
and have since removed them. Through concrete examples from these
allies’ experiences, this report demonstrates how the transition to
open service has proceeded elsewhere and how it would likely proceed
in the United States.
C. Methodology
This report studies the process of integration of openly gay and
lesbian servicemembers into the militaries of Australia, Canada,
Israel, and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected be-
cause each had informal or formal prohibitions against openly gay and
lesbian people serving in the armed forces, and because each engages
in military operations similar to those of the U.S. armed services.
Each of these countries has removed its prohibition at some point in
the course of the last three decades.
The issues-based analysis here, with particular attention to unit
cohesion, living conditions, training of servicemembers, sexual harass-
ment and anti-discrimination policies, and relationship recognition,
likewise tracks concerns that have arisen in discussions of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.” These issues are among the most important deter-
minants of effective transition to open service and will be integral to
the implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” ’s repeal.
The report is based on three sources of information. First, it
relies on documents published by the ministries of defense in the
Ed O’Keefe & Craig Whitlock, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Report: Little Risk to Allowing Gays
to Serve Openly, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/11/30/AR2010113003935.html.
7. Karen Parrish, President Signs “Don’t Ask” Repeal Act into Law, AM. FORCES PRESS
SERV., Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle/aspx?id=62213. At the
signing ceremony, President Obama remarked, “We are not a nation that says, ‘Don’t ask,
don’t tell’ . . . . We are a nation that says, ‘Out of many, we are one.’ ” Id.
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respective countries that address the transition and current policies
regarding gay and lesbian servicemembers. Second, it has extracted
information published in newspapers and other periodicals, accessed
either through their websites or through LexisNexis, an online
database. Third, it uses information gathered from interviews with
current and former servicemembers from the respective countries.
These interviews have been conducted in person, over the telephone,
or by written response to a questionnaire drafted by the Columbia
Law School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic.8
The questionnaire asked a range of open-ended questions re-
garding the issues covered in this report. It was worded to elicit in-
formation without influencing the opinion of the respondents. The
questionnaire was circulated among current and former service-
members in Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom
through various channels of contact.
The report is the independent academic work of the Columbia
Law School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic. It was not funded in any
part by any outside agency or organization.
D. Roadmap
As noted above, this report traces the experiences of Australia,
Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom through their transitions and
addresses five specific areas of concern: unit cohesion, living quarters,
education and training, sexual harassment and anti-discrimination
policies, and relationship recognition. The report also includes a sep-
arate section describing multinational forces in which American sol-
diers serve alongside soldiers from countries that allow openly gay and
lesbian individuals to serve. Finally, the report includes recommen-
dations for the United States culled from the results of the research
just described.
I. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the bans on
open service previously in place in Australia, Canada, Israel, and
8. In the United Kingdom, a directive was issued by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
prohibiting servicemembers from answering the questionnaire. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
DIRECTIVE, QUESTIONNAIRE ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION FROM COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SEXUALITY AND GENDER CLINIC (Mar. 9, 2010) (on file with author). The Columbia Law
School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic submitted an appeal letter to the Directive, which
remained pending at the time this report was issued. Letter from Columbia Law School
Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic to U.K. Ministry of Defence (Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with
author). As a result of the Directive, the Clinic was unable to carry out as many interviews
of U.K. servicemembers as of servicemembers from other countries studied in this report.
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the United Kingdom and discusses the history and circumstances
under which these bans were lifted.
A. Australia
In 1986, the Australian Defence Force implemented a ban on
gay and lesbian personnel serving openly in the military through a
military policy that guided commanding officers to discretely ask
gays and lesbians to resign.9 The military put forth four justifications
for the ban: 1) negative impact on morale; 2) need to protect minors;
3) concern about public health, namely, the risk of HIV infection; and
4) concern about national security.10
In 1990, Anita Van Der Meer, a junior naval officer, was reported
by one of her peers as being involved in a same-sex relationship.11 The
navy subsequently threatened her with discharge for being a lesbian.12
To preserve her employment, she denied the charge, which caused
great emotional turmoil for her.13 Recalling her experience, she said,
“It was very traumatic for me, but I still had the cooperation of my
supervisors and my peers . . . . In the end, I had more support than
I expected.”14
After she denied the charge, Van Der Meer brought a complaint
against the Australian Defence Force to the Australian Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, an organization outside
of the military created by Parliament in 1986.15 The Commission did
not have the authority to lift the ban itself but, as a result of Van
Der Meer’s complaint, it put pressure on the government to do so.16
Veterans groups, however, such as the Returned & Services League
and the Armed Forces Federation of Australia, strongly opposed the
9. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-93-215, HOMOSEXUALS IN THE
MILITARY: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES 19 (1993), available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/GAO/pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; see also Hugh
Smith, The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force, 21 ARMED
FORCES & SOC’Y 531, 544 (1995) (noting that one general remarked that “[h]omosexual
behaviour is not accepted or condoned in the Defence Force” (quotation marks omitted)).
10. Smith, supra note 9, at 544.
11. David Crary, U.S. Allies Embrace Gay Military Personnel, HUFFINGTON POST,




14. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
15. William Branigin, Australia to U.S.: It’s No Big Deal: Military Adjusting to New
Policy Allowing Homosexual Troops, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1993, at A6; Smith, supra note
9, at 544.
16. Smith, supra note 9, at 544-45.
2011] OPEN SERVICE AND OUR ALLIES 553
proposal to lift the ban.17 Many servicemembers within the military
protested as well; surveys done during this time indicated at one
point that approximately eighty percent of servicemembers opposed
lifting the ban.18 Nonetheless, the Cabinet, after much debate, lifted
the ban in November 1992.19
The transition to open service in Australia proved to be largely
uneventful. As discussed in detail in Parts II and V of this report,
military officials reported no significant increases in harassment by
or of gay and lesbian servicemembers.20 In fact, unit cohesion and
morale reportedly improved because gay and lesbian servicemembers
could develop relationships built on trust and honesty more pro-
foundly with their fellow soldiers than they could prior to the ban
being lifted.21 To facilitate the transition and maintain a well-ordered
work environment, the Defence Gay and Lesbian Information Service,
an organization recently formed by gay and lesbian servicemembers,
provides information to all personnel about Australian Defence Force
polices relating to gay and lesbian personnel.22 Also, gay and lesbian
servicemembers, with the Australian Defence Force’s non-funded
approval, have marched in three annual Sydney Mardi Gras parades
as well as gay pride parades in Brisbane and Melbourne.23
B. Canada
Before Canada lifted its ban on gay and lesbian servicemembers
in the military, it had a “policy against ‘knowingly’ hiring or promot-
ing lesbians and gays.” 24 In 1992, however, a lawsuit initiated by
Michelle Douglas, a former servicemember who was honorably dis-
charged from the Canadian military for being a lesbian, led to the
lifting of the ban.25 Indeed, one writer observed that the Canadian
17. Id. at 545.
18. Id.
19. See Branigin, supra note 15, at A6 (explaining that “the cabinet decided to remove
the ban over objections from the defense minister and service chiefs that unit cohesion and
command would be eroded”).
20. See infra notes 41-58, 121-32 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. DEFGLIS—About Us, DEFENCE GAY & LESBIAN INFO. SERV., http://www.defglis
.com.au/index.php?id=aboutUs (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
23. Farewell from our Secretary, DEFENCE GAY & LESBIAN INFO. SERV. (DEFGLIS,
Australia), Apr. 19, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.defglis.com.au/Newsletters/2010
-2.pdf.
24. Stephen Bindman, Military to Lift its Ban on Gays, Lesbians, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
10, 1991, at A1.
25. Anne Swardson, Canada: No Problem with Gays in Ranks: Military’s Restrictions
Lifted Last Fall, WASH. POST, July 6, 1993, at A8.
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Federal Court decision in Douglas v. Canada26 striking down the ban
as a violation of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms “prompted
more openly gay men and women to join the ranks of the [Canadian]
Army, Air Force and Navy.” 27
To implement the removal of the ban on gay men and lesbians
serving openly in the Canadian military and to ensure a smooth
transition, Canada took several steps. Primary among these was
that military leaders stressed that all servicemembers had to act in
accordance with the new rule, regardless of their personal beliefs or
values.28 This move was consistent with military protocol, which regu-
larly requires servicemembers to comply with military rules regardless
of their views.29 By describing the ban as a change to the way service-
members must behave (i.e., no discrimination, unequal treatment,
or harassment of individuals solely because they are gay), rather than
as a change to what servicemembers must believe, the transition was
more easily made.30
In addition to emphasizing that the policy focuses on changes in
behavior, as opposed to changes in individual beliefs, the Canadian
military issued a “Post-Announcement Action” by the Assistant
Deputy Minister of Personnel31 “to provide military leaders with
guidance to ‘communicate the rationale for the change, encourage its
acceptance, and respond to the personal concerns of the [Canadian
26. Douglas v. Canada (1992), [1993] 1 F.C. 264, (Can. Ont.).
27. Tobi Cohen, Canada Quietly Marks Anniversary for Gays in Military While U.S.
Debate Rages, CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 24, 2009, available at http://www.canadaeast.com/
front/article/832812.
28. Aaron Belkin & Jason McNichol, Homosexual Personnel Policy in the Canadian
Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?, 56 INT’L J. 73, 77
(2001); see also YVETTE C. HOPKINS, SCH. ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, OUT OF THE
CLOSET: ADDRESSING POLICY OPTIONS 22, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTR
Doc?AD=ADA393883&Location=U2 &doc=GETTRDoc.pdf (discussing the implementation
and transition to open service in the Canadian forces).
29. See Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 82 (noting that “[e]ven though some
soldiers feel hatred towards their homosexual peers, the military’s expectation of pro-
fessional conduct seems to have been sufficient to prevent individual beliefs from under-
mining military effectiveness”); see also Luke Fisher, Armed and Gay: Homosexuals in
the Military Face an Uneasy Welcome, MACLEAN’S, May 24, 1993, at 15 (describing an
officer’s understanding that “no wavering on the policy will be tolerated” despite individual
service members’ personal feelings).
30. See Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 87 (explaining that “[t]he personal
attitudes and decisions of individual soldiers would be respected, but soldiers would be
expected to put personal feelings aside to accomplish military objectives and to uphold
the law”); see also Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, Sexual Orientation and Military
Preparedness: An International Perspective, Comments of Michelle Douglas at 54:53,
Mar.12, 2008, [hereinafter Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel], available at http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=TEmSDmuk-J8 (discussing how the Canadian military distinguished
between telling people what to believe and how they must behave).
31. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 22-23.
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Forces’] members.’ ” 32 In addition, the military also disseminated a
Canadian Forces Personnel Newsletter, which is distributed to all
active servicemembers, describing the policy change.33 The “Post-An-
nouncement Action” and the Newsletter brought the policy to the
ground in an accessible way by showing, tangibly, how the policy
would work.34 This demonstration turned out to be very important
in ensuring a smooth transition for the servicemembers.35
In sum, the steps taken by then-Chief of Defence General de
Chastelain and other military leaders to create a smooth transition
included:
(1) “[Eliminating] any distinction in the regulations be-
tween heterosexual and [gay, lesbian, and bisexual]
soldiers.” 36
(2) “[Making] it clear that the policy change had the full
support of the military leadership.” 37
(3) “[Outlining] the standards of behaviour that would be
expected of all military personnel, regardless of sexual
orientation, and distribut[ing those] new standards and
regulations widely.” 38
(4) “[Emphasizing] the distinction between beliefs and
behaviour.” 39
(5) Encouraging respect for “personal attitudes and deci-
sions of individual soldiers,” but expecting soldiers “to
put personal feelings aside to accomplish military objec-
tives and to uphold the law.” 40
C. Israel
When Israel was founded in 1948, it did not have any restrictions
on gay and lesbian soldiers serving in the military. In 1983, however,
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23.
34. Id. at 22-23.
35. Id. at 22.
36. Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 87.
37. Id.; see also HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 22 (recalling General de Chastelain’s press
report in which he declared that “the Canadian Forces will comply fully with the Federal
Court’s decision. Canadians, regardless of their sexual orientation, will now be able to serve
their country without restriction”).
38. Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 87; see also Swardson, supra note 25, at A8
(describing the training programs implemented).
39. Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 87; see also Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel,
supra note 30, Comments of Michelle Douglas at 54:53, (discussing how the Canadian mili-
tary distinguished between telling people what to believe and how they must behave).
40. Belkin & McNichol, supra note 28, at 87; see also Fisher, supra note 29, at 15
(describing officers’ understanding that “no wavering on the policy will be tolerated,”
despite their personal feelings).
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the military changed its policy to prevent gay and lesbian service-
members from serving in intelligence positions.41 The Israeli mili-
tary restricted these servicemembers’ access to intelligence positions
under the theory that their sexuality would “prove to be a security
hazard.” 42 At that time, gay and lesbian servicemembers were not
excluded from holding any other positions.
However, the Israeli military did not enforce the restriction on
gay and lesbian servicemembers in the intelligence services43 and,
in 1993, the prohibition on gay and lesbian servicemembers serving
in intelligence positions was repealed.44 That year, the Knesset sub-
committee that dealt with gay and lesbian rights held a conference
to highlight inequality under Israeli law.45 At this conference, Uzi
Even, a former colonel in the Israeli military, testified that he had
lost his rank and his security clearance when his sexual orientation
was discovered.46 Colonel Even, who had conducted classified military
research for fifteen years, testified that he was not a security threat
because he was open about his sexual orientation.47 His testimony gar-
nered significant attention and led the Knesset’s military committee
to remove the restrictions of the 1983 policy.48
Currently, the Israeli military does not make any effort to identify
gay and lesbian servicemembers. Gay and lesbian servicemembers,
however, often do not reveal their sexuality to their commanding
officers and their fellow soldiers until they are well established in
the military.49
D. United Kingdom
In September 1999, the European Court of Human Rights ruled
that the United Kingdom’s policy prohibiting all gay and lesbian
military personnel, whether open or closeted, from serving in the
armed forces was illegal.50 As a result, in January 2000, the British
41. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
42. Id. at 40-41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces: Did
Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?, 27 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 541,
543 (2001).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 543-44 (noting that “Prime Minister Rabin declared, ‘I don’t see any
reason to discriminate against homosexuals,’ and called for a military committee to explore
the matter”).
49. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 42.
50. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (2000); Smith
& Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999).
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government lifted the prohibition and began allowing openly gay and
lesbian people to serve in the armed forces.51
Attitudes in the armed forces have changed dramatically since the
removal of the prohibition. Gay and lesbian servicemembers are now
well integrated in the armed forces. Six months after the ban was
lifted, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) issued a confidential report that
stated:
There is widespread acceptance of the new policy. It has not been
an issue of great debate. In fact, there has been a marked lack of
reaction. Generally there has been a mature, pragmatic approach
which allowed the policy to succeed. The change in policy has been
hailed as a solid achievement.52
Further, “[i]n what many gay Service personnel see as a mark
of official acceptance, members of the Navy were permitted to march
in uniform at the annual Gay Pride march in London in 2006, the
first time any Armed Service had granted such permission.” 53 The
next year, the Royal Air Force followed suit, and the Army allowed
uniforms to be worn in the march in 2008,54 a sign of the significant
change in the Army’s outlook since the lifting of the ban in the last
decade.
II. UNIT COHESION, MILITARY PERFORMANCE, AND MORALE
This section examines the extent to which the transition to open
service had consequences for unit cohesion and morale in the armed
forces of Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom. In all
cases, no negative effect on military cohesion and morale was reported
after the bans were lifted. In fact, unit cohesion and morale were re-
ported to have improved significantly in these countries after the tran-
sition to open service. This improvement in morale and unit cohesion
has been attributed to a deeper relationship of honesty and trust that
51. MOD Ends Its Ban on Gays in the Military, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), Jan. 13,
2000, at 6.
52. Ben Summerskill, It’s Official: Gays Do NOT Harm Forces: Six Months On,
Confidential MoD Report Reveals No Adverse Effects on Morale, OBSERVER (U.K.),
Nov. 19, 2000, at 5.
53. Tom Coghlan, The Fuss of Ten Years Ago Seems Somewhat Bizarre, TIMES
(London), Jan. 16, 2010, at 101.
54. Id.; see also Damian Barr & Lucy Bannerman, Soldiers Can Wear Their Uniforms
with Pride at Gay Parade, Says MoD, TIMES (London), June 14, 2008, http://www.times
online.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4133763.ece (reporting that “[i]ndividuals from all three
services will now be able to celebrate their profession and sexuality at the same time [at
the parade] without fear of facing disciplinary action”).
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developed among servicemembers after the transition to open service,
which has enabled all military personnel to maintain their focus on
their professional duties within the military.
A. Australia
After November 1992, when the ban was lifted,55 reports from
military officials indicated that the transition was largely a non-event
and that controversy over the lifting of the ban soon disappeared.56
Lieutenant Colonel Ray Martin, a thirty-seven-year-old army offi-
cer, said, “We’re a conservative institution, and there is some resid-
ual angst with the policy . . . [but t]here haven’t been any adverse
effects that we’re aware of. It’s been a seamless transition as far as
I can see.” 57
Likewise, Greg Austin, a senior Defence Department staff mem-
ber, commented, “The effect in the armed forces has been negligible
so far.” 58 Neil James of the Australian Defence Association, a secu-
rity think tank, recalled, “Everyone said, ‘Good heavens, that’s a bit
of a surprise’ and after five minutes the conversation reverted back
to football . . . . After a while it was met with a collective yawn.” 59
In 2000, Bronwen Grey, then-Director of the Defence Equity
Organisation, an internal military office that monitors and enforces
the sexual harassment and anti-discrimination policies of the Austra-
lian military, stated that the transition was a “non-event” and had
no adverse impact on military cohesion or performance.60 When her
interviewers asked her to describe specific observations, she replied,
“All I can say is [that] . . . nothing happened. And it’s very hard to
document nothing.”61 One servicemember who did experience some
harassment based on his sexual orientation stated, “The problem I
had, although major to me, had no bearing on overall unit cohesion
or morale.” 62
55. Many U.S. Allies Accept Gays in Military and Find Brouhaha Here Baffling, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 28, 1993, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Branigin, supra note 15, at A6.
58. Id.
59. Crary, supra note 11.
60. AARON BELKIN & JASON MCNICHOL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL MINORITIES IN
THE MILITARY, THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING GAY AND LESBIAN SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRALIAN
DEFENCE FORCES: APPRAISING THE EVIDENCE 17 (2000), available at http://www.palmcenter
.org/files/active/0/Australia_Final_Report.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Questionnaire Response of Leading Aircraftsman Troy D. Jorgensen, Australian
Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file
with author).
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In addition, both the United States and Great Britain observed
that Australia’s open service transition incurred no negative conse-
quences. Seven months after the ban was lifted, the United States
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) interviewed Australian Defence
Force officials to inquire about the nature of the transition. The 1993
report noted that “no reported changes have occurred in the number
of persons declaring his or her sexual preference or the number of re-
cruits being inducted . . . [and that] early indications are that the new
policy has had little or no adverse impact [on unit cohesiveness].” 63
In February 1996, the U.K. Ministry of Defence also researched
the personnel policies of foreign militaries after a transition to open ser-
vice. The delegation, which traveled to Australia to conduct its review,
reported that Australian military personnel “believed that the change
had not resulted in any notable problems for military functioning.” 64
Even opponents agree that there has been no adverse effect on
military performance or morale. Retired Major General Bill Crews, the
former President of the Returned and Services League, a veterans’
organization in Australia, said:
I was there in the early days . . . . I thought there’d be a continu-
ing problem because of prejudice that exists in parts of the com-
munity . . . . I don’t see any evidence now that homosexuals are in
any way discriminated against. . . . A homosexual can be just as
effective a soldier as a heterosexual.65
Major General Peter Philips, President of the Returned and
Services League in 2000, echoed, “[gays serving in the military has]
not been a significant public issue. The Defence Forces have not had
a lot of difficulty in this area.” 66
Indeed, unit cohesion among Australian servicemembers has
improved substantially by the lifting of the ban. Military personnel
interviewed by Aaron Belkin, Associate Professor of Political Science
at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and by the Columbia
Law School Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic, indicated that open ser-
vice has enhanced unit cohesion, military performance, and morale.67
Specifically, the interviewed personnel reported that open service has
63. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
64. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, REPORT OF THE HOMOSEXUALITY POLICY ASSESSMENT
TEAM 227, H1-1 (Feb. 1996) (on file with author).
65. Crary, supra note 11.
66. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 27 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 32, 34; see also Questionnaire Response of Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien,
Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 25,
2010) (on file with author) (“Morale within units has improved and unit cohesion is at its’
[sic] highest. Our personnel seem to be more relaxed and more honest with each other,
allowing ever[y] [sic] member to get on with their core duties.”).
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allowed gay and lesbian servicemembers “to spend less time moni-
toring their comments and more time focusing on their work.” 68 In
addition, the sexual orientation of Australian military personnel
“becomes integrated as one aspect of who they are, taken no more or
less seriously than any other aspect of their lives.” 69 According to
those interviewed, open service has also fostered an environment more
sensitive to the equal treatment and opportunity of women and ethnic
minorities, as well as of gay and lesbian servicemembers.70
During a 2008 panel at the Georgetown University Law Center
entitled, “ ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’: An International Perspective,” Chief
Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, a current servicemember who is also
Chairperson of the Defence Gay and Lesbian Information Service
and has served for over twenty years, stated, “Has [the transition to
open service] had any impact? None at all. I, I think . . . because I can
be honest with myself, I can be honest with everybody, so it’s made
me a better person.” 71
Other Australian servicemembers have also observed that open
service has allowed “a stronger bond [among peers] to occur” be-
cause members can feel free to be themselves and “not put on a false
façade.” 72 O’Brien has also noted that, “when working alongside U.S.
military personnel in Baghdad in 2006,” he learned that “[U.S. mili-
tary personnel] valued the work that I did and that’s all that it comes
down to at the end of the day. . . . Sexuality has nothing to do with
anything any more within the services.” 73 Another servicemember
emphasized the importance of trusting the competence and profes-
sionalism of other military personnel to unit cohesion:
[Open service] allows members to be honest. Trust is an integral
part to any team oriented organisation, as we need to trust the
person next to us to do their job . . . if someone can hide this part
of [their] life, it raises the question of what else can they lie
about. In my experience service members are more concerned
with whether the person next to them can do their [job] compe-
tently and effective[ly].74
68. See BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 32 (quoting a servicemember who re-
marked that “[e]verything’s out in the open, no fear, no nothing, no potential of blackmail,
no security implications . . . nothing”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 32, 34.
71. Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Stuart O’Brien
at 19:34.
72. Questionnaire Responses of Private Nathan Howarth and Signalman Michael
Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic
(Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
73. Crary, supra note 11.
74. Questionnaire Response of Lieutenant Phil Murphy, Australian Defence Force,
Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
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B. Canada
According to the GAO, unit cohesion, military performance, and
morale have not been negatively affected since the ban was lifted in
the Canadian Forces.75 Since General de Chastelain issued the order
in 1992 declaring that gay and lesbian servicemembers in the Cana-
dian Forces could serve openly and restored the full rank of all those
that had been subjected to difficult conditions, no change in military
performance has been found.76
Undertaken months after General de Chastelain’s open service
order to determine the effects of the open service policy, the GAO
analysis found no resignations, no assaults, no sexual orientation-
based hate crimes, and no problems involving recruitment, morale, or
cohesion as a result of the policy change.77 The GAO analysis also indi-
cated that Canadian Department of National Defence officials and
representatives of gay and lesbian advocacy groups considered the
lifting of the ban to be a great advantage because gay and lesbian
servicemembers no longer had to live in fear of their sexual orienta-
tion being discovered and their being discharged from the military.78
In addition to the findings of the GAO report, a number of
Canadian servicemembers who have spoken about the lifting of the
ban found no significant effect on unit cohesion, military performance,
or morale. Shortly after the ban was lifted in 1992, a retired brigadier
general who served as director general for personnel policy in the
Canadian Forces explained why Canada terminated the ban even
before the Douglas case was decided:
“We would not have been able to prove that [homosexuality] had
that deleterious effect on cohesion and morale that everyone
talked about . . . . Basically, we realized that we didn’t have the
evidentiary foundation. . . . It just wasn’t there. I mean, you can’t
use the old cohesion and morale arguments just based on folklore.
You have to be able to prove this stuff.” 79
Michelle Douglas, the plaintiff in that case, reinforced this point:
“Since [General de Chastelain’s] order, every report, every analysis,
75. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 31-32.
76. Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Michelle Douglas
at 52:24 (stating that General de Chastelain’s order gave servicemembers back-pay and
restored their dignity).
77. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 31-32.
78. Id. at 32. But see id. (noting that “[t]hey also believe, however, that many homo-
sexuals will not openly express their sexual orientation because they will see no advantage
gained in doing so”).
79. John Lancaster, Many Allies Allow Gays in the Military: Canada, Australia Are
Latest to Drop Exclusionary Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1992, at A1.
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every study that’s looked at the effect of this decision and the order,
has found that none of those dire predictions were realized, just as
happened in Australia and in the U.K.” 80
Moreover, Douglas noted that “there was no violence, no reduc-
tion in recruitment, no harassment and no one quit.” 81 Indeed, when
the ban was lifted in 1992, General de Chastelain suggested that sex-
ual orientation had not proven to be correlative with military per-
formance. Specifically, at that time he stated that “[t]he Canadian
Forces of today believe an individual’s sexual orientation is irrele-
vant to whether or not that individual can perform his or her job.” 82
Finally, as Major-General Lewis MacKenzie put it, “[t]he impact on
operational effectiveness is nil.” 83
In addition to servicemembers speaking out about the non-
effect of the policy change on unit cohesion and morale, some ser-
vicemembers indicated that perhaps the change was for the better.
Former servicemember Corporal Barbara Hamilton stated that “a
strict heterosexual environment must have negatively influenced
unit cohesion.” 84
In fact, since the lifting of the ban, the Canadian Forces have
found an increase in effective performance. Before the ban was lifted,
soldiers had difficulty advancing in their careers because rules barred
the promotion of gay servicemembers. Now that the ban has lifted,
without having to worry about being discharged, gay servicemembers
are, with increasing frequency, rising in their ranks.85 Luc Cassivi is
an example of a servicemember who has risen significantly in ranking
since the lifting of the ban.86 When Cassivi joined the Canadian Navy
in 1983, he did not speak openly about his sexual orientation; now
Cassivi is “the highest-ranking sailor aboard HMCS Ville de Quebec,
a commander in the Navy,” and no longer feels the need to hide who
he is.87 Cassivi describes his experience as follows:
I’ve been openly gay for a number of years. My friends and my
co-workers know it and it surely has not been an impediment for
80. Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Michelle Douglas
at 52:46.
81. Id. at 53:06.
82. Stephen Bindman, Military’s No-Gay Rule Under Fire in Court, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 27, 1992, at A21.
83. David Pugliese, Eggleton Spitting Bullets over Gay Army Remarks, HAMILTON
SPECTATOR (Ontario), Nov. 19, 1997, at B2.
84. Questionnaire Response of Corporal Barbara Hamilton, Canadian Armed Forces,
Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with author).
85. See Cohen, supra note 27 (reporting that “[i]n the last 17 years, many [openly gay
men and women] have risen to the top in their respective fields”).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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me progressing . . . . [O]nce the rules changed, . . . so did the
culture. Opportunities began to surface. These days, . . . success
is dictated by performance. It’s not colour, cultural background,
gender or the like. It’s (whether) you are competent at what you
do . . . . If you’re competent at what you do, then the team will
take you in and fully integrate you.88
Thus, because gay and lesbian servicemembers in the Canadian
Forces no longer have to fear discovery and discharge, they can dedi-
cate their energy to their performance.89
Though problems still may exist for gay and lesbian service-
members in the Canadian Forces, some of whom feel isolated and
face negative reactions to their sexual orientation,90 all reports indi-
cate that unit cohesion and morale remain strong years after the ban
was lifted.
C. Israel
Recent studies have found no negative effect on unit cohesion
or morale as a result of allowing gay and lesbian military personnel
to serve openly in the Israeli armed forces. Reuven Gal, the former
director of the Israeli Institute for Military Studies, found that:
[homosexuals’] presence, whether openly or clandestinely, has not
impaired the morale, cohesion, readiness, or security of any unit.
Perhaps the best indication of this overall perspective is the rela-
tive smoothness with which the most recent June 1993 repeal of
the remaining restrictions on homosexuals was received within
the IDF and in Israeli society as a whole.91
Similarly, a 1999 study of seventeen soldiers in the Israeli
Defense Forces (“IDF”) found that only two of the seventeen reported
that they would have a problem serving under a gay or lesbian com-
mander, and only three soldiers reported being concerned about show-
ering with gay or lesbian soldiers.92 One female soldier, who served
from 1993 to 1996, stated that she experienced no problems as a
88. Id.
89. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 32.
90. See Gay Troops Living Isolated Lives, CALGARY SUN (Alberta), July 23, 2006, at
22 (noting that an anonymous gay servicemember sent a letter in 2006 and asserted that
“[f]rom personal experience, I know there are young [gay and lesbian] soldiers who feel like
they don’t belong”).
91. Belkin & Levitt, supra note 46, at 547 (quoting Reuven Gal, Gays in the Military:
Policy and Practice in the Israeli Defense Forces, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY
(W.J. Scott & S.C. Stanley eds., 1994)).
92. Id. at 545.
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result of her sexual orientation.93 She was amazed to discover that
“people either thought that [her] sexual orientation was ‘cool’ or were
indifferent to it.” 94
In fact, reports indicate that military effectiveness and morale
has improved by allowing gay and lesbian servicemembers to serve
openly. A recent article in Foreign Policy magazine by Danny Kaplan,
an expert on the Israeli military, determined that allowing gay and
lesbian soldiers to serve openly has actually increased military ef-
fectiveness.95 In addition, the article concludes that policies prohibiting
open service negatively affected military effectiveness and morale.96
Prohibiting gay and lesbian soldiers from serving openly has the
counterproductive effect of creating an atmosphere of paranoia and
suspicion, in which “everyone becomes suspected of being gay. . . .
When intimacy and sexuality—which are, like it or not, key features
of masculine military culture—cannot be negotiated, cannot be told
and discussed, they may be turned inwards, transformed into an urge
to hunt fellow soldiers.” 97
Open service also improves morale and military effectiveness by
reinforcing the fundamental importance of military service. In Israel,
not serving is generally looked down upon, both because of the secu-
rity risks faced by Israel and because military service in Israel is
compulsory.98 Eliav Lieblich, a former captain in the Israeli army,
observes that because military service is so fundamental, the repeal
of the prohibition on gay and lesbian servicemembers has served to
“reinforce[ ] the democratic nature of the state . . . [and that] it is the
responsibility of the commanders to educate their people about basic
democratic principles.” 99 The repeal of restrictions on open service
has thus not only had no negative effect on military effectiveness and
morale, but has had the additional positive effect of reinforcing both
the importance of military service and important democratic values.
D. United Kingdom
Studies conducted in 2000 show that the repeal of the prohi-
bition against gay and lesbian people serving openly in the United
93. Id.
94. Id.; accord Susan Taylor Martin, Will Israeli Army Success Sway U.S. Policy on
Gays?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Jan. 8, 2007, at 1A.
95. Danny Kaplan, They’re Here, They’re Queer, It’s No Big Deal, FOREIGN POL’Y




98. Belkin & Levitt, supra note 46, at 555.
99. Questionnaire Response of Captain Eliav Lieblich, Israel Defense Forces, Columbia
Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
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Kingdom’s military has had no perceived effect on morale, unit cohe-
sion, or operational effectiveness. In 2000, six months after lifting the
ban, the MOD issued an internal report about the effect of the policy
change.100 The report stated “that the introduction of [openly gay
servicemembers into the military] has had no adverse effects on the
operational effectiveness of the forces.”101 In addition, the assess-
ment found “that the effect on morale has been non-existent.”102 In
January 2010, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence confirmed
that the repeal of the ban on gay and lesbian servicemembers in the
Armed Forces has had “absolutely no impact at all on operational
effectiveness.”103
In an additional sign of acceptance, in July 2009, for the first
time in its history, the cover of Soldier magazine, the British Army’s
official publication, featured an openly gay servicemember.104 Trooper
James Wharton, clad in his dress uniform, is pictured complete with
his medal for service in Iraq, next to the headline “Pride.”105
III. LIVING QUARTERS
This section discusses the effect that lifting the ban has had on
each military’s living quarters and shows that, for all countries, no
changes were made in living quarters, excepting the United Kingdom’s
slight revision to its housing policy to recognize same-sex couples in
the military.
A. Australia
Australia’s military did not change its policy on housing or bath-
rooms and showers after its transition to open service.106 Currently,
100. See Summerskill, supra note 52 (reporting that “MoD staff canvassed the Army,




103. Coghlan, supra note 53. Additionally, the MOD report revealed that “[t]he ser-
vices reported that the revised policy on homosexuality had no discernable impact, either
positive or negative, on recruitment.” Summerskill, supra note 52.
104. Terri Judd, How the Forces Finally Learnt To Take Pride, INDEPENDENT (U.K.),
July 27, 2009, at 10.
105. See id. (asserting that this open display “is the most obvious sign that almost a
decade after the military lifted the ban on homosexuality it is finally comfortable with
its new clothes”).
106. Understanding Homosexuality Module 6: Living & Working Alongside Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Colleagues, AUSTL. DEFENCE FORCE, (2003), www.defence
.gov.au/fr/education/Understanding%20Homosexuality%202003/index.html [hereinafter
Understanding Homosexuality Training]; see also Questionnaire Response of Chief Petty
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according to several Australian Defence Force military personnel,
the rooms in barracks housing for basic training have up to four
non-partitioned beds.107 In all barracks and other on-base housing,
toilets and showers are generally partitioned with either doors or
curtains.108 This has not changed in any way since the lifting of the
ban in Australia. In fact, the sexual-orientation-awareness training
that the Australian Department of Defence created for military per-
sonnel notes that “[t]here are and always have been homo- and bisex-
ual personnel living, sleeping and showering with others of the same
gender without anyone knowing of their orientation. Disclosure of
that orientation will not result in a sudden shift from discretion to
blatant flaunting. Why would it?”109
B. Canada
Living quarters in the Canadian Forces have not changed since
the lifting of the ban, with the result that gay and heterosexual ser-
vicemembers continue to share living quarters.110 Before the ban was
lifted, a Canadian Charter Task Force (“CTF”) “undertook to assess
‘the probability of adverse effect’ ” from lifting the ban.111 The CTF’s
concern was that as Canadian Force members live and work in close
proximity (for example, sharing common latrine and shower facilities),
the close living quarters might invite sexual advances by gay service-
members toward heterosexual members.112 According to the report
of Dr. Franklin C. Pinch, of Human Resources Consulting, the CTF
studies undertaken found that “the alternative of providing four
Officer Stuart O’Brien, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender
Law Clinic (Mar. 25, 2010) (on file with author) (indicating that “no changes were made”).
107. Questionnaire Response of Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, Australian Defence
Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 25, 2010) (on file with
author); Questionnaire Responses of Private Nathan Howarth and Leading Aircraftsman
Troy D. Jorgensen, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law
Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
108. Questionnaire Response of Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, Australian Defence
Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 25, 2010) (on file with
author); accord Questionnaire Responses of Chief Petty Officer Dion Chandler, Private
Nathan Howarth, Leading Aircraftsman Troy D. Jorgensen, Lieutenant Phil Murphy, and
Signalman Michael Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality &
Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
109. Understanding Homosexuality Training, supra note 106.
110. See Swardson, supra note 25 (noting that “[n]o accommodation exceptions were
included in the new policy”).
111. FRANKLIN C. PINCH, U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INST. FOR THE BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCI.,
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN FORCES 16 (1994), avail-
able at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=
ADA277746.
112. Id. at 18-19.
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separate sets of accommodation and hygiene facilities (especially in
the navy) might be possible, but not practical.”113
Notably, notwithstanding these and additional concerns about
shared living quarters that were raised initially when the ban was
lifted, over a decade has passed without any amendment to living
quarters policies, and no reports have been found that indicate prob-
lems with the Canadian Forces’ living quarters since the lifting of
the ban.114
C. Israel
According to interviews with Israeli servicemembers, no changes
were instituted to the barracks, showers, or toilets after the repeal
of the prohibition on gay and lesbian servicemembers.115 However,
some sources report that “when a homosexual soldier lives in the bar-
racks, commanders often give heterosexual soldiers the option to live
off base if there are objections to rooming arrangements.”116 The same
is true for “homosexual soldiers . . . [, who] have the option to live on
a closed post.”117
Israeli military housing is segregated based on sex and differs
depending on where the servicemember is located and on his or her
career stage.118 Israel has both closed bases, where people live on the
base, and open bases, where servicemembers return to their own
homes at night.119 Thus, for many Israeli soldiers living on open
bases, the amount of time living in barracks is minimal—especially
during peacetime.120
For servicemembers who live on closed bases, and thus in mili-
tary housing, the living conditions vary between tents containing
between five and twenty beds, barracks containing between five and
seven beds, and field tents holding two soldiers.121 No walls in the
113. Id.
114. Swardson, supra note 25.
115. Questionnaire Response of Captain Eliav Lieblich, Israel Defense Forces, Columbia
Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with author); Questionnaire
Response of Anonymous Staff Sergeant, Israel Defense Forces, Columbia Law Sch.
Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 2, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with First
Sergeant Eli Kaplan-Wildman, Israel Defense Forces, in N.Y., N.Y. (Mar. 1, 2010).
116. Sherilyn A. Bunn, Straight Talk: The Implications of Repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t





120. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 43.
121. Questionnaire Response of Captain Eliav Lieblich, Israel Defense Forces, Columbia
Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
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barracks separate individual soldiers’ sleeping spaces.122 Toilets are
partitioned, however, and showers are usually separated by a wall,
though a common entrance is accessible by all.123 Israel’s open service
policy did not lead to any changes in these housing conditions.
D. United Kingdom
Much of the discussion surrounding the repeal of the prohibition
against gay and lesbian servicemembers concerned issues of privacy
in shared accommodations and showers.124 When the transition to
open service was implemented, however, those issues quickly faded
into insignificance.
Servicemembers who are not married or in civil partnerships are
usually housed in Single Living Accommodation (“SLA”).125 Judging
by a photograph on the website of the Ministry of Defence, it appears
that individuals have considerable privacy in an SLA,126 even while
sharing common showers and bathrooms. No significant changes to
this arrangement have been made following the transition to open ser-
vice, and no publicly available reports indicate that the use of common
showers and bathrooms by gay and heterosexual servicemembers has
presented significant or systemic problems. Shared showers and bath-
rooms did not present a problem for couples’ and families’ housing
because couples and families are typically allotted units that have
their own bathrooms.
In 2005, the housing policy for couples was affected by the intro-
duction of the Civil Partnerships Act of 2004, under which married
quarters were renamed Service Family Accommodation.127 Currently,
“[s]ervice personnel [who] are married, in a civil partnership or who
have custody of children are entitled to Service Families Accommo-
dation.”128 In sum, at present, gay and lesbian servicemembers are en-
titled to the same housing facilities as their heterosexual counterparts.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, REPORT OF THE HOMOSEXUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT TEAM
120-29 (Feb. 1996) (on file with author).
125. Infrastructure Division—The Australian Defence Force’s Single Living Accommo-
dation Project, AUSTL. DEP’T OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/id/sla/project_purpose
.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
126. Photo of Single Living Accommodation, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, http://www.mod
.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DE/WhatWeDo/Accommodation/ProjectSlamsingleLiving
AccommodationModernisation.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
127. Judd, supra note 104, at 10.
128. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SERVICE FAMILY ACCOMMODATION, REPORT BY THE
COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL (HC 13 Session 2008-2009) (Mar. 18, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/Australia_Final_Report.pdf.
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IV. EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMS
The introduction of educational and training programs has been
an important step in the transition to open service for several of the
countries surveyed. Training has taken the form of general programs
covering all issues of equality as well as more specialized programs
targeting issues of sexual orientation discrimination. These programs
are reported to have contributed in some measure to changing the atti-
tudes of military personnel toward gay and lesbian servicemembers.
A. Australia
Throughout the nearly two decades since the ban was lifted in
Australia, the Australian Defence Force, through the office of the
Defence Equity Organisation, has gradually implemented training
programs on sexual orientation, as well as other diversity issues, for
all military personnel.129 A few months after the ban was lifted in
1992,130 some services within the Australian Defence Force made ef-
forts to integrate training and education. For example, Commodore
Richard R.W. Gates, a Royal Australian Navy official, recalled that
Navy officials implemented a training program entitled “Good Work-
ing Relationships.”131
Currently, the Defence Equity Organisation takes responsibility
for monitoring, educating, and enforcing the sexual harassment and
anti-discrimination policies of the Australian military, which now in-
clude harassment or discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.132 The Defence Equity Organisation reports directly to the head
of personnel for the Australian Defence Force and “handles complaints
regarding all matters of sexual misconduct including harassment,
bullying and assault, provides an anonymous advice line for service
129. Aaron Belkin & Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, The International Experience,
in THE U.S. MILITARY’S “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” POLICY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 59, 69
(Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert ed., 2007).
After the lifting of the ban, the ADF introduced a variety of new programs
and training courses to enforce and support the provisions of the Defence
Instruction on Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Offences, Fraternisation
and other Unacceptable Behavior in the Australian Defence Forces (2000).
In 1997, responsibilities for monitoring, education, and enforcement of the
instructions were consolidated into the new Defence Equity Organization
(DEO) that reports directly to the Defence Personnel Executive (the head of
personnel for the ADF).
Id.
130. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 2.
131. Id. at 20.
132. Unacceptable Behaviour, AUSTL. DEP’T OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/
RR/unacceptablebehaviour.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
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members and commanders, and directs the training and outreach
activities of ‘Equity Advisors’ throughout the forces.”133
Within the Australian Defence Force, all military and civilian
personnel must undergo the Annual Equity Awareness Training,
which covers a broad range of topics, including issues of gender, sex-
uality, race, and age within the military.134 In addition, since 2003
the Australian Defence Force has had an online training program to
educate servicemembers about gay and lesbian personnel.135 The
“Understanding Homosexuality” training program is not mandatory;
rather, it was created so that managers and supervisors can speak
with sensitivity about issues affecting gay and lesbian personnel.136
The comprehensive training presentation first gives background
information about sexual orientation and identity.137 It then shows
why harassment and discrimination against gay and lesbian service-
members is a detriment to the military.138 It also describes why allow-
ing gay and lesbian personnel to disclose their sexual orientation in
the military is important to unit cohesion and morale, and offers advice
133. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 16; accord Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Stuart O’Brien at 20:15; e.g., A Guide to Fair
Leadership and Discipline in the Australian Defence Force, DEF. EQUITY ORG., http://
www.defence.gov.au/fr/publications/guidetofairlead.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011); Defence
a Bully-Free Workplace, DEFENCE EQUITY ORG., at http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/
publications/ bullybrochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011); Defence Workplace Equity
and Diversity Plan: 2007-2009, DEP’T OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/apscareers/
careeropportunities/ information_packs/documents/Combined_WEDP_20070707.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2011); Guide to Equity and Diversity in Defence, DEFENCE EQUITY ORG.,
http://www.defence.gov.au/ fr/publications/e&dbooklet-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
134. Questionnaire Responses of Chief Petty Officer Dion Chandler, Private Nathan
Howarth, Lieutenant Phil Murphy, Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, and Signalman
Michael Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law
Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author) (discussing the various types of training programs
and packages).
135. See Alternative Resolutions and Equity: Training, DEP’T OF DEFENCE, http://www
.defence.gov.au/fr/ARE/training.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (noting that although the
training is mandatory, servicemembers have the option of completing the training either
by attending a face-to-face presentation or online); see also Mary K. Pratt, Australian
Military Standardizes Training with Web Tool, CIO, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.cio.com
.au/article/43689/australian_military_standardizes-training-web-tool/ (noting that the
Defence Online Campus was capable of providing uniform training to all servicemembers).
136. Questionnaire Response of Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, Australian Defence
Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 25, 2010) (on file with
author) (“[I]t is designed to give Managers/Supervisors more inclusive terms (such as
‘partner’ rather than ‘wife’ or ‘husband’) and give them a little more knowledge in relation
to the Gay & Lesbian Community”). Although the “Understanding Homosexuality” training
program is not mandatory, servicemembers are required to complete Equity and Diversity
training each year. Questionnaire Response of Lieutenant Phil Murphy, Australian
Defence Force, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file
with author).
137. Understanding Homosexuality Training, supra note 106.
138. Id.
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for servicemembers, presumably those who are uncomfortable with
open service, on how to serve alongside gay and lesbian personnel.139
B. Canada
Education and training sessions within the Canadian military
did not change significantly after the ban was lifted. Under General
John de Chastelain, the Canadian Forces modified already existing
harassment guidelines, started attitudinal training programs, and set
up new methods of handling complaints when Canada transitioned
to open service.140 The training sessions did not focus solely on issues
affecting gays.141 Instead, they were aimed at reinforcing the impor-
tance of sensitivity generally and the position that harassment will
not be tolerated in any instance. Colonel Edward Nurse, commander
of a Canadian Forces base, explained that, “It allows people to see that
this is the military program, that it’s not just a nice thing to do. We
have zero tolerance for harassment, whether it’s sexual, gender or
ethnic.”142 The mandatory training sessions, however, did use words
like gay and lesbian to give concrete examples to integrate the policy
objectives and to aid in understanding the new policy.143
In addition to training sessions, “[t]he National Defence Head-
quarters (NDHQ) issued a ‘Questions and Answers’ sheet for use
within the [Canadian Forces] that explained the change in policy”
through questions and answers about appropriate behavior.144 The
sheet addressed a range of concerns, such as:
Q31: Will such activities as dancing, hand holding, embracing be-
tween same/sex members be accepted in mess social functions?
A31: Standards of conduct for homosexual members will be the
same as those for heterosexual members. Common sense and
good judgment will be applied and required of all members.145
Significantly, the “Questions and Answers” sheet sets out the
logistics of how the shift in policy would affect the composition of the
139. Id.
140. Swardson, supra note 25.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Belkin & Embser-Herbert, supra note 129, at 65 (noting, for example,
the Canadian Forces implemented “the Standards for Harassment and Racism Preven-
tion (SHARP) program [which] strove to overturn common stereotypes about gays and
lesbian[s]”).
143. Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Michelle Douglas
at 55:11.
144. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 23.
145. Id. (citation omitted).
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military.146 To the extent that soldiers were concerned that the lifting
of the ban would create complications or leave servicemembers un-
sure of their actions, the sheet served as a reference for individuals’
questions and provided clear responses using concrete examples.
In sum, Canada made slight alterations to its existing training
sessions to integrate the new policy and provided guidebooks like the
“Questions and Answers” sheet to clarify what the new rules would
mean for soldiers on the ground.
C. Israel
While the Israeli military does provide training to address abusive
treatment and harassment of certain populations, such as women, it
has not provided any special education or training related to address-
ing harassment or abusive treatment of gay or lesbian servicemem-
bers.147 The Israeli military chose not to provide such educational or
training courses because it has not found that any problems have
arisen related to gay and lesbian servicemembers in the military,
and thus believes the training is unnecessary.148
An expert on the Israeli military has attributed the success of
Israel’s transition to an open military, at least in part, to the military
authorities’ ability to prevent “sexual orientation [from] becom[ing]
a source of . . . disruption by treating it as a fact of life rather than
a problem to be addressed.”149 The lack of special training and the
implication that gay and lesbian soldiers serving openly is not an
issue have resulted, overall, in the successful integration of gay and
lesbian soldiers into military units.150
D. United Kingdom
The Ministry of Defence developed Equality and Diversity
Schemes, first introduced in 2006, to promote race, disability, sexual
orientation, and gender equality.151 In addition, the Joint Equality
146. Id.
147. See Belkin & Levitt, supra note 46, at 547 (noting that “[t]he IDF does not con-
duct any special education or sensitivity training related to sexual orientation issues”);
Questionnaire Response of Captain Eliav Lieblich, Israel Defense Forces, Columbia Law
Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 43.
149. Kaplan, supra note 95.
150. Id.
151. The Equity and Diversity Schemes have been revised and are now in force until
2011. Equality & Diversity Schemes 2008-2011: Incorporating Armed Forces, Wider
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defense Police, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2 [hereinafter
Equality & Diversity Schemes], http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/98E4EAB6-CE02-4F39
-9EF2-17DD054C5905/0/eqdivschemes20082011.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
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and Diversity Training Centre, which is part of the U.K. Defence
Academy, provides training to Equality and Diversity Advisers and
their Assistants, training for senior Service personnel, and training
services to individual units to meet the requirements of Commanding
Officers.152 It appears that the main training provider for the staff,
DB Learning, is in the process of integrating “equality and diversity
issues across a range of their training products . . . [to mainstream]
equality and diversity into every aspect of Defence business.”153
According to a former servicemember, all army personnel receive
training on equality and diversity issues, which includes issues faced
by gay and lesbian servicemembers.154 This is first carried out in re-
cruit training.155 All soldiers then receive annual awareness training
as part of their annual training cycle.156 This training, which is car-
ried out by military staff in the unit who have attended the Equality
and Diversity Advisers Course, generally consists of watching a film
explaining the services’ policy, showing several examples of good
and bad behavior, and asking the training audience to discuss what
they saw.157
In addition, the U.K. armed forces also use a variety of media to
educate servicemembers about their policies on equality and diversity.
For example, the armed forces publish the Royal Navy’s Diversity and
Equality Newsletter. Where appropriate, officials in the Ministry of
Defence also contribute information to articles and give interviews in
the wider media. The armed forces also engage in a range of promo-
tional, recruitment, and outreach activities, including annual sponsor-
ship of gay pride events, youth initiatives, and building links with
community associations.158
V. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
Sexual harassment of servicemembers has long been a major
concern in the armed forces. In response to the shift to open service,
the military branches studied here modified their existing prohibitions
against sexual harassment. The revised sexual harassment policies
focus on inappropriate acts instead of the sexual orientation of the per-
sons allegedly engaging in these acts. While changes in official policy
152. Id. at A-14.
153. Id. at A-14, A-15.
154. Telephone Interview with an anonymous former servicemember, U.K. Armed




158. Equality & Diversity Schemes, supra note 151, at A-16.
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have been effective as a general matter, occasional incidents of harass-
ment toward gay and lesbian military personnel remain. In response
to these isolated incidents, military personnel have worked to create
accessible systems of reporting and effective means of discipline.
A. Australia
Sexual harassment and discrimination policies in the Australian
Defence Force played a central role in overturning the prohibition on
gay and lesbian servicemembers in the military. Before the ban was
lifted, the military’s sexual harassment policy prohibited so-called
“homosexual behaviour,” making it grounds for discharge.159 In the
course of lifting the ban, the government changed the military’s code
of conduct to base discharge on “unacceptable sexual behavior,” no
matter whether applied to gay or heterosexual personnel.160 A govern-
ment statement observed that the policy “gives commanders sweeping
powers and firm guidelines for disciplinary measures.”161
Less than a year after the ban was lifted, then-Defense Depart-
ment’s Information Director Brigadier, Adrian D’Hage, said, “We now
have a policy that’s based on sexual propriety in the workplace . . . .
We will still discharge homosexuals, but not because of sexual pref-
erence. It will be because of sexual harassment.”162
In the years immediately following the lifting of the ban, some
isolated incidents of harassment and discrimination were reported.163
For example, one officer’s sexual orientation was presumed to be gay,
although he did not reveal this himself, and “some adverse reactions
ensued.”164 Also, “an enlisted man complained that an officer had tried
to kiss him,” and “[t]he officer was discharged for ‘unacceptable sexual
behavior.’ ” 165 During the 1993 Senate Armed Services Committee
hearings on the potential repeal of the ban on gay men and lesbians
in the U.S. military, U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Frederick Peck testi-
fied that Australians he spoke to said that gay and lesbian personnel
would likely not come out for fear of experiencing “barracks justice”
and an “inhospitable environment.”166
159. Smith, supra note 9, at 544; accord GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
160. Smith, supra note 9, at 545; GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
161. Branigin, supra note 15, at A6.
162. Id.
163. Smith, supra note 9, at 545.
164. Id. at 545-46.
165. Branigin, supra note 15, at A6.
166. Pilita Clark, U.S. Gulf War Hero Backs Gay, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 13,
1993, at 7.
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In addition, in 2000, when Aaron Belkin and Jason McNichol
interviewed Dr. Katerina Agostino, professor of the Department of
Sociology at Macquarie University in Sydney, she stated, “There is
a senior naval officer that I know who’s very good at what he does,
but he’s been unable to get promotion. . . . He was also told there’s
nothing wrong with being gay, you just can’t look so gay.”167 Some of
the servicemembers interviewed for this report mentioned that they
had experienced or observed harassment on the basis of sexual orien-
tation as well.168
Overall, however, there is very little evidence that sexual harass-
ment or discrimination on the basis of sexual preference has been a
widespread or pervasive problem in the Australian Defence Force.
Immediately after the ban was lifted, senior Defence official Greg
Austin noted that “[t]here have been more instances of unacceptable
heterosexual than homosexual behaviour . . . . There are more men
out there trying to rape women than trying to rape men.”169
Moreover, as of 2000, sexual orientation-related complaints
made up less than five percent of the total complaints the Australian
Defence Force received related to sexual harassment, bullying, and
other forms of sexual misconduct.170 In addition, of the 1,400 calls
received between August 1998 and September 2000 by a hotline
administered by the Australian Defence Force to assist managerial
personnel in handling potential misconduct, only 1.21% “related to
sexual orientation” complaints.171
Lastly, all the servicemembers interviewed for this report who
had observed or experienced harassment emphasized the accessibil-
ity of the remedial measures the Australian Defence Force makes
available to military personnel.172 When faced with an incident of
harassment, servicemembers have several options for redressing
their grievances, including calling a Defence Equity Advisor or calling
the Defence Equity hotline, reporting the harassment to superiors,
contacting the Defence Gay and Lesbian Information Service for a
referral, or requesting a formal inquiry into the incident.173
167. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 25.
168. Questionnaire Responses of Private Nathan Howarth, Leading Aircraftsman Troy
D. Jorgensen, and Signalman Michael Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law
Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
169. Branigin, supra note 15, at A6.
170. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 3.
171. Id.
172. Questionnaire Responses of Private Nathan Howarth, Leading Aircraftsman Troy
D. Jorgensen, and Signalman Michael Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia Law
Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
173. Id.
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B. Canada
Sexual harassment and anti-discrimination policies in the Cana-
dian Forces did not undergo any significant changes after the lifting
of the ban. However, after the ban was lifted, the Canadian Forces is-
sued a new regulation (CFAO 19-36) entitled “Sexual Misconduct,”174
which revised versions of general policy on personal relationships and
harassment. This regulation “was intended to provide clear policy and
guidance on what constituted inappropriate sexual behavior and
conduct” by all military servicemembers.175 The order applied to gay
and nongay servicemembers equally, such that sexual harassment
policies did not differ according to one’s sexual orientation.
In addition to the new regulation, the Department of National
Defence implemented a program known as Standard for Harassment
and Racism Prevention (“SHARP”) in 1996 to deal with all sexual
harassment.176 The Canadian Forces managed to integrate smoothly
the SHARP regulations into the already-existing sexual harassment
policy by drafting “[t]he SHARP section on sexual harassment and
sexual misconduct [using] gender and orientation-neutral terms
describing specific behavior that would be classified as harassment
or misconduct.”177
The SHARP program produced many positive results.
The Canadian Forces 1998 survey on harassment found that the
SHARP training program had substantially increased awareness
of the harassment policy. In 1998, 97% of the [Canadian Forces’]
personnel surveyed stated that they were aware that the [Cana-
dian Forces had] a harassment policy, compared to 84% of women
and 80% of men in 1992. The survey further revealed that three-
quarters of the respondents . . . had a harassment advisor for
their unit.178
In addition to the positive results of the SHARP program, statis-
tics collected by the Canadian military in 1995 showed no correlation
174. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 23.
175. Karol W.J. Wenek, Briefing Note to Director of Public Policy, Ottawa: Canadian
Forces ¶ 2 (Aug. 1995).
176. CAN. DEFENCE ACAD., LEADERSHIP IN THE CANADIAN FORCES: LEADING THE
INSTITUTION 109 (2007), available at http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/lea/doc/
Leading%20the%20Institution%20-%20English.pdf.
177. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 24.
178. AARON BELKIN & JASON MCNICHOL, EFFECTS OF THE 1992 LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS
ON GAY AND LESBIAN SERVICE IN THE CANADIAN FORCES: APPRAISING THE EVIDENCE 11
(2000) (citing Major J.E. Adams-Roy, Harassment in the Canadian Forces: Results of the
1998 Survey, Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters (1999)).
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between homosexuality and offensive conduct.179 These studies led
members of the “military police staff responsible for maintaining sta-
tistics on offences committed by military members” to conclude that
“homosexuality has not been a contributing factor in matters of con-
duct and discipline.”180 According to their statistics, “of the 905 assault
cases for the period from November 1992 to [1995], none could be iden-
tified as involving” attacks on gay and lesbian personnel.181 Further,
the staff responsible for administering human rights complaints filed
with the Canadian Human Rights Commission reported that, “from
November 1992 to [1995], only three of the 213 such complaints were
based on sexual orientation, two of which pertained to differential
treatment and releases which occurred prior to the policy change.”182
Military personnel “responsible for dealing with military grievances
which come to the attention of National Defence Headquarters . . .
[expressed confidence] that, of the approximately 2,000 grievances
handled in the past three years, no more than about a dozen have in-
cluded sexual orientation as a significant element of the grievance.”183
Further, according to Megan MacLean, a spokeswoman for
Canada’s Department of National Defence, gay and lesbian people
currently serve in all three branches of the military, and since the
1992 policy change, “incidents of discrimination and harassment have
been ‘extremely rare.’ ”184 However, many gay and lesbian personnel
serving in the military shortly after the ban was lifted said that “they
still routinely encounter[ed] prejudice.”185 According to a lesbian cor-
poral who preferred to remain anonymous, “Because of the macho
mind-set of the army, gay men must have had a more difficult time
than women, especially in the field.”186 Still, according to then-Chief
of Defence staff, John Rogers Anderson, “there is little, if any, active
resistance to the new rules.”187 While Admiral Anderson agreed that
“more senior officers likely opposed the change than supported it,”
he believed that they “[understood] that no wavering on the policy
[would] be tolerated.”188 Harassment or discrimination of any kind
179. See, e.g., Wenek, supra note 175, ¶¶ 3-6 (finding that “behavioural and conduct data
compiled by several agencies in National Defence Headquarters yield little or no evidence
to suggest that allowing homosexuals to serve in the Canadian Forces has been prob-
lematic, either in terms of their behaviour or their treatment by other members”).
180. Id. ¶ 5a.
181. Id.
182. Id. ¶ 5c.
183. Id. ¶ 5d.
184. Cohen, supra note 27.
185. Fisher, supra note 29, at 14.
186. Id. at 14-15.
187. Id. at 15.
188. Id.
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would be punished, and individuals like Master Corporal Mike Simic,
who expressed disagreement at the time with gay men and lesbians
being allowed to serve in the military, said his attitude was to “grin
and bear it. . . . There’s a lot of the military that’s out of your hands.
The policy is very clear.”189
The blanket requirement that harassment would not be tolerated
by or against any servicemember reinforced that the transition did
not require an overhaul of the already-existing system, but involved
reemphasizing already-existing obligations toward all individuals.
Further, even though harassment still occurs, the fact that Canada
no longer has a ban on gay and lesbian personnel serving in the mili-
tary serves as a constant reminder that the Canadian Forces are com-
mitted to treating all servicemembers equally, and that harassment
of any kind, including harassment of gay and lesbian soldiers, will
not be tolerated.
C. Israel
The Israeli military regulates the behavior of its soldiers through
prohibitions on sexual activity occurring in the barracks.190 In addi-
tion, the Israeli military prohibits sexual relations between officers
and their subordinates.191 These prohibitions drew no distinction be-
tween sexual acts of same- or different-sex couples even before the
service restrictions were lifted, and thus did not need to be altered
after the Israeli military opened access to all positions to gay and
lesbian soldiers.192
Since the repeal of the restrictions on gay and lesbian soldiers,
there have been no significant problems of discrimination against
or harassment by or of gay and lesbian soldiers.193 A formal study of
harassment complaints, undertaken at the behest of the Knesset,
found that none of the cases of harassment were based on animus to-
ward sexual orientation.194 An extensive review of Israeli newspapers
189. Swardson, supra note 25.
190. See Clyde Haberman, Homosexuals in Israeli Army: No Official Discrimination,
but Keep it Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at 14 (noting that “[r]egulations prohibit
sexual activity in general on military bases, although the rules are often ignored at least
between men and women”).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Belkin & Levitt, supra note 46, at 547; see also Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:
Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?, 33 PARAMETERS 108, 112 (2003) (reporting
that “the 35 experts, soldiers, and officers we interviewed were able to recall only a handful
of cases involving harassment based on sexual orientation after the lifting of the gay ban”
(citation omitted)).
194. LEE WALZER, BETWEEN SODOM AND EDEN: A GAY JOURNEY THROUGH TODAY’S
CHANGING ISRAEL 135 (1999).
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“also uncovered no stories of soldiers who were denied promotions
because of their sexual orientation.”195 This was confirmed by “a
board member of Israel’s primary gay rights organization,” who stated
in an interview that he did not know of any “cases in which a soldier
had been denied benefits, promotions, or assignments because of his
or her sexual orientation.”196
In addition, Brigadier-General Uri Shoham, the military’s judge
advocate general, stated that he could remember only a few cases of
harassment based on sexual orientation, and that such cases are
“very rare.”197 Further, Shoham “stated that that [sic] he had never
had to deal with harassment against gay troops in his career as a
military lawyer.”198
In general, little evidence is available of harassment occurring
on the basis of sexual orientation because individual commanders
generally handle these types of claims.199 However, though some evi-
dence of harassment exists—such as a female officer’s observation
that, while there was no discrimination in her unit, “[r]umors (usually
from the news) do show the existence of some such problems in ‘closed
units’ ([w]here one lives on base)” 200—most of the commanders ques-
tioned in studies on the issue have reported that they could not recall
any examples of harassment of gay or lesbian soldiers.
D. United Kingdom
The transition to allowing gay and lesbian servicemembers to
serve in the U.K. armed forces was supported by the military’s poli-
cies against sexual harassment and discrimination. The new code of
conduct that replaced the ban on gay and lesbian servicemembers in
the forces was neutral as to sexual orientation, and instead forbade
“touching, displays of affection and relationships across the ranks.” 201
The code was intended to “restrict sex, not sexuality,” and applied to
all servicemembers equally.202 Because the focus has been placed on
inappropriate behavior instead of sexual orientation, sexual orienta-
tion has not become a source of antagonism as some had feared.
Rather, “the forces treat sexuality as a private matter, and military
195. Belkin & Levitt, supra note 46, at 554.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 546.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting an anonymous communication, Mar. 27, 2000).
201. Jack Mathieson, New Code to Replace Forces’ Ban on Gays, EVENING NEWS
(Edinburgh), Nov. 15, 1999, at 5.
202. Id.
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recruits are no longer asked their sexual orientation.” 203 Gay and
lesbian service personnel may rely on the code of conduct for sup-
port in the event of harassment or bullying. Expressions of hostility
toward gay and lesbian servicemembers are treated as grounds for
disciplinary action.204 Further, all servicemembers know that they
have recourse if they witness or experience inappropriate comments
or actions.
The policies of the Ministry of Defence specifically target inappro-
priate behavior, rather than sexual orientation. The social conduct
policy of the Ministry of Defence prescribes that soldiers, regardless
of sexual orientation or sex, are prohibited from engaging in social
behavior that undermines, or may potentially undermine, the trust
and cohesion, and therefore the operational effectiveness, of the ser-
vices.205 Enumerated inappropriate behavior includes:
[U]nwelcome sexual attention in the form of physical or verbal
conduct, over-familiarity with the spouses . . . or partners of other
Service personnel, displays of affection which might cause offence
to others, behaviour which damages or puts at risk the marriage,
civil partnership or personal relationships of Service personnel
or civilian colleagues within the wider defence community, mis-
use of rank and taking advantage of subordinates, probing into
a person’s private life and relationships, . . . [and other types of]
social misbehaviour.206
Deference is given to the commanding officer to determine if behavior
constitutes a threat to the efficiency or operational effectiveness of
the service.207
With respect to discrimination, cases of discrimination based on
sexual orientation have been few in number. According to Lieutenant-
Colonel Colin Bulleid of the British Army Equality and Diversity
policy branch, expressions of “homophobia in the Army [are] now
restricted to ‘the odd prat who behaves inappropriately.’ ” 208
203. Tom Kelly, Gay Sailors, the Navy Needs You, DAILY MAIL (London), Feb. 3, 2006,
at 21.
204. See Coghlan, supra note 53 (noting that “homophobia is treated as a ground for
disciplinary action”).
205. Armed Forces Code of Social Conduct: Policy Statement, U.K. MINISTRY OF DE-
FENCE, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/Personnel/Equality




208. Ben Macintyre, Obama Is out of Step on Gays in the Military, TIMES (London),
Oct. 15, 2009, at 19.
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However, the U.K. MOD has taken several steps to ensure that
where there are problems, measures are in place to combat them. For
instance, “[t]he Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regula-
tions [of] 2003, which came into force on [December 1, 2003], outlaw
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in employment and
vocational training.” 209 To further the goals of the Regulations, the
MOD has an entire organizational structure to protect equality and
diversity.210 In addition, soldiers can report to a number of depart-
ments or specialist officers to raise concerns about harassment.211
All Army units at the battalion level and upwards have an Equality
and Diversity Adviser appointed who is normally at captain or major
rank.212 Aggrieved servicemembers can approach the Adviser with
their complaints.213 Complaints can be raised through the formal
complaints process as well.214 The MOD has also appointed a Service
Personnel Complaints Commissioner to ensure that complaints of
bullying, harassment, or discrimination are dealt with properly.215
The appointment of the Commissioner is another indicator of the com-
mitment of the Ministry of Defence to ensuring equality among ser-
vicemembers. In the words of the first Service Personnel Complaints
Commissioner, Dr. Susan Atkins:
The Armed Forces and MOD have signalled their commitment
to having a rigorous, independent and transparent scrutiny of the
complaints system. They have also understood the need for an
alternative route of access for Service personnel and their families.
I shall hold them to their word. I am determined to ensure that all
Service men and women and their families have confidence in the
complaints process and are treated properly.216
The Royal Military Police now has Lesbian and Gay Liaison
Officers appointed on all the large military bases.217 These military
police officers have attended training on gay and lesbian issues with
the civilian police.218 They, along with other military police, are
209. Equality & Diversity Schemes, supra note 151, at 27.
210. See id. at 20 (“The Department has adopted a unified philosophy towards equality
and diversity issues at the strategic level . . . [which] is reflected through our Unified
Diversity Strategy.”).
211. Interview with anonymous former servicemember, U.K. Armed Forces (Mar. 29,
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OF DEFENCE NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/Defence
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available to investigate bullying or harassment of any sort which is
deemed serious enough to merit a criminal investigation, for example
if an assault has taken place.219
Other measures to ensure equality include the LGBT Forum, a
departmental diversity forum, which comprises volunteers who repre-
sent the interests of LGBT staff in the Department.220 The Armed
Forces also has its own website to provide information to LGBT per-
sonnel.221 The site is owned and run privately, although it does now
receive some MOD funding.222
Dave Small, a former Navy Warrant Officer who left service five
years ago, observed:
Like any big organisation, at certain times you are going to come
across problems. But the services certainly have strong processes
in place which they are encouraging their staff to take up, if you
are subjected to bullying or harassment, they want to know. The
last five years has been more about letting this policy make a dif-
ference and not be just a piece of paper. That is why we have seen
these big changes.223
VI. RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION
This section discusses how the militaries in Australia, Canada,
Israel, and the United Kingdom have recognized same-sex couples in
terms of employment benefits and access to social functions. In gen-
eral, all of the countries studied in this report have adopted some poli-
cies to recognize the relationships of gay and lesbian servicemembers.
While all of the countries in this report have chosen to recognize
same-sex relationships, they have chosen to do this in different ways,
either through extending employment benefits to the servicemembers’
partners, through acceptance of gay and lesbian servicemembers and
their partners at military social events and ceremonies, or both.
A. Australia
In general, little information is available on how the Australian
military has handled relationship recognition, other than as regards
219. Id.
220. Terms of Reference, MOD LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER (LGBT)
FORUM 1 (Feb. 2005), http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/182123BE-3055-4ADE-902C-9678
E011B7D2/0/LGBTForumTermsofReferencev2.pdf.
221. Networking, Supporting and Informing Britain’s LGBT Armed Forces, PROUD2
SERVE.NET, http://www.proud2serve.net (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
222. FAQs about Proud2Serve, PROUD2SERVE.NET, http://www.proud2serve.net/faqs
(last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
223. Judd, supra note 104.
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marriage-related benefits. In 1993, Brigadier Adrian D’Hage specu-
lated, “No doubt we will have a first test when someone wants to
bring his boyfriend to the regimental dance.” 224 One servicemember
noted that it was somewhat of an issue: “I took my ex-partner to the
work Christmas party . . . I [told] my boss beforehand that I was going
to do it. And he just looked at me with a bit of a pained expression
and said, ‘I expect you to behave.’ ” 225
However, another officer, Stuart O’Brien, stated that he has
never had a problem with the recognition and treatment of his part-
ner at official military events: “My partner was made most welcome
at all events, dinners, formal functions, even my Admiral’s wife took
my partner un[der her] wing while I was working at one function. I
have heard this same story told over and over by friends. So no issues
at all.” 226
Other servicemembers report that they have shared Officer
O’Brien’s experience; even those who have not had the opportunity
to bring a same-sex partner to a military social event do not express
concern that other military personnel would react adversely, and in
fact anticipate that their partners would be made to feel welcome and
accepted into the military community.227 One officer mentioned that
“I sincerely believe that . . . if . . . an obvious negative response . . .
occur[red], this would not be tolerated in any way, shape or form.” 228
Australia has also recently recognized same-sex couples within
the military. Although Australian federal law does not recognize same-
sex couples’ marriages, the relationships of same-sex couples are con-
sidered “de facto” relationships, and a servicemember in a same-sex
relationship is entitled to the same benefits as married personnel.229
B. Canada
When Canada lifted its ban on gays and lesbians serving in the
military, it also initiated recognition of the same-sex partnerships
224. Branigin, supra note 15, at A6.
225. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60, at 32 (citation omitted).
226. Email from Officer Stuart O’Brien (Mar. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
227. E.g., Questionnaire Responses of Chief Petty Officer Dion Chandler, Private
Nathan Howarth, and Signalman Michael Purdon, Australian Defence Force, Columbia
Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
228. Questionnaire Response of Private Nathan Howarth, Australian Defence Force,
Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
229. AUSTL. DEP’T OF DEFENCE, DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS (GENERAL), INTERDEPENDENT
RELATIONSHIPS (2005), available at http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/; Georgetown
Univ. Law Ctr. Panel, supra note 30, Comments of Stuart O’Brien at 22:05-25:58;
Questionnaire of Chief Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien, Australian Defence Force, Columbia
Law Sch. Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic (Mar. 25, 2010) (on file with author).
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of gay and lesbian servicemembers.230 In June 1996, the Canadian
Federal Human Rights Tribunal issued an order requiring that the
same medical, dental, and other benefits be provided to gay and les-
bian couples as are provided to heterosexual couples.231 Included
among these benefits are: “compassionate leave; leave without pay
for spousal accompaniment on military, foreign service, or isolated
post assignments; and relocation entitlements.” 232 In addition, since
June 2005, military chaplains have blessed same-sex unions and
performed these ceremonies on military bases.233
C. Israel
Since the repeal of the prohibition on gay and lesbian service-
members, the Israeli army has made some adjustments to its proce-
dures related to relationship recognition. In particular, the Israeli
army recognizes soldiers’ same-sex partners as bereaved next-of-kin
in the event of the soldier’s death.234 These surviving partners are
“eligible for benefits,” although they receive less compensation than
spouses of soldiers generally receive.235
The Israeli army has also allowed gay and lesbian service-
members to be accompanied by their partners at events, as any other
servicemember could be accompanied by a different-sex spouse. For
example, at events such as “promotions and other ceremonies,” many
gay and lesbian officers will be accompanied by their partner.236 No
major problems have been reported as a result of this policy. One
woman, a soldier in the Israeli Defense Forces, discussed the possi-
bility of bringing her partner to a social event on base with her com-
mander. Her commander recommended that she not hide her sexual
orientation and promised that he would support her if any problems
arose as a result of her decision to bring her partner.237
D. United Kingdom
The U.K. military has similarly permitted gay and lesbian service-
members to bring their partners to official events. For “ ‘semi-official’
230. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 26.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 27.
233. Clifford Krauss, Canada: Gay Soldiers Wed at Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005,
at A11; Telephone Interview with Michelle Douglas speaking in her personal capacity
(transcript on file with author).
234. Crary, supra note 11.
235. WALZER, supra note 194, at 138.
236. Crary, supra note 11.
237. WALZER, supra note 194, at 133.
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functions,” the Ministry of Defense announced rules in 2000 that
allow the President of each “Mess” dining unit to exercise discretion
in allowing gay or lesbian servicemembers to attend Mess events, as
he or she does for all Mess guests.238
VII. MULTINATIONAL FORCES
This section examines multinational forces in which U.S. service-
members train and fight alongside allies from countries that allow
open service. These findings provide additional concrete evidence
that American soldiers have not exhibited the behavior nor shown
the deterioration in productivity and cohesion that has been feared
by proponents of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.
A. U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The experiences of U.N. Peacekeeping forces provide a clear pic-
ture of how American servicemembers interact with openly gay and
lesbian soldiers. Importantly, no serious problems have occurred, not-
withstanding the fact that “U.S. personnel assigned to UN-controlled
peace operations . . . work closely with personnel from other nations,”
many of which allow openly gay and lesbian service.239
Officials interviewed from the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (“DPKO”) at the U.N. in 2002 and 2003 did not know of
any policy with respect to sexual orientation for personnel in U.N.
peacekeeping operations, and “could not think of any instance in a
mission when [sexual orientation] became an issue, whether in regard
to differences in policy among the various TCCs [troop contributing
countries], command and control, integration, or personnel/admin
conflicts.” 240 However, since only problems of serious magnitude war-
rant attention, minor issues could have arisen and been handled
locally.241 These DPKO officials also noted that “no departing Force
Commander and Chief Military Observer has ever mentioned the
issue in an end-assignment report, [which is] where more general
observations and recommendations to DPKO are shared.” 242
238. BELKIN & MCNICHOL, supra note 60; Judd, supra note 104.
239. Geoffrey Bateman & Sameera Dalvi, Multinational Military Units and Homosexual
Personnel, UNIV. OF CAL. SANTA BARBARA: CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL MINORITIES
IN THE MILITARY 9 (2004) (quoting Colonel Michael Dooley), available at http://escholarship
.org/uc/item/0tj9033f.
240. Id. at 13 (alterations in original) (quoting Corinna Kuhl & Cedric de Coning)
(quotation marks omitted).
241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Corinna Kuhl) (quotation marks omitted).
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Soldiers serving in multinational forces are regulated, for the
most part, by their particular nation’s regulations. However, universal
standards of conduct, drafted by the U.N., apply to all peacekeeping
forces.243 Peacekeepers, known as “Blue Helmets,” must carry a card
with them at all times enumerating the ten rules of the U.N. Code
of Personal Conduct.244 Rule number seven demands that soldiers
“[s]how military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all
members of the mission, including other United Nations contingents
regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.” 245 Notwithstanding
the official policy of non-discrimination, Jan Koller, President of U.N.
Gay Lesbian or Bisexual Employees has written that, “Internally,
in spite of claims of non-discrimination, the UN does not extend any
benefits such as visas, insurance, etc., . . . to same sex partners, nor
does it have any policies specifically dealing with discrimination based
on sexual orientation.” 246
In addition, sexual relations between consenting adults who are
U.N. staff, U.N. volunteers, U.N. police, military observers, and contin-
gents are not prohibited, provided that they do not contravene appli-
cable (national) codes of conduct for specific categories of personnel.247
Further, in addition to their own domestic training, “the UN
also requires [TCCs] to provide further training . . . in UN rules and
policies” to their peacekeeping soldiers—“including the zero-tolerance
policy” with respect to sexual harassment and abuse of local popula-
tions and training about “their additional responsibilities as repre-
sentatives of the international community.” 248
Anecdotal evidence suggests that working alongside openly gay
and lesbian servicemembers as part of a multinational force has not
been an issue for U.S. soldiers. Petty Officer Stuart O’Brien of the
Royal Australian Navy249 worked under a U.N. mandate with both
U.S. and U.K. sailors in 1999 before the U.K. ban was lifted. He
reported that his fellow sailors knew he was openly gay, and that
243. Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, U.N. CONDUCT & DISCIPLINE
UNIT, http://cdu.unlb.org/UNStandardsofConduct/TenRulesofPersonalConductForBlue
Helmets.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Bateman & Dalvi, supra note 239, at 13 (quoting Jon Koller) (quotation marks
omitted).
247.  UN PEACEKEEPING PDT STANDARDS, INTRODUCTION TO CORE PRE-DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING MATERIALS 6 (2009), available at http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb
.org/PBPS/Library/CPTM%20Unit%204%20Parts%201-2%20Dec%202009.pdf.
248. Michael Fleshman, Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses: Action Initiated to End
Sexual Misdeeds in Peacekeeping Missions, 19(1) AFR. RENEWAL 16, 19 (2005), available
at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol19no1/191peacekeep.htm.
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“[t]here were no dramas whatsoever.” 250 O’Brien also “repeatedly
emphasized that focusing on common goals helped the sailors nego-
tiate cultural differences” when differences arose between U.S. and
Australian crewmembers.251 Moreover, despite it being well-known
that O’Brien was gay—“Australian colleagues asked about his male
partner in front of U.S. service members and made other references
to his sexuality”—no U.S. sailors “complained or expressed any con-
cern about working with [him].” 252
B. NATO
In general, NATO forces do not work as closely together as U.N.
Peacekeeping forces. One study notes that “the two corps in which
U.S. personnel serve are multinational in name only and are clearly
non-integrated.” 253 Personal contact between forces is limited to a
small number of senior exchange officers.254 To the extent that troops
do work together, “NATO does not set policies of any sort for its mem-
ber states, but encourages standardization to promote effective military
cooperation.” 255 Standardization Groups work to mitigate the most
extreme differences between member countries’ military policies.256
“NATO’s respect for national sovereignty requires a de facto
support for [gay and lesbian servicemembers] who serve in integrated
NATO missions.” 257 Within NATO, Norway, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Spain, and Canada permit same-sex couples to marry.258 Nine
other countries—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Slovenia,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, and Luxembourg—
allow same-sex couples to register their partnerships and enjoy many
of the same rights and obligations.259 Portugal recognizes unregistered
cohabitation, which provides limited rights.260 However, no Standard-
ization Groups formally address issues of gay personnel, which can
250. Bateman & Dalvi, supra note 239, at 22-23.
251. Id. at 23.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 8.
254. See Host Command Information, DEFENSE.GOV, http://ra.defense.gov/documents/
irt/rofe/HostComHnts.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (giving information to NATO units
on how to prepare for a visit from an exchange officer).
255. Id. at 9.
256. Id. at 9-10.
257. Id. at 12.
258. International Survey of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, MARRIAGELAW
FOUNDATION.ORG 1, available at http://www.marriagelawfoundation.org/publications/
International.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
259. Id. at 1-2.
260. Id. at 2.
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be taken to indicate that U.S. soldiers serving beside openly gay and
lesbian forces has not been a pressing problem.
C. Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
As part of the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S.
soldiers have fought for years alongside troops from twenty-two of
the approximately twenty-four countries that allow gay and lesbian
servicemembers to serve openly.261 This service includes both training
and combat.262 General Gregory S. Newbold, a vice-president at the
Potomac Institute, reported that “American and British forces ‘have
trained together a great deal, so that relationship is a very easy one
to carry into combat.’ ” 263
Importantly, no one has reported that the presence of openly
gay and lesbian members of other countries’ militaries has had a
negative effect on the ability of U.S. troops to serve effectively.264 For
example, referring to gay soldiers under his command, Glenn Truitt,
a former submarine officer and graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy,
said “ ‘[t]he homosexual men I knew in the military were much more
professional about their sexuality than the heterosexuals, . . . if only
because they had to be’ to gain full acceptance.” 265 The ability of U.S.
soldiers to serve alongside openly gay and lesbian servicemembers
from other countries in “[t]he Iraq war demonstrates that the morale
and cohesion of our forces is simply not affected by the presence of
openly gay soldiers.” 266
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Drawing from the practices and policies of Australia, Canada,
Israel, and the United Kingdom, the following four recommendations
261. See Coalition Countries, U.S. CENT. COMMAND, http://www.centcom.mil/en/
countries/coalition (last visited Mar. 28, 2011) (listing the countries in the Coalition).
There is some debate as to exactly which countries currently allow service by openly gay
and lesbian people. See Countries That Allow Military Service by Openly Gay People,
PALM CTR. (2009), http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/CountriesWithoutBan.pdf
(discussing the countries that are currently considered to be “questionable cases”).
262. Press Release, Palm Center, Researchers See No Problems When U.S. Troops Fight
with Gay-Friendly British (May 14, 2003), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/
dadt/releases/researchers_see_no_problems_when_u_s_troops_fight_with_gay_friendly
_british_zero_impact_seen_on_combat_capab [hereinafter Palm Center Press Release].
263. Id.
264. Stacey L. Sobel, The Mythology of a Human Rights Leader: How the United States
Has Failed Sexual Minorities at Home and Abroad, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 204 (2008).
265. Palm Center Press Release, supra note 262.
266. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (statement by former U.S. Rep. Martin Meehan, a
Massachusetts Democrat and, at the time, a senior member of the House Armed Services
Committee).
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are aimed to facilitate a smooth transition to open service in the
United States:
A. Educational and Training Programs
Programs on equality education and training proved vital to most
of the countries in a successful transition to open service and would
likely do so in the United States. Training programs that address sex-
ual orientation could form part of general equality training programs
that already target gender, race, religion, and age discrimination.
These programs should be made mandatory for all service personnel
to address clearly and comprehensively the need for fair treatment
throughout the armed forces, regardless of servicemembers’ sexual
orientation. In addition to this general programming, a more special-
ized educational program on sexual orientation discrimination and
the issues faced by gay and lesbian service personnel could be admin-
istered to managerial and supervisory personnel.
B. Anti-Discrimination Policies
The successful integration of gay and lesbian servicemembers
into the U.S. armed forces will depend in part on how secure these
servicemembers feel in the performance of their duties vis-à-vis other
servicemembers. Anti-discrimination policies are essential to ensure
that gay and lesbian servicemembers are treated equally. All service
personnel, irrespective of their sexual orientation, should have access
to a complaints mechanism when a breach of the anti-discrimination
policy occurs. In addition, to ensure that the anti-discrimination policy
is implemented on the ground, army units at the battalion level up-
wards should have an Equality Adviser. The Equality Adviser would
be the first point of contact for a discrimination complaint.
C. Sexual Harassment Policies
The armed forces already have policies against inappropriate
conduct, including sexual harassment. As long as these policies apply
equally to all members without regard to sexual orientation, they do
not require revision. If they refer to the sexual orientation of parties,
these policies should be revised to focus on the inappropriate act,
rather than on the sexual orientation of the party committing the act.
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D. Gay Pride Activities
Since the armed forces have traditionally excluded gay and les-
bian servicemembers, there may be cultural barriers in the forces
impeding integration of these servicemembers. By taking measures
such as supporting gay pride events, encouraging lesbian and gay
affinity groups within the military, and engaging with the media in
welcoming gay and lesbian servicemembers, the armed forces can
facilitate this integration.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming weight of our evidence points in one direction.
Even though some concerns existed over allowing gay and lesbian sol-
diers to serve openly in the countries reviewed here, these concerns
were, and continue to be effectively addressed. Through meaningful
education and training programs, strong anti-discrimination policies,
and clear reporting measures, the fears espoused by those opposed to
lifting the ban, including, for example, loss of unit cohesion or military
readiness, never came to pass. Not only were these fears unfounded,
but even more compellingly, the experiences of our allies also show
that allowing open service has increased the morale and military
performance of those gay and lesbian servicemembers previously
forced to hide their sexual orientation and has likewise enhanced
the performance of their military friends and colleagues.
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1. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) [hereinafter THE MEASURE OF INJURY].
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The text engages the reader both directly and indirectly. Not only
do the authors raise numerous important issues, but the spirit of the
book soon causes the reader to formulate other questions about how
the tort system works and what it achieves. Although The Measure of
Injury is focused more on “deconstruction” than “reconstruction,” and
furnishes only limited specific proposals for reform,2 the book offers
insights into the American tort system and the challenges it faces.
Even readers who differ with the authors’ analysis will likely admit
that Chamallas and Wriggins are asking important questions that too
often are not raised.
I. A RADICAL CHALLENGE TO EXISTING TORT LAW
Persons perusing The Measure of Injury should not necessarily
expect an “easy read.” The volume is highly intellectual, and generally
assumes familiarity with not only the main features of American tort
law, but with numerous key points on which scholarly and professional
opinions differ regarding what the law should be. The authors’ argu-
ments are carefully reasoned, lucidly explained, and abundantly
supported by citations to theoretical literature and primary sources.
Law professors are undoubtedly one target audience. It is easy to
picture The Measure of Injury as the focus of law school seminars.
Practicing lawyers, sitting judges, and other readers more immediately
interested in what courts and legislatures do today, than in what
scholars say or what legal history teaches, might not persevere until
they reach the heart of the argument. This is because the early
sections of the book offer a detailed, but inevitably dense, discussion
which locates the authors’ thesis within a broader theoretical context.
However, the initial daunting geography of schools of legal theory soon
gives way to a fascinating landscape where the discussions center on
many of the most important torts topics of the twenty-first century and
earlier eras.
A. Identity-Based Scholarship
The authors explain that they draw upon feminist theory
(including “liberal, cultural, radical, and intersectional feminism” 3),
2. See id. at 6 (describing the authors’ “advice on reforming tort law [as] limited and
highly contextual”).
3. Id. at 25.
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critical race theory4 (including the practices of “asking the ‘race sub-
ordination question,’”5 appreciating the “racial implications of neutrally
phrased doctrines,” 6 and requiring justification of “disparate impact”7),
and general critical theory8 (including “postmodernism” 9). Chamallas
and Wriggins reject the adequacy of the “law and economics” and
“corrective justice” paradigms,10 and take “for granted” much of the
“Realist legacy.”11 As the authors explain, “this book . . . falls under the
genre of identity-based scholarship.” 12
One of the things that makes the book so energetic is that the
authors occasionally volley between being seemingly mainstream and
revolutionarily challenging. For example, in one paragraph they say
that they “start from an assumption that tort rules ought to be evalu-
ated by their ‘real world’ success . . . rather than by some measure of
internal logic or consistency.” 13 This statement is unlikely to alarm
many old-style “Restatement-type scholars” 14 (i.e., “the torts establish-
ment” 15) who believe “that ‘the function of tort law is [to] compensate
and deter.’ ” 16 Yet in the next two paragraphs, the authors assert that
they are “highly critical of the Restatement approach and the implicit
tort theory that underlies it,” 17 and that their goal is to effect “a
change in the ‘deep structures’ of tort law . . . that . . . reflect and
reinforce the social subordination of women and racial minorities.” 18
B. Prioritizing Emotional Harm and Relationships
The authors make clear early in the book that their quest is
radical in the sense of going to the root. They challenge “the dual
premises that accidental injury lies at the core of tort law and that
physical injury, rather than emotional harm or injuries to relation-
ships, is of paramount concern.” 19 Thus, they contest what they insist20
4. Id. at 13, 26-28.
5. Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
6. Id.
7. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 24.
8. Id. at 13-14.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 14-17.
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 8.
13. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 20.
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 20.
18. Id.
19. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 2.
20. At various junctures, the authors argue that the subject of intentional tort liability
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are the well-entrenched (and misguided) suppositions that the law of
negligence (rather than intentional torts) is the primary focal point in
American tort law,21 and that tort law is mainly about liability for
physical harm to persons and property damage.22
II. CENTRALITY OF RACE AND GENDER
One of the main objectives of the authors “is to connect the
current emphasis on negligence, physical harms, and economic dam-
ages to gender and race bias, broadly conceived.” 23 In part, the book
argues “that the gender and racial contexts of tort cases [should] be
made more visible.” 24 However, the authors go much further. They
attach “fundamental” importance to gender in analyzing tort doctrines
and evaluating potential reforms.25 The authors assume as a given
that tort law reflects “a basic pattern of male dominance,” 26 and that
“whiteness has long served as an unstated default in tort law.” 27
is largely ignored by modern legal education to the detriment of women and minorities
who will ultimately be served by law school graduates. See id. at 64-65, 70. Whether this
is true is open to question. Admittedly, the law of negligence is complex, and it takes a
great deal of time to cover all of the basic rules (relating, for example, to the reasonably
prudent person standard and relevance of customary practices) and the special cases
(such as the complex rules governing negligence liability for failure to act and premises-
related injuries). However, most casebooks give substantial attention to both the simple
intentional torts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, and con-
version) and complex torts (such as misrepresentation, nuisance, defamation, and invasion
of privacy) for which intentionally tortious conduct is either required or a common path
to liability. Many of these intentional torts are tested on the widely used Multistate Bar
Examination, which makes it somewhat probable that these subjects are not ignored in law
school classes. Moreover, it seems likely that discussion of intentional tort liability plays a
prominent role in classroom coverage of many doctrines not specifically focused on inten-
tional tort causes of action, such as punitive damages, spoliation of evidence, concerted
action liability, respondeat superior, joint and several liability, contribution, indemnity, stat-
utes of limitations, and immunities. Some torts theorists may have largely excluded in-
tentional torts from their research focus, but it seems doubtful that the many hundreds of
professors who teach tort law in American Bar Association-approved law schools have done
so. Today’s graduates may be better acquainted with the contours of intentional tort liability
than the authors expect. This would seem to be particularly true of students who take
Advanced Torts courses at the scores of law schools where such courses are taught, since
with respect to those types of subjects (such as fraud, libel, slander, appropriation of name
or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, tortious
interference with contract or prospective advantage, trade libel, and slander of title),
intentional tort liability looms far larger than does negligence-based liability.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 89-90.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 7.
25. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 21.
26. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 28.
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However, the authors say “that gender and race equity should [not]
be the only goal . . . or even the most important goal of tort law in
every context.” 28 Rather, the authors “align [themselves] with [the]
‘pluralist’ scholars who regard the quest for a unified theory of torts
as futile and undesirable.” 29
A. Refining the Argument
At various junctures, the authors strive to refine their arguments
relating to tort law and race. For example, after explaining for several
pages that consciousness of race should infuse tort law, Chamallas and
Wriggins opine that “overemphasis [can be] placed on race in calculat-
ing an accident victim’s prospects for future income.” 30 In the final
chapter of the book, they point out (to the likely surprise and dismay
of many readers) that race-based life-expectancy tables are still being
used by experts who play important roles in the resolution of tort cases
involving calculations of lost earnings.31 The authors argue, quite ap-
propriately, that “[w]hen courts rely on gender- and race-based earn-
ings tables, it means that historical patterns of wage discrimination in
the labor market are replicated in tort awards, even though the labor-
force participation of social groups may be changing rapidly.” 32
The authors also discuss tort liability related to children mixed up
at birth and given to the wrong parents. They explain that sometimes
the cases “involve reactions to race, when, for example, a child from an
unintended [sperm] donor turns out to be of a different race than the
mother or siblings.” 33 The authors argue that: 
[t]o award a couple damages for emotional distress in such a
case might well reinforce racial prejudice or racial antipathy and
might be understood as making a statement that it is reasonable
for a person to reject a child for the sole reason that his skin
color or physical attributes are different from the plaintiffs’.34
The authors opine that in such cases it is justifiable for a court to use
the doctrine of proximate causation to cut off liability to avoid
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 27-29.
31. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 158-70.
32. Id. at 159.
33. Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
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“undermin[ing] important public policies, such as promoting racial
equality or furthering the best interests of the child.” 35
B. Selective Perception and Related Risks
Viewed in all of its complexity, the authors’ argument seems to be
that matters of race should be taken into account by tort law when
cognizance will benefit persons who are members of classes that
have historically suffered from discrimination, but not otherwise.
Nevertheless, the risk of “selective perception,” 36 which the authors
note, is a reason why it is dangerous to focus on race at all, particularly
in a society where the demographics of majority and minority are shift-
ing. It is easy to strike the wrong balance with regard to identity-
related matters, such as race and gender, about which many persons
feel deeply. Some readers will protest that it is better to leave an
express consideration of race out of tort law altogether. The argument
would likely be that less damage is done by treating persons simply as
persons, not as African-Americans, Whites, Hispanics, Mixed-Race
individuals, and so on.
The authors correctly note that “because the tort system is com-
mitted to individualized determinations—with few checks for systemic
bias—devaluation [of persons and their injuries based on race] is
largely invisible and unaddressed in contemporary law.” 37 This is
troubling particularly because lay juries often play a critical role in
tort litigation decision making processes. The authors explore in detail
how racial perceptions can distort even seemingly neutral inquiries,
such as those related to factual causation.38 However, they do not
explain how the risks of harm resulting from racial bias and prejudice
of jurors can be eliminated from the tort system.
A juror’s cameo appearance in tort litigation offers virtually no
opportunity for affected litigants to scrutinize, or ever know, whether
the resolution of their case was infected by impermissible bias or
prejudice based on race, gender, or other grounds. At least with
respect to judges, there is an opportunity to evaluate their conduct
over a period of years. Moreover, American judges are subject to profes-
sional discipline for discriminatory conduct involving race or gender.39
35. Id.
36. Id. at 29.
37. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 28 (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 126-27 (discussing distortion resulting from stereotyping). For a general
discussion of causation, see id. at 119-53.
39. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2010) (providing in part that “[a]
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias
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Perhaps ad hoc lay juries should be replaced by “professional jurors”
of the kind recommended by some commentators or by judges sitting
as fact finders.40 “England and most countries depend exclusively on
judges for the resolution of disputes, completely abandoning the jury
system.” 41 Moreover, if racial bias and prejudice are an invisible,
pervasive, and ungovernable risk in lay jury fact finding, perhaps the
use of lay juries does not make sense in multi-cultural societies. Maybe
individualized awards of damages should be replaced by some stan-
dardized mode of compensation more akin to worker’s compensation
than to the current tort system. Alternatively, perhaps lay participants
in the judicial resolution of disputes should act only in conjunction
with professional jurists, as is true in certain civil law countries where
lay and professional judges serve as members of a joint decision-
making panel.42
C. The Difficulties of Historical Analysis
It may be impossible to analyze the history of American tort law
fairly and accurately from a racial perspective. This is true because, as
the authors candidly acknowledge, reported cases—especially recent
decisions—rarely mention the racial identities of the parties.43 Even
older judicial opinions seldom commented on such matters. Focusing
too heavily on dated tort precedents that referred to the race of the
parties carries with it obvious risks. Placing analytical weight on
such anomalies may distort both the explanation of legal history and
recommendations bearing on current practices.
or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harass-
ment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation”).
40. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An
Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865, 881 (1996) (noting that
“[s]ome commentators even suggest discarding the jury system entirely and, instead,
conducting trials before professional jurors or judges alone to improve the system’s
accountability” (citation omitted)). But see Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1, 12 (1998) (arguing that in Texas the powers of juries have already been
excessively limited).
41. Kristy Lee Bertelsen, Note, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling
for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1,
2 (1998); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW 532 (3d ed. 2007)
(stating that “[t]he jury died in England in most civil cases for a variety of reasons”).
42. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental
Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 195-96 (discussing
the German version of the “mixed court” of lay and professional judges).
43. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 28.
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In their review of tort precedent related to race and gender, the
authors explore a number of important historical topics: the doctrine
of coverture, which merged a woman’s legal rights with those of her
husband;44 the “nervous-shock” cases, that often denied recovery for
certain types of emotion-related harm, such as miscarriages;45
wrongful-death cases, where damages were devalued because of the
plaintiff’s race;46 and wrongful-birth cases, in which resistance to
compensation for interference with the constitutional right to an
abortion emerged “in a highly gendered setting,” 47 and courts, at least
initially, tended to fix responsibility for losses relating to birth defects
solely on pregnant women.48 These discussions are always interesting
and vividly illustrated, but readers who live in a world of instant news,
and who may be reluctant to urge a court to rely on even a thirty-year-
old case, may have difficulty seeing the relevance of topics related to
cases decided long ago, often before Eisenhower, Coolidge, or even
McKinley was president. The world has changed. It is interesting
to know how courts decided torts cases prior to Brown v. Board of
Education49 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964,50 but there is a valid
question about what this says about courts today.
Of course, the authors’ goals in offering these “[h]istorical
[f]rames” 51 are large. The authors intend to illustrate that issues
related to race and gender have always been a problem, and that there
are a multitude of ways in which considerations related to race or
gender can infect the tort system. This is an important and astute
observation. However, even if this viewpoint is accepted as given, there
remains the question of how to approach the problem. Presumably,
there are at least three alternatives. One option is to place a heavy
emphasis on race and gender issues. This is what Chamallas and
Wriggins do with fervor, energy, and great skill in their book. Another
option is to ignore these issues as much as possible in search of race-
blind and gender-blind justice. The authors would argue that this is
impossible because “the underlying continuity of gender and racial
hierarchy . . . reproduces the same—yet different—tort law.” 52 The
44. Id. at 35-36.
45. See id. at 36-47 (discussing the impact of gender on “nervous-shock” cases).
46. See id. at 37, 52-62 (discussing the impact of race on wrongful-death cases).
47. Id. at 137.
48. See id. at 128-38 (discussing wrongful-birth cases).
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Vincent Robert Johnson, Film Review, Teaching
Transformative Jurisprudence, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 536 (1991) (suggesting that Brown
was “the most important pronouncement ever made by a United States court”).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (2006).
51. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 35.
52. Id. at 62.
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third option is to address issues of race and gender selectively on the
assumption that a lighter touch will raise consciousness without
alienating those who must embrace the reforms that in many respects
are needed. Chamallas and Wriggins, however, are fearless advocates.
They are not concerned about alienating potential supporters of reform
by over-stressing race- and gender-based issues. The authors are
interested in radical change, not ameliorative half-steps.
III. THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE
Chamallas and Wriggins distinguish their approach to tort law
from other perspectives, such as law-and-economics scholarship, which
views tort issues from the position of the decision-maker, that is, the
legislator or the judge.53 In contrast, the authors focus on the “victim’s
perspective,” and “the position of the governed.” 54 There is nothing
wrong with this. Genuine concern for a victim’s plight is dictated not
only by good tort theory, but by basic principles of humanity and
common decency. Of course, the interests of defendants must also
be considered. Justice cannot be achieved by focusing only on those
who have been wrongly harmed and neglecting the interests of those
wrongly accused of causing harm.
It is essential to remember that women and minorities are not
only victims of tortious conduct, but also alleged perpetrators of torts.
They not only sue when their privacy is invaded,55 but are sued for
invading the privacy of others.56 Pregnant women not only suffer
emotional distress when their unborn children are harmed,57 but they
cause emotional distress to fathers by negligently harming their
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
55. See, e.g., Alderson v. Bonner, 132 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006)
(permitting recovery for intrusion upon seclusion because, even though “standing on
another’s front porch and looking through a window in the door is not normally offensive,”
an uninvited man’s “peering in the window at a young female, with video camera in hand
and without announcing his presence, . . . is objectionable”); Pendleton v. Fassett, No. 08-
227-C, 2009 WL 2849542, at *15 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 1, 2009) (allowing an invasion of
privacy claim based on intrusion to go to trial because there was evidence that a student
was made to bare her breasts during a search for drugs).
56. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a
privacy claim was stated against a wife who hired private investigators to install a hidden
camera in the bedroom of her estranged husband’s separate residence); cf. Clayton v.
Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 154, 155-56 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that there were issues of fact
as to whether a wife, who hired a private investigator to install a hidden video camera in the
bedroom she shared with her husband, invaded her husband’s privacy, and whether the
investigator was liable for knowingly assisting the wife in the commission of tortious acts).
57. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 102-12 (discussing reproductive harm).
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unborn children.58 Women and minorities drive cars, operate small
businesses, represent clients, and heal patients. When their activities
produce losses, female and minority actors are sued and called upon
to defend their conduct. They have rights when they are defendants,
just as they have rights when they are plaintiffs. It cannot be assumed
that women or minorities are only victims, or that solicitude for those
groups necessitates a pro-plaintiff bias.
IV. APPEALING ARGUMENTS AND INTERESTING QUESTIONS
The authors raise many questions and observations that are
intellectually interesting and professionally challenging. They query
“whether certain types of injuries (e.g., emotional harm) or certain
types of damages (e.g., noneconomic damages) have been devalued in
part because of their cognitive association with women.” 59 Simi-
larly, the authors observe that lead paint litigation, which has gener-
ally been unsuccessful in providing remedies to injured persons,60
“most often arises in low-income, predominantly minority communi-
ties, where there is a large stock of deteriorating older buildings that
pose a lead paint hazard, especially to children.” 61 Chamallas and
Wriggins also note that although most states hold that “bystander”
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be limited
to close family members, typically related by blood, marriage, or
adoption, “this exclusion of nontraditional families can have a negative
effect on minority families, which often do not mirror the white middle-
class ideal.” 62
Some readers will doubt the accuracy or usefulness of the
authors’ assertion “that tort law reflects a masculinist viewpoint that
. . . seems oblivious or indifferent to the . . . suffering many women
experience,” 63 or that sexual abuse has been “perpetuated by male-
focused standards of consent.” 64 The authors contend that intentional
58. See Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 361-62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
public policy did not preclude liability in a wrongful death action brought by a father to
recover against the mother’s automobile insurer when their unborn child was stillborn as
a result of the mother’s negligent driving).
59. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 24.
60. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 443 (R.I. 2008) (holding that
a state action related to lead paint hazards failed because there was no infringement
of a “public right” sufficient to support a cause of action for public nuisance and because
the state did not allege that the “defendants were in control of lead pigment at the time
it caused harm to children”).
61. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 138-53 (discussing
lead paint cases).
62. Id. at 114-15.
63. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id. at 26.
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tort law and the negligence doctrine have failed “to make protection of
sexual autonomy and integrity a high priority.” 65 However, the
numerous cases holding that (male) defendants are subject to liability
for transmitting sexually-related diseases,66 for spying on naked
women,67 and for various forms of clergy sexual abuse68 would seem
to prove otherwise, at least in recent decades, but also in some
earlier cases.69
Chamallas and Wriggins raise many issues that have natural
appeal to anyone who believes that there is a moral imperative to
strive to make the world a better place. Two of those issues relate to
tort liability for domestic violence and reproductive injuries.
A. Domestic Violence
The authors argue that victims of domestic violence are routinely
deprived of recourse under tort law “by short statutes of limitations,
. . . technical procedural rules . . . , and a system of insurance that
denies coverage for women abused in their homes.”70 They also argue
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 161 (Cal. 2006) (holding that
liability for the tort of negligent transmission of HIV does not depend solely on actual
knowledge of infection and includes situations where the actor has reason to know of the
infection); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (imposing liability
for negligent transmission of herpes simplex II).
67. See, e.g., Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the installation of hidden viewing devices constituted an invasion of the privacy of
women using a roller rink restroom, and that whether the defendant actually used the
devices to observe the women was relevant only to the issue of damages).
68. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 314, 331 (Colo. 1993) (finding, in
an action by a parishioner who entered into a sexual relationship with an associate priest
during a counseling relationship, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that the defendants, an Episcopal bishop and the diocese, owed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff and that they violated that duty by negligently hiring and supervising the
associate priest); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 700, 705 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from a
clergyman’s sexual relationship with a parishioner); Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880
N.E.2d 892, 894, 896 (Ohio 2008) (holding that equitable estoppel is unavailable to
overcome the statute of limitations applicable to a clergy sexual abuse claim); Doe 1 ex rel.
Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 42 (Tenn. 2005) (holding
that a church was not entitled to summary judgment on a claim for reckless infliction of
emotional distress arising from a former priest’s alleged molestation of children); John Doe
1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827, 831, 846 (Wis. 2007) (holding that a fraud
claim related to clergy sexual misconduct was not barred by the statute of limitations); see
also TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 1-10 (2008) (examining the policy
responses resulting from clergy sexual abuse litigation).
69. In a famous early example of judicial recognition of personal autonomy and
integrity in sex-related matters, the court held that a doctor could be liable for failing to
disclose that the young man he brought with him to help deliver a child lacked medical
qualifications, De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 146, 149 (Mich. 1881).
70. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 3.
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“that violence against women in the home . . . should be treated as
seriously in the law as stranger violence.” 71 Issues of this sort are
important and certainly merit open-minded consideration.
The authors accurately note that “the most formidable barrier to
tort recovery for domestic violence victims lies . . . in the law’s failure
to require or encourage insurers to provide adequate protection for
victims of intentional harms.” 72 However, despite discussing the
“moral hazard” issue and calling for “serious debate,” 73 the authors do
not offer a plan for remedying this deficiency.74 The political and social
obstacles to bringing domestic violence effectively within the scope of
standard insurance coverage are substantial. The solution to the lack-
of-insurance problem is not obvious.
B. Reproductive Injuries
Chamallas and Wriggins devote great attention to torts involving
sexual relations and what might be called “reproductive injuries,”
harm related to sterilization, conception, pregnancy, and birth. With
vivid illustrations drawn from actual disputes, and detailed consider-
ation of cases that were badly decided, they probe issues related to
compensation for emotional distress and relational injuries, as well as
ancillary issues, such as consent. At some junctures the discussion is
breathtaking, such as the authors’ explanation that a federal court in
Maryland held that forced sterilization was not actionable as battery
“because it did not cause any additional physical pain, injury or illness
other than that occasioned by the C-Section procedure,” when the
plaintiff was unconsensually subjected to bilateral tubal ligation.75
V. BREAKING DOWN DOCTRINAL BOUNDARIES
Chamallas and Wriggins argue that it is necessary to rethink the
boundaries between torts and domestic relations law and between
torts and civil rights statutes.76 They contend that this must be done
in order for tort law to capture and compensate the recurrent injuries
experienced disproportionately by marginalized groups as a result of
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id. at 72.
74. Wriggins has explored potential remedies on other occasions. See, e.g., Jennifer
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 122-29 (2001) (offering a remedy
to improve upon civil liability for domestic violence torts).
75. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 109-10 (quoting Robinson v. Cutchin,
140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 (D. Md. 2001)).
76. Id. at 20.
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family violence, workplace harassment, and sex-related injuries.77 The
authors “criticize efforts to enforce a strict separation between torts
and other domains of law.” 78
A. Cross-Boundary Tradition and Precedent
In many respects, the authors’ argument on this point is well-
rooted in American legal precedent and practice. It has long been
regarded as appropriate for tort law to take cognizance of non-tort
legislative enactments in deciding which grievances to remedy. The
most obvious example is liability imposed under a negligence per se
theory based on legislation which neither expressly nor implicitly
creates a civil cause of action.79 It is also clear that, in many instances,
a plaintiff may pursue tort-style remedies under different legal
theories for harm resulting from the same course of action. For
example, the fact that a victim of a deliberate falsehood might (or
might not) be able to sue a defendant for violating the state’s deceptive
trade practices act normally does not foreclose a claim based on
common law fraud principles.80
Recognizing that provisions found in civil rights or family law
statutes are important expressions of public policy that are relevant
to the development of tort law is hardly a shocking idea. In Feltmeier
v. Feltmeier, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that its recogni-
tion that domestic violence could give rise to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was consistent with state laws against
domestic violence.81 In Sorichetti v. City of New York, the New York
Court of Appeals similarly found that the issuance of a statutorily
authorized domestic violence protective order was an important factor
supporting its decision to impose tort liability based on failure to
provide police protection to a child.82 It is useful to remember, however,
77. Id. at 20-21.
78. Id. at 34.
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 (2010) (discussing some statutory violations as negligence per se); Vincent R.
Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV.
255, 264-72 (2005) (discussing negligence per se principles in the context of statutory
obligations to protect data). But see Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per
Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221, 285-86 (2009) (opining that “[i]t is high time for courts of last
resort to move away from the problematic intent-based approach of the negligence per se
doctrine and to an astute judicial policy analysis approach for harmonizing nonprescriptive
legislative and administrative standards with the common law negligence standard”).
80. See, e.g., VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 166-208
(2011) (discussing actions against lawyers by clients and non-clients).
81. 798 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2003).
82. 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that presentation to a police officer of a
protective order issued under the Family Court Act “obligates the officer to investigate and
take appropriate action”).
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that good arguments can be made against breaking down the bound-
aries between fields of law. Three such arguments, pertinent to the
authors’ thesis, relate to legislative resolution of divisive issues, protec-
tion of the integrity of legal principles, and inefficiency resulting from
remedial duplication.
B. Arguments for Separating Areas of Law
1. Deference to the Legislature
First, judicial recognition of a new tort remedy can undercut the
balance struck by legislation addressing a difficult social issue. This
would seem to be particularly true with regard to statutes dealing with
race and gender. In these situations, creation of a new remedy by the
judiciary may displace the bargain struck by the more democratically
responsible branches of government, the legislative and the execu-
tive.83 In the history of Anglo-American law, there has been a
tradition—often honored, sometimes ignored—of leaving the resolution
of wrenching questions to legislators, rather than to judges.84 Absent
legislative infringement of constitutional rights, judicial deference to
the legislature may be warranted by principles calling for respect of
the actions of co-equal branches of government.85
This argument generally has force only if the legislature intended
to strike an exclusive bargain. Anticipating this point, the authors
focus on the question of whether relevant civil rights legislation in-
cludes language expressly preempting, or not preempting, common
law remedies.86 If a law provides that common law remedies are not
83. This argument is weakest if judges are elected, rather than appointed. This is par-
ticularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that judges and judicial candidates
may announce their views on controversial issues. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 768, 774-80 (2002) (holding that rules of judicial ethics that bar judges and
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues violate
the First Amendment).
84. See Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1927) (stating that, traditionally, “[i]f the judges thought that a new remedy was
necessary, they invented it, unless the invention of it would have shocked public opinion,
in which event they left [the task] to Parliament”).
85. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 9 (4th ed.
2009), stating that: 
[I]t is often urged that certain questions are best left to the legislature
because of its ability to gather facts through the legislative hearing process,
to craft comprehensive solutions to broad-ranging questions, or to represent
the will of the public on highly controversial issues. Presumably, the policy
favoring deference to co-equal branches of government has less force where
legislative or executive action is likely to be distorted by the lobbying of
special interest groups, the under-representation of victims in the decision-
making process, or lack of adequate funding.
Id.
86. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 80-81.
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affected by the passage of a statute, there is little reason for courts
to defer to the legislature. The authors point out, however, that
even courts faced with statutes containing non-preemption language
have resisted recognition of tort remedies for race- and gender-
related discrimination.87
2. Doctrinal Integrity
Second, there are some boundaries between fields of law that are
important to recognize because they protect the integrity of legal
principles. A useful example can be drawn from the context of defective
product-related tort claims. Suppose that a product purchased by the
plaintiff turns out to be ineffective or does not work at all, but causes
neither personal injury nor damage to other property. It is widely
agreed that the plaintiff’s only recourse is under contract law, and the
terms of the parties’ bargain cannot be circumvented by suing under
tort principles.88 Otherwise, “contract law would drown in a sea of
tort.” 89 A tort remedy is denied to the plaintiff in order to ensure that
contract principles have meaning. Purely economic product-related
losses fall on the contract side of the boundary line which sometimes
runs between torts and contracts. This arrangement works because
the Uniform Commercial Code has been ubiquitously adopted.90 Even
if the parties have not bargained about the allocation of purely eco-
nomic losses, the UCC supplies default principles to resolve disputes
about who should pay.91
Conceptually, it is possible that expanding the reach of tort
liability to encompass certain forms of impermissible discrimination
could “drown” some civil rights statutes in a “sea of tort” by providing
more generous terms of recovery. This would be a significant risk in
cases where a tort cause of action (such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress) is interpreted to cover the same basic type of
conduct for which a statute has already defined the conditions and
terms of legal remedies. In this type of situation, supplanting statutory
civil rights or domestic relations legislation with common law princi-
ples would reverse the normal trend of legal development. The ten-
dency in American law has been to replace rag-tag common law
87. Id. at 80.
88. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 549-52 (2009) (discussing products liability).
89. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
90. Cf. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 2005) (holding that the
economic loss rule did not bar tort remedies related to injuries arising under a service
contract because no body of law similar to the UCC applies to service contracts).
91. Id.
606 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:591
decisions addressing important social issues in a piecemeal fashion
with comprehensive statutory solutions92—not vice versa.
Still, it is hard not to sympathize with the idea that tort law
should be expanded to provide remedies for types of race- and gender-
related discrimination for which there is, in many cases, no statutory
avenue for redress. This might include such forms of conduct as dis-
crimination against persons based on “how they perform their identity”
by resisting stereotypes, as in the case of effeminate men, or resisting
assimilation, such as by adopting “ethnic” hairstyles.93 If a plaintiff can
prove to a jury that such discrimination amounts to extreme and out-
rageous conduct deliberately calculated by the defendant to victimize
the plaintiff, recovery for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress, under well-established tort principles,94 should not be barred
simply because no statute has created a parallel remedy.
However, the authors argue that tort law should do much more
than take a “gap filler” 95 approach to workplace harassment. They
argue in favor of pervasive remedies under tort law which reflect the
public policies found in anti-discrimination statutes. More specifically,
they urge that tort law can borrow from Title VII to give meaning
to the outrageous conduct requirement in tort actions for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.96 The authors opine that, at
present, intricate tort doctrines send a clear message that tort law
offers little in the way of redress for domestic violence and work-
place harassment.97
3. Duplication and Inefficiency
Third, any expansion of common law remedies into the provinces
now occupied by civil rights law and domestic relations statutes would
pose a risk of remedial duplication and inefficiency. These types of
costs are sometimes significant because there are limited judicial
resources available for the resolution of disputes.98 In other contexts,
certain types of claims have sometimes been rejected on the ground
92. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 94 (stating that the “Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act is a good example of the law’s tendency to replace common-law developments
with statutory ‘solutions’ ”).
93. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 77 (noting, for example, “the African
American woman who wears her hair in braids or corn rows”).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 45 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (defining the requirements of an action for
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional disturbance).
95. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 78.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id. at 86-87.
98. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 9 (discussing the importance of adminis-
trative convenience and efficiency in the formulation of tort law).
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that they are duplicative. For example, in the legal malpractice field,
a judge may dismiss a breach of contract claim in a suit that also
alleges negligence, if the breach of contract claim amounts to nothing
more than an argument that the representation was incompetent and
negligent.99 “False light” invasion of privacy is sometimes not recog-
nized as a tort because it overlaps too much with well-established prin-
ciples of defamation law.100 And, touching someone in a sexual manner
has been deemed not to constitute an actionable invasion of privacy
because offensive touching is actionable as battery and “the tort of
invasion of privacy was not intended to be duplicative of some other
tort.” 101 In determining whether tort law should routinely provide
remedies for forms of discrimination already addressed by state and
federal legislation, some account must be taken of the costs of systemic
inefficiency resulting from remedial duplication. In The Measure of
Injury, the authors do not address this issue, focusing instead on the
importance of providing better civil remedies for workplace discrimina-
tion and domestic violence.
VI. COMPENSATING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A large part of Chamallas and Wriggins’s argument is aimed at
expanding the reach of the two independent torts actions offering
compensation for purely emotional suffering: intentional infliction of
emotional distress,102 sometimes called the tort of outrage,103 and negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.104 The authors’ contention is that
these causes of action have the potential to redress a wide range of
losses that are particularly significant to women and racial minorities.
Despite the fact that the authors compellingly state their case,
their quest faces great obstacles. With respect to actions for intentional
99. See Oberg v. Burke, No. 040721A, 2007 WL 1418546, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007)
(noting a breach of contract claim cannot be characterized apart from a malpractice claim
on the facts); Sitar v. Sitar, 854 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (App. Div. 2008) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation because they arose from the
same facts as the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim and the plaintiff did not allege
distinct damages).
100. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to recognize
false light because defamation encompasses most false light claims and false light “lacks
many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defamation, thus unaccept-
ably increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional
guarantees and tort law”).
101. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003).
102. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 66-87 (discussing intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress in relationship to domestic violence and workplace harassment).
103. See, e.g., Klinger v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C10-5546RJB, 2010 WL 4237849, at *6
(W.D. Wash. 2010).
104. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 89-117 (discussing negligence,
generally).
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infliction of emotional harm, many states, as the authors acknowl-
edge,105 articulate the requirements for recovery in exceptionally de-
manding terms. It will be difficult or impossible to reverse this course
of development because the tort of outrage has been much litigated
and the accretion of unfriendly precedent is substantial. Moreover,
insofar as negligent infliction is concerned, the law (viewed nationally)
is so muddled106 that it is hard to imagine that this tort will someday
offer a reliable path to recovery for seriously injured plaintiffs in cases
not involving observation of the tortiously caused death or serious
injury of a family member. However, the authors can take comfort
in the fact that the Supreme Court of Tennessee recently opined that
“the development of the law in the United States relating to negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims has been to enlarge rather than
to restrict the circumstances amenable to the filing of a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim.” 107
If there is one obstacle the authors underestimate, it is the
difficulty of quantifying emotional distress damages. Rather, the
authors argue that judicial reluctance to provide compensation for
emotional distress “cannot be explained or justified solely by the
difficulty of measuring intangible injuries or finding a logical stopping
point for liability.” 108
Many types of tort damages, such as lost wages, medical
expenses, and the costs of repairing or replacing property, can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty.109 The bills, receipts, and
written cost estimates may be gathered, and the total added up.
Defense counsel may dispute the reasonableness of such expendi-
tures or the accuracy of the numbers, but the jury nevertheless has
access to concrete evidence to guide its assessment of how much
damage was caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct. This is
even true with respect to out-of-pocket costs related to emotional
distress, such as amounts spent on counseling and prescriptions.
Indeed, even with regard to “parasitic damages” for pain and suffering
105. Id. at 78 (stating that “[s]ome states set the bar of proof of ‘outrageousness’ so high
that they allow recovery only in extremely aggravated [cases]”).
106. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 569 (stating that “[n]o area of tort law is
more unsettled than compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress” and that
“decisions continually restate the criteria for recovery, and there are often substantial
differences in the requirements, or their interpretation, from one jurisdiction to the next,
and within any one jurisdiction at different times”).
107. Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 734, 738 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that family
members stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress even though they did
not see the event that injured a child).
108. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 21.
109. Note, however, that the authors argue many types of economic damages, such as
future medical expenses and loss of future earning capacity, are “notoriously hard to
measure.” Id. at 179.
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incidental to a physical injury,110 a jury can make some comparison to
out-of-pocket losses in determining how much to award for intangible
suffering. It is not uncommon for lawyers negotiating the settlement
of cases to talk about general damages for emotional distress being
calculated as a certain multiple of special out-of-pocket damages.
In contrast, there is little to guide a jury’s assessment of the
proper amount of compensation for purely emotional suffering.111 An
award can have more to do with the eloquence or effectiveness of
counsel, the identity of the plaintiff,112 or the efforts of “tort reformers”
decrying lawsuit “abuse” 113 than with the amount of harm actually
caused by the defendant. These realities create a serious risk that
similarly affected plaintiffs may be treated very differently, and that
emotional distress awards may vary radically from one case to the
next. Presumably, to address these concerns as well as the prospect of
“runaway verdicts,” many states, in certain types of cases, have capped
awards for noneconomic losses114 or denied recovery for emotional
distress not resulting in out-of-pocket expenditures.115 Moreover,
scholars argue that awards for psychic suffering are inherently
suspect because emotional distress is simply not monetizable.116
Not surprisingly, Chamallas and Wriggins address these points.
They argue that caps on noneconomic damages, while neutral on
110. See Kennedy v. Carriage Cemetery Servs., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (D. Nev.
2010) (distinguishing “parasitic damages” for emotional harm from damages that are
recoverable in actions for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress).
111. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2000) (stating that awards for
emotional and physical “pain are not easy to evaluate because there is no objective
criterion for judgment”).
112. See id. (opining that a “claim of [emotional or physical] pain is . . . a serious threat
to the defendant since, lacking any highly objective components, it permits juries to roam
through their biases in setting an award”).
113. In Texas, tort reform battles are sometimes waged on busy highways. Roughly a
decade ago, a group called Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse erected billboards saying
“Lawsuit Abuse. We All Pay. We All Lose.” It was virtually impossible to reach the court-
house without seeing one of these signs. I served on a panel of prospective jurors in a
medical malpractice case. During voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney asked whether any of
the potential jurors had seen the billboards decrying “lawsuit abuse.” Forty-nine of the fifty
potential jurors raised their hands. The case settled before a jury was empaneled.
114. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2010) (providing that in an action “against
a health care provider based on professional negligence,” a plaintiff may not recover more
than $250,000 in noneconomic damages as compensation for “pain, suffering, incon-
venience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage”); see also
DOBBS, supra note 111, at 1071-73 (discussing capping statutes).
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343, 350 (N.H. 1986) (allowing recovery for
emotional distress damages in a wrongful birth cause of action only to the extent that they
result in “tangible pecuniary losses,” such as medical expenses or counseling fees).
116. Joseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem
Arguments for Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8-27 (2003).
He offers examples of per diem arguments and opposes their use “because they exploit the
suggestible nature” of jurors and “compound the illogic of attempting to monetize pain and
suffering into a damages remedy.” Id. at 11.
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their face, have a disparate and devastating impact on women and
minorities because it is harder for such plaintiffs to prove economic
losses, and therefore recovery of noneconomic losses is more impor-
tant.117 They further contend that the argument that money damages
cannot repair intangible harms is flawed, because that is also true
of certain types of economic losses, for which recovery of damages is
ordinarily not capped.118 Some readers will find the authors’ argu-
ments on these points persuasive.
VII. OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
As Chamallas and Wriggins explain, their book is focused on race
and gender, and they “have not wrestled with other important dimen-
sions of personal identity, such as sexual orientation, disability, and
social class.” 119 It would be interesting to know what they think about
those issues, and about whether focusing on those matters would
cause the authors to refine or modify their gender- and race-based
critique of tort law. Moreover, it is intriguing to consider how the
authors would address other important contemporary issues, such
as those arising in the legal malpractice context. At many junctures,
the authors explore the conduct and responsibility of medical profes-
sionals. Presumably, similar questions could be raised about the
conduct of lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Judged by any fair standard, The Measure of Injury is an
important book. Even those who disagree with the authors’ sustained
emphasis on race and gender must acknowledge that this volume
addresses important questions about the American tort system in a
thoughtful and intellectually rigorous fashion.
The Measure of Injury presents a coherent vision for radically
reshaping tort law. To the extent that the authors’ arguments are
found to be persuasive, The Measure of Injury may play a key role in
revolutionizing the compensation of intentional injuries and accidents.
117. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 170-82 (discussing caps on noneco-
nomic compensatory damages).
118. Id. at 180.
119. Id. at 23.
PROTECTING WOMEN: PRESERVING AUTONOMY IN THE
COMMODIFICATION OF MOTHERHOOD
INTRODUCTION





D. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis





E. Effects of Unregulated MRT: MRT Tourism
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MRT
A. In re Baby M
B. Johnson v. Calvert
V. CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO MRT COMMODIFICATION
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR ALLOWING MRT COMMODIFICATION
VII. CORRELATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AN INEVITABLE “PROBLEM”
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The development of new technology has often begged questions
that are not answered by the previously existing legal framework.1
Current advances in modern technologies are no different and are out-
pacing legislative and regulatory developments.2 Lack of regulation
and a developed legal framework can make it impossible to control the
risks associated with new technology.3 Such non-regulation of mod-
ern reproductive technologies will ultimately lead to the unavoidable
commodification of motherhood.4
1. Ivan K. Fong, Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling Through, 19
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 444 (2001) (book review).
2. Gary E. Marchant et. al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach
Us about Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726-27 (2009).
3. See id. (discussing “four potential problems that may result from the failure of
law to keep pace with technology”).
4. For a definition of “commodification,” see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1987) (“The term ‘commodification’ can be
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Commodification of the womb, sex cells, and DNA will revolu-
tionize the way we view reproduction. This could potentially lead to
a change in the way society views the role of motherhood in defining
womanhood. Although this may be seen as an unwanted side effect to
modern reproductive technologies, it also seems virtually unavoidable.
Instead of spending time and legislative energy trying to prevent
commodification, the federal government, states, and medical asso-
ciations should focus on regulating the safety of reproductive tech-
nologies. In order to best protect women’s health and preserve their
decision-making autonomy, it is necessary that we accept the unavoid-
able commodification of some aspects of traditional motherhood and
focus legislative efforts on regulating the medical administration of
modern reproductive technologies.
I. RISE OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
For the purposes of this Note, the term “modern reproductive
technologies” (MRT) refers to certain medical procedures currently
available that were developed with the intention of aiding human
reproduction.5 Specifically, MRT will refer to artificial insemination,
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), which include in vitro
fertilization, as well as surrogacy,6 and also to genetic engineering
and cloning of embryos. Each of these technologies will be discussed
in turn below.
MRT began with the birth of “[t]he first test tube baby” in 1978,
who was conceived through in vitro fertilization.7 More than thirty
construed narrowly or broadly. Narrowly construed, commodification describes actual buy-
ing and selling (or legally permitted buying and selling) of something. Broadly construed,
commodification includes not only actual buying and selling, but also market rhetoric, the
practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions, and market meth-
odology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions. Universal
commodification embraces this broad construction in its most expansive form, limiting
actual buying and selling only by the dictates of market methodology, and solving problems
of contested commodification by making everything in principle a commodity.” (internal
citations omitted)).
5. For an overview of several forms of technology-aided reproductive methods, see
Murray L. Manus, The Proposed Model Surrogate Parenthood Act: A Legislative Response
to the Challenges of Reproductive Technology, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671, 677-79 (1996).
6. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define ART as “all fertility treat-
ments in which both eggs and sperm are handled.” Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
According to this definition, ART does not encompass artificial insemination because sperm
is the only thing handled. Id. Nor does ART include the administration of medicine to
increase egg production. Id. Medical treatment is only categorized as ART if both an egg
and sperm are manipulated together with the intention of creating a baby. Id.
7. Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy:
A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 275 (2009).
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years later, what once seemed like science fiction8 has become com-
mon practice. In 2006 alone, the number of “test-tube” babies born in
the United States numbered 54,656.9 More impressively, if the re-
cent trend continues, the number of “test-tube” births will continue
to rise.10
There seem to be at least two cooperating theories seeking to
explain the growth in the MRT market. The first theory is that high
infertility rates have created a large group of people looking for alter-
native means to start a family.11 MRT offers infertile parents the
chance to conceive a child that is biologically their own,12 fulfilling a
desire to unite a family through “flesh and blood.”13 MRT can provide
the closest substitute for natural conception because the resulting
child can be genetically linked to both parents.
The second theory is that the definition of the modern family has
broadened the MRT consumer base to more than just young, infer-
tile, married couples.14 Over time, there has been increased cultural
acceptance of both MRT and non-traditional family structures.15 “Non-
traditional” families might include those with a single parent,16 homo-
sexual parents, older parents, and career-focused mothers. In order
to have children, many of these modern families are turning to MRT.17
8. See The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,946934,00.html (comparing the first test-tube baby to the reproduc-
tion methods described in Aldous Huxley’s science fiction novel Brave New World).
9. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT: SECTION 5—ART TRENDS 1996-2006, fig. 49 [hereinafter 2006
ART REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/sect5_fig49-64.htm#f49.
10. See id. (showing a yearly increase in the number of infants conceived and born
through ART between 1996 and 2006).
11. Manus, supra note 5, at 676.
12. Id.
13. Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 347, 366 (2008).
14. See Nadine A. Gartner, Lesbian (M)Otherhood: Creating an Alternative Model for
Settling Child Custody Disputes, 16 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 45, 48 (2007) (recognizing
the “surge of lesbian motherhood” as part of the “ ‘gayby boom’ ”); Sherri A. Jayson,
Comment, “Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to Help Have Baby. $6,500
Plus Expenses and a Gift”: Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies by Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 287, 288-90 (2001) (noting that older
women now use ART more frequently than do younger women); see also Lee, supra note
7, at 282 (discussing the increase in the number of “career women” seeking surrogates to
bear their children).
15. See Jayson, supra note 14, at 290 (mentioning changing societal attitudes as a
contributing factor to why older women are seeking out ART at higher rates).
16. See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 355 n.39 (“ ‘Eight[y]-six percent of all children lived in
two-parent homes in 1950, as opposed to just 72 percent in 1990.’ ” (quoting STEPHANIE
COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA’S CHANGING
FAMILIES 37 (1997))).
17. Jayson, supra note 14, at 290.
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II. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES
Fiction writers like Aldous Huxley, in Brave New World,18 and
Andrew Niccol, in the motion picture Gattaca,19 have recognized the
possibility of a society that creates children in laboratories.20 Their
fantasy stories are becoming reality in today’s world of reproductive
technology. Despite the reluctance of law-makers to recognize the
drastic change that occurred when reproductive technology jumped
from the pages of fiction into our homes and communities,21 MRT is
firmly embedded in our culture.22
A. Sperm Donation
The most common form of MRT is in vitro fertilization (IVF).23
The IVF procedure involves removing unfertilized eggs from the in-
tended genetic mother, fertilizing them in a laboratory with sperm
from the intended genetic father, and then placing the fertilized egg
in the uterus of the intended birth mother.24
Sperm donation is an important part of IVF.25 Donors, other than
those with the intention of creating a child of their own, often donate
anonymously to commercialized sperm banks.26 Most anonymous
donors are motivated primarily by the promise of compensation.27
Some donors, however, claim to be motivated by altruism.28
The sperm donation process is currently regulated by the federal
government,29 individual states,30 and professional organizations,31
18. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (The Modern Library 1932).
19. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1997).
20. Bryan Appleyard, The Gene Machine, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 21, 1998, at 11.
21. See Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, and
Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 193, 194 (2008) (“The U.S. is far behind other countries in crafting a legislative re-
sponse to curb dangers inherent in advances in ART . . . .”).
22. See 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 9, fig. 49 (showing how, each year, the number
of infants born from ART has increased).
23. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
(ART) REPORT: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2007), available at http://apps .nccd.cdc.gov/
art/NationalSummaryReport.aspx (select year 2007 from drop-down box).
24. 2006 ART Report Commonly Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
25. Vanessa L. Pi, Note, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation
Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 382 (2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. For a discussion of the societal perception of sperm donors’ altruistic moti-
vations, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in
the Gamete Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61-63 (2009).
29. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R. § 1271
(2010).
30. Pi, supra note 25, at 382.
31. Id.
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but there is concern that “[f]ederal and state regulation of sperm
donation lags far behind the constantly evolving science of ART, caus-
ing uncertainty, fear, and even medical harm.” 32 For example, even
though “the FDA requires [sperm banks to conduct] a donor medical
history interview,” 33 donors are not required to update their medical
files if diagnosed with a disease after donation, preventing individu-
als using donor sperm from knowing about potential genetic health
risks.34 The net result of the lack of regulation is a potentially in-
complete medical history for children conceived with sperm from an
unknown donor,35 frustrating the possibility of preventative care for
possible genetic disorders.
Further, sperm banks do not necessarily keep a comprehensive
record of the number of times a donor has donated sperm.36 Popular
characteristics can lead to demand for a certain donor’s genetic mate-
rial and can result in many children in one area having the same bio-
logical father.37 The resulting problem, termed “consanguinity,” is that
the children may eventually marry and reproduce with their own half-
siblings without ever having discovered their biological relationship.38
B. Egg Donation
Egg donation, like sperm donation, is becoming a fixture in the
MRT world.39 Perhaps unlike sperm donation, however, searching
for an egg donor has become a very public task. Publicly accessible
websites advertise the availability of “desirable” eggs,40 and hopeful
parents can even place advertisements for egg donors with certain
characteristics in periodicals likely to reach a target population, such
as college newspapers.41
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 390.
35. Id. at 389.
36. Pi, supra note 25, at 389-90.
37. Id. at 389 (describing a donor who “is the biological father of at least 36 children all
born between 2002 and 2007” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
38. Id.
39. Sarah Terman, Note, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg
Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 167, 167
(2008) (“Each year thousands of young women enter the American gamete market as egg
providers.”).
40. See, e.g., A PERFECT MATCH, http://www.aperfectmatch.com/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2011) (“A Perfect Match . . . specializ[es] in the recruitment of intelligent, well-educated,
accomplished and affordable college-aged donors to be matched with intended parents who
need the help of an egg donor to create their family. We also recruit young, healthy gesta-
tional surrogates who are prescreened and ready to cycle immediately.”).
41. AARON D. LEVINE, HASTINGS CTR., SELF-REGULATION, COMPENSATION, AND THE
ETHICAL RECRUITMENT OF OOCYTE DONORS 25, 27 (2010) (“Three ads, in the Harvard
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Women undergoing the ovum donation procedure for purposes
other than to create a child of their own are often motivated by mone-
tary compensation.42 Many donors also state that they are motivated
by the thought of helping infertile women conceive a child,43 but there
is significant evidence that this is largely untrue.44
Ovum donation, also known as egg harvesting,45 is a complicated
process that is potentially very risky for the donor.46 First, the donor’s
menstrual cycle is synchronized with the recipient’s cycle using birth
control pills.47 Then, the donor receives a hormone suppressant to pre-
vent normal ovary function.48 Next, the donor receives another round
of hormones, this time to “hyper-stimulate” egg production so that
multiple eggs can be harvested at one time, increasing the likelihood
of a successful donation.49 The recipient also receives hormone medi-
cation to prepare her uterus for implantation of the fertilized eggs.50
The eggs are later fertilized in the laboratory using sperm do-
nated by the genetic father.51 After the fertilized eggs have reached
the proper stage of maturity, typically one or two of the fertilized eggs
are implanted into the recipient’s uterus.52
There are at least three distinct controversies surrounding ovum
donation. First, the egg harvesting process can pose high risks for
the donor.53 Egg retrieval surgery risks damage to blood vessels and
organs located near the ovaries and can possibly result in infection
Crimson, the Daily Princetonian, and Yale Daily News, offered $35,000, and an ad in the
Brown Daily Herald offered $50,000 to ‘an extraordinary egg donor.’ ”).
42. Pi, supra note 25, at 382; Jim Hopkins, Egg-donor Business Booms on Campuses,
USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2006-03-15
-egg-donors-usat_x.htm.
43. Pi, supra note 25, at 382.
44. See Krawiec, supra note 28, at 61-62 (noting that, despite the perception of an egg
donor as a “sunny Samaritan” willing to donate her eggs for altruistic purposes, without
compensation, women are likely to stop donating).
45. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195.
46. “During the entire process, the donor is subject to a number of health risks, in-
cluding possible bleeding or infection during the removal procedure.” Id. at 194 (citation
omitted).
47. Patient Education: Egg Donation Process for Recipients, UCSF MED. CTR., http://
www.ucsfhealth.org/education/ovum_donation_process_for_recipients/index.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Patient Education].
48. Id.
49. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195.
50. Patient Education, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 194; see also Emily Galpern, Beyond Embryo Politics:
Women’s Health and Dignity in Stem Cell Research, WOMEN’S HEALTH ACTIVIST
NEWSLETTER (Nat’l Women’s Health Network, Wash., D.C.), May/June 2006, available at
http://nwhn.org/beyond-embryo-politics-womens-health-and-dignity-stem-cell-research
(noting the health risks related to egg donation for stem cell research).
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and infertility.54 Additionally, as with any surgery involving sedation,
egg donation carries the possibility of “anesthetic complications.” 55
Studies have also suggested that there is a link between the hor-
mone therapy administered to stimulate ovulation and some types
of cancer.56
Beyond the proven risks, the complete list of potential dangers
posed by hormone administration is unknown,57 making it difficult to
inform donors of the actual risks of donation. The lack of knowledge
about long-term effects of the hormone therapy, combined with the ex-
pected risks in any invasive surgery, can create an ethical dilemma,
especially as “there is a conflict of interest between those seeking
eggs and potential donors . . . .” 58 The nature of the informed consent
required from egg donors is inconsistent and, at best, only vague in
its warning about health risks.59
The second controversy surrounding ovum donation is its associ-
ation with stem cell research.60 In the past, stem cell research relied
exclusively on the use of “leftover” fertilized eggs that were not im-
planted into the recipient during ovum donation.61 New cloning tech-
nology called “somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT),” however, requires
freshly harvested eggs.62 The ovum donation procedure is the same
for SCNT donation as for IVF donation.63 After harvesting, however,
instead of being fertilized, each egg’s nucleus is removed and replaced
with the nucleus from a somatic cell, or “body cell,” 64 resulting in an
egg that can be used to grow a stem cell line.65 Because DNA is con-
tained in the nucleus of a cell, each egg is a clone of the somatic cell,
rendering it ideal for research purposes.66
54. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT, http://www
.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last updated June 5, 2002).
55. Id.
56. Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge, 442
NATURE 601, 607 (2006), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7103/
pdf/442607a.pdf.
57. Id. at 608 (“ ‘It’s important for people to understand in the consent process that we
don’t know as much as we should about what th[e] risks are . . . .’ ” (quoting Mildred Cho)).
58. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 210.
59. Id. at 209-10. For an example of an informed consent form used in egg donation for
IVF procedures, see the OHSU Center for Women’s Health website. Patient Handouts,
OHSU CTR. WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/health/services/women/services/
fertility/patient-resources/upload/IVF-Informed-Consent.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
60. See Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195 (discussing the two markets of “the ‘egg
trade’ ”: “IVF treatments and . . . research purposes” (citation omitted)).
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Stem cell research has been publicly condemned by pro-life
organizations as a violation of protected rights of an unborn child.67
Adding fuel to their fire, in March of 2009, President Barack Obama
signed an executive order lifting the ban on federal funding for em-
bryonic stem cell research68 imposed by President George W. Bush.69
Despite the medical breakthroughs predicted by those involved in
stem cell research,70 many pro-life supporters strongly oppose the
use of embryos, whether left over from the IVF process or cloned
specifically for research purposes, because all “embryos and fetuses
are human beings worthy of respect.” 71
The third controversy surrounding ovum donation is the potential
coercive threat it poses to economically desperate women.72 A woman
in a difficult financial position may feel compelled to undergo the dan-
gerous medical procedure to make ends meet.73 The concerns with
ovum donation for-pay are analogous to potential ethical concerns
regarding organ donation, or even prostitution, because of the risky
nature of the egg donation procedure, combined with the potentially
high financial pay off.74
Despite these concerns, compensation for egg donation is not
federally regulated.75 Instead, independent agencies have issued
67. Press Release, Nat’l Right to Life Comm., National Right to Life Says the Obama
Administration is Pushing Step-by-Step the Creation and Harvesting of Human Embryos
for Research (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nrlc.org/press_releases_new/Release
041709.html (“[L]ongstanding law . . . actually prohibits funding of research that creates
or harms human embryos, including all creation of human embryos by cloning.”).
68. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
69. Daniel Nasaw, Obama Ends Bush Ban on Embryo Stem Cell Research, GUARDIAN
.CO.UK, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/06/embryonic-stem-cell
-research-obama.
70. See, e.g., Stem Cells and Diseases, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://stemcells.nih.gov/
info/health.asp (last modified Jan. 7, 2011) (“Studying stem cells will help us understand
how they transform into the dazzling array of specialized cells that make us what we are.
Some of the most serious medical conditions, such as cancer and birth defects, are due
to problems that occur somewhere in this process. A better understanding of normal cell
development will allow us to understand and perhaps correct the errors that cause these
medical conditions.”).
71. Erin P. George, Comment, The Stem Cell Debate: The Legal, Political and Ethical
Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific Research on Human Embryos, 12 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 747, 782 (2002).
72. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
73. Id.
74. See Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ
Donation Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 84-85 (2008) (discussing the
ethical concerns of being able to buy and sell life-necessary organs in a free market); Emily
Bazelon, Why Is Prostitution Illegal?: The Oldest Question about the Oldest Profession,
SLATE (Mar. 10, 2008, 7:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2186243 (discussing the ethical
considerations of legalizing prostitution).
75. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 204. In contrast, England’s Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) long “prohibited payment for egg donors, limiting donor
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guidelines defining proper compensation. For example, the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) guidelines suggest:
Compensation should be structured to acknowledge the time, in-
convenience, and discomfort associated with screening, ovarian
stimulation, and oocyte retrieval. Compensation should not vary
according to the planned use of the oocytes, the number or quality
of oocytes retrieved, the number or outcome of prior donation
cycles, or the donor’s ethnic or other personal characteristics.76
The ASRM’s guidelines further state that “[t]otal payments to donors
in excess of $5,000 require justification and sums above $10,000 are
not appropriate.” 77 These guidelines, however, are merely advisory,
and agencies can choose whether to comply.78 The ASRM website lists
egg donor agencies that are in compliance with its guidelines but notes
that the agencies have paid a fee to be listed on the website and that
neither the ASRM nor any other authority has verified the agencies’
assertions that they are in compliance with the guidelines.79
Although some states regulate egg donor compensation, there
is no clear trend in the substance of the regulations.80 For example,
Louisiana, one of the few states that specifically addresses egg donor
compensation, statutorily prohibits all compensation, and also gen-
erally prohibits egg donation,81 whereas Virginia specifically excludes
the sale of eggs from its prohibition on the donation of body parts.82
C. Commercial Surrogacy
Another controversial form of MRT is commercial surrogacy.83
Commercial surrogacy comes in two forms. The first involves paying
a woman to relinquish her parental rights after giving birth to a
child that is genetically her own.84 The second form, “gestational
compensation to fifteen pounds (approximately thirty dollars) plus reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.” Id. at 204-05 (citing Press Release, Human Fertilisation & Embryology
Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on Payment for Egg Donors (Feb. 25, 2004), available
at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/784.html).
76. AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 305, 305 (2007).
77. Id.
78. See LEVINE, supra note 41, at 26 (describing the fertility industry as self-regulated).
79. ASRM Patient Resources: Egg Donor Agencies, AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., http://
www.asrm.org/detail.aspx?id=856 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
80. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 203.
81. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2011)).
82. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.16 (West 2010)).
83. See Lee, supra note 7, at 281 (discussing the potential for “surrogacy agencies and
medical practitioners [to] employ[ ] unethical practices solely to generate profit”).
84. Id. at 275-76.
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surrogacy,” 85 is more common in modern society.86 Gestational sur-
rogacy requires ovum donation and IVF, but, instead of the fertilized
egg being implanted into the egg donor herself, the egg is implanted
into a third party who agrees to carry the child to term for a fee and
then relinquish all parental rights to the paying party.87 Gestational
surrogates have no genetic link to the baby,88 avoiding some of the
legal issues posed by early MRT litigation surrounding post-birth
parental rights.89
As with other forms of MRT, commercial gestational surrogacy
is not federally regulated in the United States.90 Some states have
adopted their own laws regarding commercial gestational surrogacy,
but there is no dominant approach to the regulation.91
D. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is used to diagnose ge-
netic or chromosomal problems in embryos before they are implanted
in the mother’s uterus.92 PGD allows potential parents to screen the
embryos for disorders such as Down Syndrome and Tay-Sachs.93
The PGD process works like any IVF procedure: the hopeful
mother goes through an egg-harvesting procedure, the hopeful father
donates sperm, and the eggs are fertilized by a technician.94 Only some
of the eggs will be fertilized successfully and begin the cell division
process.95 After allowing the eggs to grow for a few days, a techni-
cian will take “an embryo biopsy” and conduct genetic testing on the
cells.96 Embryos that have an undesirable trait are usually donated
for research purposes or discarded.97 Then, a few “good” embryos are
placed in the uterus.98
85. Id. at 276.
86. Id. at 275.
87. Id. at 276.
88. Id.
89. Lee, supra note 7, at 275-76 (mentioning the case of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988), which highlights the difficulties inherent in determining the parental rights
of a surrogate who uses her own eggs).
90. Id. at 288, 292.
91. Id. at 288-90 (discussing the “fragmented approach” of the states in regulating
commercial surrogacy).
92. Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 285 & n.1 (2008).




97. Id. at 291.
98. King, supra note 92, at 291.
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PGD can also be used to screen embryos for “non-medical” genetic
traits, such as sex, deafness, dwarfism, and blood and tissue type.99
This type of screening can raise ethical concerns and is much less
common than screening for medical genetic disorders.100
The limited use of PGD is due in part to the lack of reliable
genetic tests for many traits and lack of public knowledge of the
field.101 It is possible to imagine that, in time, parents may “screen
kids almost before conception for an enormous range of attributes,
such as how tall they’re likely to be, what body type they will have,
their hair and eye color, what sorts of illnesses they will be naturally
resistant to, and even, conceivably, their IQ and personality type.”102
The ability to select the genetic makeup of children could result in
extreme disparities between children of different economic classes,
making those whose parents can afford PGD smarter and healthier
than those whose parents cannot.103
The President’s Council on Bioethics doubts that the ability to cre-
ate such a “designer baby” is imminent but also recognizes that “PGD
risks normalizing the idea that a child’s particular genetic make-up
is quite properly a province of parental reproductive choice . . . .”104
Assuming PGD is in fact recognized as a “reproductive choice,” it is
currently possible to buy certainty that your child will be a girl, and
that she will be free from over 100 diseases currently identifiable
through genetic testing.105 Despite the controversial applications of
PGD, however, the United States currently does not federally regu-
late its use.106
99. Id. at 296; see also Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 328-
29 (2003) (discussing a case in which parents used PGD in order to ensure that the mother
would give birth to a child who would be a bone-marrow match for a sick sibling).
100. Id.
101. King, supra note 92, at 297-98.
102. Michael D. Lemonick et al., Designer Babies, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 64, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989987,00.html.
103. See id. at 66 (describing “a scenario in which society splits into two camps, the
‘gen-rich’ and the ‘gen-poor’ ”). For a more frightening interpretation of the possibilities
of PGD, see George J. Annas, The Changing Face of Family Law: Global Consequences
of Embedding Physicians and Biotechnology in the Parent-Child Relationship, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 511, 526 (2008) (discussing how genetic engineering may result in the creation of a
“superhuman” that sees humans “as an inferior subspecies without human rights to be
enslaved or slaughtered preemptively”). Annas refers to this theory as “gender genocide.”
Id. at 525.
104. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 95 (2004), available at http://bioethics.georgetown
.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/.
105. Id. at 90-91.
106. King, supra note 92, at 321.
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III. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGULATIONS
As indicated in the sections above, there is a lack of uniform, man-
datory regulation of MRT. There are, however, a number of regula-
tory forces that affect the current structure of MRT service delivery.
A. Federal Funding
The development of MRT is regulated in practice by the limited
amount of funding available for research.107 Without resources from
federal and private agencies, research laboratories are often limited
in the amount of resources they can devote to developing and improv-
ing MRT.108 In essence, MRT’s expansion is regulated by its limited
ability to advance without research funding.
Recently, however, the federal government has been relatively
generous with funding for MRT-related research. As of March 2009,
the federal government is once again allotting federal funding for
stem cell research in order to develop new gene therapies targeting
some of the human population’s most deadly diseases.109 An increase
in federal funding for new technology could improve MRT effective-
ness and applicability, specifically in relationship to the burgeoning
field of PGD.
Another example of federally-funded MRT research is the
National Human Genome Research Institute’s completion of the
Human Genome Project in April 2003.110 The culmination of the
Human Genome Project was the sequencing of the entire human
genome,111 which “gave us the ability to, for the first time, to [sic] read
nature’s complete genetic blueprint for building a human being.”112
The future goal of the National Human Genome Research Institute
is to use the power of sequencing to collect information about the
function of different genes so that we may more easily predict how
107. See id. (discussing the federal government’s limitation on federal funds for
embryonic research).
108. Id. at 322 (describing how this lack “of federal research funding has pushed repro-
ductive genetics out of the laboratory and into medical practice”).
109. See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar. 9, 2009) (repealing the federal
ban on funding for stem cell research).
110. All About the Human Genome Project (HGP), NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH
INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001772 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) [hereinafter All About
the HGP].
111. Human Medical Sequencing Program and Current Initiatives, NAT’L HUMAN
GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/15014882 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
[hereinafter Human Medical Sequencing Program].
112. All About the HGP, supra note 110.
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our genes affect our lives.113 If this goal becomes reality, it is possible
to imagine using PGD in order to select for a variety of traits.114
B. Self-Regulation
Doctors and scientists working in the MRT field are often free
from federal or state regulation and, instead, voluntarily self-regu-
late.115 There are a number of obvious ethical problems with self-
regulation, such as a desire to maximize profits by downplaying
risks, inflating success rates, and providing new, yet experimental,
treatment, potentially exposing patients to unknown risks.116 MRT
providers are also not licensed in any special way,117 revealing that
there is little to no uniform oversight of the procedures or reporting
requirements.118
Individual doctors also have the opportunity to regulate MRT use
by declining to enter into the doctor-patient relationship with some-
one interested in using MRT.119 Though a doctor can almost always
refuse to treat a patient, she cannot, within the bounds of professional
ethics, refuse treatment based on “a patient’s personal characteris-
tics if the treatments would be provided to other patients with similar
medical profiles.”120 This means that a doctor risks violating the eth-
ical code by refusing to use MRT treatment for the benefit of an un-
married woman or a woman in a lesbian union if the doctor would
treat a married woman with the same medical characteristics.121 That
is not to say that a doctor is limited to perusing medical records when
making her decisions with respect to providing MRT treatment. A
doctor can also “take into account known or reasonably suspected
characteristics that would render the parent(s) unable to deliver a
decent minimum of child-rearing.”122
113. Human Medical Sequencing Program, supra note 111.
114. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 104, at 91 (noting traits such as
“height, leanness, or temperament”).
115. Jayson, supra note 14, at 332.
116. Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 253-56 (2009).
117. Id. at 252.
118. Id. at 252-53.
119. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 64-65 (2008) (“[A] physician is free
to determine whether or not to enter into a doctor-patient relationship with a prospective
patient . . . .”).
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id. at 66-67.
122. Id. at 67. For additional information regarding a physician’s ability to deny care
based on her judgment of a parent’s child-rearing capabilities, see id. at 67-68.
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C. Federal Regulation
Federal regulations of MRT are currently found in the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA),123 and in FDA
donor tissue regulations.124 The FCSRCA calls on the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to develop an accreditation pro-
gram that sets standards for embryo agencies.125 The CDC released
its “Model Program” in 1999,126 but state and individual-agency
compliance with the Model is optional.127 Importantly, neither the
FCSRCA nor the CDC Model Program include minimum safety re-
quirements for MRT procedures.128
The FDA donor tissue regulations do set standards for screening
and testing donors, attempting to reduce the number of infectious
diseases transferred during MRT.129 The regulations do not require
testing for genetic diseases, however,130 nor do they set standards for
MRT procedural safety.131
Non-regulatory federal bodies have attempted to address ques-
tions left unanswered by federal regulation. For example, the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics issued a report in March 2004 titled The
Regulation of New Biotechnologies.132 The report makes recommenda-
tions for the appropriate use of MRT.133 The report weighs the ethical
concerns surrounding MRT, expresses growing uneasiness with its
existence, and recognizes the inability of current federal legislation
to fully address its legal and ethical implications.134
123. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)(1) (2006).
124. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1,
1271.3 (2005).
125. Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue—
The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010), available
at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=11&article=8.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 251.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id. at 251-52.
130. Id. at 253-54.
131. See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R.
§ 1271 (2005) (lacking provisions for safety verification of MRT procedures themselves).
Although the lack of regulation regarding screening gamete donors for genetic diseases is
outside the scope of this Note, a poignant example of the deleterious effects of this “hole”
in legislation can be found in an article by William Heisel titled “Egg Donor Gives Life—
and a Death Sentence.” SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, available at http://seattletimes
.nwsource.com/html/health/2004068536_eggdonor13.html (discussing an egg donor who
recently learned that one of the children conceived with her eggs has Tay-Sachs disease).
132. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 104.
133. Id. at 205-24. For example, the report calls for “increased oversight by professional
societies and practitioners.” Id. at 215.
134. Id. at 36-37, 171.
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The egg donation process itself, not even considering compensa-
tion standards, is largely unregulated at the federal level.135 The regu-
lations that do exist differ for the donation of an egg to produce an
embryo meant for childbirth and the donation of an egg for research
purposes.136 Clinics can voluntarily choose to conform to federal MRT
regulations.137 The lack of enforceable regulations raises concerns
for the health of the women involved in egg donation, as well as con-
cerns about whether the current system allows women to make truly
informed decisions regarding donation.138
D. State Legislation
One way state law regulates MRT is through physician and
facility licensure.139 Several states have also attempted to compensate
for the lack of federal regulation by passing their own laws regarding
MRT, in addition to any licensure requirements they may have.140 For
example, many state legislatures have statutorily created regulatory
schemes regarding commercial surrogacy agreements.141 Scholars have
broken down the various regulatory models for surrogacy contracts
into four distinct types.142
Statutes in the first category make all surrogacy contracts un-
enforceable in that state.143 States that have such statutes may pass
other statutes that define the “legal parent” of a child conceived under
the auspices of a surrogacy contract.144 Many of “[t]hese jurisdictions
have effectively chosen to subjugate the rights of the genetic/intended
parents to those of the birth parents.”145 Violation of the statute by
forming a surrogacy contract can cause the contracting parties to be
charged with a crime for which they may face a misdemeanor or felony
conviction and hefty fines.146
Statutes in the second category only prohibit contracts that will
compensate the surrogate for more than just her medical expenses.147
135. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 198 (“[T]here is at best a patchwork system of federal
oversight of reproductive services and research.” (citation omitted)).
136. Id. at 194.
137. Id. at 199.
138. Id. at 194, 207.
139. Heled, supra note 125, at 255.
140. Lee, supra note 7, at 289-90.
141. Adam P. Plant, With a Little Help from my Friends: The Intersection of the Gesta-
tional Carrier Surrogacy Agreement, Legislative Inaction, and Medical Advancement, 54
ALA. L. REV. 639, 649 (2003).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 650-51.
145. Id. at 651.
146. Id.
147. Plant, supra note 141, at 649.
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Controversy over surrogacy compensation can echo that of egg dona-
tion: critics are overwhelmingly concerned with the commodification
of the womb and even the commodification of children.148
Statutes in the third category address only parts of the surrogacy
contract or surrogacy law generally, avoiding broad prohibitions.149
Many of these statutes merely decriminalize surrogacy.150 Some
states have also passed legislation regarding the presumed parent-
age of children conceived through a surrogacy contract.151 These laws
may establish a preference for the biological parent, either the mother
or the father, or may involve some other calculation to determine
parental rights.152
Statutes in the fourth category explicitly make surrogacy con-
tracts legal and enforceable.153 While these statutes may seem progres-
sive, many of these states have also passed sister legislation, which
heavily regulates the situations in which surrogacy contracts will be
held enforceable.154 For example, some states require that a couple
prove medical incapability of conceiving “naturally,” while others re-
quire that individuals seeking to hire a surrogate be married.155
E. Effects of Unregulated MRT: MRT Tourism
Citizens from countries that have strict regulations concerning
commercial surrogacy travel to other, less regulated, countries, such
as the United States and India, in order to reap the benefits of MRT.156
These potential parents are looking for good technology at the right
price.157 Not only is commercial surrogacy an illustration of MRT’s
nature as a commodity, but it also shows that the domestic market
is not the only influence on MRT.
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MRT
The rapid development of MRT has posed many novel legal
questions concerning parental rights.158 The section below discusses
148. Id. at 652 (describing the fear of “baby-selling”).
149. Id. at 649.
150. Id. at 653.
151. Id. at 654.
152. Id.
153. Plant, supra note 141, at 654.
154. Id. at 654-55.
155. Id. at 655.
156. Lee, supra note 7, at 284.
157. Id. at 276-77.
158. See Barbara K. Kopytoff, Surrogate Motherhood: Questions of Law and Values,
22 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 206 (1988) (discussing “just how unprepared the law is to deal with
the questions that are raised” by “surrogate motherhood”).
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two key cases in the development of surrogacy law that highlight the
diverging interests of “procreative liberty” and traditional notions
of family.
A. In re Baby M159
In re Baby M was the first major case in the United States to
grapple with the issue of parental rights when a child results from
MRT.160 The parties to the case were, on one side, the intended par-
ents and, on the other, a surrogate who was hired to conceive a child
with the intended father.161 Importantly, the surrogate mother was
also the natural biological mother of the child.162
The two parties created a surrogacy contract, but, after the birth
of the child, the surrogate refused to give the child to the intended
parents,163 even though the contract terminated her parental rights.164
The court held that the surrogacy contract was invalid and “restore[d]
the ‘surrogate’ as mother of the child.”165
The Supreme Court of New Jersey made clear that the egg and
the womb should not be treated as commodities; the court refused to
validate the “sale” by contract of the womb.166 Instead, the court held
that such contracts were contrary to public policy167 and endorsed the
Superior Court’s test for the award of parental rights by considering
“the child’s best interests,”168 an analysis typically used in determining
child custody rights upon family dissolution.169
It is undeniable that surrogacy scenarios create a complex prob-
lem in contract law due to the potential of extreme emotional vulnera-
bility among the parties.170 This might suggest—as the court held in
Baby M—that such contracts should be deemed against public policy,
and that disputes over parentage should be settled using traditional
family law. It is equally undeniable, however, that such concerns, and
159. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
160. Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1996, 2069 (2003).
161. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235, 1237.
162. Id. at 1234.
163. Id. at 1237.
164. Id. at 1238.
165. Id. at 1234.
166. Id. at 1240.
167. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
168. Id.
169. Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 948 (2001).
170. Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California
Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W.
L. REV. 321, 331-32 n.58 (2006) (noting emotional and economic vulnerability).
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the resulting denial to enforce surrogacy contracts, can infringe on
“procreative liberty.”171
B. Johnson v. Calvert172
The California case of Johnson v. Calvert explored a question
left open by the New Jersey court in Baby M: how to determine paren-
tal rights of gestational, not traditional, surrogates.173 The Supreme
Court of California noted that though there is support for both the
genetic mother’s and the gestational mother’s parental rights174 under
California law there can be “only one natural mother.”175 The court
held that when there are two such conflicting claims of motherhood,
the woman “who intended to procreate,” essentially the woman to
whom the surrogacy contract granted custody, shall be awarded
parental rights.176
The Johnson court implicitly recognized that there is some allow-
able level of commodification of children and the womb;177the court
viewed the embryo and the womb as things that can be dealt with by
using normal contract principles without violating public policy.178
Comparing the “best interests” test used in Baby M with the
“intent” test later used by the majority in Johnson, it becomes clear
that MRT is changing the way courts and individuals think of the
definition of “family.”179 Notably, however, there is some reluctance
to embrace the change, as indicated by Justice Kennard’s dissent in
Johnson advocating for application of the “best interests” test for
parentage articulated in Baby M.180
V. CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO MRT COMMODIFICATION
Since the birth of the first test-tube baby in 1978, there have
been countless articles, books, and theories written regarding MRT.
171. John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in
Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10 n.29 (1989).
172. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
173. Id. at 777-78.
174. Id. at 782.
175. Id. at 781.
176. Id. at 782.
177. Id. at 785.
178. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783-84. But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother,
13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 429-33 (2007) (arguing that existing constitutional
jurisprudence supports granting parental rights to gestational mother instead of genetic
mothers, even where surrogacy contracts exist).
179. See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 371 (“In short, the presumption that both autonomous
choice and the preservation of tradition can be central to the construction of a family sug-
gests a contradiction at the center of society’s view of family.”).
180. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 789, 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Arguments for and against the use of MRT are vehement. Regard-
less, the market for MRT services is growing.181
Ethical arguments against commodification of MRT are often
just another vehicle to argue about the ethics of abortion.182 “Pro-life”
advocates view embryos as persons,183 and so may have problems not
just with the commodification of the embryo and womb, but rather,
with any use of MRT, because it typically results in the production of
embryos, some of which will never be used or will be used for stem
cell research.184
Others taking issue with the unregulated MRT cite extreme cases
such as “octo-mom” Nadya Suleman, a single woman who requested
implantation of a large number of embryos in hopes of having multiple
children at one time, despite lacking sufficient income to support so
many children.185 It is argued that Suleman’s story is the perfect
example of how complete freedom of choice with respect to MRT can
lead to an unhealthy family situation.186 The response to Suleman’s
story not only caused “public fury and social hysteria,”187 it also led
lawmakers to consider legislation regulating MRT by limiting the
number of embryos that can be implanted during one procedure.188
An additional argument against commodification asserts that the
practice of buying and selling gametes can devalue human life and
harm “the dignity of donors.”189 Some argue that “[c]ommercialization
of gametes and embryos (putting a price on them by the donors and
the scientists who profit from embryo research) causes further harm
by viewing uniquely human entities as objects in commerce rather
than as inalienable symbols of humanity.”190
181. 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 9, fig. 49.
182. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 193.
183. Sherry F. Colb, To Whom Do We Refer When We Speak of Obligations to “Future
Generations”? Reproductive Rights and the Intergenerational Community, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1582, 1601 (2009).
184. Id. at 1601-02.
185. See Alison Stateman, The Octuplets Mom Speaks, and the Questions Grow, TIME,
Feb. 7, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877962,00.html (discussing
the negative reaction to Nadya Suleman’s delivery of eight babies).
186. Id.
187. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the “Octomom,” 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 120, 120 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/34.
188. Id.; see also Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why
Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 135-36 (2010) (arguing that Congress should pass the Family
Building Act of 2009 or similar legislation mandating insurance coverage for in vitro
fertilization in order to reduce multiple embryo transfers).
189. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercialization in Human
Embryo Research, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 39, 43 (1995).
190. Id.
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Many opposed to commodification also argue that compensating
women for their eggs can result in the exploitation of economically
desperate women.191 Compensation for egg donation has been reported
to range from $1,500 to $150,000, with the average compensation
falling between $4,217 and $5,200.192 As mentioned previously, the
ASRM recommends a maximum payment of $5,000, stating “sums
of $5,000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 are
not appropriate.”193 The ASRM justifies these numbers by saying that
keeping the amount of payment low “minimizes the possibility of
undue inducement of donors and the suggestion that payment is for
the oocytes themselves.”194
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR ALLOWING MRT COMMODIFICATION
Many of the arguments against MRT commodification cannot
withstand careful scrutiny and cannot be used to justify legislative
action. This section will address several of the more convincing con-
cerns regarding MRT commodification and argue that regulatory
efforts are unnecessary to address these concerns.
First, legislation is unnecessary to prevent socially undesirable
situations typified by “octo-mom” Nadya Suleman. Although perhaps
well-intended, state legislative efforts to set a maximum number of
embryos for implantation is redundant. Doctors are already able to
make recommendations about care and refuse any “treatment request
[that] is known to be scientifically invalid, has no medical indication,
and offers no possible benefit to the patient.”195 Further, a doctor can
refuse non-discriminatory treatment that “is incompatible with the
physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs.”196 It seems clear that
there is already precedent in the medical field for a doctor to refuse
implantation of a certain number of fertilized eggs when she finds
it inappropriate for the patient.
Second, the argument that commodification of MRT devalues
human life falls short, in part, because it is outrageous to say that a
child conceived using MRT or a child born from a gestational surrogate
191. E.g., Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
192. Krawiec, supra note 28, at 66. Krawiec is careful, however, to note that these
numbers are “self-reported” and may be unreliable, but she acknowledges that,
ultimately, these are the best numbers available. Id. at 66-67.
193. AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., supra note 76, at 308.
194. Id.
195. Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 10.05—Potential Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion1005.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (citing Opinion 8.20).
196. Id.
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is less of a person than those conceived or born in a more traditional
way. If this were the case, it is unlikely that MRT use would have
exploded in recent decades, with more than 400 fertility clinics in
existence197 and approximately 1.2 million women seeking fertility
treatment in 2005.198 Although the commodification of sex cells and
the womb may reshape the idea of how families are formed, the valu-
ation of the individual family members is certainly not affected.
The new conception of “family” may already be commonplace.199
Professor of health care law Janet L. Dolgin writes in her article
Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family:
Many commentators—in universities, in courts, in the media,
and in private settings—have noted the increasing importance of
autonomous individuality and choice to understandings of families
in the U.S. For almost a half century, society and the law have
increasingly viewed family members—especially adults within
families—as autonomous individuals, free to forge their own bar-
gains within family settings. In consequence, families shaped by
individuals’ nontraditional choices are now commonplace.200
Echoing the majority in Johnson, Professor Dolgin specifically
notes the modern trend in recognizing “adults within families . . . as
autonomous individuals, free to forge their own bargains.” 201 Legis-
lation preventing a woman from contracting and making autonomous
decisions about her own body could, in fact, do more damage to our
modern conception of family decision-making than will the commodifi-
cation of reproduction by MRT.202
In a related concern to the argument that commodification of
reproduction devalues human life, some claim “that ‘paid surrogacy
within the current gender structure may symbolize that women are
fungible baby-makers for men whose seed must be carried on,’ ” 203
or that such a market for embryos “turn[s] ‘women’s labor into some-
thing that is used and controlled by others.’ ” 204 This point, however,
197. Daar, supra note 119, at 26.
198. Id. at 24-25.
199. Dolgin, supra note 13, at 348.
200. Id. at 347-48 (internal citations omitted).
201. Id. at 348.
202. See id. at 348-50 (discussing the tensions between traditional “flesh and blood”
family composition and new ideas about individual autonomy, decision-making, and
bargaining).
203. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2305, 2328 (1995) (quoting Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1935 (1987)).
204. Id. (quoting Debra Satz, Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 123-24 (1992)).
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ignores the fact that a woman is capable of exercising her autonomy
in order to make such a valid, legally-recognized decision for herself.205
Third, concerns that a woman cannot make MRT decisions for
herself without being exploited are likely exaggerated by an inappro-
priate viewing of contract law as strict and unyielding.206 Current
contract doctrine “aimed at deterring coercion and minimizing nega-
tive externalities . . . can obtain some of the benefits that are pre-
sumed to be gained by a family law approach.” 207
Arguments in favor of legislating a maximum compensation for
egg donors in order to curtail the potential for exploitation are weak-
ened by situations typified by South Korean stem cell researcher,
Dr. Hwang Woo Suk.208 Dr. Suk used his position of power to coerce
women into donating eggs for only $1,400.209 Two of Dr. Suk’s research
assistants donated eggs without receiving any compensation whatso-
ever.210 Imposing a compensation ceiling will not prevent situations
like those encountered by Dr. Suk’s research assistants. Existing
contract and tort law, however, can address Dr. Suk’s misconduct.
Those arguing for limits in compensation may also be concerned
that free-market sales have resulted in lower payment for eggs used
in research than for those sold to mothers hoping to conceive a child.211
The fear is that the dual market may create two distinct classes of
donors: one consisting of individuals whose eggs are desirable for re-
productive donation—typically white or Asian women who tend to be
“highly educated”—and another consisting of those whose eggs are
desirable only for research purposes, for which they would receive less
compensation.212 To prevent this problem, it might be tempting to
draft legislation that would require research laboratories to rely in-
stead on altruistic egg donation.213 Practically, however, the fact that
donation is altruistic does not affect the riskiness of the procedure
and, as demonstrated by the actions of Dr. Suk, altruistic donation
does not prevent coercion.
205. Id. at 2329.
206. Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2344 (1995) (“Contract law need not be the cold, heart-
less, masculine doctrine that some feminists and family law professors accuse it of being.”).
207. Id. at 2344-45.
208. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 198.
209. Id.
210. James Brooke, Korean Leaves Cloning Center in Ethics Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2005, at A5.
211. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 198; Brooke, supra note 210, at A1.
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VII. CORRELATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
In considering arguments for and against commodification, it is
informative to analyze potential double standards within the MRT
regulatory effort. Differences in compensation between sperm and
egg donation and differences in ethical concerns between surrogacy
and simple egg donation may reveal the dangerousness of legislation
aimed at “protecting” women from commodification.
First, a comparison of egg donation and sperm donation reveals
that there is little correlation between the dangerousness of the proce-
dure and the payment received for the gamete. As mentioned before,
egg donor compensation in the United States purportedly varies from
$1,500 to up to $150,000, with most clinics reporting that donors
receive an average of between $4,217 and $5,200 per donation.214
Dividing the total payment amount by the number of hours a woman
spends undergoing various medical procedures involved in ovum do-
nation results in a total pay of between approximately seventy-five
dollars and ninety-three dollars per hour.215 This payment is roughly
the same compensation rate per hour that men receive for sperm
donation, a virtually risk-free procedure.216 Although difficult to claim
with certainty, cultural assumptions that eggs are donated for altru-
istic purposes and sperm is donated for profit may be responsible for
the questionable cost-to-risk ratio of egg donation.217 Prejudicial legis-
lative efforts that set a compensation ceiling for egg donation, but
not for sperm donation, may reinforce both cultural assumptions and
payments for egg donation that do not correspond to the high-risk
nature of the procedure.
Second, as discussed previously, much of the concern regarding
compensation of egg donors is linked to a fear that economically des-
perate women may risk the invasive procedure in order to receive
reportedly high levels of compensation. This contrasts with the view
that opponents to compensated surrogacy take, which is “grounded
in a judgment that commodification of women’s reproductive capac-
ity is harmful for the identity aspect of their personhood and in a
judgment that the closeness of paid surrogacy to baby-selling harms
our self-conception too deeply.” 218 The concern that an individual
woman is not able to make a rational decision to donate her eggs
214. Krawiec, supra note 28, at 66.
215. Id. at 67.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 67-68, 71-72 (discussing cost-to-risk ratio of sperm and egg donation and
differing cultural assumptions regarding egg and sperm donors’ motivations).
218. Radin, supra note 4, at 1932.
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contrasted with the concern that all gestational surrogacy will de-
value all of humanity may reflect an incongruous societal conception
of “womanhood” and “motherhood.” 219
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AN INEVITABLE “PROBLEM”
If there is one point of clarity in the MRT legislative debate, it
is that reproductive technology is here to stay. It prevents genetic
illness, it provides a solution to infertility, it is profitable, and it is
common. Yet it also seems fairly clear that something about the cur-
rent state of MRT delivery is not ideal. In order to provide a better,
safer system—one that recognizes a woman’s right to access reproduc-
tive technology as equivalent to a person’s right to contract, reproduce,
and make decisions—perhaps we should reconsider our regulatory
focus. Instead of concentrating legislative and regulatory efforts on
avoiding commodification through contracts and compensation, we
should focus on ensuring that the administration of MRT is done in
the proper clinical setting, with stringent federal requirements for
reporting, informed consent, and clinical trials. Federal legislation
is necessary to provide consistent and reliable protection for women
making the autonomous decision to use MRT.
As mentioned in the earlier discussion regarding federal and
state legislation of MRT, little attention has been paid to the safety
of women undergoing MRT-based treatment.220 In order to truly pro-
tect women, federal legislation should address both the physical and
mental health risks posed by MRT.221
The potential for mental health risks is often used as an argu-
ment against commodification, namely that women cannot rationally
choose to become surrogates because they are likely to regret the de-
cision.222 Although potential mental health risks may be serious, they
are likely exaggerated. “[F]ewer than one percent of surrogates . . .
change their mind” at some point during the surrogacy process and
take steps to become the child’s mother.223 This number is close to the
percentage of women who report regretting their decision to have an
abortion or to be sterilized.224 A logical interpretation of these statistics
219. See id. at 1930 (“Surrogates may feel they are fulfilling their womanhood by
producing a baby for someone else, although they may actually be reinforcing oppressive
gender roles.”).
220. See, e.g., Galpern, supra note 53 (noting that “[s]ome of the drugs used for egg ex-
traction have never been subjected to rigorous safety studies investigating their use for
the procedure”).
221. Andrews, supra note 206, at 2361-62.
222. Id. at 2350.
223. Id. at 2351.
224. Id.
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indicates that women entering into surrogacy agreements may be no
more vulnerable to experiencing regret than women making any
other long-term decision regarding reproductive health. Women enter-
ing surrogacy agreements, therefore, are just as capable of rational
decision-making as those choosing to have an abortion or become ster-
ilized and need no greater legislative or regulatory protection, as long
as they are fully informed of the potential physical risks.
Additionally, the American Medical Association’s position is that
gestational contracts should be strictly enforced, and that the risk of
psychological detriment to the surrogate mother is small and is out-
weighed by the surrogate’s lack of “genetic tie to the fetus” and the
“mutually beneficial” surrogacy arrangement.225 The AMA also posits
that traditional surrogacy arrangements, those in which the gesta-
tional mother also bears a genetic relationship to the child, should be
enforced, with the exception of allowing the gestational mother to void
the contract within a reasonable time after the child’s birth.226
Still, some may consider it an important goal to attempt to elimi-
nate even the small remaining risk to the psyche of the surrogate
mother in order to truly allow free contracting. To do so, regulations
could require surrogate mothers to undergo basic psychological
screening that test potential surrogates for duress or psychological
vulnerability.227 Just as surrogate mothers are commonly screened
for physical disorders that may affect the child they have contracted
to carry, they would also be mandatorily screened for issues that
might make MRT dangerous to their mental well-being.228
As noted earlier, there are serious health risks associated with
MRT procedures that have been virtually ignored.229 Emily Galpern
writes, “[t]he anti-choice movement’s single-minded focus on the moral
status of the embryo has put women’s health advocates in a defensive
position and obscured concerns about the safety of the procedure for
women whose eggs are being extracted.” 230 In order to protect women,
it is important to step outside of opposition to the commodification of
the womb and instead focus on how regulations can be imposed in a
way that will keep women safe from MRT’s medical risks.231
225. Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 2.18—Surrogate Mothers, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion218.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
226. Galpern, supra note 53.
227. Andrews, supra note 206, at 2374-75.
228. Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body is Your Business, 85
WASH. L. REV. 647, 652-53 & n.21 (2010).
229. Galpern, supra note 53.
230. Id.
231. See id. (discussing regulations as one method for “protect[ing] the health and
dignity of women who provide eggs”).
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Galpern makes a list of recommendations that, if enacted, would
accomplish this goal of safety.232 Her recommendations include the
establishment of a federal regulatory body charged with “oversight
of drugs used for egg extraction” 233 and requiring clinics to report
any adverse effect on women who undergo egg extraction.234 These
regulations would create a better standard of care for women under-
going MRT by making sure that drugs and procedures are carefully
studied and adverse effects publically reported.
Beyond regulation, Galpern notes that “[w]omen and other disen-
franchised groups have often been used as guinea pigs in research” 235
and recommends conducting studies in order to fully understand the
long-term health effects of the drugs used in stimulation of egg pro-
duction and egg harvesting.236 She also calls for studies to explore an
alternative to the current egg-extraction procedure that would pose
less of a risk to the donor.237
If regulation were to establish clear guidelines for the testing and
use of MRT, its currently-unknown risks could then be discovered and
made public. Armed with the full knowledge of risks and benefits of
using MRT, a woman could give truly informed consent to MRT. This
would alleviate much of the worry surrounding MRT because it would
be certain that a woman was not coerced, and was instead making an
autonomous and informed decision to enter into a contract.
The idea of the modern family in the United States embraces an
individual’s ability to make choices about her family structure.238 It
has also been noted that acknowledging the freedom to contract is an
important element of recognizing the legal capacity of women to enter
into surrogacy agreements.239 As early as 1993, a court upheld a sur-
rogacy contract as valid, finding the “intent” of the contract to grant
parental rights.240 Although there are arguments to the contrary, there
seems to be a rallying force that would allow a woman the autonomy
to freely contract for the sale of her sex cells and womb. Relying on
the market-economy justification and existing contract law principles




235. Galpern, supra note 53.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Dolgin, supra note 13, at 371.
239. Epstein, supra note 203, at 2328-29.
240. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
241. Andrews, supra note 206, at 2345.
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CONCLUSION
MRT will necessarily redefine some aspects of traditional mother-
hood as a commodity unless the government enacts laws regulating
the growth of the MRT industry. Such regulation, however, violates
the modern view of personal autonomy and should not be used to
“protect” a woman from her ability to freely contract. This is not to
say that MRT should exist entirely unchecked in the market. In-
stead, all legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at MRT should be
refocused to address the safety concerns posed by MRT procedures.
The federal government should require investigative studies to
explore risks of MRT procedures and should require that these risks
be fully divulged during the informed consent stage of any MRT ad-
ministration. Once fully informed, a woman will be better able to
evaluate the risks and benefits of MRT and use that information to
choose whether to enter into a contract for egg donation or surro-
gacy for a price that meets her autonomous determination of value.
Information, not legislation, will address concern surrounding MRT
and allow women using the technology to protect themselves.
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Rape undoubtedly is one of the most horrific experiences a woman
can endure, nearly always resulting in traumatic after-effects, namely
psychological distress and flashbacks of the scene.1 For women in
developing countries during times of conflict, the cultural and social
stigmas surrounding rape many times lead the victims to blame them-
selves for the brutality endured.2 Due to the taboos of rape in these
areas, women many times are forced out of their communities, the rape
altering not only their psychological makeup, but their social status as
well.3 For women in these developing areas, widespread poverty, patri-
archal norms, and the total lack of economic independence compounds
the complicated and sensitive issues surrounding rape.4 Notably, the
fact “[t]hat such sexual shame has been traditionally heaped upon
women is a sad historical truth, one on which combatants rely when
1. See, e.g., Teresa Godwin Phelps, Feminist Legal Theory in the Context of
International Conflict, 39.1 U. BALT. L.F. 173, 178 (2008) (describing how raped women who
had suffered “deeply traumatizing events” often “received psychological counseling and had
trouble sleeping”).
2. Id.; see also Eunice Menka, Tackling Africa’s Last Taboo: Talking About Sex, AFR.
WOMAN, Sept. 2003, at 2, available at www.coldtype.net/Assets/Africawoman/AW14.pdf
(discussing the effects of wide scale rape on African women in times of war and conflict).
3. See Katrina Anderson, Turning Reconciliation on Its Head: Responding to Sexual
Violence Under the Khmer Rouge, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 785, 811 (2005) (describing the
ostracizing effects associated with the social taboos of being raped or discussing the rape
in post-conflict Rwanda).
4. See Lori A. Nessel, Rape and Recovery in Rwanda: The Viability of Local Justice Ini-
tiatives and the Availability of Surrogate State Protection for Women that Flee, 15 MICH. ST.
J. INT’L L. 101, 110 (2007) (noting that the lack of economic and social independence makes
women in these areas more vulnerable to community pressures to stay silent about rape).
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using rape to achieve military ends.”5 Historically considered part and
parcel to the conquests of war,6 the use of rape during the course of
warfare has evolved.7 Rape is now understood as a method to inten-
tionally destroy and decimate a population, amounting to an effective
tool in the execution of genocide.8
The growing use of this so-called “genocidal rape,”9 specifically in
developing countries, did not gain full recognition within the realm of
international humanitarian law until 1998, when the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu
recognized rape as an actual form of genocide.10 Women’s and human
rights activists applauded this decision as a great victory for the
cause,11 particularly because the classification allowed it to be tried as
a “‘class one’ offense” carrying great penalties.12 However, recent
legislation in Rwanda moving the genocidal rape cases from the inter-
national forum into a process called gacaca13 threatens the progress
made for women’s rights by the Akayesu decision. Proponents of
gacaca, which involves community-wide involvement in the prosecu-
tion proceedings, argue that the domestic model makes the rebuilding
process more accessible to the local community.14 However, the
gacaca approach is less feasible because of the potential repercussions
associated with participating in gacaca prosecutions.15
5. Phelps, supra note 1, at 178.
6. Katherine Jones, Rape as a Tool of Warfare, ASSOCIATED CONTENT FROM YAHOO,
Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/690379/rape_as_a_tool_of_warfare
.html?cat=7 (discussing the war practices of the Ancient Greeks, who viewed the rape of con-
quered women as a “right” (citing SHARON FREDERICK, RAPE: WEAPON OF TERROR 10 (2001))).
7. See id. (showing the evolution of rape as a tool of warfare).
8. See TANJA MRDJA, RAPE: ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE? 9-10 (Janja Bec-Neumann & Dan
Bar-On eds., 2007), available at http://www.war-crimes-genocide-memories.org/fajlovi/
Rape_Asymmetrical_Warfare.pdf (explaining how the raping of women in the course of
warfare disrupts social relations within communities and is viewed as an attack against
a whole community or population).
9. Id. at 15 (quoting BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA, HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (1996)).
10. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731-34 (Sept. 2,
1998). The Prosecutor charged Akayesu with two counts of genocide for inciting several
acts such as killing, executions, rape, and sexual violence. Id.
11. See, e.g., Yael Weitz, Note, Rwandan Genocide: Taking Notes from the Holocaust
Reparations Movement, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 357, 369 (2009) (“[T]he Akayesu court
ultimately characterized rape and similar crimes of sexual violence as both genocide and
as crimes against humanity. This expanded definition, along with the subsequent prose-
cution of rape, is a significant step forward for women’s rights and has contributed to the
development of international humanitarian law as a whole.” (internal citation omitted)).
12. Nessel, supra note 4, at 105.
13. Weitz, supra note 11, at 373 (discussing the creation of the 2001 Gacaca Law).
14. Nessel, supra note 4, at 102.
15. See id. at 103, 106 (positing that women’s participation in local gacaca proceedings
threatens to re-traumatize and stigmatize rape victims).
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This Note will set out the competing results that Akayesu and the
movement towards gacaca proceedings present to the field of women
rights, particularly for women in developing countries. Part I will
trace the historical use of rape in the course of warfare, popularly
viewed as a “reward” for the victorious soldiers in conquered towns
and representing the patriarchal view that women were regarded as
property of their husbands.16 Part II will focus on the change in the
use of rape during war in the World War II and post-World War II era,
as it was increasingly used as a tactic to humiliate and demoralize
enemy soldiers and villages in an effort to decimate the population.17
Concentrating on the atrocities of the Holocaust, this section also
traces the evolution of humanitarian law, with specific focus on
treaties and conventions against events like the Holocaust.
Part III will analyze the landmark Akayesu decision to finally
recognize the use of rape as a crime against humanity and act of
genocide.18 Part IV will describe the gacaca proceedings in Rwanda
and the ill-effects the process will have on women’s rights, both in
theory and in practice, particularly for genocidal rape survivors in the
country. Part V will then suggest alternative models of rape prose-
cution in Rwanda in order for Akayesu to again have legal teeth in the
field of women’s rights.
I. RAPE AS A REWARD IN THE COURSE OF WARFARE: PRE-WORLD
WAR I TACTICS AND THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
Rape has long been used as a tool in warfare.19 Even great phi-
losophers “such as Aristotle and Cicero” wrote about the common and
“ ‘justified’ ” practice of warfare, “which included the right to rape the
women of the conquered party.” 20 Even in the Bible, the rape of
women was regularly referenced as a commonplace act by the vic-
torious tribe against those they conquered.21 Historically, rape was
16. Jones, supra note 6 (citation omitted); see also discussion infra Part I (detailing the
historical use of rape in war).
17. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the evolution of rape as a tool of warfare).
18. See discussion infra Part III (highlighting the expansion of rape as an inter-
national crime).
19. Jones, supra note 6 (“[Despite] common belief, the use of rape during times of
conflict is not a new phenomenon. In 1474, military officer and knight Peter van
Hagenbach became the first individual to be tried under an international tribunal for the
rapes committed against the women of Briesbach, Austria by troops under his command
during the military occupation of the town.” (citing SHARON FREDERICK, RAPE: WEAPON OF
TERROR 10 (2001))).
20. Id. (citing SHARON FREDERICK, RAPE: WEAPON OF TERROR 11 (2011)).
21. See, e.g., Zechariah 14:2 (King James) (“For I will gather all nations against
Jerusalem to battle; and the city shall be taken, and the houses rifled, and the women
ravished . . . .”).
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not utilized as a combat tool, for example to advance on an enemy’s
territory, but more as a reward for winning the war or conquering an
invaded territory, “included as part of the spoils of warfare.” 22 While
the twelfth century saw the stirring of the need for protection against
the rape of women during warfare, a soldier’s obligation to follow his
superior’s orders, which may have included the command to rape and
pillage a conquered village, remained the most important obligation.23
Subsequent centuries saw various works of literature that advocated
the prohibition of the rape of women during wartime.24 These works,
however, were much more the exception than the rule, and the use of
rape during wartime was still viewed as a justified practice.25
The prosecution of Hagenbach in 1474 marked the first time
that rape, used for centuries as a customary practice in the course of
warfare, was viewed as a grave violation, and commanding officers
could be punished not only for the acts of their subordinates.26 Fur-
thermore, progressive doctrines such as the Lieber Code emerged in
the nineteenth century, which prohibited the use of rape in the course
of warfare.27
Subsequently, the First Geneva Convention, promulgated in 1864
largely due to the horrors of the Battle of Solferino,28 sought to regulate
and “humanize” the conditions of war by providing aid to wounded and
22. KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 21 (1997) (citing PETER KARSTEN, LAW, SOLDIERS AND COMBAT 5
(1978)); see also Laura Smith-Spark, How Did Rape Become a Weapon of War?, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 8, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm (“The opportunistic rape and pillage
of previous centuries has been replaced in modern conflict by rape used as an orchestrated
combat tool.”).
23. See ASKIN, supra note 22, at 24 (discussing John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, in which
he declares that rape, still considered a property crime, “should receive the most severe
punishment”). However, irrespective of this position, “if the soldier’s superior commanded
the solider [sic] to commit . . . rapine . . . ignoring that command would be the greatest
crime.” Id. at 24-25 (citation omitted). Therefore, Askin concludes that “obeying a superior’s
commands, whether legal or illegal, moral or immoral, was the ultimate duty of the
soldier.” Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 26.
25. See id. at 25 (explaining that regardless of the developments and restrictions on
warfare, these protections did not extend to women, who remained subject to rape).
26. Id. at 29; Jones, supra note 6.
27. ASKIN, supra note 22, at 36. “This code, drafted by Francis Lieber in 1863 as
General Orders No. 100, was derived from international custom and usage and became the
official U.S. Army regulation guide on the laws of land warfare.” Id. (citation omitted). Not
only did this code give rise to the idea of safety for civilians in an attacked country, it
“mandated, ‘all rape . . . [is] prohibited under the penalty of death.’ ” Id. (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
28.  See From the Battle of Solferino to the Eve of the First World War, INT’L COMM. FOR
THE RED CROSS [ICRC], Dec. 28, 2004, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengo0.nsf/html/
57JNVP (discussing the adoption of the First Geneva Convention following the Battle
of Solferino).
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sick soldiers in the battlefield.29 While a short document, the First
Geneva Convention is generally regarded as the “ ‘birth [of] a consider-
able part of the system of international law.’ ”30
After the passage of the First Geneva Convention in 1864, the
Hague Conventions, adopted in 1899 and 1907, added to the rules and
warfare regulations put into force by the Geneva Convention, and
further aimed to protect individuals against the abusive use of force
during war.31 Although no specific prohibition against rape during the
course of warfare was written prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,32
the recognition of the dignity of the individual and increasing calls for
humane tactics to be employed under the Geneva and Hague Conven-
tions are generally regarded as the beginning of a solidified body of
humanitarian law, including the advocation against war rape.33
The gruesomeness of War World I brought a renewed fury towards
the utilization of rape as a war tactic.34 This time, however, rape was
not used as a method of “reward” for victory, but rather as “a weapon
of terror, rage, and intimidation.” 35 After World War I ended, the War
Crimes Commission was established to “report on the violations of the
laws . . . of war committed by the Axis powers.” 36 Rape was one of the
thirty-two offenses identified in the Commission’s report, which speaks
to the increasing view that rape was not a justifiable or expected side-
effect of warfare.37
29. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 970
(regulating the treatment of wounded or sick combatants).
30. See ASKIN, supra note 22, at 37 (quoting GEZA HERCZEGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 21 (1984)). “The Geneva Convention of 1864 . . . was consid-
ered unique since it ‘aimed at regularizing in a permanent manner, a situation which until
then had only been haphazard.’ ” Id. at 38 (quoting Perry Gulbrandsen, A Commentary on
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, in 1 A TREATISE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 369 (Bassiouni & Nanda eds., 1973 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))).
31. Id. at 39.
32. See Timothy Tree, Comment, International Law: A Solution or a Hindrance Towards
Resolving the Asian Comfort Women Controversy?, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
461, 490 (2000) (discussing how, although the statutorily codified international war crime
of rape did not exist before the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it arguably “existed prior to
WWII as customary international law”).
33. See ASKIN, supra note 22, at 37, 47 (concluding that the expansion of international
humanitarian law under the Hague and Geneva Conventions “provide[s] strong evidence
that women were to be protected from sexual assault,” which includes rape).
34. See id. at 41 (highlighting the massive use of rape and sexual assault during
World War I).
35. Id. Askin notes that “during the German invasion of Belgium . . . sexual assault was
‘catapulted into prominence as the international metaphor of Belgian humiliation.’ ” Id.
(quoting SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL, MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 40 (1975)).
36. Id. at 42, 47.
37. Id. at 47.
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II. RAPE AS GENOCIDE: SYSTEMATIC USES OF RAPE DURING WORLD
WAR II AND POST-WORLD WAR II CONFLICTS
The use of rape in the course of warfare escalated during World
War II.38 Instances of Nazi soldiers brutally and systematically raping,
torturing and killing girls and women in ghettos, concentration camps
and invaded territories speaks to the use of rape not only to dehuman-
ize and demoralize the enemy, but also to decimate the population.39
Although rape was used in this manner, the underlying roots of
rape in warfare persisted.40 Women, on a fundamental level, were still
considered (and to some feminists arguably are still considered) pro-
perty of their husbands.41 The argument behind this bleeds into the
effectiveness of using rape as a tactic in warfare to destroy the enemy.
In order to humiliate the enemy and destroy his honor, the rape of his
wife is utilized by the perpetrator to disrupt the balance, peacefulness,
and social workings of a population, effectively destroying the com-
munity in this manner.42 In addition, the brutality of the rapes and
accompanying dishonor was so severe that suicide was common
amongst women of conquered villages who knew that the invading
soldiers would likely rape them upon victory.43 Of course, the rape of
women in concentration camps, many times followed by murder,
was more of a systematic and sadistic method of destroying the
spirit of the so-called enemy than bringing humiliation on the
opposing soldiers.44
38. See id. at 52 (noting that a shocking 100,000 rapes occurred in Berlin in the last two
weeks of the war (citing HILKKA PIETILA & JEANNE VICKERS, MAKING WOMEN MATTER, THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 146 (1994))).
39. See, e.g., ASKIN, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing evidence produced at the
Nuremberg Trials that, in many instances of invasion by the Nazis, every female resident
of a town was sexually assaulted, “indicat[ing] an organized and systematic plan to rape
and further destroy the women inhabitants”).
40. See id. at 59 (arguing that the methodology of rape employed during World War II
“reinforces the view of women as mere property”).
41. Id.
42. See MRDJA, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing the effects of rape on men and the
community).
43. See, e.g., ASKIN, supra note 22, at 73 n.253 (discussing how, for many women, the
extreme shame of rape degraded them to the point that life was no longer desired as they
could no longer live with the pain or endure more sexual assault). In these instances, many
women committed suicide, considering death to be preferable to rape. Id. During the latter
part of World War II, this trend grew, particularly when the Russians invaded. Id. (citing
CORNELIUS RYAN, THE LAST BATTLE 493 (1966)). Women regularly kept vials of poison on
them in the event that a soldier came near them with clear intent to rape. Id.
44. See id. at 57 (arguing that the mass rapes are evidence of a “systematic plan” to
destroy the women in these areas). “That rape committed by Germans against Jews was
so prevalent during the war is in itself quite instructive of its force and perpetuity, since it
was strictly forbidden for Germans to have sex with Jews.” Id.
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In the wake of World War II and the massive human rights abuses
accompanying it, which provided arguably the best example of the
evils of warfare, the world realized the need to hold the perpetrators
of such grave abuses accountable for their actions.45 The International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Tribunal) was establish
at the end of World War II to address four main crimes: “crimes
against peace, war crimes [including genocide], and crimes against
humanity, and conspiracy to commit such crimes.” 46 In defining crimes
against humanity in the Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal for Nuremberg Trials in 1945, rape was not specifically men-
tioned.47 However, the Nuremberg Principles, promulgated in 1950,
recognized the need to hold individuals responsible for criminal acts
on an international level.48 In addition to the crimes specifically listed
in the original charter, the definition of crimes against humanity set
forth in the Principles leaves the door open for potential acts (such as
rape) to be prosecuted under international law.49
Out of the atrocities of the Holocaust also came the 1948 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopt-
ed by the United Nations General Assembly, and its accompanying
definition of genocide and declaration of genocide as a violation of inter-
national law.50 Furthermore, the adamant desire of the international
45. See War Crimes Trials, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/
wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005140 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (detailing the resolution
of the Allied Powers to prosecute those responsible for committing war crimes following the
atrocities of World War II).
46. Id.
47. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 (“Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”).
48. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1950] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 374, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1
49. Id. at 377 (“Crimes against humanity: [m]urder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population . . . when such acts
are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime
against peace or any war crime.” (emphasis added)).
50. See United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, [hereinafter Convention on
Genocide] (defining genocide as a crime against international law). Genocide is defined as:
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Delib-
erately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Id.
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community to “end impunity for the perpetrators of [these] serious
crimes” fueled the eventual creation of the International Criminal
Court (ICC).51
The ICC is governed by the Rome Statute, adopted on July 17,
1998 in Rome, Italy by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on
the Establishment of an International Court.52 For the purposes of this
Note, the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute are Articles 6, 7, and
8, defining genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, respec-
tively.53 The definition of genocide in Article 6 is identical to that found
in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.54
Importantly, Article 7 of the Rome Statute expands the definition
of crimes against humanity, as stated in the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for Nuremberg Trials in 1945, adding “[r]ape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable grav-
ity.” 55 Furthermore, the definition of war crimes includes the crimes
of “[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7 . . . .” 56 In addition, the ICC has
jurisdiction to prosecute such war crimes, particularly when such
war crimes are regarded as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes.” 57
While rape was not given a specific definition, it was finally recog-
nized as a crime against humanity and a means to systematically wipe
out and destroy a population.58 The inclusion of rape as a crime
against humanity and breach of the Geneva Conventions became
51.  Factsheets: The ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/6AC33C11-BOF2-4C32-A155-8992885320FF/282122/ICCatAGlanceEng.pdf
(last updated May 26, 2009). Over 100 countries have signed on to the ICC, which was
created on July 17th, 1998. Id. The purpose of the ICC is to prosecute some of the most
serious crimes under international law. Id. The Court does not have jurisdiction over all
international crimes, but can exercise proper jurisdiction over an accused who is a national
of a state that is party to the Court, a crime that took place on a state party’s territory,
or if the United Nations Security Council has referred the case to the ICC Prosecutor,
regardless of whether the other two provisions are satisfied. Id.
52. Id.; Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to
Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release L/ROM/22 (July
17, 1998).
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6-8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
54. Compare id. art. 6 (emphasizing the “intent” requirement for genocide), with Conven-
tion on Genocide, supra note 50, art. 2 (noting the exact language found in the ICC Charter).
55. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 7(g).
56. Id. art. 8(b)(xxii).
57. Id. art. 8(1).
58. See id. art. 7 (defining rape as a crime against humanity).
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particularly crucial and important in the aftermath of the Rwandan
genocide of 1994.59
III. RWANDAN GENOCIDE: RAPE AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
The 1994 Rwandan genocide saw the systematic and brutal kill-
ings of 800,000 Tutsis60 and “moderate Hutus” by Hutus61 in a period
spanning less than 100 days as part of an ethnic conflict between the
groups.62 The atrocities and methods of killing in Rwanda were hor-
rendous. Machetes were regularly used to rip people apart savagely.63
Equally as savage in nature, rape was used as a widespread
method to terrorize and destroy, with victims often killed after the rape
or left to live with the shame, humiliation and sadness that remained.64
In fact, the vast majority of women who survived the mass slaughter
were gang-raped by those that destroyed their families and communi-
ties.65 Not only is the residual emotional pain present for these women,
59. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda’s prosecution of rape as a war crime and crime against humanity).
60. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2008, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm. A Tutsi is a member of an ethnic minority group in Rwanda and
Burundi, traditionally considered aristocratic. Tutsi, THE FREE ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Tutsi (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). Through
history, Tutsis typically have been dominant over Hutus, perpetuating a cultural rivalry
between the two groups. Id.
61. While holding similar religious and cultural beliefs to the Tutsi, the Hutus histor-
ically have been dominated by the Tutsi, who created a “lord-vassal” system in Rwanda
and Burundi, where both groups resided. Tutsi, THE FREE ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Tutsi (last visited Apr. 1 , 2011). After unsuccessful
attempts to overthrow the Tutsi rule, the Hutu instituted a genocidal campaign in 1994,
killing many Tutsis and Hutus who had aligned themselves with the Tutsi government. Id.
62. See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 60.
63. Mark Doyle, Ex-Rwandan PM Reveals Genocide Planning, BBC NEWS, Mar. 26,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3572887.stm.
64. See, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDA GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda
.htm (describing the means in which rape was used to terrorize victims in Rwanda).
Although the exact number of women raped will never be known, testimonies
from survivors confirm that rape was extremely widespread and that thou-
sands of women were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such
as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery (either collectively
or through forced “marriage”) or sexually mutilated. These crimes were
frequently part of a pattern in which Tutsi women were raped after they had
witnessed the torture and killings of their relatives and the destruction and
looting of their homes. According to witnesses, many women were killed
immediately after being raped. Other women managed to survive, only to be
told that they were being allowed to live so that they would “die of sadness.”
Id.
65. Lindsey Hilsum, Don’t Abandon Rwandan Women Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004,
at A15.
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estimates of those infected with AIDS from the widespread rapes
range up to 14,000, many of whom eventually died from the virus.66
After the genocide, which involved the killing of mostly men,
Rwanda was left as “a predominantly female society” with few eco-
nomic resources and extremely limited social rights, namely property
rights.67 Because of the lack of rights available for women, and the
accompanying stigma attached to the survivors of rape, many women
have equated death and rape during the genocide as the same, in some
cases stating that death was preferable to the aftermath associated
with rape.68
In response to the Rwandan genocide, the U.N. Security Council
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in
1994 to deal with the horrific aftermath.69 The ICTR possesses “the
authority to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in . . . Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations . . . in . . . neighbor-
ing states.” 70 Those subject to prosecution under the ICTR are “indi-
viduals suspected of committing genocide, crimes against humanity,
and violations of Article 3 [of] the Geneva Conventions.” 71
Although many criticized the slow speed at which cases moved
through the ICTR,72 the landmark case of Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
66. Id.
67. Nessel, supra note 4, at 109-10 (citations omitted). Under customary Rwandan law,
“women were not permitted to own or inherit property” because women, themselves, were
thought of as the property to their husbands. Id. at 110. Many widows after the genocide
were unable to inherit the land they farmed and lived on due to the inheritance laws that
excluded women as land owners. Id. Coupled with the lack of income and lack of spousal
support, women have become “more vulnerable in post-genocide Rwanda.” Id. This factor,
along with the extreme communal shaming that is associated with rape, has made
women more reluctant to share their accounts of rape. Id. This point will become in-
creasingly important in the gacaca discussion below. See infra Part IV (discussing the
gacaca courts).
68. See John D. Haskell, The Complicity and Limits of International Law in Armed
Conflict Rape, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 53 (2009) (detailing the accounts of Rwandan
rape victims who compare their rapes to death). 
69. Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation
in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 128 (2008). 
70. Id. (quoting JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 474 (2d ed. 2000)). Interestingly,
the Rwandan government did not support the formation of the ICTR, mainly because the
Charter did not provide for the death penalty. Id. at 129. Because many of the lower-level
perpetrators were to be tried in national courts, the government worried that the most
significant leaders of the genocide would get prison sentences, while those that were
involved in the killing, and not planning stages, would be subjected to death. Id. Further-
more, the “limited temporal jurisdiction” given to the ICTR, spanning events between
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, was met with disfavor by the Rwandan govern-
ment because the plans for genocide began in 1990. Id.
71. Id. at 128-29.
72. See id. at 131 (noting that the Rwandan government resorted to granting jurisdiction
to the local courts of Rwanda to address, among other factors, “the slow speed of the ICTR”).
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Akayesu73 was applauded as the first case to enforce the 1948 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in
the context of international criminal law.74 In the area of rape, this
case “demonstrated . . . the significant developments in the prosecu-
tion of rape” under international humanitarian law.75
While the initial 1996 indictment against Akayesu did not include
sexual violence,76 the Prosecution amended the indictment to include
“three counts of rape and other inhumane acts as crimes against hu-
manity” after female witnesses testified, unprompted, about instances
of rape during the initial trial proceedings.77 Witness testimony follow-
ing the amended indictment revealed that sexual violence was rampant
and implemented in a systematic way, “with the intent to humiliate,
harm, and ultimately destroy the Tutsi group physically or mentally.”78
In the judgment against Akayesu, the Trial Chamber stated that
rape and sexual violence:
“[C]onstitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and
sexual violence certainly constitute . . . one of the worst ways of
inflict [sic] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily
and mental harm . . . Sexual violence was an integral part of the
process of destruction . . . of the Tutsi group as a whole. . . .
Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the
tutsi [sic] group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and
of life itself.” 79
The judgment goes on to provide a definition of rape, the first by an in-
ternational criminal court, as the “ ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.’ ” 80
73. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
74. Judge Inés Mónica Weinberg De Roca, Ten Years and Counting: The Development
of International Law at the ICTR, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 69, 69 (2005).
75. Id. at 73.
76. Id. The initial case was intended only to try Akayesu on counts of genocide and
crimes against humanity due to his alleged involvement in the genocide while serving
as a mayor of a Rwandan province. Andrea R. Phelps, Gender-Based War Crimes:
Incidence and Effectiveness of International Criminal Prosecution, 12 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 499, 510 (2006). However, during trial, a female witness gave spontaneous
testimony about her six-year-old daughter being raped while Akayesu was present. Id.
Subsequent witnesses followed suit. Id. After much pressure, the prosecutorial team
amended the complaint to include sexual violence charges against Akayesu. Id. at 511.
77. Weinberg De Roca, supra note 74, at 73 (citation omitted).
78. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 74 (alterations in original) (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR
96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731-32 (Sept. 2, 1998)).
80. Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 598
(Sept. 2, 1998)).
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In addition to his convictions for war crimes, Akayesu was con-
victed of “crimes against humanity for rape, other forms of sexual
violence charged as rape, and other inhumane acts; in addition to rape
as constituting genocide.” 81 This landmark decision represents the
first time sexual violence was deemed a violation of international law,
as well as the first time rape was found to be a genocidal act.82
Despite this landmark decision and the positive effect it, along
with other ICTR cases, has had on the view that these crimes are a
gross violation of international humanitarian law,83 the ICTR was
still criticized for the speed at which the cases before it were tried and
the tremendous cost of the trials.84 Akayesu also represents an outlier,
as ninety percent of the cases tried by the Prosecutor’s Office had no
accompanying rape charges and, for those that did, only two cases
resulted in convictions.85 Four rape cases resulted in acquittal.86 With
the amount of evidence showing how many rapes actually took place
during the genocide, it is not fitting that only two defendants have
been held responsible for rape.87
Because the U.N. set an end-date for the ICTR and progress was
slow (and expensive), the ICTR began to transfer some of its cases into
national courts of Rwanda and several other countries.88 Additionally,
in 2008, the Rwandan government passed Organic Law No. 08/96 on
the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime
of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1,
1990.89 This law granted jurisdiction to the criminal courts of Rwanda
to prosecute those that committed genocide and crimes against hu-
manity as defined by the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.90 The defendants were classified
81. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 731
(Sept. 2, 1998)).
82. Id.
83. See Weinberg De Roca, supra note 74, at 79 (highlighting the significant role of the
ICTR in the development of international law).
84. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 130 (highlighting some of the criticisms of the ICTR). By
September 2004, the ICTR had resolved only twenty-three cases, even though investi-
gations had begun ten years earlier. Id. Over two years later, in December 2006, the ICTR
had convicted twenty-six people and acquitted five people. Id. It was estimated that the
ICTR would spend over one billion dollars prosecuting approximately forty genocidaires
in the period from 1995 through 2007. Id. However, by the end of 2007, only thirty-five
accused had been tried. Id. (internal citations omitted).
85. Binaifer Nowrojee, “Your Justice is Too Slow”: Will the ICTR Fail Rwanda’s Rape
Victims? 6 (Bos. Consortium on Gender, Sec., & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 105,
2003), available at http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Nowrojee.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 130-31 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 131.
90. Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed
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into four categories, with the first category containing four sub-parts:
a) the masterminds of the genocide, b) authoritative figures who
helped to foster the crimes, c) “notorious murderers” whose actions
were particularly malicious, and d) “persons who committed acts of
sexual torture.” 91 Notably, the first category was limited to perpetra-
tors of the most serious crimes.92 Because of the serious nature of the
crimes in the first category, the ICTR maintained the authority to hold
superseding jurisdiction and, in fact, limited some of these Category
1 cases from being tried in front of the Rwandan national courts.93
While the speed at which trials progressed did increase, these national
courts did not exceptionally expedite the start and completion of many
trials, due mainly to the devastation of the country’s criminal justice
system during the genocide.94
Additionally, the ICC has not brought many charges of rape or
sexual assault within its jurisdiction, only opening investigations in
the Congo, Uganda, Darfur, and the Central African Republic.95 While
many other countries have experienced widespread instances of rape
amidst conflict, namely Rwanda, the ICC has failed to investigate
these incidents.96 The Rwandan government in 1996 sought to address
these issues by enabling the domestic courts to hear these cases.97
However, because of the difficulties faced by the ICTR and
national courts, the Rwandan president, officials and citizens estab-
lished a commission to expedite the process.98 On January 26, 2001,
legislation was passed setting up Gacaca Jurisdiction to accomplish
this goal.99 Translated as “ ‘the grassy lawn’ ” in the Rwandan local
language, gacaca is the traditional communal conflict resolution sys-
tem used to resolve disputes in Rwanda.100 The general approach of
gacaca is to recruit and enlist public participation of members of the
since October 1, 1990, art. 1, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/
rwanda.htm. [hereinafter Organic Law No. 08/96]; Sosnov, supra note 69, at 131.
91. Organic Law No. 08/96, art. 2. Additionally, Category 2 was comprised of perpe-
trators or accomplices of intentional homicide or harmful assault, Category 3 was com-
prised of those whose acts are qualified as serious assaults, and Category 4 included those
who committed property offenses. Id.
92. Id.
93. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 131.
94. Id. at 132 (discussing the already poor and under-funded criminal justice system in
Rwanda, which suffered additional financial drain from the long term imprisonment of
those accused of participating in the atrocities, and from the death of many judges and
lawyers during the genocide).
95. Haskell, supra note 68, at 62.
96. Id.
97. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 131.
98. Id. at 134.
99. Haskell, supra note 68, at 75.
100. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 134 (citation omitted).
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Rwandan community in public hearing forums to try the accused for
genocide.101
Gacaca courts, created to work alongside national courts, have ju-
risdiction to adjudicate cases that took place between October 1, 1990
and December 31, 1994, and over the same four categories of genocide
suspects detailed in Organic Law 08/96.102 In the original legislation
passed in 2001, Category 1 suspects were excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of gacaca, but gacaca held jurisdiction over the other three cate-
gories.103 Although the courts were slated to close in 2009, as of
September 29, 2010, the official closure of the courts had yet again
been suspended indefinitely.104
The practical system of gacaca allows judges, mostly illiterate and
lacking any form of legal training, to preside over cases in a public
setting.105 The judges are elected if they are over the age of twenty-one
and have a communal reputation “for being honest, truthful and trust-
worthy, ha[ve] good behavior and morals, a spirit of sharing speech
and [are] free of sectarian and discriminatory beliefs.” 106 The stated
goals for gacaca proceedings are to speed up the rate at which genocide
trials occur, and in turn relieve the overcrowding in prisons, procure
the truth about what happened during the genocide and promote
reconciliation through alternative dispute methods.107 To further
expedite the trying of cases, gacaca courts encourage confessions.108
The accused who confesses before the gacaca court must provide “a
detailed description of the offense” and include specifics such as the
names of victims in order to receive the benefits of the procedure.109
If this right to confess is exercised, the accused is required to
publicly apologize to the victims, should they be alive, and to the
community.110 Those exercising the right to confess receive a reduction
in penalties.111
101. Haskell, supra note 68, at 75.
102. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 135 (citation omitted).
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Gacaca Official Closure Postponed Sine Die, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Arusha),
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/13738/1169/.
105. Rwanda’s Grass Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004, at A28.
106. Pernille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca: Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace
and Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT’L. L. REV. 31, 44 (2002) (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 47.
108. See id. at 44-45 (noting that the Gacaca Law provides incentives for defendants
to confess, including reduced sentences).
109. Id.
110. Gary Edmonds & Randy Stime, The Healing Begins in Rwanda, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2003670260_rwanda18
.html.
111. Ironside, supra note 106, at 45.
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IV. GACACA TRIALS FOR RAPE: LESSENING THE LEGAL TEETH OF
AKAYESU
There are several valid criticisms made regarding gacaca,112 but,
with specific regard to the legal force behind the landmark Akayesu
decision, the passage of such legislation renders women’s rights and
the recognition of rape as a crime against humanity essentially void.113
The idea behind the gacaca proceedings was not entirely without
merit. Notably, the courts have contributed to tackling the enormous
backlog of genocide cases in Rwanda, with hopes to prosecute over
one million Rwandans for acts committed during the genocide.114 This
is in stark contrast to the mere forty-four judgments delivered by the
U.N. Tribunal since its creation in 1994.115 Additionally, while western
critics have perceived the gacaca method with skepticism, the goal
of gacaca is to encourage reconciliation and diffuse animosity a-
mongst Rwandans by employing a traditional mechanism that in-
volves the entire community in the prosecution of the perpetrators
of the crimes.116
While an underlying goal of gacaca may be to respect the cultural
practices and utilize community-wide opinions to facilitate reconcili-
ation and justice,117 the other, albeit unstated and therefore unofficial
cultural practice of shaming women who are victims of rape, gets lost
in the shuffle.118 Along with the depression, stigmatization, and
112. See, e.g., Rwanda Gacaca Criticized as Unfair for Genocide Trials, VOICE OF AM.,
Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-04/2009-04-09-voa32.cfm?
moddate=2009-04-09 (“[M]any have criticized gacaca, saying genocide is too big a crime
to go before the village courts, or that the courts fail to deliver justice. . . . ‘The person who
is deciding the case generally is not legally trained. . . . Under international fair trial
standards, the proceeding is not fair.’ ” (quoting Georgette Gagnon, Africa Director for
Human Rights Watch)) [hereinafter Rwanda Gacaca Criticized].
113. See, e.g., Int’l Justice Tribune, The Ever-Changing Gacaca, RADIO NETH.
WORLDWIDE (Apr. 20, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/
ever-changing-gacaca (“ ‘[R]ape has been used to eliminate the Tutsi group within the
country. And it was done with the aim of deliberately infecting them with AIDS. It was
done to destroy their sexual parts so they cannot reproduce themselves’. . . . The . . . 2008
law keeps rape in Category 1, but would move rape trials to gacaca courts. . . . [I]t seems
unlikely that rape survivors will feel comfortable having their cases heard by lay judges
they may well know.”).
114. William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 879,
881-82 (2005); see also Status of Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (noting the status of
current and past cases).
115. 1994 Genocide: Gacaca Trials Have Discharged One Million Cases So Far,
HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/
12201/26/.
116. Ironside, supra note 106, at 47-48.
117. See id. at 49 (noting the benefits of gacaca’s local and inclusive approach).
118. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE: BARRIERS TO JUSTICE FOR
SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES 25-27 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11975/
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isolation associated with rape, Rwandan women are also victims of
community rejection, preventing many of them from even reporting the
crimes, let alone going in front of a public hearing on the matter.119
Many married rape victims in Rwanda view the act as a sin of adultery,
blaming themselves for the attacks that occur.120 In fact, a 2002 study
conducted by the Rwanda Unity and Reconciliation Commission re-
vealed that women were more than sixty percent less likely to testify
to the events of rape because of the intimate nature of the crime and
the associated stigma.121 Rejection by a rape survivor’s husband is com-
mon in Rwanda, as is the assumption that rape has led to the con-
traction of HIV, yet another taboo topic of discussion in the country.122
Out of this societal stigmatization stems retaliation against many
women and witnesses who do testify in gacaca.123 Witnesses and rape
survivors are afforded little protection by the state or the police and
are many times intimidated by government officials and police into not
testifying.124 While the 2001 and 2004 Gacaca Laws prohibit such
intimidation, intimidation and threats are common.125 For example,
despite the threat of both life imprisonment and the death sentence for
those who kill survivors planning to testify in gacaca,126 in 2006 “there
were at least 16 killings and 24 attempted killings of witnesses.
Several of the murdered individuals were executed with [a] machete,
the same farm tool used to carry out the genocide.” 127
Additionally, the Code of Criminal Procedure in Rwanda does not
require the names or identification of rape victims to be redacted from
criminal complaints,128 which opens victims up to an even more public
section/1 (discussing the challenges faced by rape victims in gacaca courts as a result of the
stigma attached to rape) [hereinafter STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE].
119. Id.
120. See id. at 24 (explaining the story of a woman who describes her rape as an act
of adultery).
121. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 137-38.
122. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 27 (noting that many women fear
that their husbands will leave them if they report these crimes).
Because they wish to lead full and normal lives, they hesitate to testify to rape
for fear that the revelation will lead their husbands to reject them or, if they
are unmarried, make them unmarriageable. [An] official described the cases
of three women who were raped during the genocide and are now married
with children. They had privately recounted their experiences to her but
refused to testify in gacaca courts for fear that their husbands would
abandon them.
Id.
123. Id. at 25-29 (explaining that women are reluctant to testify against their perpe-
trators for fear of retaliation by their community and family).
124. Rawanda Gacaca Critized, supra note 112 (citation omitted).
125. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 28.
126. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 138.
127. Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 28.
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form of ridicule and vulnerability to attack. The societal ridicule and
ostracism, combined with the resulting dismissal of many rape sur-
vivors from their communities,129 has coincided with another disturb-
ing occurrence: a higher likelihood that these women will become
prostitutes.130 No longer accepted in their communities or by their
families, many victims turn to prostitution after they are discovered
as survivors of sexual violence.131 Prostitutes are similarly treated as
aberrations of society, regularly raped, beaten and tortured by police,
military and civilians alike.132
The very public nature of gacaca, therefore, submits all these
victims to the effects of being forced to publicly declare the trauma
they went through, which challenges the progress made by the Akayesu
decision that declared rape a crime against humanity.133 While Akayesu
provided a step forward in the realm of women’s rights and human
rights,134 the legal teeth are significantly weakened if women are
increasingly dissuaded from stepping forward to report the crimes.135
Furthermore, because many of these gacaca proceedings rely
upon previously gathered evidence from the prosecutors’ offices, there
is a high incidence of error and contamination.136 Moreover, the lack
of sufficient evidence leads to high rates of dismissal due to a lack of
sufficient evidence.137 Additionally, because of the lack of training for
those conducting medical examinations of rape victims, high rates
of error in both the collection and preservation of proper and sufficient
evidence makes it difficult for judges to evaluate such evidence.138
While the collection of evidence in preparation for gacaca does
allow the rape survivors to be interviewed and testify, many are
reluctant to do so.139 This reluctance is due to the lack of action
taken after victims initially testified or were interviewed prior to
129. See id. (arguing that this lack of confidentiality discourages women from testifying).
130. Id. at 29.
131. Id. at 29-30.
132. Id. at 30.
133. Weitz, supra note 11, at 369 (citation omitted).
134. Id.
135. See STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 28 (reporting that many women are
afraid to testify in gacaca courts).
136. Id. at 31.
137. Id. (“In thirty-two judgments handed down from 1997-2002 involving rape during
the genocide, courts acquitted several defendants accused of rape due to insufficient
evidence. . . . With respect to seven other defendants, the court held that the testimony
of the victim and other witnesses alone did not adequately prove that the accused
committed rape.”).
138. See id. at 31-32 (explaining that because of the lack of training, medical reports
often lack sufficient evidence (citation omitted)).
139. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 138 (citation omitted).
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the institution of gacaca proceedings.140 Following initial testimony,
“[n]o one helped them. That’s why it is difficult to tell these women
that they should tell it to their neighbors during Gacaca, neighbors
who have no training and who cannot help them with their trauma.”141
Combined with a commonplace misconception that most rape victims
somehow are to blame, the bar set for conviction, assuming the stig-
matization of a public trial is overcome at all, is extremely high.142
In addition to the very harsh effects gacaca has on women who
survived genocidal rape in Rwanda, there is little proof that gacaca
has actually accomplished its stated goals.143 Namely, there is no hard
evidence to suggest that this alternative, in the form of community-
wide participation and reconciliation, is actually unifying the commu-
nity.144 For example, in stark contrast to the old form of gacaca, which
allowed the community to decide which form of dispute resolution
would be utilized,145 punishment is now legislated by the state,146 with
judges having the ability to put individuals in prison.147
Therefore, the intention of bringing a community together to unite
and heal in the aftermath of the genocide is not accomplished, as the
process is largely focused on retribution and is controlled by judge-
made law.148 Combined with the practical flaws listed above, the gacaca
courts fail to follow any sort of procedures that afford due process or
fair trial guarantees “enumerated in domestic law and the interna-
tional and regional treaties to which Rwanda subscribes.” 149 Indeed,
this “[f]ailure to do so weakens gacaca in the eyes of the local populace
and the international community.” 150
V. RAPE CASE TRIAL REFORM: NECESSARY FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN
RWANDA
The use of such a structurally-flawed process to try the most hor-
rendous violence of the Rwandan genocide specifically affects rape
140. See id. (“At first women who were raped used to testify, but nowadays they don’t
want to because nothing happened after their testimony.”).
141. Id.
142. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 29. Furthermore, a number of
accused defendants have been acquitted because of a lack of sufficient evidence. Id. at 31.
143. See Sosnov, supra note 69, at 144 (discussing gacaca’s failure to achieve recon-
ciliation in Rwanda).
144. See id. (arguing that rather than reunifying the country, gacaca has actually
proven divisive).
145. Id. at 146.
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. See id. (noting that judges have the sole discretion to imprison the accused).
149. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 147.
150. Id.
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survivors, and furthers the oppression and lack of recourse faced by
these women.151 While Akayesu has been lauded for the landmark path
it set forth for women’s rights,152 with the transfer of rape cases into
gacaca, the progress made is merely in theory, not in action. In theory,
classifying genocidal rape as a category one offense should aid in
highlighting the offense as a serious crime.153 This has the effect of
shifting the focus of the crime from the outdated notion that rape is
a given consequence of the spoils of war, to its use as an intentional
effort to demoralize the enemy population.154 Additionally, forcing the
victims of rape to participate in gacaca investigations threatens to re-
traumatize and marginalize these women and further eliminates any
shred of theoretical progress in bringing women’s rights, particularly
those rights of already marginalized women in developing countries,
any meaningful change.155
Ideally, for women’s rights to truly forge ahead and for Akayesu
to sufficiently represent unparalleled change, genocidal rape cases
should be removed from gacaca proceedings altogether. However,
because gacaca was introduced in order to speed up slow and back-
logged genocide proceedings,156 it is unlikely that shifting rape cases
back to national courts will occur.157 What then must occur is, at a min-
imum, a heightened sensitivity of the special problems rape survivors
face and a re-structuring of the gacaca method of serving justice.
While it is true that cultural considerations must come into play
and that the western model of adjudication of crimes cannot be lauded
as the best and only method of resolution,158 heightened protections,
both practical and procedural, must be put into place if gacaca will be
151. See supra Part IV (criticizing the structure of gacaca and its effects on female
rape victims).
152. See, e.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive
Developments, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1012 (2005) (“The Akayesu judgment formally
recognized that gender-related crimes are systematically used as instruments of war and
terror, and the impact of the crime is extensive and devastating, resulting in harm inflicted
far beyond the immediate victim . . . . The significance of the law developed in this case
is unparalleled.”(citation omitted)).
153. See Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions
for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed
since October 1, 1990, art. 2, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/
rwanda.htm (setting forth the Category 1 offenses).
154. See Nessel, supra note 4, at 103 (arguing that this classification will promote the
view of war rape as an intentional crime).
155. Id.
156. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 136.
157. See id. at 132 (explaining the extent to which the Rwandan judicial system is over-
burdened with criminal cases following the genocide). With over 135,000 suspects detained
in prisons awaiting criminal trial, this makes it unlikely that gacaca cases will be shifted
back to the already overloaded national courts. Id.
158. See, e.g., Ironside, supra note 106, at 34, 56 (arguing that there is a “misplaced
faith” that the Western criminal model is best suited to achieve reconciliation in Rwanda).
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at all effective in ensuring a fair and just result. For example, there
is a lack of focus on training judges and prosecutors about the issue of
gender sensitivity, such as communicating with rape victims, and
the lack of witness protection, two overtly obvious problems with
gacaca proceedings.159 Because gacaca judges are members of the
Rwanda community, they should know first hand the delicate nature
of the crime and the potential for rape survivors to be killed or, at
the very least, disowned from their community.160 It would seem that,
in order for gacaca to be viewed as an ethical and effective body,161 gen-
der sensitivity training should be a minimal and obvious requirement.
Procedural safeguards must be implemented as well to ensure
justice and, ultimately, the protection of women’s rights. For example,
pursuant to the 2001 Gacaca Law, rape survivors are allowed to both
request closed chambers to provide testimony and provide an anon-
ymous letter to be read during the trial.162 Additionally, the Gacaca
Law of 2004 aimed to increase the privacy safeguards by disallowing
public accusations and public confessions of sexual violence and re-
quiring that a victim make accusations in private.163 However, despite
these laws, women are often unaware of these safeguards, and no
extra steps are taken to ensure that rape survivors know or utilize
these procedures.164 This lack of information must be reversed. While
extra time might be required for the judges to be privately spoken to,
the cost would be greatly outweighed by the mal-effects of being pub-
licly required to testify to the trauma again.
Additionally, the model for reparations could be altered in order
to enable rape survivors to emerge from the trauma and actually begin
a process of true healing, rather than being ostracized. That is, while
punishments for rape under gacaca generally includes imprisonment
for the perpetrators,165 punishment should also include reparations for
the victims, particularly women who are rape survivors.166 Due in part
159. See STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 45-47 (discussing the lack of
training of judges, prosecutors and policemen, and concerns raised by the flaws in
witness protection).
160. See id. at 28. (noting that women commonly face threats and retaliation from the
community).
161. See Sosnov, supra note 69, at 147-48 (discussing several criticisms of gacaca, includ-
ing allegations that judges are not impartial, and are prone to corruption and manipulation).
162. Nessel, supra note 4, at 120.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Chiseche Mibenge, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law at the National
Level: The Gacaca Jurisdictions of Rwanda, 7 Y.B INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 410, 418 (2004)
(charting the minimum and maximum penalties for Category 1, 2, and 3 offenders).
166. See, e.g., Nessel, supra note 4, at 123 (“[I]t is essential that the punishment include
less traditional aspects, such as paying for medical treatment for HIV or economic resti-
tution. For women survivors of genocidal rape, medical treatment and economic assistance
would be essential components of justice.” (citation omitted)).
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to the patriarchal system in the country, Rwandan rape survivors are
left with little prospect of marriage, in addition to a lack of material
resources, such as land or adequate housing.167 Therefore, many rape
survivors feel that “ ‘justice’ ” afforded in the form of punishment for
the crime is inadequate.168 The crime itself affects the victim’s posi-
tion in society, leaving the survivor essentially without any nec-
essary and basic requirements to live.169
Importantly, because many perpetrators raped women with the
intent to not only destroy the female population, but also infect them
with the HIV virus,170 the lack of treatment afforded to rape survivors
from gacaca is a major concern and criticism of the process.171 Gacaca
does not begin to address a survivor’s lack of ability to financially
afford treatment.172 Due to both the patriarchal nature of the country173
and the ostracizing effect of the proceedings, the survivor is left
without any realistic means to provide for themselves or maintain
housing.174 Many rape survivors justifiably feel that the gacaca
courts’ inability to address these harms make the process unable to
successfully eliminate “a culture of impunity, create a lasting peace,
or contribute to reconciliation in the country.” 175
Ironically, while the rape survivors are left to die with the virus,176
the perpetrators of the crimes are put into jail, clothed, housed, and
treated. Granting reparations in gacaca for rape victims may assist
in shifting this viewpoint. Such a shift would provide not only mean-
ingful change in the field of women’s rights, but also the community’s
trust in the process’s ability to reach communal interests and needs.
While gacaca laws have guaranteed a compensation fund to
reward victims, no government action has been taken to create
167. Sarah L. Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca
Courts in Rwanda, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 167, 195 (2005) (citation omitted).
168. See id. at 194 (positing that many women feel that the traditional justice system
fails to address the harm suffered by women during the genocide).
169. Id. at 194-95.
170. See, e.g., Francoise Nduwimana, Women and Rwanda’s Genocide: What Goes
Unsaid, 14(2) LIBERTAS, Nov. 2004, at 1, available at http://peacewomen.org/news/
Rwanda/Dec04.genocide.html (noting that on January 29, 1996, a U.N. report stated that
the HIV positive militiamen used their HIV status as a “ ‘weapon, intending to cause
delayed death’ ” (citation omitted)). Based on testimony from victims raped by men who
told them things such as, “ ‘I have AIDS and I want to give it to you,’ ” many women who
have survived the genocide are now infected with AIDS. Id.
171. Wells, supra note 167, at 194-195 (“Of foremost concern to many female survivors
is treatment for HIV/AIDS . . . resulting from wartime rapes. Many women believe there
will not be justice until their health concerns are met and ask, ‘what good is truth or
compensation if you are dying?’ ” (citation omitted)).
172. See id. (discussing that survivors have a lack of resources).
173. Id. at 195.
174. Id.; see also discussion supra Part IV (analyzing the ostracizing effects of gacaca).
175. Wells, supra note 167, at 194 (citation omitted).
176. Nduwimana, supra note 170, at 3.
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one.177 Furthermore, “[w]ithout providing victims with material
benefits through compensation . . . , there exists little reason to invest
in gacaca. Reconciliation remains possible for Rwandans; however,
it is unattainable under the current gacaca system.” 178
In addition, a system of witness and victim protection in Rwanda
must be implemented. The Rwandan community generally does not
give high priority to women’s safety.179 For women and witnesses
alike, despite the 2004 Gacaca Law reform, which prohibits the threat-
ening or intimidation of witnesses and victims planning on testifying
in gacaca, such intimidation still keeps many from testifying at all.180
Recommendations have even been made to the ICTR to increase pro-
tections for witnesses and victims through both anonymity during
trial and, in some instances, relocation and the issuance of new iden-
tities after testimony is given.181 Such measures have not been taken
by gacaca courts, despite the increasing numbers of retaliation against
witnesses and victims alike.182 Unless there are increased protections
for women testifying publicly in gacaca or for witnesses, who provide
crucial evidence in the absence of legitimate and trustworthy direct
testimony,183 the gacaca proceedings will be essentially pointless in
granting any sort of justice to rape survivors.
The above measures are necessary. They do, however, require
that certain financial resources are available to implement them. In
this instance, the international community needs to aid in the process.
Rwanda is in a severe state of poverty, magnifying the problems asso-
ciated with instituting justice and reconciliation.184 While the ICTR
budget, funded by the UN, is nearly $246 million,185 the budget for the
gacaca court is a fraction of that amount, making the amount largely
disproportionate to the ever-growing list of tasks and cases it is
expected to try.186 Created to take the burden off of the national courts
177. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 145.
178. Id.
179. Anderson, supra note 3, at 813.
180. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 28.
181. Eva Gazurek & Anne Saris, The Protection of Women as Witnesses and the ICTR,
COAL. FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS, http://www.womens
rightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/witnessProtection/protectionofwitne
sses_en.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
182. See STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 28 (highlighting that gacaca pro-
cedural guidelines fail to even expressly require judges and the authorities to keep the
identity and information of victims and witnesses confidential).
183. See id. at 31 (detailing the significant challenges posed by inadequate and suspect
evidence).
184. Id. at 10, 43 (discussing the barriers poverty places on reconciliation).
185. General Information, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
186. Gacaca Courts, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE & RECONCILIATION, http://www
.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=60
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and the ICTR,187 this figure represents the barriers to effectively
instituting proper justice for the victims it is intended to aid.
In terms of funding, the international community provides nearly
all of the money used to maintain and build the judicial institutions in
Rwanda.188 Despite many foreign nations’ acknowledgements of their
duties to aid the war-torn country,189 the sufficient aid needed to
achieve the goals of reconciliation is lacking. With specific regard to
the United States, and contrary to popular misconception, the budget
for foreign aid is actually close to one percent.190 Most Americans
believe the figure is closer to twenty percent, which encourages the
notion that this country is doing “enough.” 191 This figure is extremely
low for a nation that boasts to be the wealthiest in the world. That
small amount of money shared among the rest of the nations in need
spreads quite thin per nation. Per survivor, the figure is, therefore,
even lower.
In order to adequately do its job of restoring hope and justice to
the Rwandan community, particularly rape survivors, the interna-
tional community must aid the impoverished nation with funds.
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that Akayesu has had a great impact on women’s
rights, particularly in the human rights realm, by recognizing rape
as a crime against humanity.192 However, when up against a history
and tradition of rape utilized as a warfare tactic,193 the force behind
the decision will only be realized by action supporting its legal conclu-
sion. Particularly in developing countries, sexual shame associated
with rape brings to the forefront the essential importance of bringing
culturally sensitive proceedings against perpetrators in a timely
fashion.194 With the diminished social status of women and girls in
developing countries,195 the additional shame brought upon them as
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (citing the budget of the gacaca courts at $1.03 million for 2007).
187. Sosnov, supra note 69, at 134.
188. Rwanda: Gacaca Courts Get Under Way, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS
(IRIN), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=32637 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
189. See Edwin Musoni & Gilbert Ndikubwayezu, Rwanda: Country to Rely Less on
Foreign Aid, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 15, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200902160856.html
(stating that, between 1994-2000, Rwanda relied completely on foreign aid following the
genocide).
190. Discussion: International Health Aid, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
rxforsurvival/series/experts/aid.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
191. Id.
192. Nessel, supra note 4, at 105; Weinberg De Roca, supra note 74, at 74.
193. Nessel, supra note 4, at 131.
194. Id. at 103, 131.
195. See, e.g., E. Torun, Socio-Economic Status of Women According to Development
Levels of Countries and Structure in Turkey, 5 AFR. J. AGRIC. RESEARCH 1154, 1154-55
662 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:639
a result of rape causes the already low status of women in those
societies to plummet to almost non-existence. This further limits their
opportunities for access to health care, education, and basic neces-
sities required for survival.196
While the modern recognition and understanding of warfare rape
as a tool to humiliate and demoralize the enemy has solidified a hypo-
thetical recognition of such an act as a crime against humanity,
particularly in the post-Rwanda genocide era,197 the current trend will
relegate the recognition to indefinitely remain as theoretical and not
tangible. To this effect, the transfer of rape crimes into informal com-
munal proceedings compromises the progress made by the 1998
Akayesu decision.198 While the reasons behind the transfer are prac-
tical and valid,199 more must be done in order to safeguard the victims
involved in the gacaca process.
Without such safeguards, the Akayesu decision will only exist as
a needle in the haystack for the development of women’s rights. While
the stated goal of the transfer is to allow for community-wide involve-
ment to facilitate the healing of a nation,200 the cultural respect paid
to such communal proceedings casts aside the cultural practice of
shaming, killing, or brutalizing women who publicly state their stories
of rape in Rwanda.201 Additionally, because sexual violence against
women has increasingly become protracted in conflict settings, epito-
mized in the brutal stories stemming from the Rwandan genocide,
the legal remedies, while potentially coupled with good faith efforts,
may be insufficient to lead to any real relief for the victims.202 To that
end, even if it may not be feasible to require all rape proceedings to
stay out of gacaca, a heightened sensitivity of the special problems
rape survivors face, along with a re-structuring of the gacaca method
must occur. Gender awareness training for judges, closed testimony
hearings, and witness and victim protection would be simple, yet
extraordinary steps to increase the safety of the victims in post-
conflict settings.
Additionally, the model for damages should be modified in order
to put the victims on a path to recovery. More specifically, rather than
(2010) (discussing the depressed socio-economic status of women in developing countries).
196. Id.
197. Nessel, supra note 4, at 128.
198. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing the negative impact of gacaca in post-
genocide Rwanda).
199. See Ironside, supra note 106, at 47 (discussing the intended goals of gacaca).
200. Wells, supra note 167, at 176-77.
201. STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE, supra note 118, at 24-25, 28.
202. Dina Francesca Haynes, Professor, New Eng. Sch. of L., Address at the William &
Mary Journal of Women and the Law Symposium: A Man’s World? Challenges and Solu-
tions as Women Take Center Stage in Global Theater (Feb. 27, 2010).
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simply doling out punishments for the perpetrators, monetary repara-
tions would be extremely effective in protecting the victims from the
total and complete loss of housing or support.203 Because victims who
go public with their stories often are disowned by their patriarchally-
headed families,204 basic and necessary requirements to live become
impossible to achieve.
Access to health care in Rwanda should also become a part of the
damages model, as many of those attacked contracted HIV and have
no financial means to care for themselves.205 To enable the creation of
an adequate model of healing for victims of rape in Rwanda, the inter-
national community needs to provide funds to the impoverished nation.
While there generally is widespread international support for post-
conflict constitution-building,206 there is generally little tangible
support and relief.
With a worldwide recognition of rape as an act of genocide comes
the obligation to put force behind the notion, through both legal recog-
nition and financial aid. Without any force behind Akayesu’s recogni-
tion of rape as a war crime and the momentous mark it created for
women’s rights, the decision will stand for nothing.
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Every year, the United States grants political asylum to refugees
who have fled their countries because of persecution.1 Women and
children make up the majority of the world’s refugees.2 Often the first
victims of political and social turmoil, women are forced to flee their
homes to escape gender-related abuses such as rape, beatings, torture,
and sexual harassment.3 Furthermore, in societies fueled by social and
political instability, victims of gender-persecution are often left with
little recourse.4
Until recently, women’s asylum claims relating to such abuses
have been largely ignored under both the United States Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.5 In an attempt to extend “more
1. Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Refugees & Asylum” hyperlink;
then follow “Asylum” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
2. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625, 626 & n.1 (1993) (noting that “75 percent of refugees and
displaced persons are women and young children” (citing Susan Forbes Martin, Issues in
Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, Division for the Advancement of
Women/UNOV, 1, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/1990/WP.1 (1990))).
3. Id. at 626.
4. Id. at 626-27.
5. Id. The INA is the statutory mechanism under which the Attorney General may
grant political asylum to applicants that satisfy the INA’s definition of “refugee.” INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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meaningful protection” to women refugees,6 the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees published its Guidelines on the Protection
of Refugee Women, which emphasized the need for states to recognize
gender-based asylum claims.7
In recent years, “[n]ew paths have been forged in the recognition
of women’s asylum claims based on forms of persecution that are
gender-based.” 8 In 1995, the United States Immigration & Natural-
ization Services (INS) issued new guidelines that formally recognized
“gender-based persecution” as a valid ground for relief under U.S.
asylum law.9 To qualify for asylum, women filing gender-based asylum
claims must show that they cannot return to their country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion . . . .”10
Although the INS issued these guidelines for evaluating women’s
asylum claims, there remains no “‘bright line’ test” to determine
whether a petitioner qualifies as a refugee under the INA.11 More
notably, by failing to make a distinction between male and female
applicants, the statutory definition of “refugee” under the INA
purports to remain gender-neutral.12 This Note will argue that the
failure to enumerate gender-specific provisions under the INA,
deprives bona fide female asylum applicants of the “special protec-
tion needs” reflective of gender-persecution.13
Part I of this Note will discuss the basic asylum claim: what must
be proven to qualify as a “refugee” under the INA statutory definition.
6. Kelly, supra note 2, at 659.
7. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,
¶ 55, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (July 1991) [hereinafter Guidelines] (“Protection from sexual
discrimination is a basic right of all women and is enshrined in a number of international
declarations and conventions. While the universal right to freedom from discrimination on
grounds of sex is recognized, and discrimination can constitute persecution under certain
circumstances, the dividing line between discrimination and persecution is not a clear one.”).
8. SANA LOUE, IMMIGRATION LAW AND HEALTH: PATIENTS AND PROVIDERS § 10:46 (1993).
9. INS Publishes Gender Persecution Guidelines, 72 no. 22 INTERPRETER RELEASES
771, 771 (1995) [hereinafter Persecution Guidelines].
10. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Note that gender-based asylum
claims do not only apply to women. See LOUE, supra note 8, § 10:46 (noting that asylum was
granted to a Jordanian man who feared he would become the victim of an “honor killing”
due to his sexual, “non-marital” relationship with a Jordanian female).
11. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to Immigration and Naturalization Service Asylum Officers, 
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women 8 (May 26,
1995) [hereinafter INS Memorandum] (on file with the U.S. Department of State).
12. Kelly, supra note 2, at 627.
13. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 3 (“In addition to these basic needs shared with all ref-
ugees, refugee women and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender: they
need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and physical abuse and exploit-
ation, and protection against sexual discrimination in the delivery of goods and services.”).
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Part II will discuss the framework for evaluating gender-based asylum
cases, including the standards set by the 1995 INS Guidelines. Part III
will explore how these standards have been applied by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the United States federal courts.
Part IV will argue that a successful asylum case turns on how the
adjudicating body interprets the term “persecution.” To qualify for
asylum, an applicant must prove that they have been “persecuted” or
face “persecution” as defined under the INA. Although the INS has
recognized that forms of “severe sexual violence” such as rape, sexual
abuse, and genital mutilation may constitute persecution, case law
has shown that the BIA and federal courts have interpreted these
harms disparately.14 A finding of persecution in the context of gender-
based claims is determinant on the specific facts of the case, which
court hears the claim, and even in some cases, what judge hears the
case.15 This Note will argue that to foster more consistency and
predictability in the adjudication of women’s asylum claims, there
must be an amendment to the INA definition of “refugee.”
Part V will propose an amendment to the definition of “refugee”
under INA § 101(a)(42), whereby gender-based persecution in the form
of rape, torture, and sexual assault will be identified in the statute as
a form of persecution. The proposed amendment will mirror a recent
amendment to the INA, which recognizes forced sterilization or forced
abortion as a form of persecution.16
I. THE ASYLUM CLAIM
Under the INA, the term “refugee” means:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion . . . .17
14. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
15. See infra Part IV (discussing the idea of asylum as “Refugee Roulette”).
16. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (“For purposes of determinations
under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such
a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion . . . .”).
17. Id.
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To qualify as a “refugee” under the statutory definition, an app-
licant must establish that they have a “well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.”18 An applicant may meet this burden by showing that they have
been persecuted in the past, or have a “well-founded fear of future
persecution,” 19 and that the persecution is “on account of” one of the
five statutory grounds enumerated in the INA.20 Furthermore, “an
alien must establish . . . that he personally would be singled out for
persecution on account of one of these statutory factors, or that there
is a reasonable possibility of such persecution.” 21
An applicant must also demonstrate that there is “no recourse to
state protection.” 22 Asylum will not be granted where the applicant
has been given refuge elsewhere or may avoid harm by relocating to
another part of the country.23 Ordinarily, the applicant must also show
that the “feared persecution” will be carried out by the government or
by a party the government is “unwilling or unable to control.”24
A. What is “Persecution”?
In all asylum cases, the adjudicating officer or court must deter-
mine whether the harm suffered or feared is “serious enough” to be
considered “persecution.”25 The more important question then
becomes: what is “persecution”? Although there is no universally
accepted definition of the term, and attempts to formulate such a
definition have not proven successful,26 the UNHCR’s Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status states that “a
threat to life” or “[o]ther serious violations of human rights” always
constitute persecution.27
The BIA has interpreted persecution to include “a threat to the
life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who
18. Id.
19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2010). The regulations also state that a finding of past
persecution creates a rebuttal presumption that the petitioner also has a “well-founded”
fear of future persecution. Id.
20. Kelly, supra note 2, at 635-36.
21. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986).
22. LOUE, supra note 8, § 10:46.
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii); see also Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution:
Protecting Women Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511, 534 (1993)
(“The refugees’ inability to receive protection from their own government differentiates
refugees from ordinary aliens.” (citation omitted)).
24. Kelly, supra note 2, at 635 (citation omitted).
25. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html [hereinafter Handbook].
27. Id.
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differ in a way regarded as offensive.” 28 The harm or suffering inflicted
includes confinement, torture, and “economic deprivation or restric-
tions so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or
freedom.” 29 Persecution is also found “when there is a difference
between the persecutor’s views or status and that of the victim; it is
oppression which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a
difference that the persecutor will not tolerate.” 30
B. The “On Account” Requirement
In order to qualify as a “refugee,” an applicant must also demon-
strate that the past persecution or “well-founded” fear of persecution
has, or will be imposed “on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 31 The
phrase “membership in a particular social group,” however, has not
been specifically defined by the INA.32 Some commentators have
pushed for a broad interpretation of the term, arguing that “[t]he
‘social group’ category was meant to be a catch-all which could
include all the bases for and types of persecution which an imaginative
despot might conjure up.” 33
The UNHCR Handbook considers persons with “similar back-
ground[s], habits or social status” to constitute a “ ‘particular social
group.’ ” 34 The BIA, however, has taken a more restrictive approach:
“[P]ersecution on account of membership in a particular social
group” . . . [encompasses] persecution that is directed toward an
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share
a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in
some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as
former military leadership or land ownership. The particular
kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construc-
tion remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it
must be one that the members of the group either cannot change,
28. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985).
29. Id.
30. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985). In determining whether
threats or violence constitute “political persecution,” one may look to the motivation, views,
and political opinion of the persecutor. Id.
31. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 45 (1983); Kelly, supra note 2,
at 647-48 (citation omitted).
34. Handbook, supra note 26, ¶ 77.
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or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences.35
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,36 the Ninth Circuit enunciated a four-
part test to evaluate whether an applicant qualifies as a “refugee”
under the particular social group category.37 An adjudicator must
determine: 1) whether the group identified by the applicant is cog-
nizable as a particular social group; 2) whether the applicant is a
member of that cognizable group; 3) whether the “social group” has in
fact been targeted for persecution; and 4) whether special circum-
stances exist to create per se eligibility for asylum on the basis of mere
membership in that social group.38
In summary, to make a successful claim for asylum, the applicant
must prove persecution “on account” of one of the five statutory
grounds.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS
AND THE 1995 INS GUIDELINES
In 1995, the INS issued new guidelines for evaluating women’s
asylum claims based “wholly or in part on their gender.” 39 The
guidelines, which formally recognized gender-based persecution as a
potential ground for asylum,40 expanded the definition of “refugee” to
include those fleeing “gender-based persecution.”41 The Guidelines also
35. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
36. 801 F.2d 1572 (9th Cir. 1986).
37. Id. at 1574-75.
38. Id.; see also Linda A. Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re Kasinga: A Feminist
Perspective on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 319, 329-33 (1996) (discussing In re Kasinga). Fauziya Kasinga, a nineteen-
year-old native of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe sought asylum
in the U.S. to escape forced female genital mutilation (FGM). Malone, supra note 38, at
329. In evaluating her claim, the BIA relied heavily on the 1995 INS gender guidelines.
Id. 331-32. “[T]he opinion addresse[d]: (1) female genital mutilation as persecution; (2)
definition of the ‘social group;’ and (3) the applicant’s fear of persecution ‘on account of ’
membership in that group.” Id. at 332. The court found that Kasinga belonged to a
cognizable social group: “ ‘[y]oung women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.’ ” Id. at 333 (quoting
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 13-14 (B.I.A. 1996)).
39. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1. The guidelines were addressed to all INS
asylum officers. Id.
40. Persecution Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771. Through the INS Memorandum, the
United States became the second country after Canada to adopt “formal guidelines”
recognizing gender-persecution as a legitimate ground for asylum relief. Id.
41. See Cipriani, supra note 23, at 535 (“ ‘Governments should recognize as forms of
persecution, leading to the granting of refugee status, social and institutionalized forms of
oppression of women which contravene international judicial standards and constitute
violation of human rights, and should take measures to bring this to public attention.’”
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sought to address the need for more accurate and consistent decisions
in asylum cases brought by women:42 “[t]his guidance will serve as a
useful tool for new Asylum Officers, and will help to ensure uniformity
and consistency in procedures and decisions.”43 Following the adoption
of the guidelines, the BIA and federal courts have relied heavily on its
provisions to adjudicate asylum claims brought by women.44
The guidelines: “(1) review the historical and human rights
context in which guidance on gender-related adjudications has evolved
internationally; (2) emphasize the importance of creating a ‘customer-
friendly’ asylum interview environment . . . and (3) describe how such
claims should be analyzed within the framework of U.S. law.” 45
They state that gender-based claims must be viewed within the
framework of existing international human rights instruments that
advocate the principle that “women’s rights are human rights.”46 The
guidelines cite to relevant authority such as the 1993 U.N. Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which recognizes such
violence as “a per se violation of human rights,”47 and the UNHCR-
adopted Conclusion No. 73 on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence,
which emphasizes that “asylum seekers who may have suffered sexual
violence be treated with particular sensitivity.”48
The guidelines also propose several procedural considerations for
asylum officers. The INS states, “[a]lthough women applicants fre-
quently present asylum claims for reasons similar to male applicants,
they may also have had experiences that are particular to their
gender,” which may be analyzed under one or more grounds.49 They
(quoting NANCY IRIS, REFUGEE WOMEN: IN 1985, NO LONGER THE ‘FORGOTTEN MAJORITY,’
1986 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 32, 33)).
42. Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women
Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 568-69 (1993); see also Persecution
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771 (“[T]he guidelines represent a ‘huge shift in the commit-
ment of the INS to gender-based cases’ and that they will result in more accurate decisions
in asylum cases brought by women.” (quoting Michelle Beasley)).
43. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1.
44. See Malone, supra note 38, at 329-34 (discussing In re Kasinga, wherein the BIA
relied on the gender guidelines found in the INS Memorandum to evaluate the petitioner’s
claim on whether she had established persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group).
45. Persecution Guidelines, supra note 9, at 771.
46. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2.
47. Id. (citing World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/DC/1/Add.1
(June 24, 1993)).
48. Id. at 3 (citing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Exec. Comm.
Conclusion No. 73 Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, Report of the 44th Session,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/821 (1993)). The Guidelines also cite to the Canadian Guidelines on
Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, the first formal
recognition of gender-based persecution claims. Id.
49. Id. at 4.
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further state that “rape . . . sexual abuse . . . domestic violence . . . and
genital mutilation are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at
girls and women and they may serve as evidence of past persecution
on account of one or more of the five grounds.” 50
A. “Persecution” as Defined by the INS Guidelines
The guidelines also attempt the formidable task of defining the
term “persecution.” 51 The INS adheres to the INA requirement that an
applicant must prove “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion” on account of one of the five statutory grounds.52 The asylum
officer must also make a finding of “ ‘persecution’ as [the] term is
understood under the relevant international and domestic law.” 53 In
making such a determination, “[s]erious physical harm consistently
has been held to constitute persecution. Rape and other forms of
severe sexual violence clearly can fall within this rule.” 54 Forms of
“severe sexual violence” such as “sexual abuse, rape, infanticide,
genital mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence, and
forced abortion” are also explicitly recognized as possible forms of
persecution.55 The INS, however, states that although such harms
may be imposed because of the victim’s gender, the asylum officer
must assess “whether the specific harm amounts to persecution on
the basis of the general principles” of asylum law.56
In determining whether sexual violence constitutes persecution,
a claim involving “severe sexual violence does not differ analytically
from beatings, torture and other forms of physical violence” associated
with asylum petitions.57 The guidelines state, “[a] determination that
sexual abuse may be serious enough to amount to persecution does not
by itself make out a claim to asylum.” 58 The applicant must still
demonstrate that she has been persecuted or has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a “protected ground.” 59
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8-10.
52. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting INA § 101(a)(42)).
53. Id. Domestic law being the INA, and the reference to international law suggests rele-
vant U.N. Declarations and Conventions regarding human rights and the status of refugees.
54. See id. at 9 (“Salvadoran woman raped and brutalized by an army sergeant who
denounced her as subversive had been ‘persecuted’ within the terms of the Act.” (citing
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987))).
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added) (“[P]ersecution . . . include[s] threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or free-
dom.”); see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (“Generally harsh
conditions shared by many other persons [do] not amount to persecution.”).
57. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 9.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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B. Private Acts as “Persecution”
To establish “persecution,” the petitioner must generally prove
that the harm was inflicted by the government or a non-government
entity that the government is “unable or unwilling to control.” 60
Numerous claims involving instances of rape and sexual abuse, how-
ever, tend to lack a “readily identifiable state actor or group.” 61
Furthermore, petitioners must also establish the motive of their per-
secutors.62 This is particularly difficult to prove in asylum claims
where petitioners lack access to direct evidence.63 This burden
becomes even more difficult when a persecutor is a “private actor.” 64
Some critics argue that rape and similar acts have traditionally been
viewed as “private acts” that are inflicted by “private actors.” 65 Linda
Cipriani argues that, “[i]nternational law has allowed the particular
concerns of women to be ignored because of its structural distinction
between public and private spheres.”66 Furthermore, immigration law
has tended to extend more protection to harms that are “publicly
oriented,” and discounted harms within the “private sphere.” 67
The INS guidelines attempt to clarify this disconnect between
“public versus private acts”: “[i]n the usual case, the government will
be the alleged persecutor. The question may arise, however, whether
an act committed or threatened by a government official was neverthe-
less a purely private one.” 68 Such cases often “involve public officials
60. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The threat of persecution need
not come from the government, but may also come from groups, including anti-government
guerrillas, which the government is ‘unwilling or unable to control.’ ”(citation omitted));
Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990).
61. Kathryn Fanlund, Our Safety or Their Lives? Legislative Changes Impacting
Immigration and the Risks Posed to Immigrant Women, 23 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y
135, 153 (2008) (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 152.
63. See id. (citation omitted) (explaining that most petitioners who have fled their
countries consequently do not have access to direct evidence that could be used to
demonstrate the motive of their persecutors).
64. Id. (citation omitted); see also Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing that Fisher, an Iranian woman, was denied asylum for failing to establish per-
secution on account of her religious or political beliefs). “Persecution requires the govern-
ment actor to inflict suffering on account of an individual’s religious or political beliefs,
race, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. . . Fisher [the applicant]
has the burden of showing the requisite connection between the Iranian government’s
acts and her religious or political beliefs.” Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
65. See Cipriani, supra note 23, at 539-40 (discussing the effects of the public/private
distinction).
66. Id. at 539 (citation omitted); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 625-34 (1991) (noting the concerns with the
public/private distinction).
67. Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based
Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137, 146 (1995).
68. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 16.
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who commit what is commonly seen as a private act.” 69 The guidelines
state that “[i]n such situations adjudicators must determine whether
a reasonable basis exists for regarding the act as a ‘public’ one that
can be attributed to the government or an agent the government is
unable or unwilling to control.” 70 Consequently, petitioners must
frame “private acts” such as rape or sexual abuse in the language of
the “public” sphere.
However, the guidelines recognize that in some cases a persecutor
will not be a state or government actor.71 In this case, “the applicant
must [still] show that the government is unwilling or unable to protect
its citizens” from such harm.72
III. GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION: THE CASE LAW
In all asylum cases, an adjudicator must make a finding of “per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution.” 73 Thus, relevant case
law turns on how the immigration courts, the BIA, and the federal
courts have interpreted the term. Although the INS has recognized
forms of severe gender-violence as persecution,74 the BIA and federal
courts have produced inconsistent judgments that have fostered a lack
of predictability and efficiency in administering these claims. While
adjudicators have extended protections to women asserting gender-
based persecution, they have denied similar protections to others.75
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of persecution in the context of
gender-based asylum claims stands in contrast to the decisions of the
Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits.76
In Lazo-Majano v. INS,77 the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a
Salvadoran woman who had been sexually abused by an army officer




73. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
74. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the INS Guidelines).
75. See In re D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 78 (B.I.A. 1993) (showing the case of a twenty-
seven year-old female and native of Haiti whose application for asylum was approved). The
applicant had worked as a secretary in the government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide and was also the member of a church group that had been formed by President
Aristide. Id. The applicant was gang raped and severely beaten by members of the Haitian
military and claimed that she was targeted for her political opinion and religion. Id. The
BIA found that the applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution “based
on her political opinion and religion if she were returned to Haiti.” Id. at 79. But see
Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding “that there was no nexus
between [the] rape of a Filipino asylum applicant by Marxist guerillas and her imputed
political opinion”).
76. Kelly, supra note 2, at 638.
77. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
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over a period of years.78 The applicant, a domestic worker, had been
subjected to rape, beatings, and threats by the man she worked for,
Sergeant Zuniga, an officer in the Salvadoran armed forces.79 Lazo-
Majano also testified that Zuniga threatened to denounce her to the
military as a “subversive” if she resisted him.80 Lazo-Majano then fled
El Salvador with the hopes of seeking asylum in the United States.81
After an immigration judge denied her asylum claim on grounds that
“the harm she feared was strictly personal and did not constitute
persecution within the Act,” 82 the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision,
holding that the applicant had been persecuted on account of a polit-
ical opinion attributed to her by her persecutor.83 The court stated:
Persecution is stamped on every page of this record. Olimpia has
been singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured, raped, and en-
slaved. . . . The persecution has been conducted by a member of
the Armed Force, a military power that exercises domination over
much of El Salvador despite the staunchest efforts of the Duarte
government to restrain it.84
Conversely, in Gomez v. INS,85 the Second Circuit upheld a denial
of asylum to Carmen Gomez, a Salvadoran native, on grounds that she
did not present the evidence necessary to establish that she possessed
a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group . . . .” 86 The petitioner testified that “[b]etween the ages of
twelve and fourteen, [she] . . . was raped and beaten by [Salvadoran]
guerilla forces on five separate occasions.” 87 Gomez stated “that on
each of the five occasions, the guerillas threatened her life and
vandalized her home.” 88 Gomez contended that “by virtue of these
prior attacks she became a member of a social group, i.e., women
who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran
guerillas.” 89 She thus claimed to possess a well-founded fear of
78. Id. at 1433-34, 1436.
79. Id. at 1433.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1433-34.
82. Kelly, supra note 2, at 637 (citation omitted).
83. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 638 (“[T]he Court
also found that Sergeant Zuniga expressed an opinion regarding the nature of power
between men and women in his treatment of Ms. Lazo-Majano. Through her flight, Ms.
Lazo-Majano expressed the political opinion that men do not have the right to dominate
women.” (citation omitted)).
84. Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434.
85. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 664.
87. Id. at 662.
88. Id.; Kandt, supra note 67, at 145 (citation omitted).
89. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663-64.
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persecution based on her membership in this “discrete group.” 90 In
reaching its holding, the court reasoned that:
A particular social group is comprised of individuals who possess
some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of
the outside world in general. . . . Like the traits which distinguish
the other four enumerated categories—race, religion, nationality
and political opinion—the attributes of a particular social group
must be recognizable and discrete. Possession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group.91
The court found that Gomez had failed to show that future
persecutors would be able to identify members of this purported social
group and, thus, would not be capable of singling out individuals such
as Gomez.92 The court stated, “[w]e cannot . . . find that Gomez has
demonstrated that she is more likely to be persecuted than any other
young woman.” 93 Accordingly, the court found that because she
could not establish that guerilla forces were inclined to target her
based on her membership in this social group, she had not proven her
case for asylum.94
Although both petitioners from El Salvador, Lazo-Majano and
Gomez, complained of past instances of rape and sexual abuse by
authoritarian figures, the court in Gomez found that the petitioner had
failed to show that she had been persecuted within the terms of the
Act.95 The court in Lazo-Majano, however, found that the petitioner
had been individually targeted on account of a political opinion attri-
buted to her by her persecutor.96
Similarly, in Campos-Guardado v. INS,97 the Fifth Circuit upheld
a denial of asylum to Sofia Campos-Guardado, a  Salvadoran woman




94. Id. at 663, 664.
[A w]ell-founded fear consists of both a subjective and an objective
component. . . . To satisfy the objective component, the applicant for asylum
must submit documentary evidence or testimony alleging specific facts from
which it can be inferred that he or she may be singled out for persecution on
the basis [of one of the five statutory grounds].
Id. at 664.
95. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 662, 664 (“[T]he INS argues that regardless of Gomez’ tragic
encounters in El Salvador, she has failed to prove that she is a refugee, i.e., that her fear
of future persecution is based on her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or member-
ship in a particular social group, and thus she failed to qualify for political asylum or
withholding of deportation.”).
96. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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who had been violently raped after witnessing the politically moti-
vated murders of her family members.98 Campos-Guardado testified
that her family members, who were active in the agrarian land reform
movement in El Salvador, were attacked by armed locals.99 The
applicant was forced to watch while her uncle and male cousins were
hacked to death with machetes.100 The applicant and her female
cousins were then raped while a woman who was with the attackers
chanted political slogans.101
Campos-Guardado sought asylum on grounds that the rape was
inflicted on account of the political opinion of her family members that
was imputed to her.102 The court upheld the denial of her asylum on
grounds that the applicant “failed to establish that the rape was
motivated by a desire to harm her because of a political opinion that
she possessed or was believed to possess, and that subsequent threats
by her rapist were personal rather than political.” 103
In Klawitter v. INS,104 the Sixth Circuit denied political asylum to
a Polish woman who had been blacklisted for refusing to join the
Communist Party and was subsequently sexually assaulted by a
colonel in the Polish secret police.105 Klawitter testified that upon
returning from a five month visit to the United States, she was called
on several occasions to appear before the Polish secret police and was
harshly interrogated and threatened by the colonel.106 The court, how-
ever, found that the colonel’s actions were a result of his “personal
interest” in the applicant, rather than “any interest on his part to ‘per-
secute’ her.” 107 Consequently, such acts did not constitute “persecu-
tion” within the meaning of the INA.108 The court reasoned that:
98. Id. at 286, 291.
99. Id. at 287.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 288.
103. Kelly, supra note 2, at 639 (internal citation omitted). But see Arteaga v. INS, 836
F.2d 1227, 1227-31 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting asylum to a Salvadoran man who had a “well-
founded fear” of persecution). In Arteaga, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a
Salvadoran man following a visit by several of his old friends to his house a few years
earlier. Id. at 1228. Arteaga claimed that his friends, who were now part of the guerilla
insurgency that sought to start a civil war against the government, threatened that if the
petitioner remained neutral, they would be out to get him. Id. The court found that this
threat established a “well-founded fear” of persecution supported by the fact that the verbal
threat was directed at Arteaga, and his identity and residence were known by the guerillas.
Id. at 1233.
104. 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 150-51. Petitioner alleged that the Polish secret police colonel forced himself
on her and used violence against her while threatening to destroy her career. Id. She feared
his position of authority and power in Poland. Id.
106. Id. at 150.
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id. (finding that Niedzwiecki “persistently sought her out” because he found her
attractive and that he “simply was reacting to her repeated refusals to become intimate
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However distasteful his apparent treatment of the respondent
may have been, such harm or threats arising from a personal
dispute of this nature, even one taking place with an individual
in a high governmental position, is not a ground for asylum. . . .
[A]lthough petitioner’s testimony recounts an unfortunate
situation, harm or threats of harm based solely on sexual attrac-
tion do not constitute “persecution” under the Act.109
Despite the fact that the petitioner’s initial contact with the
colonel arose from her refusal to join the Communist Party (a political
act), the court failed to find a nexus between her political opinion and
the resulting harm.110 Furthermore, although the petitioner was
sexually assaulted by a high ranking official, the court concluded that
these acts merely manifested the official’s personal sexual desires
and did not stem from any political conflict.111
The Klawitter decision highlights the distinction courts place
between acts that are perceived as “public” and those perceived as
“private.”112 Consequently, acts found to be within the private sphere,”
such as sexual offenses are often not seen as “persecution.” 113 Nancy
Kelly argues that such “cases reflect the lack of a cohesive framework
within which to evaluate the gender-related claims of women.” 114
Although “[e]ach case raised a claim based on political opinion or
imputed opinion,” the courts made disparate determinations of when
“persecution” existed.115
IV. “REFUGEE ROULETTE” 116
On May 21, 2009, a San Francisco immigration judge granted
political asylum to Philip Belarmino, a forty-three-year-old English
Professor from the Philippines, who claimed that he feared persecution
with him”).
109. Id.
110. Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152.
111. Id.
112. INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 17.
113. Kandt, supra note 67, at 151.
114. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 640 (“While arriving at contradictory results, neither
the Campos-Guardado court nor the Klawitter court attempted to reconcile their
decisions with the Lazo-Majano decision or to elaborate principles for determining when
gender-specific persecution will be considered politically-motivated.” (internal citations
omitted)).
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (discussing the chance of being granted asylum
as a game of “Refugee Roulette”). The term “refugee roulette” refers to the concept that
one’s chance of being granted asylum is just as random as a game of Russian roulette—a
game of probability and luck. Id. at 296.
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in his home country because of his sexual orientation.117 Belarmino,
who was repeatedly subjected to rape and sexual abuse, fled the
Philippines to seek refuge in the United States.118 Belarmino testified
that due to the corrupt nature of the Philippine police, the State would
be unable to protect him from such harms.119 In this momentous case,
the immigration judge found that Belarmino possessed a “well-
founded fear” of persecution based on his “ ‘membership in a particular
social group’ ”: a homosexual in the Philippines.120
Eight years before Belarmino’s case, however, a San Francisco
immigration court rejected Jose Patricio Boer-Sedano’s (a Mexican
national) petition for asylum on grounds that “he failed to establish
past persecution on account of a protected basis.” 121 Although the
petitioner testified that he was sexually assaulted at gun point by a
“ ‘high-ranking police officer’ ” on nine separate occasions,122 the
immigration judge concluded that “the sex acts that Boer-Sedano was
forced to perform by the police officer were simply ‘a personal problem’
he had with this officer.” 123 The language used by the immigration
judge in this case reflects the tension between acts that are deemed
“public” and those that are held to be “private.” 124
After appealing this decision to the BIA, the Ninth Circuit in
Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales held that the immigration judge erred in
ruling that the petitioner failed to establish that he had been perse-
cuted within the terms of the Act.125 The court stated, “[w]hether
117. Rodel Rodis, Gay Filipino Gets Asylum in Historic US Case, GLOBAL NATION,





121. Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1085-87 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
immigration judge denied Boer-Sedano’s petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture).
122. Id. at 1086. Boer-Sedano testified that after his first encounter with the police
officer, over the next three months, the police officer targeted him on nine separate
occasions, ordering the petitioner into his official police car and forcing him to perform oral
sex on him. Id. On one occasion, the police officer put a gun to his head with a single bullet
in the chamber and began to play a game of Russian Roulette. Id.
123. Id. at 1087. The immigration judge “further concluded that the petitioner had not
established a well-founded fear of persecution because ‘he was not subject to systematic
persecution which prevented him from living his chosen life style . . . .’ ” Id.
124. See supra Part III (discussing Klawitter v. INS and noting that gender crimes such
as rape and sexual assault are often viewed as consequences of an attacker’s personal
sexual desires). In this case, despite the fact that Boer-Sedano was abused by a state
official, the immigration judge found that these acts were “simply a personal problem” that
could not be attributed to his membership in a particular social group. Boer-Sedano, 418
F.3d at 1087.
125. Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1088 (holding that the immigration judge “erred as a
matter of law by concluding that Boer-Sedano had not been persecuted”). The court found
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particular acts constitute persecution for asylum purposes is a legal
question . . . . We have held that sexual assault, including forced oral
sex, may constitute persecution. Therefore, there can be no doubt that
the nine sex acts that Boer-Sedano was forced to perform rise to the
level of persecution.” 126
The court further stated, “ ‘[w]e have [also] consistently held that
death threats alone can constitute persecution.’ The IJ’s [immigration
judge’s] minimization of the death threat Boer-Sedano received from
the police officer may account for her failure to recognize that he
suffered persecution.” 127 The court also found that because the peti-
tioner had “established past persecution, he [was] presumed to have
a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 128
Although both petitioners complained of similar instances of
sexual assault, their presiding immigration judges came to disparate
conclusions as to whether these acts amounted to “persecution.” 129
Immigration attorney Rodel Rodis argues, “[t]he difference in the
immigration judges’ contrasting decision in the cases of Belarmino and
Boer-Sedano also show that applying for political asylum is like
playing Russian roulette—land the right judge and you win, land the
wrong judge and you lose.” 130
The concept that asylum adjudication operates like a game of
Russian Roulette can be attributed to an influential article entitled,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication.131 According to
the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United
States received about 49,000 applications for asylum in 2008 alone.132
Of those applications, 22,930 petitions for asylum were granted.133 The
authors of Refugee Roulette argue that “in asylum cases . . . the
outcome apparently depends in large measure on which government
official decides the claim.” 134 They argue that “[i]n many cases, the
most important moment in an asylum case is the instant in which
that the immigration judge further erred by rejecting petitioner’s claim that he was
persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group by concluding that
“homosexual men in Mexico could not form the basis of a social group.” Id.
126. Id. at 1088 (internal citations omitted).
127. Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. Rodis, supra note 117.
131. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
132. Krista Gesaman, Desperately Seeking Freedom: Are the Number of Immigrants
Seeking Asylum Over Sexual-Orientation Discrimination Increasing?, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
30, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/11/29/desperately-seeking-freedom.html.
133. Id.
134. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
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a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular asylum
officer or immigration judge.” 135
The 2007 study analyzed databases of asylum decisions from four
levels of the adjudication process, including decisions administered by
884 asylum officers over a period of 7 years, 225 immigration judges
over a period of 4.5 years, 126,000 decisions of the BIA over a period
of 6 years, and 4215 decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals in 2004
and 2005.136
The authors contend that their analysis of these figures reveals
discerning disparities in asylum grant rates:
Given our national desire for equal treatment in adjudication, one
would expect to find in this system for the mass production of
justice many indicators demonstrating a strong degree of unifor-
mity of decision making over place and time. Yet in the very large
volume of adjudications involving foreign nationals’ applications
for protection from persecution . . . we see a great deal of statis-
tical variation in the outcomes pronounced by decision makers. The
statistics that we have collected and analyzed . . . suggest that in
the world of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in
decision making from one official to the next, from one office to the
next, from one region to the next, from one Court of Appeals to the
next, and from one year to the next, even during periods where
there has been no intervening change in the law.137
They argue that the decision whether to grant a petitioner asylum
relief may be determined by which court or official presides over the
matter, as much as it is by the facts and law of the case.138 The study
revealed for example, that “Colombian asylum applicants whose cases
135. Id.; see also Rodis, supra note 117 (discussing a case involving two Egyptian male
lovers who filed for asylum in 2001). Because the two men were not married they could not
file their applications jointly. Id. In filing separately, they were ordered to appear before
two different judges in the same court. Id. The immigration judge for the first petitioner,
known for denying ninety percent of asylum claims that came before him, denied the
petitioner’s application for withholding of removal. Id. However, the second petitioner
who was assigned to a more “liberal” judge was granted discretionary relief for withholding
of removal. Id. Although both men filed almost identical claims alleging harassment,
beatings, hospitalization, and the lack of police response, they received different fates. Id.
136. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
137. Id. at 302. The authors argue that “[t]he very essence of the rule of law, embodied
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that individual cases should be
disposed of by reference to standardized norms rather than by arbitrary factors, partic-
ularly the personal biases, attitudes, policies, or ideologies of government adjudicators.” Id.
at 299-300.
138. See id. at 302 (arguing that the fact that the outcome of an asylum case is heavily
influenced by the identity of the adjudicator is “particularly discomfiting [sic] in asylum
cases,” where such a decision will ultimately lead to the deportation of an individual who
may face grave danger upon returning to their home country).
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were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5%
chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges and an 88% chance
of prevailing before another judge in the same building.” 139 Similarly,
“a Chinese asylum seeker unlucky enough to have her case heard
before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on
her claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.” 140
The authors argue that a petitioner’s potential for success on an
asylum claim is affected not only by one’s assignment to a particular
immigration judge, but also by the gender of the immigration judge,
and his or her past work experience.141 In conclusion, they suggest
several solutions to this problem, such as “more comprehensive
training, more effective and independent appellate review, and other
reforms that would further professionalize the adjudication system.”142
Although the authors make a strong argument about the appar-
ent discrepancies in asylum grant rates, this Note argues that in the
context of asylum law, there lies a larger issue. Illustrated by cases
like Lazo-Majano v. INS and Campos-Guardardo v. INS,143 a decision
whether to grant asylum often centers around a finding of “persecu-
tion.” Such a finding typically turns on whether a specific act is identi-
fied as “persecution” by the adjudicating body.
In Lazo-Majano, the Ninth Circuit held that instances of rape and
sexual abuse by an army official constituted “persecution” on account
of a political opinion attributed to the petitioner by her persecutor.144
However, in Campos-Guardado, the Fifth Circuit found that the rape
of and subsequent threats to the petitioner by politically motivated
actors did not constitute “persecution,” and were merely personal acts
instituted against her.145
These decisions demonstrate that the standards employed to
evaluate asylum claims have been applied inconsistently, and have
thus created a system that lacks cohesion and predictability. In the
context of gender-based persecution claims, the lack of guidance as to
what definitively constitutes “persecution” has left the term open to
different levels of interpretation. One would hope that in the context
of criminal law, experienced judges would not need “more comprehen-
sive training” in order to make consistent determinations of the law.
139. Id. at 296 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 329 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 296.
142. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 116, at 296.
143. See supra Part III (discussing both cases).
144. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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V. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO INA § 101(A)(42): QUALIFYING THE
TERM “REFUGEE”
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees has recog-
nized the importance of extending greater protection to victims of
gender-based persecution.146 The 1991 UNHCR Guidelines state: “[i]n
addition to these basic needs shared with all refugees, refugee women
and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender: they
need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and phy-
sical abuse and exploitation . . . .” 147 The United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly known as the INS,148 has
also recognized these special protection needs of women refugees
through the 1995 INS Guidelines.149
From the case law, however, it is palpable that asylum adjudica-
tors have an unrestrained freedom to interpret whether gender-based
harms satisfy the INA definition of “persecution.” These guidelines are
only guidelines. They are yet to be integrated into the immigration law
or federal regulations. Therefore, adjudicators may look to these
guidelines when evaluating gender-based persecution claims, but they
are not bound by them.
Furthermore, the statutory definition of “refugee” under the INA
remains gender neutral. This Note argues that in order to realize
these “special protection needs” of women and girls, there must be an
amendment to the INA definition of “refugee,” whereby gender-based
harms such as rape, and sexual and physical abuse are formally iden-
tified in the statute as a form of persecution. Through such an amend-
ment, adjudicators will be increasingly bound to interpret these crimes
against women as persecution and not merely private sexual acts.150
Such an amendment, as applied, should however be limited to
bona fide asylum petitioners and be evaluated according to the general
principles of asylum law. An asylum applicant must still make a show-
ing that they have been persecuted in the past or have a “well-founded”
fear of future persecution “on account of ” one of the five statutory
grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 151 An applicant must also still show
146. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 4.
147. Id. ¶ 3.
148. Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011).
149. See INS Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1 (declaring that the purpose of the 1995
Guidelines was to enhance the understanding of and sensitivity to gender-related
asylum issues).
150. See Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the rape of the
applicant was a “private” act not subject to asylum protection).
151. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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that the gender-persecution was or will be carried out by a govern-
ment actor or by a party that the government is “ ‘unwilling or unable
to control.’ ” 152
A. The 1996 Amendment
In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to the definition of “ref-
ugee” under INA § 101(a)(42).153 This amendment formally recognized
that a threat of forced abortion or involuntary sterilization constituted
a per se form of persecution.154 The amendment, which was driven by
domestic outrage against China’s One-Child Policy, sought to target
the abuses that resulted from the enforcement of this population
control program.155 In an effort to control the country’s expanding popu-
lation, China’s One-Child Policy “encourages” couples to limit child-
bearing to one child.156
In Matter of Chang,157 the BIA denied asylum to an applicant who
claimed that he would be forced to undergo involuntary sterilization
as a result of China’s repressive policy.158 The BIA found that the “one
couple, one child” policy was not “on its face persecutive” and thus the
applicant could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution as
defined by the statute.159
However, in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll,160 a federal judge reversed
the denial of asylum to a Chinese petitioner who had fled the country
to avoid imprisonment and involuntary sterilization.161 The court
held that “[i]nvoluntary sterilization, in particular, has been viewed
as an egregious infringement on the fundamental right to procre-
ate,” and that the petitioner’s refusal to comply with the One-Child
Policy “constitute[d] a ‘political opinion.’ ” 162
152. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
153. Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum in




156. Laura Fitzpatrick, A Brief History of China’s One-Child Policy, TIME, July 27,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1912861,00.html. The
One-Child Policy relies on a policy of “sticks and carrots,” where couples are rewarded
for limiting childbearing. Id. Couples, however, are fined for having a “supernumerary”
child without a permit from the Chinese government. Id. Reports of forced abortions and
sterilization of women by officials are, however, commonplace. Id.
157. 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
158. Id. at 39.
159. Id. at 43.
160. 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994).
161. Id. at 873-74.
162. Id. at 872 (citation omitted).
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The 1996 Amendment thus sought to create consistency in the
adjudication of asylum claims involving forced abortion and steriliza-
tion. Michelle Chen states, “[c]larifying a longstanding legal gray area,
the statute granted asylum status to women who had been forced to
have an abortion or had been sterilized . . . .” 163 In further qualifying
the definition of “refugee,” the Amendment states:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive popu-
lation control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on
account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall
be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion.164
The language of the statute specifically enumerates that a person
who is forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary steriliza-
tion, or fears that they will be forced to undergo such a procedure, has
established per se persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on
account of their political opinion.165 It follows that this amendment has
facilitated more consistent decision-making, which in turn has affor-
ded greater protection to Chinese asylum claimants.166
B. A New Amendment: Qualifying Gender-Based Harms
This Note proposes a similar amendment to the current definition
of “refugee” found in INA § 101(a)(2). The proposed amendment should
state that persons who have suffered severe sexual or physical harm
or have a well-founded fear of suffering such harm at the hands of the
government or an actor the government is unable to control, have
established per se persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.
The petitioner must nevertheless show that the resulting persecution
can be imputed to one of the five protected grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Although this Note argues for an amendment similar to the 1996
Amendment, the concerns regarding immeasurable access to asylum
relief posed by China’s One-Child Policy are not applicable in this
163. Chen, supra note 153.
164. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2006).
165. Id.
166. Chen, supra note 153 (“[P]ersecution under Chinese family-planning laws is a
uniquely convenient basis for an asylum claim.”).
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context. Critics argue that because China’s One-Child Policy is “uni-
versally” applied, the amendment has “opened the flood gates,” so
to speak, to “any Chinese citizen who has faced the legal consequences
of having or trying to have more than one child.” 167 In 2003, USCIS
received more than 14,000 new Chinese asylum claims.168 The State
Department estimated that about half of the Chinese asylum petitions
involved China’s family-planning laws.169
China’s family-planning laws, however, are advocated as a uni-
formly applied policy that applies to all men and women in China.
Gender-based sexual harms such as rape and sexual assault on the
other hand are inflicted on individuals by their persecutors. To make
a successful claim for asylum, a petitioner must show that they were
individually targeted by their persecutor on account of one of the five
statutory bases.170 Thus, the threat of extending too much protection
to women and girls who suffer sexual and physical abuse is lacking.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, domestic and international bodies have recog-
nized the compelling need to extend more meaningful protection to
women refugees and victims of gender-based persecution. As previ-
ously mentioned, women and children represent the majority of the
world’s displaced refugees.171 The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees has declared that women and children need special
protection from harms that are reflective of their gender.172 Often left
with little recourse to the state, these victims are unable to protect
themselves from gender-based sexual and physical abuse harms.173
The Rome Statute, the treaty which formally established the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, declares that sexual
slavery, forced prostitution, rape, and other forms of grave sexual
violence constitute crimes against humanity.174 These acts have also
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting the petitioner did not
present evidence of persecution on account of one of the five bases).
171. Kelly, supra note 2, at 625.
172. Guidelines, supra note 7, ¶ 3.
173. Persecutors often represent members of the police, armed forces, and
authoritarian figures. Many victims are also citizens of countries that lack the capability
or enthusiasm to pursue complaints of such abuse. See supra Part III (discussing asylum
cases where persecution was claimed).
174. WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AD DOC TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE & THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 8 (2005), http://www.iccwomen.org
/publications/resources/docs/Overview_Sexual_Violence_and_International_Criminal_
Law.pdf (prepared by Angela M. Banks).
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been prosecuted by the ICC as war crimes.175 It is evident that these
are serious harms that warrant protection from the international
community.
Although the 1995 INS Guidelines and relevant case law have
achieved some greater protection for women refugees, there remains
a lack of consistency and predictability in the adjudication of gender-
based asylum claims. By specifically recognizing these harms as forms
of persecution, adjudicators would no longer have the unrestrained
power to determine whether one act of rape is sufficiently “persecu-
tion” and another similar instance lacks the muster. As previously dis-
cussed, a successful asylum claim turns on how the term “persecution”
is interpreted.176
In cases like Klawitter v. INS, the Sixth Circuit interpreted such
harms within the context of the “private sphere,” where sexual crimes
do not warrant protection from international governments.177 How-
ever, in Lazo-Majano v. INS, the Ninth Circuit rejected the view that
rape conducted by an army officer was a “ ‘strictly personal’ ” harm that
did “ ‘not constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act.’ ” 178
By formally identifying such instances of rape and sexual violence
as forms of “persecution,” the proposed amendment would likely facili-
tate more uniformity in the adjudication of these claims. This amend-
ment would hopefully create greater protection to the women and
children that are victims of these atrocities.
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